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Rabbinic law is particularly well known for its use of legal dodges and technical 
circumventions. This dissertation focuses on three main questions about such loopholes: 1) Why 
is rabbinic law so replete with them? 2) Are they always permitted, and if not, what are the 
parameters of their use? 3) What does the use of legal loopholes reveal about rabbinic views of 
the relationship between intention and action? 
We attempt to answer these questions by analyzing a particular subset of rabbinic legal 
loopholes known as ha‘arama (cunning).  Tracing the history and use of ha‘arama from 
tannaitic to amoraic sources, this work places rabbinic legal loopholes in context of Biblical and 
Ancient Near Eastern worldviews, Greco-Roman perspectives, and later contemporaneous 
Zoroastrian approaches. Working with both tannaitic and amoraic materials, with Palestinian and 
Babylonian sources, we observe a progression within rabbinic thinking on this front: from rigid 
legal formalism to a concern for the inner spirit of the law, and from emphasis on the inner spirit 
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Designed to frustrate the intentions of a law while preserving its letter, legal dodges are 
as old as law itself. They are in evidence in the Bible and other Ancient Near Eastern corpora. 
Yet the rabbis of Antiquity and their Roman counterparts must be credited with beginning to 
discern which circumventions may be considered licit, and which illicit.  Rabbinic law contains 
innumerable legal circumventions.  And while there is no term for the category of rabbinic 
loophole as a whole, there is a term which is used in several dozen cases of such 
technicalities: הערמה (and its active forms: מערימים, מעירימין, יערים, תערים, הערים, etc.). The term 
itself literally means “cunning” from the Hebrew root ‘.r.m., playing off the Biblical use of the 
term for both positive resourcefulness and negative chicanery.   And while all instances of הערמה 
involve subtlety, some are viewed negatively, while others are permitted or even encouraged. 
This dissertation analyzes the use of the term ha‘arama in its nominal and active verb forms as it 
evolved within ancient rabbinic literature. 
Though rabbinic literature is indeed full of examples of formalistic mechanisms, there is 
reason to use the term ha’arama specifically for our inquiry. First, terminology generally offers a 
starting point for the vast project of understanding rabbinic approached to legal loopholes. Thus, 
we view this work as the beginning, as a concrete basis for further research. Second, the 
consistent use of this terminology indicates a conscious connection between the disparate cases 
which easily allows for comparison and contrast. Third, ha’arama is categorically interesting in 
that it is by and large is not about evasion of punishment ex post facto, but rather it is a loophole 





consistent with their terminology1 we believe that the majority of cases can help paint a picture: 
by following ha‘arama chronologically and geographically, we are able to paint at least a partial 
portrait of the legal-intellectual development of the rabbinic project. 
 This dissertation is divided into four chapters which comprise two distinct, but 
complementary, sections.  The first two chapters analyze the relationship between ha‘arama and 
legalism, an approach that values adherence to the literal prescriptions of the law as the highest 
priority. In chapter 1, by focusing on individual cases of legal dodges in the Bible and the 
rabbinic commentary thereupon, we reveal that the rabbis did not develop their theory of 
loopholes based on the Bible. In fact, in most cases, the rabbinic material completely ignores 
Biblical precedents for exploiting loopholes. On the other hand, the actual term ha‘arama, 
echoing both the cunning serpent of Genesis and the Wisdom herself in Proverbs, does indeed 
stem from the Bible. In chapter 2, we posit that the rabbis’ inspiration for their schema regarding 
legal dodges stems from Roman law.  We argue for a significant correlation between ha‘arama 
and the Roman legal concept of “legal fraud” (fraus legi) which had taken the Roman legal 
world by storm during the first three centuries of the Common Era. The significance of fraus legi 
is that, for the first time, a legal system would not suffice with rigid formalism, an anything goes 
policy so long as the law was technically followed.  This was part of a larger conversation about 
the letter of the law and its spirit, or ius strictum and aequitas, taking place among Roman jurists. 
The innovation of Roman law in this regard was the recognition that some dodges must 
be rejected. And we find the rabbis of the Palestinian Talmud (PT) following suit; the 
preoccupation in PT is not with permitting ha‘arama but with outlawing those exploitations 
                                                          





which the rabbis deem inappropriate. Furthermore, given the  historical and geographical 
proximity of these two cultures, it is sensible to apply the Roman legal concept of equity, doing 
what the lawgiver would do if he himself were present, as the deciding factor in whether the 
rabbis would allow a particular dodge or not. If ha‘arama is used towards an end disapproved of 
by the law such as profit, or to shirk the law for mere convenience, it must be rejected. If, 
however, it ultimately serves ends of Jewish law2 itself, such as protecting a person from 
financial harm or from transgression not of his/her own doing, it is acceptable and even 
advisable.  While the Mishnah, the Tosefta, and pockets of Midrash Halakha begin moving in 
this direction, it is the Palestinian Talmud which evinces this approach most clearly. Contrary to 
the stereotype, these late antique rabbis were not preoccupied with finding new loopholes, but, 
inspired by fraus legi, were preoccupied with developing an approach about which loopholes to 
close and which to leave open.   
The contextualization of ha‘arama within its Roman milieu puts this dissertation in 
conversation with the work of Boaz Cohen and David Daube, both of whom compared Rabbinic 
and Roman legal phenomena, and the latter of whom was especially intrigued by shared notions 
of loopholes and legal formalism. Moreover, our particular focus on the relationship between 
Roman law and PT follows in the footsteps of the recent work of Catherine Hezser, Peter 
Schafer, Leib Moscovitz, and Hayim Lapin, et al., in this area.   
Beyond placing ha‘arama in its Roman context, we also employ contemporary legal 
theory in order to enrich the discussion. Offering universal constructs that move beyond the 
particular casuistic case of the rabbis’ own world has been the project of many scholars over the 
                                                          






last twenty plus years. Its charge has been led by Bernard Jackson, Suzanne Last Stone, Hanina 
Ben-Menahem, Yair Lorberbaum and others.  This dissertation is a contribution to this incredibly 
active field of comparative jurisprudence. 
Section two of the dissertation, chapters 3 and 4, deal with seems to be a wrinkle in the 
ha‘arama discussion, but actually proves to be a touchstone for a current academic debate about 
rabbinic views of intention. In chapter 3, we propose an interpretation of a type of ha‘arama 
which deals not with action but with intention. We view this variation of ha‘arama as reflecting 
a more externalized and ritualized understanding of intention among the tannaim and early 
amoraim. At present, Ishay Rosen-Tzvi and Mira Balberg, among others,3 are engaged in a 
debate about the rabbis’ views on the subjective self. Based on the consistent coupling of 
intention with action in early rabbinic literature, Rosen-Tzvi challenges Balberg that the rabbis 
did not speak of the contemplative self; Balberg counters that the best way to understand the role 
of individual intention in ritual im/purity law is as encountering the “subjective I.” Based on the 
use of ha‘arama in defining action in Sabbath and Festival law, and its rejection in the realm of 
ritual im/purity law, we conclude that the premise of their argument is mistaken: the question is 
not whether the rabbis conceived of a subjective self but what role it played in different legal 
arenas.  This seems to be the case at least in the early tannaitic and amoraic material. 
In chapter 4, we observe that the Babylonian Talmud (BT) demonstrates more of the 
internal subjectivity perspective across the board, that is, even in cases of Sabbath/Festival law. 
We observe this specifically in BT’s treatment of ha‘arama: a discomfort where actions and 
subjective intentions noticeably do not correspond to one another; shying away from the use of 
                                                          
3 Joshua Levinson, “From narrative practice to cultural poetics: literary anthropology and the rabbinic sense of self,” 





ha‘arama; comparing ha‘arama to sin; using the root ‘.r.m. to refer to lying; and changing 
earlier baraitot so that intentions and actions indeed correspond. This trend begins with the third 
generation of BT amoraim and continues through the redactional layers of BT. We understand 
this as part of the newly refreshed discussion in those late amoraic strata about intention, an 
intention that is qualitatively different from tannaitic versions thereof, more subjective and more 
natural. As in Part 1 of the dissertation, we enrich this discussion by adding the overlay of 
another contemporary theoretical field: in this case, we look to moral theory, specifically to 
virtue ethics, to support the significant difference between act-based morality and agent-based 
morality. 
And so the two parts of the dissertation are indeed distinct: the first regarding one type of 
ha‘arama and its parallel to the Roman notion of fraus legi, the second regarding another type of 
ha‘arama and what it reveals about the role of subjective intention in determining actions. 
However, the two come together as a study in the development of legal thinking from rigid 
Biblical formalism to an understanding of the significance of equity, and ultimately to the import 
of moving beyond law as object to emphasize the legal actor as subject. This development, we 
argue, is impacted along the way by intellectual currents found in surrounding  groups and can 
be traced most obviously from the Palestinian Talmud to the Babylonian Talmud. 
Extant Literature             
Generalizations 
As mentioned above, David Daube takes an interest in formalism within both Biblical 
literature and Roman law, and discusses legal loopholes as part of his studies. He does not, 
however, address the rabbinic material on loopholes in any detailed or systematic manner. And 





loopholes together, regardless of whether the ‘.r.m. is present. For instance, both Haim 
Tchernowitz4 and Moshe Silberg5 connect ha‘arama loopholes to taqqanot such as prosbul, 
which are never labeled ha‘arama. While the phenomena of ha‘arama and some taqqanot may 
be based on similar methodology, by isolating the ‘.r.m. terminology, it is useful to study the 
conscious rabbinic category of loopholes, as we have found that this subset of loopholes to 
specifically parallel the Roman concept of fraus legi. Furthermore, the aforementioned scholars 
do not offer anything close to the diachronic development of rabbinic loopholes. 
Boaz Cohen likewise speaks only in broad strokes and without any longitudinal 
perspective. In his seminal article, “Letter and Spirit in Jewish and Roman Law,” he sets out to 
show that Paul the apostle appropriated a Greco-Roman dichotomy between the letter of the law 
and the spirit of the law. In so doing, he discusses how the rabbis, like their Roman counterparts 
were interested in the spirit of the law as well as its letter. He cites the closing of loopholes6 as 
but one example among many different types of rabbinic concepts that show this same interest. 
He does not isolate the subject of loopholes itself more narrowly or the term ha‘arama in order 




                                                          
4 Haim Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-halakhah: kolel shalshelet ha-Ḳabalah ṿe-hitpathut ha-Torah shebaʻal peh, mi-tokh 
shorasheha ve-ṃeḳoroteha mi-reshitah ʻad ḥatimat ha-Talmud Vol.1 New York: ha-Va‘ad le-hoṣa’at kol kitvei Rav 
Ṣa‘ir (1950) 182-3 
 
5 Moshe Silberg, Kakh darko shel Talmud (Principia Talmudica). Jerusalem: Aqademon (1984) 40-41 
6 Boaz Cohen, “Letter and spirit in Jewish and Roman Law,” Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study. New 
York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America (1966) 45 esp. n. 92. (We only noticed his use of an example of 
ha‘arama proper in his footnotes after theorizing about the relationship between the Palestinian Talmud and Roman 





Legal Fictions vs. Legal Loopholes 
The paucity of material on legal loopholes is easily contrasted with the more recent work 
by scholars on legal fiction.7  Leib Moscovitz,8 for example, offers a thorough analysis of the 
progress of legal fictions from tannaitic times to amoraic and post-amoraic material, observing 
increasing conceptualization over time. In her own comparison of earlier and later legal fictions 
by the rabbis, Christine Hayes has noted increasing discomfort with bald legal fictions among 
Babylonian amoraim and beyond:  
Leib Moscovitz notes that legal fictions…gain wide acceptance among the 
Romans and the rabbis. Nevertheless, despite the widespread presence of legal 
fictions in the talmudic corpus, there is good evidence that: (1) some rabbis were 
discomfited by the gap between a legal fiction and reality, and (2) this anxiety lies 
behind efforts by later talmudic authorities either to eliminate or to provide more 
credible, realist-based rationalizations for some of the anxiety-inducing legal 
fictions of earlier authorities. 9 
 
Tzvi Novick has observed the same reluctance with regards to implausible legal presumptions,10 
but he challenges Hayes’ argument, suggesting that the Babylonian amoraim were not anxious, 
                                                          
 
7 In his work on legal fictions, Samuel Atlas makes it quite clear that he has no interest in studying legal loopholes: 
בביצה לז. אותו ואת בנו …אנו מוצאים בתלמוד הרבה דוגמאות של מעשה הערמה, שבהן התירו החכמים להערים את הדין. כגון
מות האלה שיש לקראן בשם מעשיות תכליתן היא להראות את הדרך בה יכול האדם לילך סביב כל ההער.שנפלו לבור ביום טוב..
ההלכה בדרך עקיפין ואין לנו ענין בהן כאן. כי מטרתנו בזה המאמר היא לדון בסוג אחר של הערמה השונה לגמרי מזו שלפניה. וזו 
וא בכל פרטוי לחזיון משפטי אחר ומתוך כך הוא נכלל היא כשהמשפט עצמו מערים ואמר שחזיון ידוע יהא חשוב כאילו דומה ה
 בתוך חוג החזיונות והתופעות שהצורות המשפטיות הקיימות חופפות ומקיפות אותם
We find in the Talmud many examples of ha’arama, wherein the rabbis allowed one to employ cunning 
regarding the law. For example…in bBeṣa 37a, the case of the parent and child steer which fell into the pit 
on the holiday…These cases of ha’arama which involve concrete practice, their purpose is to teach the way 
around the law in a circuitous route, and we are not interested in those here. Our purpose in this essay is to 
deal with a completely different type of ha’arama: when the law itself treats one case which is not 
analogous to another, as though it is. 
(Samuel Atlas, “Fictions in the Talmud,” Louis Ginzberg: Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of his Seventieth 
Birthday.  New York: The American Academy for Jewish Research (1945) 1-2. See also Samuel Atlas, Netivim 
b’mishpat ha-ivri.” New York: American  Academy for the Science of Judaism (1978) 265) 
 
8 Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning, Chapter 4; idem, “Legal Fictions in Rabbinic and Roman Law: Some 
Comparative Observations,” Rabbinic Law in its Roman and Ancient Near Eastern Context, Ed. Catherine Hezser. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (2003) 105-132. 






but found legal fictions “inelegant” and “a violation of the rules of argumentation.”11 Moreover, 
he makes the important observation based on a passage in Lev. Rabbah that sometimes amoraim 
themselves are condemned for not using a legal fiction that might bring justice to an unjust 
situation caused by the law.12     
Legal loopholes are distinct from legal fictions. Originating in Roman law, legal fictions 
are presumptions about reality made by the legal system13 that are partially or fully known to be 
false – e.g., a corporation is a person, a non-citizen is actually a citizen14, etc.  Such 
presumptions generally are used to make new situations “thinkable” by analogizing15 them to 
familiar legal paradigms.16  In other words, the law has rules for the “person” category, but it 
                                                          
10 Tzvi Novick, “The ‘For I Say’ Presumption: A Study in Early Rabbinic Legal Rhetoric,” Journal of Jewish 
Studies Vol. LXI, No. 1 (Spring 2010) 61; Pierre J.J. Olivier explains the difference between legal fictions and legal 
presumptions as follows: Fiction differs from presumption in that the former makes a presumption which is known 
to be untrue. A presumption does not make a deliberately false assumption, nor is the latter maintained after its 
falsity has been proved. (Pierre JJ Olivier, Legal Fictions in Practice and Legal Science. Rotterdam (1975) 42)   
 
11  Tzvi Novick, “’They come against them with the power of the Torah’: rabbinic reflections on legal fiction and 
legal agency,” Ed. Austin Sarat, Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, Vol. 50, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 
(2009) 10 
 
12 Novick, ibid.  
 
13 Pierre JJ Olivier, Legal Fictions in Practice and Legal Science, Rotterdam: University of Rotterdam (1975) 4 
 
14 See Alan Watson, The Spirit of Roman Law. Athens: The University of Georgia Press (1995) 80 – si civis Romaus 
esset (if he were a Roman citizen)  
 
15 Leib Moscovitz explains how legal fictions are distinct from ordinary comparisons of two cases (referential 
classification): “Now, it might appear that there is no practical difference between these two possibilities, for while 
legal fictions state that we should assume that the facts in case A are those of case B, what these statements really 
mean is that the law in case A is the same as that of case B. Legal fiction, in short, seems to be little more than a 
flowery way of formulating the legal ‘bottom line.’ In fact, however, there are important substantive differences 
between legal fictions and referential classification. Referential classification generally occurs where the law as 
initially formulated entails a classificatory hiatus – the law governing B is known, but the law governing A is not. 
Hence we are told as a sort of legal shorthand that A should be treated like B. By contrast, legal fiction is often 
employed where the law as originally formulated does apply to cases such as A, although this law – the base law, as 
we shall term it here – differs from the law which actually applies to A. Thus, legal fictions usually attempt to 
account for deviation from a particular base law by asserting that we treat the facts of case A as if they were the facts 
of case B.” (Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning, 164-5) 
 
16 Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions, 72. According to some, their utility is hiding judicial activism, while for others legal 





may not have rules for the new entity known as the “corporation.” Therefore, by analogy, a 
corporation is said to “be” a person for purposes of knowing how to view it, a new innovation, 
under the law.  Loopholes, on the other hand, make no counterfactual assertions; in fact, they 
eschew analogies altogether.17   
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a loophole as, “An ambiguity, omission, or exception (as 
in a law or other legal document) that provides a way to avoid a rule without violating its literal 
requirements.” Such omissions are produced, or uncovered, by literal reading: defining a law 
most narrowly, without use of analogy or extrapolation. For instance, a law that prohibits the sale 
of an item, when read literally, does not forbid other methods of exchange which may 
accomplish the selfsame result, such as gift-giving. And one may turn this gap into the loophole 
should one desire to transfer ownership of an object to a person to whom s/he legally may not 
sell that object.  Thus, while fictions tend to extend the law from one known case to a new 
unknown case, loopholes tend to take a case out of the ambit of a law which would, in the 
ordinary courses of events, apply to it by resisting analogy and by reading most narrowly and 
technically instead.18 Lastly, while individuals have recourse to loopholes, legal fictions tend to 
be the province of institutions.19 Thus our study is confined to loopholes rather than fictions. 
                                                          
fictions in general jurisprudence, see Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions. Stanford: Stanford University Press (1967); Pierre 
JJ Olivier, Legal Fictions. For Legal Fictions in Jewish law, see Leib Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning, Chapter 4. 
 
17 Moscovitz, “Legal Fictions”, 106-107; regarding rabbinic law, Haim Tchernowitz referred to loopholes and legal 
fictions as ha‘aramat ha-din (conning the law) and ha‘aramat ha-ma‘aseh (conning the action), respectively. 
(Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-halakhah Vol. 1,182-183.) 
18 Shmuel Shilo, “Circumvention in the Talmud,”  Israel Law Review Vol. 17, No. 2 (1982) 153 
 





Consequently, we do not discuss rabbinic legal fictions such as ‘eruv,20 dofen ‘aquma21 or the 
like, though colloquially some might refer to these as loopholes. However, of the aforementioned 
observations about legal fictions will certainly be relevant to our study of legal loopholes. In 
particular, the following observation by Leib Moscovitz is instructive: 
Fictions tend to develop and flourish in a particular type of legal and intellectual 
climate, which seems to have been shared by the Romans and rabbis – a 
frequently rigid and formalistic approach to law, at least insofar as explicit 
formulation and justification of the law are concerned. To be sure, such systems, 
Roman law in particular, might tacitly seek to further functionalist goals, although 
such motives might not be articulated or otherwise acknowledged…Thus, the 
shared use of legal fictions by Roman and rabbinic law seems to reflect a common 
cognitive-linguistic approach, a sort of ‘formulational formalism,’ whereby 
seemingly anomalous law is presented in terms of, and indeed as a sort of 
extension of, existing law, rather than as an exception to such law.22 
 
Legal Theory 
 The suggestions offered to explain the use of legal loopholes have been creative, but 
unsatisfactory. The following is Moshe Silberg’s account of why all legal dodges are 
permissible: 
Regarding this perfect evasion, the evasion of one law by another, the law sees no 
transgression whatsoever, for it itself is ‘guilty’ because it itself provides the 
                                                          
 
20 ‘Eruv literally means “combination.” It refers to the sharing of a common space by means of the symbolic 
enclosing of a space (such as by a string) and shared foodstuffs which are set aside to represent that joint ownership. 
According to the rabbinic interpretation of Exodus 16:29 and 36:6, one may not carry items in the public space on 
the Sabbath. To prevent confusion as to what exactly was to be considered a public space, the rabbis forbade 
carrying in any common space without walls. The religious court of Solomon expanded the prohibition to any 
space shared by residents of more than one home, even a space surrounded by walls. However, if the various tenants 
were to symbolically become joint owners of the space, carrying would become permissible as though this were a 
personal space (b’Eruvin 21b). There are other rabbinic ordinances known as eruv which are likewise grand public 
evasions- such as ‘eruv teḥumin, a machination allowing a person to travel farther than 2000 cubits outside their city 
limits, eruv tavshilin, a machination which allows a person to cook on the holiday for the Sabbath which 
immediately follows it, an act which is ordinarily forbidden by rabbinic law. 
 
21 This fiction involves viewing the intersection of the walls and the roof of a sukkah as though the walls merely 
extend in a curved fashion to the roof. Thus, up to four amot of the sekhakh on the top of the sukkah contiguous 
to the wall be invalid sekhakh withouth invalidating the entire sukkah. (bSukkah 4a) 
 





evader with the tools for the evasion. It is an assumption that the Lawgiver sees 
all, and all ‘escape routes’ are clear to him. And if He did not close the gap [in the 
law]…it is a sign that He does not mind it…In summary: When the legal norm is 
wide, non-specific and inclusive, it is certain that even those who do not act for 
the right reasons will find haven in it…23 
 
Silberg’s premise is simply inacurrate. As we illustrate in chapter 2 (below), the rabbis are 
perfectly willing to outlaw evasions that meet the letter of the law.  
In the nineteenth century, Haim Tchernowitz offered an explicitly theoretical model taken 
from the field of Historical Jurisprudence, a popular movement in his day: 
They [the rabbis] were concerned with the shell and the guise just as they were 
concerned with the content and the seed, because sometimes the outer garb too 
expresses the Volksgeist, so it is also important to maintain for the existence of the 
nation, and therefore the maintenances of outer images of the life of the nation is 
of independent importance so that it will not be uprooted and forgotten from 
Israel.24  
 
The Historical School of legal theory was founded in Germany by Friedrich Carl von Savigny 
and had its roots in Hegelian idealism, which had fostered a strongly metaphysical ideology.25  
Historicism applied Hegel’s (1770–1831) notion of Volksgeist –“the separate spiritual essences 
of the diverse nations that characterized the present stage of human history”26 – to law.  
Historicism understood the law to originate in the life of the people and was thus a reaction to 
mid-eighteenth century Legal Positivism which understood legislation by an institutional body as 
the ultimate source of law.27   
                                                          
23 Silberg, Kakh Darko, 30-31 (translation, E.S.) 
 
24 Tchernowitz, Toldot Ha-Halakhah, II, 180 
 
25 Roscoe Pound , “The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence:  I. Schools of Jurists and Methods of 
Jurisprudence,” Harvard L. Review, Vol. 24, No. 8. (1911), 592, 600 
 
26 The History of Ideas Volume 6, “Volksgeist” 
 





Savigny’s writings reflect this posture:  “Stated summarily…[the correct] view is that all 
law arises in the manner which the prevailing (though not entirely adequate) usage calls 
'customary law;' that is, it is produced first by custom and popular belief, and then through 
course of judicial decision, hence, above all, through silent inner forces, and not through the 
arbitrary will of a law-maker.”28 “Silent inner forces,” “inner life,” Volksgeist- these are all 
related terms, and according to Historical Jurisprudence, are the mother of all law. 29 
 The second central element of the Historical approach is that law changes continuously, 
reflecting the ever-evolving spirit of the nation.30  Savigny writes:  
For law, as for language,31 there is no moment of absolute cessation; it is subject 
to the same movement and development as every other popular tendency; and 
this very development remains under the same law of inward necessity, as in its 
earliest stages.  Law grows with the growth, and strengthens with the strength of 
the people…32 
 
                                                          
 
28 Friedrich Karl von Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (The Vocation of 
Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence). Frieburg i.B: Mohr (1892) 6-7, 13-14. This essay was Savigny’s 
response to German professor of Roman Law AFJ Thibaut when the latter suggested in 1814 that Germany adopt a 
civil code similar to that of France in 1804. (See Harold Berman, The Historical Foundation of Law, Vol. 54, 16) 
 
29 See Hermann Klenner, “Savigny’s Research Program of the Historical School and its Intellectual Impact in 19 th 
Century Berlin,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, 37:1 (1989), for more on the connection between the 
Historical School and Volksgeist. 
 
30 It is for this reason that Savigny bitterly opposed suggestions in his time to draft a Civil Law Code for Germany: 
he simply did not wish for the law to become static.   
 
31 As an aside, yet another element of Volksgeist is to be found in the use of language as a model of law.  In his 
Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson writes that the printing press was significant for the development of 
nationalism: because of it “speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes…gradually became 
aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language-field, and at the same time 
that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belonged.  These fellow readers, to whom they were 
connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally 
imagined community. (44) 
 





But Savigny’s method of change is subtle and gradual; it is organic.  As Karl Mollnau 
writes, “Savigny pleaded only for changes in the law, not for changes of the law.”33  Rather than 
expressly overturning older laws, or writing new legal codes, it is the job of the legislators and 
the jurists to introduce “new elements…into existing law by the same internal, invisible force 
that originally created law.”34  And this more tactful and natural way of modifying law, 
mirroring the silent inner forces of the nation, is, like many dimensions of Historical 
Jurisprudence, learned from Roman Law:   
What indeed, made Rome great, was the quick, lively, political spirit, which made 
her ever ready so to renovate the forms of her constitutions, that the new merely 
ministered to the development of the old- a judicious mixture of the adhesive and 
progressive principles…In the law, consequently, the general Roman character 
was strongly marked- the holding fast by the long-established, without allowing 
themselves to be fettered by it, when it no longer harmonized with a new popular 
prevailing theory. For this reason, the history of the Roman law, down to the 
classical age, exhibits everywhere a gradual, wholly-organic development.  If a 
new form is framed, it is immediately bound up with an old established one, and 
thus participates in the maturity and the fixedness of the latter.35 
 
Gradual progression of law, a synthesis between the well-established and the original 
would lend more credibility to the more recent emendations to the law.  Tchernowitz explicitly 
discusses his use of this school of legal philosophy: 
Against this school36 which sees in legislation the essence of law…in the last 
century, the Historical School, whose main proponents are Savigny and Fichte,37 
has arisen.  This school favors the analogy between law and language:…there is 
an organic connection between law and the identity and the character of the 
                                                          
 
33 Karl A. Mollnau, “The Contributions of Savigny to the Theory of Legislation,” The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 37:1 (1989) 89. 
 
34 Savigny, The Vocation of Our Age, 41  
 
35 Ibid., 48 
36 The reference is to Legal Positivism, which maintains that a legal system is defined by its stipulated (=posited) or 
written law. 
 





nation, which always exists.  And in this way, it is similar to language- likewise, 
law does not have one moment of complete stasis. Even the law giver, who 
emerges from the nation- whether it is a lone ruler or a democratic institution- its 
acts (of legislation) is only formal, but it draws the legal content directly from the 
spirit of the nation. 38  
          
While Tchernowitz offers an interesting parallel, it is simply too anthropocentric for a religious 
system of law. Thus, we offer our own legal theoretical model in chapter 2. 
Loopholes and Intention 
 Moving on to literature which is relevant to the second half of our dissertation, there has 
been very literal concrete theory about what role intention plays in ha‘arama.  Shmuel Shilo for 
instance identifies two distinct types of ha’arama  
Investigation of the question of circumvention in Talmudic law leads one  
to the conclusion that avoidance of the law may be classified under two principal 
categories, each with its sub-groups. The first is the use of a rule of law in order 
to by-pass another rule that would have applied if one proceeded in the normal 
manner. A sub-group of this category consists of cases in which ownership is 
transferred (particularly to a non-Jew) in order to avoid the law. The second 
principal category involves a situation where the determinative element as to the 
permissibility or otherwise of an act is subjective intention, the actor claiming that 
his intention was such as to render what he did legitimate when in fact his 
intention was quite different. It is difficult to define this category since it is very 
close to deception and fiction (though not legal fiction).39 
  
We believe Shilo’s dichotomy to be anachronistic, as it assumes a dichotomy between action and 
intention that is anachronistic.  
Samuel Atlas contends with the issue by positing the insignificance of intention: “A 
person acts licitly and transgresses only in thought. 40”   Moshe Silberg is on the same continuum 
                                                          
 
38 Tchernowitz, Toldot Ha-Halakhah, I, 129-130 
39 Shmuel Shilo, “Circumvention of the Law in Talmudic Literature,” Israel Law Review Vol. 17, No. 2, 1982, 153 
 
40 Samuel Atlas, “Ha’arama Mishpatit Ba-Talmud,” Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume on the occasion of his 





in suggesting that the justification for ha‘arama as “No one truly knows a person’s inner 
thoughts.41 ” In other words, ha‘arama is based on doubt rather than on concrete theories of 
intention. Our study, on the other hand, withdraws the assumption that action and intention are 
completely distinct and in order to reconstruct the relationship between them; instead we note 
changing attitudes overt time about the degree to which the action and intention are or must be 
related for purposes of rabbinic law.   
 Thus, our study of ha‘arama makes several contributions to the current literature: a) a 
diachronic analysis of the term ‘.r.m. to reveal trends and evolution in rabbinic thought; b) a 
proper jurisprudential paradigm for ha‘arama; c) a more robust understanding of the role of 
intention in rabbinic thought, as reflected in cases of ha‘arama; d) a contextualization of these 






















                                                          
 







Chapter 1 Biblical Loopholes and their (Non-) Impact on Rabbinic Thinking  
 
The climactic court scene in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice portrays a vengeful 
Shylock approaching the beleaguered debtor Antonio to remove a pound of the latter’s flesh as 
interest on a defaulted loan. Most serendipitously, Portia enters, disguised as a lawyer, and offers 
the most literal reading of the loan contract, a reading which undoes Shylock’s plans: 
Tarry a little; there is something else. 
This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood; 
The words expressly are 'a pound of flesh:' 
Take then thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh; 
But, in the cutting it, if thou dost shed 
One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods 
Are, by the laws of Venice, confiscate 
Unto the state of Venice. (Act IV, Scene i) 
 
Portia reads the agreement for a pound of flesh as excluding blood. Surely Shylock had intended 
to include bloodletting in the agreement. Yet, a very literal interpretation of the contract excludes 
it; this reading saves Antonio’s life and marks the beginning of Shylock’s steep and total decline. 
 While this instance of literal reading narrows Shylock’s options, the same type of reading 
can and has been used throughout history to expand a legal actor’s options: the Spartan King 
Cleomenes, for example, signed a treaty with Argos for thirty days, and managed to maintain his 
treaty by warring with Argos only at night.42  While Cicero already bemoaned this as a prime 
example of summum ius summa iniuria, “More law, less justice”43 legal systems today still 
struggle with the very same exploitation of gaps in the law, known popularly as legal loopholes. 
Black’s Law Dictionary offers the following definition of legal loopholes: 
                                                          
42 David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1947) 190 
 






Without violating its literal interpretation, an allowed legal interpretation or practice 
unintentionally ambiguous due to a textual exception, omission, or technical defect, 
evades or frustrates the intent of a contract, law, or rule. 
 
As exemplified by Cleomenes and Portia, often the use of literal reading ignores the most logical 
or straightforward reading of a law, and even the intention of the law’s author(s).  What the actor 
does is technically legal, but even to the unaided eye seems out of sync with the aim(s) of the 
law.  
Legal Loopholes in Jewish Law 
Jewish law, whether in ancient Palestine and Babylonia, or among traditionally observant 
Jews today, is replete with such loopholes. As folklorist Alan Dundes writes, there exists 
simultaneously in Judaism a “strange combination of rules and means of avoiding those same 
rules.44” David Daube’s work on fraud in Biblical and Roman law includes a personal reflection 
upon his upbringing in a Jewish household: 
…my earliest memories of the flash in the pan dodge date from age 5 or 6. They 
are linked to Passover...The sages took very seriously the biblical ban on leaven 
during Passover45…You might neither eat it nor have it in your possession nor 
derive any benefit from it; and their definition of ‘leaven’ was extremely wide. 
However, in certain circumstances, they did condone a pre-Passover sale to a non-
Jew, to be followed by a post-Passover resale. How the dodge developed, who 
spooned it, and who disliked it, is not here material. My father and his youngest 
brother carried on an important trade including goods which were, or conceivably 
might be, classifiable as leaven. So regularly, two or three days before the 
Festival, they made over their business to a non-Jew, with all the traditionally 
requisite formalities; and, of course, kept strictly aloof from it until re-acquisition. 
For the buyer, it was just a rigmarole, except that he received a gratuity. Let us 
pray that the heavenly academy will approve of the construction.46 
 
                                                          
44 Dundes, Alan. The Shabbat Elevator and Other Sabbath Subterfuges: An Unorthodox Essay on Circumventing 
Custom and Jewish Character. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc. (2002) 88. 
 
45 Ex. 12:19; 13:7 
 
46 David Daube, “Fraud No.3,” Collected Studies in Roman Law, Eds. David Daube, David Cohen, Dieter Simon. 





Daube cites the institution of selling one’s ḥameṣ (leaven) before Passover, which is permitted in 
urgent situations in tPesaḥim 2:6-7, and was institutionalized as common practice by noted 
halakhists (legal decisors) in the beginning in the fourteenth century47; the institutions has been 
debated, qualified and expanded upon ever since by traditional Jewish decisors.48 But Daube 
might have cited any number of entrenched practices of dodging still in use today in Jewish 
communities around the world.  The example of prosbul readily comes to mind. Shortened from 
πρὸς βουλῇ βουλευτῶν, "before the assembly of counselors,"49  this innovation attributed to 
Hillel the Elder50 of the first century, allows a creditor to collect debts owed to him/her during 
the Sabbatical year, circumventing the injunction of Deut. 14:3 which waived such debts, by 
involving a Jewish court in the process.51   
This is not to say that the rabbis were always sanguine about loopholes, as expressed in 
the following passage: 
 תלמוד בבלי גיטין פא.
הראשונים  בר אילעאי: בוא וראה שלא כדור אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר ר' יוחנן משום ר' יהודה
לחייבן במעשר דורות  דורות האחרונים. דורות הראשונים מכניסין פירותיהן דרך טרקסמון כדי
 האחרונים מכניסין פירותיהן דרך גגות ודרך קרפיפות כד לפוטרן מן המעשר
                                                          
47 E.g., R. Israel Isserlein, Terumat ha-Deshen 1:120; the practice was further popularized in the sixteenth century 
when Jews brewed beer made of barley grains - see R. Yoel Sirkis, Baḥ 448 
 
48 E.g., R. Joseph Saul Nathanson, Sho’el U-Meishiv, Tinyana 2:7; R. Moses Sofer, Responsa Oraḥ Ḥayyim 113. 
 
 Marcus Jastrow, Sefer Milim: Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Babli, Yerushalmi, and ”,פרוזבול, פרוסבול“ 49
Midrashic Literature. New York: The Judaica Press (1996) 
 
50 bGit. 36a-b 
 
51 For an overview of the mechanics of prosbul, see David Henshke, “How Does Prosbul Work? A History of the 
Explanation of Hillel’s Taqqanah,” Shenaton Ha-mishpat Ha-ivri 22 (5761-4) 71-106; Elisha S. Anscelovitz, “The 
‘prosbul’: a legal fiction?” Jewish Law Annual 19 (2011) 3016; Hillel Gamoran, “The ‘Prozbul’: accommodation to 
reality,” Jewish Law Association Studies 22 (2012) 103-111; “Prozbul: Was Hillel true to tradition?” S’vara 2, 2 
(1991). For further study, see also David Bigman, “Halakhic Problem or Society Solution: On the Meaning of 
Prosbul”; Ludwig Blau, “Prosbul im Lichte der griechischen Papyri und der Rechtsgeschichte (Prosbul in light of 
the Greek papyri and legal history),” Festschrift zum 50 jaehrigen Bestehen der Franz-Josef-Landersrabbinerschule 





Rabbah b.b. Ḥannah said: R. Yoḥanan said in the name of R. Judah b. ’Ilai: Come 
and see that the current generations are unlike the earlier generations. The earlier 
generations would bring their produce in through the main gate in order to 
obligate themselves to tithe it. The current generations bring their produce in 
through the roofs and backyards in order to exempt themselves from tithing it.52 
 
Because Deuteronomy 26:12 specifies that one eat one’s tithes within one’s “gates,” one is only 
required to tithe food that enters through the front door, as opposed to food brought in through a 
skylight or a back door.53 People clearly realized that they might bring their produce in through 
other entrances in order to avoid the requirement to tithe.  Rabbah b.b. Ḥannah cites earlier 
authorities lamenting how widespread the practice had become. The tone is clearly one of 
disapproval. 
 While the Talmud is well known for its hair-splitting logic, one which is rather conducive 
to developing resourceful means around challenging laws, the tannaim and amoraim were not 
the first to introduce or to notice the use of loopholes. In Chapter 2, we will explore the parallels 
between Roman Law and rabbinic law on this score, but we begin here with an exploration of the 
Biblical legacy of loopholes. The Hebrew Bible itself contains illustrations of such evasions, 
sometimes performed by heroic actors for heroic ends, in both legal and narrative sections. 
Below, we offer nine examples of loopholes used in Biblical accounts and rabbinic attitudes 
toward such examples. 
Ancient Near Eastern Context 
  Before delving into the Biblical material, we must say a word about other Ancient Near 
                                                          
52 yMa‘aserot 3:1, 50c, offers a parallel passage.  
 
53 bBM 87b-88a (Interestingly, A1 Palestinian R. Jannai is cited as the trident of this law. If Rabbah b.b. Ḥannah and 





Eastern54 material with regards to this issue. No study to date has been done on loopholes in 
Ancient Near Eastern corpora,55 but some examples do suggest that the work-around concept 
existed and was deemed acceptable. The mārūtu, or adoption, contract presents just such a case. 
Certain categories of land could only legally be transferred to the closest relative of a landowner.  
However, using a mārūtu contract a landlord could adopt a non-relative in exchange for a “gift”56 
equal to the estimated value of the land.57 Once “related,” the landlord would transfer the land to 
his now adopted child.   
A second example comes from Ancient Near Eastern myth, the Gilgamesh epic. In the 
myth of Atrahasis, the gods are sworn to secrecy about the impending flood: swear not to reveal 
the coming doom to any mortal, lest he or she escape. The god Ea circumvents his oath by 
revealing the secret to the walls of Utnapishtim’s house in the latter’s presence rather than 
speaking directly to Utnapishtim himself:58  
Far-sighted Ea swore the oath (of secrecy) with them, 
So he repeated their speech to a reed hut, 
                                                          
54 The ANE refers to what we today call the Middle East, from Iran to Egypt, and as such encompasses a number of 
different legal systems, based on different languages, cultures, and political regimes.  However, Raymond 
Westbrook has argued that the various systems exhibit a tendency for continuity in “fundamental juridical 
concepts.” (See Raymond Westbrook, A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law. Boston: Brill (2003) 4. Israel 
Finklestein, however, points out significant differences in the cosmological assumptions of Israelite and 
Mesopotamian Law respectively. (Israel Finklestein, The Ox That Gored. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical 
Society (1981) 39-46.)  
 
55 The whole notion of “the letter of the law” is different in an environment in which law was more customary than 
letter. (Samuel Greengus, correspondence) 
 
56 called qīštu 
 
57 Morris Silver, “Karl Polanyi and Markets in the Ancient Near East: The Challenge of the Evidence,” The Journal 
of Economic History Vol. XLIII, Number 4 (Dec. 1983), 826-7. See also: Dorothy Cross, Movable Property in the 
Nuzi Documents (New Haven, 1937), p. 5; Jonathan Paradise, "A Daughter and Her Father's Property at Nuzi," 
Journal of Cuneiform Studies 32 (Oct. 1980), 189-207; Carlo Zaccagnini, "The Price of Fields," Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient Vol. XXII, Part I, 2-3. Sometimes adoption transactions were used for 
debt settlements rather than outright sales. (See Maynard P. Maidman, A Socio-Economic Analysis of a Nuzi Family 
Archive [Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 1976] 96). 
 





“Reed hut, reed hut, brick wall, brick wall, 
Listen, reed hut, and pay attention, brick wall: 
(This is the message:) 
Man of Shuruppak, son of Ubara-Tutu, 
Dismantle your house, build a boat. 
Leave possessions, search out living things. 
Reject chattels and save lives! 
Put aboard the seed of all living things, into the boat. 
The boat that you are to build 
Shall have her dimensions in proportion, 
Her width and length shall be in harmony,  
Roof her like the Apsu.” 
I realized and spoke to my mast Ea, 
“I have paid attention to the words that you have spoken in this way, 
My master, and I shall act upon them…”59 
 
Clearly, though not named or found often in ANE accounts, the loophole phenomenon 
                                                          
59 Gilgamesh XI (Stephanie Dalley, Myths From Mesopotamia: Creation, the Flood, Gilgamesh, and Others. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (1989) 110.)  
A parallel recounting in the myth of Atrahasis, casts Enki as Ea, and Atrahasis as Utnapishtim:  
[Enki] opened his mouth 
And addressed his slave 
You say, ‘What am I to seek?’ 
Observe the message that I will speak to you: 
Wall, listen to me!  
Reed wall, observe all my words! 
Destroy your house, build a boat, 
Spurn property and save life. 
The boat which you build 
…] be equal [(. .)]... 
Roof it over like the Apsû 
So that the sun shall not see inside it. 
Let it be roofed over above and below. 
The tackle should be very strong, 
Let the pitch be touch, and so give (the boat) strength. 
I will rain down upon you here 
An abundance of birds, a profusion of fishes. 
He opened the water-clock and filled it; 
He announced to him the coming of the flood for the seventh night  
W.G. Lambert and A.R. Millard, Atrahasis: The Babylonian Story of the Flood. Oxford: Clarendon Press 
(1969), Tablet III, lines 15-25, 26-37 (pps. 88–89). William L. Moran suggested that earlier in Atrahasis, 
Enki uses a different loophole – a message in a dream - in order to inform Atrahasis of an earlier plague: My 
god speaks to me, but being under oath, He must inform me in dreams” (Atrahasis II, iii) (See W.L. Moran, 
“Some considerations of form and interpretation in Atrahasis,” in Ed. F. Rochberg-Halton, Language, 
Literature, and History: Philological and Historical Studies presented to Erica Reiner. CT.: American 







Loopholes in the Bible 
  An apocryphal story is told of early-twentieth-century comedian W.C. Fields: at the end 
of his life he was seen reading the Bible, a new practice for him. When asked why, he responded, 
“I’m looking for loopholes.”  Indeed, in the legal sections of the Bible, there is ample precedent 
for completely legal mechanisms used to upend presumed legal status or consequence:60 e.g., a) 
the process of ḥaliṣah61 used to release a woman who is bound to her deceased husband’s 
brother; b) the city of refuge62 which affords a buffer zone to an accidental murderer who 
otherwise may be killed with immunity by relatives of his victim; c) the institution of Second 
Passover63 for those who, due to ritual impurity, were ineligible to offer the Passover sacrifice in 
its proper time; d) the Hebrew indentured servant64 who wishes to remain with his master past 
seven years of service; by piercing his ear, somehow, he may stay on longer, though the original 
injunction seems to disallow perpetual slavery. In each of these situations, the new legal rule 
offers an exit ramp from existing legal concerns.   
We choose, however, not to dwell on these examples in detail for two reasons. The first is 
that the cases of ha'arama in the rabbinic corpora generally arise in an ad hoc fashion rather than 
as institutionalized laws. Aside from the example of Second Passover, the aforementioned 
Biblical examples, however, are presented as part and parcel of the original law itself.  The 
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61 Deut. 25:5-10 
 
62 Ex. 21:13; Numbers 35; Deut. 19 
 
63 Numbers 9:1-14 
 





second reason is related to the first: a loophole involves reading an existing law narrowly in 
order to circumvent it which is how the rabbinic examples of ha‘arama appear to work. The 
aforementioned Biblical examples, however, do no such thing.  
They do not involve reading a binding law in a particularly forced way in order exempt or 
obligate a person.  The two reasons are related because it is generally the ad hoc situation that 
necessitates the forced reading of a statute; on the other hand, the statute that is originally 
presented with exceptions generally does not rely on a forced reading but on an additional legal 
mechanism.  Thus, the Biblical loopholes which we explore below are found in narrative 
portions of the Bible, as they describe where rules and life meet – the application of law in 
complicated, real life scenarios. As in the case of Ea, oaths and other binding agreements in the 
Hebrew Bible are fertile ground for the use of legal evasion because of the open texture of words 
and conversation. 
Judges 19-21 – Reconciling with Benjamin: A Temporary Solution 
 Judges 19 relates the story of a Levite man whose concubine is gang-raped to death 
while the two are being hosted in the Benjaminite town of Gibe‘ah. In an act of dramatic 
desperation, the Levite cuts her body into pieces and sends the piece throughout the tribes of 
Israel for all to bear witness to this great atrocity. When the Benjaminites refuse to hand over the 
concubine’s murderers, the other tribes declare war against them. After decimating Benjamin, 
the other tribes take what seems a wise oath, given Benjamin’s most recent symbolic treatment 





In time, the tribes come to regret their oath, appreciating that it ultimately dooms the tribe 
of Benjamin to extinction.65 And so the Israelites look for a way out of their treaty (21:3). 
Ironically, their first approach is to kill off one of their own cities – Jabesh Gile‘ad – for not 
going to war against Benjamin in the first place, and to deliver their virgin women to Benjamin 
as wives.66 But this does not solve the problem: hundreds of single men in Benjamin remain. The 
elders offer a new plan: 
21:16 Then the elders of the congregation said: 'How shall we do for wives for 
them that remain, seeing the women are destroyed out of Benjamin?' 17 And they 
said: 'They that are escaped must be as an inheritance for Benjamin, that a tribe is 
not blotted out from Israel. 18 Howbeit we may not give them wives of our 
daughters.' For the children of Israel had sworn, saying: 'Cursed be he that giveth 
a wife to Benjamin.' {S} 19 And they said: 'Behold, there is the feast of the LORD 
from year to year in Shiloh, which is on the north of Beth-el, on the east side of 
the highway that goeth up from Beth-el to Shekhem, and on the south of 
Lebonah.' 20 And they commanded the children of Benjamin, saying: 'Go and lie 
in wait in the vineyards; 21 and see, and, behold, if the daughters of Shiloh come 
out to dance in the dances, then come ye out of the vineyards, and catch you every 
man his wife of the daughters of Shiloh, and go to the land of Benjamin. 22 And it 
shall be, when their fathers or their brethren come to strive with us, that we will 
say unto them: Grant them graciously unto us; because we took not for each man 
of them his wife in battle; neither did ye give them unto them, that ye should now 
be guilty.' 23 And the children of Benjamin did so, and took them wives, 
according to their number, of them that danced, whom they carried off; and they 
went and returned unto their inheritance, and built the cities, and dwelt in them. 
 
  While the Israelites had originally intended their break with the tribe of Benjamin to be 
complete and lasting, they find recourse using the language of the oath itself: none may give a 
daughter to Benjamin. The elders interpret “give” most literally. Thus, if the Benjaminites were 
                                                          
65 Many of the women from the tribe of Benjamin had been killed in the civil war. 
66 Judges 21:12. It is unclear whether these women were thought suitable because a) their fathers could not “give 
them away,” as their fathers were dead, or b) their city had never been part of the oath in the first place, having not 






to seize the women themselves, there would be no violation of the oath.67  The irony is palpable. 
Men who in the past took a woman by force (and raped her) are now being reintroduced into 
Israel by seizing wives for themselves without proper consent (from the maidens’ fathers 68). It is 
a clever loophole, one which reveals a debased society – where elders fancy corrupt solutions to 
solve problems caused by those very same societal ills. One wonders whether the motive of 
preventing a tribe from being “blotted out” is sufficiently strong for such methods. Do nobler 
ends justify more ignoble means?69 Or were these means not considered ignoble at all, so long as 
                                                          
67 Theodor Gaster suggests that “It is possible…that our Biblical story is…an etiological legend told originally to 
account for an ancient practice of mass-mating at seasonal Festivals.” (See Theodor Gaster, Myth, Legend and 
Custom in the Old Testaments. NY: Harper (1969) 445) 
 
68 Robert S. Kawashima argues that in ancient Israel it was the father whose consent mattered, not the girl herself. 
(See Robert S. Kawashima, “Could a Woman Say ‘No’ in Biblical Israel? On the Genealogy of Legal Status in 
Biblical Law and Literature,” AJS Review 35,1 (April 2011) 14.) 
69Josephus (Josephus Antiquities of the Jews V.169) tells the story slightly differently in his Antiquities. He suggests 
that the elders did not look directly to formalities in order to circumvent their oath, but instead some suggested that 
the oath be canceled all together due to the state in which it was made: 
…some advised them to have no regard to what they had sworn, because the oath had not been taken advisedly and 
judiciously, but in a passion, and thought that they should do nothing against God, if they were able to save a whole 
tribe which was in danger of perishing; and that perjury was then a sad and dangerous thing, not when it is done out 
of necessity, but when it is done with a wicked intention. But when the senate was affrighted at the very name of 
perjury, a certain person told them that he could show them a way whereby they might procure the Benjaminites 
wives enough, and yet keep their oath. They asked him what his proposal was. He said, "That three times in a year, 
when we meet in Shiloh, our wives and our daughters accompany us: let then the Benjaminites be allowed to steal 
away, and marry such women as they can catch, while we will neither incite them nor forbid them; and when their 
parents take it ill, and desire us to inflict punishment upon them, we will tell them, that they were themselves the 
cause of what had happened, by neglecting to guard their daughters, and that they ought not to be over angry at the 
Benjaminites, since that anger was permitted to rise too high already." So the Israelites were persuaded to follow this 
advice, and decreed, That the Benjaminites should be allowed thus to steal themselves wives…And thus was this 
tribe of the Benjaminites, after they had been in danger of entirely perishing, saved in the manner aforementioned, 
by the wisdom of the Israelites; and accordingly it presently flourished, and soon increased to be a multitude, and 
came to enjoy all other degrees of happiness. And such was the conclusion of this war.69 
The Israelites were not blind to the notion that perhaps the oath should not hold; they searched for a loophole in 
order to be excessively careful! As Louis Feldman points out: 
Josephus is very concerned that the plan suggested by the elders appears to be a ruse; and so he carefully says that 
the elders protested at the mere mention of perjury (Ant. 5.170), whereupon someone suggested a plan to provide 
wives for the Benjaminites without breaking their oaths. Whereas in the Bible the elders actually direct the 
Benjaminites on how to obtain wives (Judges 21:20), Josephus, realizing that this was a way of aiding and abetting 
the violation of the oath, says that the plan was to let the Benjaminites "be permitted" to capture their brides 
"without either encouragement or hindrance on our part" (Ant. 5.171) (Louis H. Feldman, “Josephus’ Portrayal of 





no women were injured or killed? While the Bible does not pronounce a direct verdict on these 
actions, there is implicit judgment, as the chapter ends with the refrain: “And there was no king 
in Israel; each man did as was right in his own eyes.”70 Rather than celebrating the redemption of 
an Israelite tribe, the author(s) focus on how anarchic a time it was, a time rife with civil war and 
(sexual) violence. 
The rabbis of Late Antiquity do not make their views about this circumvention explicit. 
Genesis Rabbah71 offers that Jacob’s deathbed blessing of Benjamin as a “tearing wolf” (Gen. 
49:27) alludes to the Judges 21 loophole: 
וראיתם והיה אם יצאו בנות  זאב יטרף מה הזאב הזה חוטף כך היה שבטו שלבנימן חוטף שנאמר
חוטפין נשים לבניהן משום שבועה שנשבעו מלמד שהיו  ,()שופטים כא כאשילה וגו' וחטפתם לכם 
  .עליהן ישראל שלא ישיאו להם נשים
Will tear like a wolf: Just as this wolf seizes [its prey], so shall the children of 
Benjamin seize, as it is said: And it shall be should the daughters of Shiloh come 
out…and you shall seize for yourselves…. This teaches that they would grab 
wives for their sons due to the oath that Israel had sworn about them not to marry 
off women to them.  
 
Though Benjamin is not called a wolf for ravaging the concubine at Gibe’ah in the first place, a 
wolf seizing its prey is not a very flattering image for marriage. On the other hand, the midrash 
indicates that the Benjaminites were forced into this position because of the oath. Perhaps the 
midrashic authors appreciate what has brought Benjamin to this situation. However, what does 
stand out is that the rabbis do not directly comment on the validity or scruples of the elders’ oath. 
                                                          
Feldman suggests that perhaps this is meant to parallel the story of the rape of the Sabine women as told by Livy, as 
the Romans were permitted to seize the Sabine women by king Romulus, and the Israelites are given permission by 
the elders to proceed with their own plan, which entails seizing Israelite women. (Ibid. 286) 
 
70 Judges 21:24 
 






They do not extrapolate from it to any other legal scenarios, whether because the rabbinic 
practice of nullifying oaths made such precedent unnecessary, or for some other reason. 
Amoraic elaboration on R. Simon b. Gamaliel’s72 statement, “There were no better days 
for the Children of Israel than the Day of Atonement and the fifteenth of Av,” makes the 
omission of the loophole in rabbinic writing even clearer. The Palestinian and Babylonian 
Talmuds each offer various explanations, among them that on the fifteenth of Av the 
Benjaminites were permitted to marry women from the other tribes: 
 ירושלמי תענית ד:יא, סט עמוד ג' )ליידן(
מן מקרא קראו ורבנן אמרי שבו הותר שבטו שלבנימן לבוא בקהל דכתיב ארור נותן אשה לבני
וקירבוהו מקרא קראו וקירבוהו אפרים ומנשה שראובן ושמעון יהיו לי מקרא קראו וריחקוהו גוי 
 וקהל גוים יהי ממך ומלכים מחלציך יאו ואדיין לא נולד בנימין
And the rabbis say: That is when the tribe of Benjamin was permitted to enter the 
community, as it is written, “Cursed be her who gives a wife to Benjamin.” 
(Judges 21:18) They read a verse of Scripture and drew Benjamin near; they read 
a verse of Scripture, and they put Benjamin away. They read a verse of Scripture 
and drew Benjamin news: “Ephraim and Manasseh shall be mine, as Reuben and 
Simeon are.” (Gen. 48:5). They read a verse of Scripture and put Benjamin away: 
“a nation and a company of nations shall come from you, and kings shall spring 
from you.” (Gen. 35:11) 
 
What is the meaning of בנימין לבוא בקהל הותר שבטו של ? Does this refer to the date of the seizure of 
the women, or does this refer to some later generation? 73 If this refers to some later generation, 
perhaps this is a greater joy than the temporary seizure solution, or perhaps the seizure solution 
was anathema. If this refers to the seizure solution itself, speculating on what convinced the 
elders to innovate the seizure loophole.  Moreover it is quite unclear what the significance of the 
verses is for drawing near and alienating Benjamin, respectively.74  In the Babylonian version, 
                                                          
72 mTa‘anit 4:7 
 
73 This latter reading seems more likely, given the language of הותר לבוא בקהל, which indicates permissibility for men 
to give their daughters’ hands in marriage to men from Benjamin rather than permissibility for the Benjaminites to 






which completely excludes the verses referring to distancing or bringing close, Rav offers a 
significant clarification: 
 בבלי תענית ל:
 מאי דרוש אמר רב ממנו ולא מבנינו
What is the derivation? Rav said: From among us, not from among our sons. 
 
Rav indicates that the joyous scenario of fifteen Av refers to another generation rather than the 
seizure plot of Judges 21. Yet his explanation of how the leaders of the following generation 
extricated themselves from the oath of their predecessors does not differ markedly from the type 
of loophole recorded in Judges 21 itself! Again, a close reading of the oath, we will not give our 
daughters to Benjamin, but our sons may.  Thus Rav’s statement endorses the use of a loophole 
in this situation without even making mention of the same type of loophole made by the elders in 
the first place.75 Again, the rabbis do not seem particularly interested in the elders’ own use of 
literal reading. 
I Kings 2 – Inheriting a Vendetta 
 
 Rav’s suggestion that an oath taken by fathers may not be binding on their sons offers the 
perfect segue to the story of King David and Shim'ei son of Gera. During a vulnerable time, 
when King David was on the run from his mutinous son Absalom, he was taunted and cursed by 
Shim'ei son of Gera.76 When David ultimately defeats Absalom and regains his throne, Shim'ei 
                                                          
74 The classical commentators were confounded by this. Firstly, they contend that the verse regarding Ephraim and 
Manasseh refers to distancing Benjamin, whereas the verse about kings refers to bringing Benjamin close. This is 
consonant with the Gen. Rabbah (81) version. Secondly, they do not explain the connection between the verses and 
the ability to permanently allow Benjamin back in as one of the tribes. (See Pene Moshe and Qorban Ha‘edah ad 
loc.) 
 
75 We may suggest a simple difference between the two loopholes: for those who had themselves promised not to 
marry into Benjamin, literal interpretation rings hollow. For the next generation, however, who were included in the 
oath only by proxy, perhaps there is more room to maneuver. 
 





wisely pleads with King David for immunity, and the king grants it77: he swears not to kill 
Shim'ei. On David’s deathbed, described in the second chapter of the first Book of Kings, David 
looks to remedy this situation. He instructs Solomon, his son and heir:  
8 And, behold, there is with thee Shim'ei the son of Gera, the Benjaminite, of 
Baḥurim, who cursed me with a grievous curse in the day when I went to 
Maḥanaim; but he came down to meet me at the Jordan, and I swore to him by the 
LORD, saying: I will not put thee to death with the sword. 9 Now therefore hold 
him not guiltless, for thou art a wise man; and thou wilt know what thou oughtest 
to do unto him, and thou shalt bring his hoar head down to the grave with blood.' 
 
While David may not kill Shim’ei, his son Solomon may. In fact, the Lucianic versions of the 
Septuagint on this verse read: אל תנקהו ואתה  – “but you should not grant him amnesty” as opposed 
to ועתה, “and now you shall not grant him amnesty.”78 Calling Solomon wise,79 David suggests 
that Solomon complete this task by finding some new pretext for putting Shim’ei to death.80 And 
Solomon does so: 
36 And the king sent and called for Shim’ei, and said unto him: Build thee a 
house in Jerusalem, and dwell there, and go not forth thence any whither. 37 For 
on the day thou goest out, and passest over the brook Qidron, know thou for 
certain that thou shalt surely die; thy blood shall be upon thine own head.'  
 
                                                          
77 Some suggest that he actually had wished to kill Shim’ei and did not promise immunity out of royal charity but 
out of fear of the entourage of 1000 Benjaminites with which Shim’ei “came out to greet” him (2 Samuel 19:16-24). 
Mordecai Cogan, The Anchor Bible: I Kings, Vol. 10. New York: Doubleday (2001) 174   
 
78 Cogan, ibid. 
 
79 In 2:6 David likewise tells Solomon to kill the former general Yoav for murdering two innocent men, but to do so  
“in his wisdom,” which, from 2:32, Solomon interpreted as not letting on to Yoav that David had even known about 
Yoav’s crimes. Mordecai Cogan is very clear that David is asking Solomon to use guile in both instances. (Cogan, A 
I Kings, 173) For an argument about the use of this story in the Septuagint to highlight Solomon’s unique wisdom 
and shrewdness, see David W. Gooding, “The Shim’ei Duplicate and Its Satellite Miscellanies in 3 Reigns II,” 
Journal of Semitic Studies 13 (1968) 76-92.  
 
80 It seems clear that Solomon killing Shim’ei based on a direct order from David would be a violation of that oath, 





Though Shim’ei agrees to the terms of his house arrest, three years later he violates those terms 
to retrieve some escaped slaves.81 Solomon confronts Shim’ei: 
42 And the king sent and called for Shim’ei, and said unto him: 'Did I not make 
thee to swear by the LORD, and forewarned thee, saying: Know for certain, that 
on the day thou goest out, and walkest abroad any whither, thou shalt surely die? 
and thou saidst unto me: The saying is good; I have heard it. 43 Why then hast 
thou not kept the oath of the LORD, and the commandment that I have charged 
thee with?' 44 The king said moreover to Shim’ei: 'Thou knowest all the 
wickedness which thy heart is privy to, that thou didst to David my father; 
therefore the LORD shall return thy wickedness upon thine own head. 45 But 
king Solomon shall be blessed, and the throne of David shall be established before 
the LORD forever.' 46 So the king commanded Benaiah the son of Jehoiada; and 
he went out, and fell upon him, so that he died. And the kingdom was established 
in the hand of Solomon. 
 
While Solomon maintains that Shim’ei will be put to death for violating their agreement, he does 
mention Shim'ei’s just deserts for his transgressions against the late King David.  
 The Biblical narrative indicates that Solomon’s actions were helpful for stabilizing his 
administration.82 After all, leaving one’s father’s enemies alive upon advancing to the throne 
leaves open the potential for insurrection. Likewise, perhaps David’s reasons were superstitious:, 
once Shim’ei died, his curse on David would lose its efficacy, making Solomon’s rule more 
secure.83 And so the story ends with the summation: “And the kingdom was established in the 
hand of Solomon.” Furthermore, the following chapter tells of Solomon’s love and obedience to 
God,84 as well as the story of God’s speaking to Solomon in a dream, offering Solomon whatever 
                                                          
81 I Kings 2:40 
 
82 It seems that this was David’s intention as well, as opposed to mere personal vendetta, as the commands to kill 
Yoav and Shim’ei are juxtaposed to David’s directive to Solomon to follow God so that God would uphold the 
promise of  לא יכרת לך איש מעל כסא ישראל– There shall not fail you a man on the throne of Israel (I Kings 2:4). For a 
discussion of King David’s motivations in light of beliefs about “blood” and innocence in the contemporary culture, 
see Benjamin Edidin Scolnic, “David’s Final Testament: Morality or Expediency?” Judaism 43,1 (1994) 19-26.  
 
83 See ANET 214b, in which a similar contrast is suggested: [crimes] “come down upon the heads (of the guilty), 






he desires.85 Unlike the preceding case of Benjaminites seizing wives, the Biblical account seems 
neutral to positive about Solomon’s actions towards Shim’ei.  
But as in the case above, the rabbis do not discuss the ruse against Shim’ei b. Gera, 
though they do discuss the matter of his death. Some amoraim in bBerakhot 8a, lament the death 
of Shim’ei, as he had apparently been Solomon’s teacher: 
 ואמר ר' חייא בר אמי משמיה דעולא: לעולם ידור אדם במקום רבו שכל זמן ששמעי בן גרא קיים לא
 נשא שלמה את בת פרעה
R. Ḥiyya b. ’Ami said in the name of ‘Ulla: A person should always live near his 
teacher, for as long as Shim’ei b. Gera was alive, Solomon did not marry 
Pharaoh’s daughter. 
 
R. Ḥiyya b. ’Ami and ‘Ulla do not critique David’s command or Solomon’s method of killing 
Shim’ei, though they easily could have while describing the deleterious effects of the death of his 
teacher and guide. Perhaps the comment “a person should always live near his teacher” should be 
read sarcastically, indicating that had Solomon been thinking for himself, he would not have, he 
should not have, killed Shim’ei.86 He only killed Shim’ei because of David’s command. And yet 
David’s command is not referenced. Again, the rabbis choose to ignore the loophole mechanism. 
Joshua 9 – Qualifying a Treaty 
After the Israelites sacked both  Jericho and ‘Ai, the Gibeonites, members of a Hivvite 
tribe indigenous to Canaan, realized that the Israelites mean the natives harm. To trick the 
Israelites into making a treaty, the Gibeonites dress up as wilderness travelers, complete with 
worn out shoes and dress, claiming to be from outside of Canaan:  “We are come from a far 
                                                          
84 I Kings 3:3 
 
85 1 Kings 3:5  
 






country,” they declare, “Now therefore make ye a covenant with us.'87 Following a sob story 
about meager supplies, along with praise for God’s handiwork on behalf of the Israelites against 
the Egyptians, Joshua takes the bait and enacts a treaty: “And Joshua made peace with them, and 
made a covenant with them, to let them live; and the princes of the congregation swore unto 
them.88” Upon realizing their folly several days later, the Israelite elders are in a bind. They 
cannot go back on their treaty, but they do not wish to sustain it either: 
16 And it came to pass at the end of three days after they had made a covenant 
with them that they heard that they were their neighbors, and that they dwelt 
among them. 17 And the children of Israel journeyed, and came unto their cities 
on the third day. Now their cities were Gibeon, and Ḥephirah, and Be’eroth, and 
Kiriath-jearim. 18 And the children of Israel smote them not, because the 
princes89 of the congregation had sworn unto them by the LORD, the God of 
Israel. And all the congregation murmured against the princes. 19 But all the 
princes said unto all the congregation: 'We have sworn unto them by the LORD, 
the God of Israel; now therefore we may not touch them. 20 This we will do to 
them, and let them live; lest wrath be upon us, because of the oath which we 
swore unto them.' 21 And the princes said concerning them: 'Let them live'; so 
they became hewers of wood and drawers of water90 unto all the congregation, as 
the princes had spoken concerning them. 
                                                          
87 Joshua 9:6 
 
88 Ibid., 9:15 
 
89 Throughout this narrative, there are different designations for the people on the Israelite side making this treaty – 
“the princes,” “the congregation,” “the men of Israel,” and Joshua himself. It is unclear who actually makes the 
original treaty. For this reason, many recent Bible scholars have suggested a documentary approach to the story. K. 
Mohlenbrink, Zeitschrift für die alttestamentlich Wissenschaft (ZAW) NF 15 (1938) suggested that this is an 
amalgam of two separate narratives, one in which Joshua concludes a treaty with the Gibeonites and subsequently 
curses them when he realizes his folly, and the other in which the “men of Israel” make the treaty. W. Rudoph 
suggests the original story is that of Joshua mistakenly making the treaty, told by the E and J sources, but the P 
source subsequently adds the princes to the story in order get absolve Joshua of any blame (W. Rudoph, Der 
“Elohist” von Exodus bis Josua (The “Elohist” from Exodus to Joshua), 1938, 200ff). M. Noth, on the other hand, 
suggests that the original story is that the princes made the treaty, but Joshua is added in later (M. Noth, “Josua,” 
HAT, 1953, 53ff). Jehoshua Grintz, however, that it was an essential element of ancient Hivvite treaties that two 
different elements take place – the making of the treaty and the taking of the oath. He suggests that Joshua was 
responsible for the former, while the princes were responsible for the latter, just as the text in Joshua 9:15 suggests. 
(See Jehoshua M. Grintz, “The Treaty of Joshua with the Gibeonites,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 
86,2 (1966) 123). Irrespective of this textual challenge or its potential solution, we treat the story as a unified whole 
as it would have been viewed through the ancient rabbinic lens, as ultimately we are interested in how this and other 







The Israelites manage to stay within the bounds of the treaty, even as they alter its contours: they 
reduce the Gibeonites to servility. While not breaking the covenant, this action does redefine it 
quite narrowly as only granting life to the Gibeonites. 
 Robert Boling observes that the designation of water carriers and hewers of wood is a 
“most telling inversion of the covenant motif” in Deut. 29:10, where the Divine covenant is 
presented as inclusive of all, erasing distinction between the highest members of society and the 
lowest – even the water carriers and hewers of wood. Israel’s covenant with the Gibeonites, on 
the other hand, was to be marked by social stratification, and clear boundaries between the two.91 
Indeed, according to Sumerian epics, serving as a hewer of wood and carrier of water amounted 
to true slavery.92 Likewise, the nethinim of the First Temple period, the descendants of the 
Gibeonites according to the Bible, are included with the “children of Solomon’s servants” (Ezra 
2:58, Neh. 7:60) and are descended from “royal slaves” (I Kings 9:21). Despite this dramatic 
change, the Biblical text condemns only Gibeonite trickery (Joshua 9:22). 
Unlike the first two scenarios, regarding this episode, the rabbis raise the possibility of 
nullifying the original vow:  
                                                          
90 Some have theorized that the status of hewers of wood and drawers of water amounted to the regular tax offered 
by the protégé state to the superior state in other Hivvite treaties of the time, and that therefore, the notion of this 
being some sort of punishment for fraud would be a later and incorrect interpretation. (e.g., R. Kittel, Geschichte des 
Volkes-Israel I (1923). Others argue that the lack of military aid provisions promised in this treaty indicates its sui 
generis nature (e.g., Jehoshua M. Grintz, “The Treaty of Joshua with the Gibeonites,” Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 86,2 (1966) 120). (For a summary of the various positions, see Joseph Blenkinsopp, Gibeon and 
Israel: The Role of the Gibeonites in the Political and Religious History of Early Israel. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (1972) Chapter 3.)  Regardless of the historical findings or evidence, the ancient rabbis were 
committed to the veracity of the Biblical account, and we approach this text through their lens. 
 
91 Robert G. Boling, Anchor Bible Joshua: A New Translation with Notes and Commentary, Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday & Co. (1982) 269 
 
92 S. N. Kramer, History Begins at Sumer: Thirty-Nine Firsts in Man's Recorded History. Philadelphia: University of 






  93בבלי גיטין מו.
אמר רבי יהושע בן   רבים לא יחזיר ושלא ידעו בו רבים יחזיר:רבי יהודה אומר כל נדר שידעו בו 
לוי מ"ט דר' יהודה דכתיב )יהושוע ט( ולא הכום בני ישראל כי נשבעו להם נשיאי העדה ורבנן התם 
מי חלה שבועה עילוייהו כלל כיון דאמרו להו מארץ רחוקה באנו ולא באו לא חיילה שבועה עילוייהו 
 : שום קדושת השםכלל והאי דלא קטלינהו מ
R. Judah says: Any oath that was known by the masses, one should not nullify, 
but if it was not known by the masses, on may nullify. R. Joshua b. Levi said: 
What is R. Judah’s reasoning? As it is written: And the Children of Israel did not 
kill them, for the princes of the congregation had sworn to them. And the rabbis 
[would explain]: In that case, did the oath ever truly apply? They (the Gibeonites) 
told them, “We have come from a faraway land,” but they did not, so the oath did 
not apply to them. The reason they did not kill them (the Gibeonites) was for the 
sanctification of God’s name. 
 
According to R. Judah, Joshua and the Israelites have no other recourse but to qualify their 
treaty; according to the Sages, however, the Israelites have no requirement to uphold the treaty, 
as it had been made under false pretenses. Consequently, the kindness that the Israelites show by 
making the Gibeonites water carriers and wood hewers rather than killing them is purely for the 
purpose of representing the God of Israel well.  This debate is very telling. The argument is not 
actually about whether Joshua is right or wrong in changing the content of the treaty; it is 
presumed that he did right.94 Rather, the argument is whether an oath made on false pretenses is 
binding if it made publicly. The issue of making changes to an existing agreement is secondary, 
if even that. 
Exodus 2:18 – The Exodus from Egypt 
At first blush, the Israelites’ exodus from Egypt is predicated upon a lie. In Exodus 3:18, 
Moses is instructed to ask of Pharaoh that the Israelites travel for three days to the wilderness to 
                                                          
93 The parallel sugya in yGittin 4:7, 46a (Constantinople Ed.) does not elaborate on R. Judah’s reasoning. 
 
94 In fact, elsewhere, the rabbis emphasize how lacking in character the Gibeonites proved themselves to be in II 
Samuel 21, when demanding the death of seven men as compensation for Gibeonites, leading King David to alienate 
them more than Joshua ever had. (yQid.4:1, 65b; an echo of this story appears in bYeb. 79a, with the explanation as 





worship their God. And throughout Moses and Aaron’s dealings with Pharaoh, they never say 
otherwise; they never proclaim, or request, permanent freedom. Pharaoh too understands their 
request as limited to three days, for once three days have passed, Pharaoh wonders why they 
have not returned. He surmises that they must be lost in the desert, that is, until he is informed, 
“that the nation had fled.95” Is there some legal technicality in use here which relies on autonomy 
once the Israelites are beyond Pharaoh’s reach?  
Several midrashic passages broach the discrepancy between the three-day request and the 
complete escape. Exodus Rabbah,96 of medieval provenance, is very clear about this: The 
Israelites lied in order to lure the Egyptians to the Reed Sea after three days; there they would 
drown just the way they had drowned Israelite babies. It was deceptive behavior, but it was for 
the purpose of punishing the Egyptians measure for measure. Earlier midrashic material, 
however, is less equivocal. The two Mekhiltot - of R. Ishmael and R. Simon b. Yoḥai – offer two 
versions of the following story: at Pharaoh’s behest, Egyptian officers accompany the Israelites 
on their three-day journey to the wilderness to worship their God and to ensure that they would 
return. On the fourth day, the officers demand that the Israelites return to Egypt, but the Israelites 
refuse. When the officers continue to press, the Israelites beat them and kill several of them.  The 
variation between the two Mekhilta versions consists in the Israelites’ verbal response to the 
Egyptian officers prior to the beating.  According to Mekhilta d’R. Ishmael,97 they respond with a 
rhetorical question: וכי יצאנו ברשות פרעה יצאנו? Did we leave with Pharaoh’s permission? The 
midrash continues with a citation of Numbers 33:3, “On the morrow of Passover, the Children of 
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96 Ex. Rabbah (Vilna) Shemot 3 
 





Israel left with a raised hand,” that is, brazenly. In other words, the exodus has nothing to do with 
their original request of Pharaoh. They have left of their own accord. And they communicate this 
to their Egyptian chaperones. In the Mekhilta d’R. Shimon bar Yoḥai98 version, however, the 
Israelites respond differently, offering a savvier perspective. They declare: Once outside of 
Pharaoh’s domain, we are are outside of his jurisdiction as well –  כיון שיצאנו ממצרים יצאנו מרשות
 This is subtler: “Yes, we applied for a three day journey, but technically once we have  .פרעה
crossed state lines, we are no longer subject to Pharaoh’s will.” And Pharaoh cannot complain; 
after all, he had given permission in the first place. 
 Clearly, the rabbis noticed the discrepancy between what Moses requested – namely, 
three days in the wilderness – and what the Israelites took – full freedom. They are divided on 
how to view this discrepancy. One view suggests that the ends justify the means: Moses lies in 
order ultimately to punish the Egyptians. One a second view, the Israelites are not beholden to 
Pharaoh at all; they leave indignantly, unrelated to Pharaoh’s request/permission. But on the 
third view, there is indeed a clever loophole in use: leaving the borders of Egypt, which the three 
days allowed them to do, puts them under different jurisdiction. They cannot be extradited. 
Unlike the other cases, in this case the rabbis seem to be in touch with technical circumventions, 
yet they still do not use it as a model or precedent for their own rulings. 
Numbers 27, 36 – Daughters of Zelophehad 
 In Numbers 27, Moses commits the land of Zelophehad as inheritance for his five 
unmarried daughters.  In Numbers 36, the issue arises again, as the clan leaders of Manasseh, the 






late Zelophehad ‘s  tribe, raise the worry of losing tribal land should Zelophehad ‘s daughters 
marry outside of their own tribe.  
The family heads in the clan of the descendants of Gilead son of Makhir son of 
Manasseh, one of the Josephite clans, came forward and appealed to Moses and 
the chieftains, family heads of the Israelites. They said, “The Lord commanded 
my lord to assign the land to the Israelites as shares by lot, and my lord was 
further commanded by the Lord to assign the share of our kinsman Zelophehad to 
his daughters. Now, if they marry persons from another Israelite tribe, their share 
will be cut off from our ancestral portion and be added to the portion of the tribe 
into which they marry; thus our allotted portion will be diminished. And even 
when the Israelite observe the jubilee, their share will be added to that of the tribe 
into which they marry, and their share will be cut off from the ancestral portion of 
our tribe. (36:1-4)99 
 
Moses validates this challenge and obligates the daughters of Zelophehad to marry within their 
own tribe: 
This is the thing which the LORD hath commanded concerning the daughters of 
Zelophehad, saying: Let them be married to whom they think best; only into the 
family of the tribe of their father shall they be married. So shall no inheritance of 
the children of Israel remove from tribe to tribe; for the children of Israel shall 
cleave everyone to the inheritance of the tribe of his fathers. And every daughter, 
that possesseth an inheritance in any tribe of the children of Israel, shall be wife 
unto one of the family of the tribe of her father, that the children of Israel may 
possess every man the inheritance of his fathers. So shall no inheritance remove 
from one tribe to another tribe; for the tribes of the children of Israel shall cleave 
each one to its own inheritance.' (ibid. 6-9) 
 
Michael Fishbane notes the problematic result of this new ordinance:  
What is extraordinary about the case in Num. 36:6-9 is not simply that the new 
divine ordinance of Nu. 27:6-11 also proved insufficient. The remarkable fact 
from a legal standpoint is that this second responsum, requiring the daughters to 
marry a paternal relative, produces a veritable legal fiction. For if the daughters of 
Zelophehad must marry into their father’s family – in this case their cousins, for 
paternal uncles were forbidden by law (cf. Lev. 18:14) – the inheritance would 
necessarily revert to precisely those males who would be next in line if the father 
had no children whatsoever (per Num. 27:9-11). Accordingly, the ruling in favor 
of female inheritance provided by the first adjudication (Num. 27:8) is 
                                                          
99 The family heads of Manasseh are particularly concerned about losing land, which is consistent with the decision 
in Numbers 32:33 that half of Manasseh was to be on one side of the Jordan River and half on the other side. Loss of 





functionally subverted by the responsum in Num. 36:6-9 – even though its 
specific provisions remain valid (27:9-10).100 
 
Evidently bothered by just this point, the rabbis interpret the requirement to marry endogamously 
as applicable only to future female heirs, not to the daughters of Zelophehad themselves. Thus, 
Numbers 36 does change the law but not for the daughters of Zelophehad who had already been 
the beneficiaries of the ruling of Numbers 27: 
 בבלי בבא בתרא קכ.
שנאמר: , השבטים לכל להנשא הותרו צלפחד בנות: שמואל אמר יהודה רב אמר
 מקיים אני מה אלא, לנשים תהיינה בעיניהם לטוב
. להגון להן אלא ינשאו שלא, הכתוב השיאן טובה עצה? לנשים תהיינה אביהם מטה למשפחת אךד
"אמור אליהם" )ויקרא כב( לאותן העומדים על הר סיני "לדורותיכם" אלו דורות   מותיב רבה
אבות למה נאמר בנים ואם נאמר בנים למה נאמר אבות? מפני שיש באבות מה הבאים. אם נאמר 
שאין בבנים ויש בבנים מה שאין באבות באבות הוא אומר "וכל בת יורשת נחלה"...הוא מותיב לה 
 והוא מפרק לה לבר מבנות צלפחד.
R. Judah said in the name of Samuel: The daughters of Zelophehad were 
permitted to marry into any tribe, as it says, “Let them be married to whom they 
think best.” So can I uphold, “only into the family of the tribe of their father shall 
they be married”? Scripture is giving them good advice to marry only one who is 
proper for them. Rabbah challenged with a tannaitic source: “Say to them” – to 
those standing at Sinai, “for your generations” – these are the future generations. 
If the parents are indicated, why mention the children, and if the children are 
indicated, why are the parents indicated? Because some laws are mentioned 
regarding the parents but not regarding the children, and some laws are mentioned 
regarding the children but not regarding the parents. [For instance], regarding the 
parents it says, “And every daughter who inherits land…” He questioned it, and 
he answered it: [this verse is] excluding the daughters of Zelophehad. 
 
This passage discusses the very crux of the question, Numbers 36:9, the command that every 
female heir must marry within her tribe, and concludes that the daughters of Zelophehad 
remained unaffected by it. Essentially, the Babylonian Talmud reads Numbers 36 not as a way of 
circumventing the dispensation in Numbers 27 to the daughters of Zelophehad but as emending 
the ruling of Numbers 27 for other women in the future. This accords quite well with the 
                                                          





comments of the Sifri that the ruling in Numbers 27 is only temporary )101.)לשעה Relatedly, 
further in the same Sifri passage, R. Ishmael learns the law of a husband inheriting his wife’s 
land from Numbers 36:8, rather than from the daughters of Zelophehad themselves.102  
On the other hand, another Sifri passage resolves the tension not by reinterpreting 
Numbers 36 but by suggesting that both Numbers 27 and Numbers 36 are simultaneous from the 
Divine perspective:103  
ספרי דברים כי תצא פיסקא רלג 
בדבו נאמרו שניהם ושמור זכור ,אחד בדבור נאמרו שניהם ,לך תעשה גדילים שעטנז תלבש לא )יב(
 כבשים שני השבת וביום )במדבר כח:ט( יומת מות מחלליה )שמות לא:יד( אחד ר
תגלה )דברים  לא אחיך אשת ערות )ויקרא יח:טז(  ,אחד בדבור נאמרו שניהם שנה בני
 נחלה )במדבר לו:ח( וכל בת יורשת )במדבר,אחד בדבור נאמרו שניהם עליה יבא יבמה כה:ה(
שנ לומר ודם לבשר איפשר שאי מה אחד בדבור נאמרו שניהם מטה אל ממטה נחלה תסוב ולא לו:ט(
 שמענו זו שתים אלהים דבר אחת שנאמר)תהילים סב:יב( כאחת דברים י
“Do not wear sha‘atnes”, “Make fringes for yourself,” were both said in one 
utterance; “Remember” and “Guard” were both said in one utterance; “Its 
desecrators shall be put to death,” “And on the Sabbath day two year-old 
unblemished sheep” were both said in one utterance; “Do not reveal your 
brother’s wife’s nudity,” “Her brother-in-law shall sleep with her,” were both said 
in one utterance”; “Any daughter who inherit land,” “And land shall not pass from 
one tribe to another” were both said in one utterance, which someone of flesh and 
blood cannot do – to say two things as one, as it is said: God spoke one, yet we 
heard two.”104  
 
                                                          
101 As opposed to לדורות, for future generations. This possibly alludes to their special dispensation to marry 
whomever they wished. 
 
102 Sifri Numbers Pinḥas 134 
 
103 Qorban Ha’edah  (yNed. ibid. s.v., ve-lo tisov) reads this differently. He suggests that it refers to the question of 
whether the law was only such for the wilderness generation, as suggested by the introduction to verse 8 זה הדבר, or 
whether it is always applicable. This is a clear Babylonianization of the text on the basis of Rava’s comment in bBB 
120a that זה הדבר refers only to the current generation in the case of female inheritance and marriage. It is unclear 
whether Rava’s position about זה הדבר was espoused by the author of this passage; likewise the quotation of the 
clause כל בת היורשת rather than זה הדבר indicates that this is not the meaning of the statement 
104 Sifri Deut. Ki Teṣe 133. YNed. 3:2, 37d, and yShevuot 3:10, 34d, contain the same passage, with a change in the 
placement of sha‘atnes to last rather than first, with the addition of the different modifiers of testimony in the 
Decalogue as recounted in Exodus and Deuteronomy– “false” and “vain,” respectively, as well as with the claim that 





The midrash here gathers a number of statements that either complement one another – such as 
remembering the Sabbath as well as guarding it – or directly contradict one another – such as the 
prohibition to marry one’s sister-in-law, and the commandment to off one’s hand in levirate 
marriage to one’s brother’s childless widow – and offers that they are inextricably linked. 
Whether the human mind can conceive of them as simultaneous notions, it is the divine intention 
that the two be considered as one, without contradiction. This addresses the underlying question 
of how Numbers 36 could qualify Numbers 27: it was the Divine plan all along. It is not a 
mistaken gap in the law, a loophole of sorts; it is rather a pre-planned exception. It is no different 
from the built-in exception of wearing wool and linen mixtures in one’s fringed garments or 
marrying one’s levir.105 The fact that the tribal leaders had their epiphany about the need to 
address exogamy and land is only the narrative context of the law, though it is not the origin 
thereof.  
 In both sources, the rabbis try to erase any sense of backtracking or discovered dodge on 
God’s part.  Whether they do so for theological reasons (Divine decision-making cannot be so 
capricious and short-sighted), for ethical reasons (how unfair to promise the daughters of 
Zelophehad only to ultimately take it away or at least minimize it), or simply to protect the Bible 
from scorn, they confront their discomfort head on. In this regard it is fascinating to consider that 
perhaps for the rabbis, people may use loopholes, but God may not.106 Yet, there still is no 
loophole language suggested here. They talk around the issue rather than giving it a name. 
 
                                                          
105 We do not deal here with the fact that the Sabbath example seems different from the others. 
 






Genesis 30 – And Everywhere that Jacob Went, the Sheep Were Sure to Go 
Jacob wishes to leave Laban’s house, but not empty-handed. He offers to take only the 
“speckled and spotted sheep, and every dark one among the sheep, and the spotted and speckled 
among the goats.” 107 To Laban’s surprise, even after Laban removes all such sheep, Jacob 
manages to manipulate the breeding patterns of the flock (vv. 37-42),108 which produces צאן רבות 
– “large flocks” (v. 43) of such spotted and speckled animals. Though Laban had agreed to the 
plan without preconditions or an upper limit of how many animals Jacob could take and with no 
limitations on the methods Jacob could use, chapter 31 reveals Laban and his sons as upset about 
the results: 
1 And he heard the words of Laban's sons, saying: 'Jacob hath taken away all that 
was our father's; and of that which was our father's hath he gotten all this wealth.' 
2 And Jacob beheld the countenance of Laban, and, behold, it was not toward him 
as beforetime.  
 
Jacob rationalizes the outcome to his wives by arguing that his success was due to Divine 
intervention punishing Laban for having cheated Jacob on wages in the past: 
7 And your father hath mocked me, and changed my wages ten times; but God 
suffered him not to hurt me.  8 If he said thus: The speckled shall be thy wages; 
then all the flock bore speckled; and if he said thus: The streaked shall be thy 
wages; then bore all the flock streaked. 9 Thus God hath taken away the cattle of 
your father, and given them to me. 10 And it came to pass at the time that the 
flock conceived, that I lifted up mine eyes, and saw in a dream, and, behold, the 
he-goats which leaped upon the flock were streaked, speckled, and grizzled. 11 
And the angel of God said unto me in the dream: Jacob; and I said: Here am I. 12 
And he said: Lift up now thine eyes, and see, all the he-goats which leap upon the 
flock are streaked, speckled, and grizzled; for I have seen all that Laban doeth 
unto thee. 109  
                                                          
107 Gen. 30:32 
 
108 For a discussion of just how this complex manipulation is to be understood, see Scott B. Noegel, “Sex Sticks and 
the Trickster: A New Look at an Old Crux,” Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Society 25 (1997) 7-17, which 
includes both a general survey of interpretations as well as the author’s own innovative suggestion. See also, Schneir 
Levin, “Albinism and Genetics in the Bible,” Jewish Bible Quarterly 31 (2003) 
109 This episode is included in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice as evidence of Jewish cunning. Shakespeare places 






Unsurprisingly, Josephus completely skips this story in Book 1 of his Antiquities of the 
Jews.110 And while the Book of Jubilees includes the agreement between Jacob and Laban that 
Jacob would take “each of the lambs and kids which were born (and) on which there were black 
or spots or white,” it omits Jacob’s initiatives or any surprising changes in hibernation patterns. 
(vv. 28:27-29) His activities were legal but cunning. 
How are Jacob’s actions understood by the rabbis?111 Dealing devilishly with the devil? 
Within his technical rights?  
 בראשית רבה )וילנא( פרשת וישלח פרשה פב
אות על  ,מדבר בדוד ומתקיים ביעקב ,עשה עמי אות לטובה (תהלים פוכתיב ) ,וירא אלקים אל יעקב
 ...'וגואם כה יאמר עקודים יהיה שכרך  ()בראשית לאשם שנאמר 
And God appeared to Jacob- It is written, “Make with me a sign for goodness.” 
(Psalms 86) It speaks of David, but is fulfilled through Jacob. A sign, regarding 
what was said, (Gen. 31) “If he would say [The speckled shall be your wages, 
then all the flock will bear speckled; if he would say:] The streaked will be your 
wages [then all the flock will bear streaked].” 
 
 בראשית רבה עד:ג
 צפה הקב"ה מה עתיד לבן לעשות ליעקב אבינו והיה צר צורה כיוצא בה "אם כה יאמר וגו'"
God saw what Laban would do to our patriarch Jacob in the future, and would 
draw a picture of it: “If he would say [The speckled shall be your wages, then all 
the flock will bear speckled; if he would say: The streaked will be your wages, 
then all the flock will bear streaked].” (Gen. 31:8) 
 
 בראשית רבה עג:י
                                                          
blessing if men steal it not.” The Merchant of Venice, Ed. John Russell Brown, The Arden Shakespeare, London: 
Methuen (1969) I.iii.71-85. To understand the connection between the Jacob-Laban story and usury, see Joan Ozark 
Holmer, “When Jacob Graz’d His Uncle Laban’s Sheep: A New Source for Merchant of Venice,” Shakespeare 
Quarterly 36,1 (1985) 64-5. 
 
110 He writes instead that “Jacob, moreover, took with him one half of the cattle without the knowledge of Laban.” 
(1.311a)  Some offer this as reworking the biblical verse about Jacob “stealing Laban’s heart” (MT, LXX, Tgs. Ps.-
J. and Neof. Gen 31:20). 
 
111 E.A. Speiser suggests that there are two accounts of the narrative. In J’s version (30:25-31:1), Jacob performs this 
feat of his own initiative because Laban himself had acted cunningly by removing any grown animals that could 
potentially have yielded the animals which Jacob sought. In E’s version (31:2-18a), however, no such actions by 
Laban are recorded, and instead Jacob is told in a dream to do this in order to teach Laban a lesson. Thus, in each 
version, Jacob’s cunning is justified. (E.A. Speiser, The Anchor Bible: Genesis, Introduction, Translation and Notes. 





היה אבינו יעקב נותן את המקלות בשקתות המים והיתה בהמה באה לשתות, ורואה את המקלות 
ונרתעת לאחוריה והזכר רובעה והיתה יולדת כיוצא בו. אמר ר' הושיעא נעשו המים זרע במיעיהם 
 ולא היו חסרות אלא צורת הולד.
Our patriarch Jacob would place the sticks in the water troughs. An animal would 
come to drink, see the sticks and jump backwards in fright, and the male would 
have intercourse with her, and she would birth one like him. R. Hoshaya said, 
“The water became semen within them, and all they needed was the form of the 
fetus.” 
 
According to the rabbis, as according to Jacob himself in the Biblical account, this is not clever 
human manipulation but Divine intervention, full of wonder and miracle. 
Genesis 38 – Judah and Tamar  
After his first two sons, both married to Tamar, die, Judah refuses to marry off a third son 
to her. Rather than declare these intentions, Judah has her languish in her widowhood, ostensibly 
waiting for his third son to come of marriageable age. Tamar devises a plan. She dresses as a 
prostitute and sets up shop in Judah’s path; he sleeps with her, unaware of her true identity. 
When Tamar shows signs of pregnancy several months later, and Judah demands the capital 
crime for her adulterous behavior, Tamar proves to Judah that indeed she is pregnant with his 
seed. The story ends with Tamar giving birth to twins who are considered full-fledged children 
of Judah.  
Are Tamar’s actions adulterous or merely a loophole to achieve levirate union with 
Judah? According to Ancient Near Eastern Law, a widow’s brother-in-law or father-in-law could 
perform levirate marriage.112 Thus, though she has to dress as a prostitute, her union with Judah 
is fully legal – ethically questionable, but fully legal. She tricks him into performing his levirate 
                                                          
112 See Middle Assyrian Law no.33, ANET 182, and Hittite law no. 193, ANET, 196. For a discussion of other 
cultures’ similarities in this regard, see Millar Burrows, “The Ancient Oriental Background of Hebrew Levirate 
Marriage,” BASOR 77 (1940) 8-9.  Based on Ruth 3-4, it seems that in Israelite culture it became common for any 





duties. 113 Perhaps this is why Tamar is validated at the end of the narrative. Indeed, the story 
ends with Judah admitting  צדקה ממני– “She is more righteous than I,” (Gen. 38:26),114 and 
Scripture treats the children of the union of Tamar and Judah as legitimate.115 Elsewhere in the 
Bible, Tamar is even listed as the direct ancestor of King David himself and is held up as a 
model for Israelite women.116   
 While the reality of Ancient Near Eastern Law may render Tamar’s actions completely 
licit - and her ruse simply a loophole - Second Temple and rabbinic literature retroject post-
Sinaitic law onto the Judah and Tamar story. The Book of Jubilees chapter 41, for instance, cites 
the general prohibition of sleeping with a daughter-in-law or a mother-in-law: 
1. …And for that reason she was not given to Shelah, and he did not again approach 
her… 
4. And Judah acknowledged that the deed which he had done was evil, for he had 
lain with his daughter-in-law, and he esteemed it hateful in his eyes, and he 
acknowledged that he had transgressed and gone astray, for he had uncovered the 
                                                          
113 The following sources maintain the sexual encounter between Judah and Tamar as a fulfillment of levirate duties: 
E. Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws. London: Longman, Green & Co. (1944) 34-39; Harry A. Hoffner, Jr., 
“Incest, Sodomy and Bestiality in the Ancient Near East,” Orient and Occident: Essays Presented to Cyrus H. 
Gordon on the Occasion of His Sixty-Fifth Birthday, Ed. Hoffner; Alter Orient und Altes Testament 22 Kevalaer: 
Butzon & Bercker; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, (1973) 81-90, especially 82; Raymond Westbrook, 
“Biblical Law,” in Ed. N.S. Hecht, B.S. Jackson, S.M. Passamaneck, D. Piattelli, A.M. Rabello, An Introduction to 
the History and Sources of Jewish Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1996) 12. Moreover, GW Coats suggests that 
levirate duties may have entailed only intercourse and conception, not marriage. If so, Judah’s sexual act of 
impregnating Tamar would fulfill this obligation, as she bears two children as a result. This would answer Von 
Rad’s famed question about the Tamara story, namely that the audience is never told of her marriage to either Judah 
or Shelah at the end of the story. (See GW Coats, “Widow’s Rights: A Crux in the Structure of Genesis,” CBQ 34 
(1972) 461-66, esp. 464, and Gerhard Von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary. Philadelphia: Westminster (1961) 356.) 
Esther Marie Menn disagrees with the Judah-as-levir position on the basis that: a) Ancient Near Eastern Law may 
not predict the actions of Biblical characters; b) the children of the union are listed in Biblical genealogies as the 
sons of Judah rather than the sons of 'Er or 'Onan. (See Esther Marie Menn, Judah and Tamar (Genesis 38) in 
Ancient Jewish Exegesis: Studies in Literary Form and Hermeneutics (Supplements to the Journal for the Study of 
Judaism v.51). Leiden: Brill (1997) 60) 
 
114 Both Targum Onqelos and Neophyti split the clause in two: צדקה- she is innocent of the charges against her, and 
 the child she bears is from me. (See James Kugel, The ladder of Jacob : ancient interpretations of the biblical -ממני
story of Jacob and his children.  Princeton University Press: Princeton (2006) 170-1, for further discussion.) 
 
115 Gen. 38:28-30; Ruth 4:18. Most significant, I Chronicles 1:3-4 lists Judah as having five sons, equating his two 
sons from Tamar to the three sons he fathered with his original wife. 
 





skirt of his son, and he began to lament and to supplicate before the Lord because 
of his transgression. 
5. And we told him in a dream that it was forgiven him because he supplicated 
earnestly, and lamented, and did not again commit it. 
6. And he received forgiveness because he turned from his sin and from his 
ignorance, for he transgressed greatly before our God; and every one that acts 
thus, everyone who lies with his mother-in-law, let them burn him with fire that 
he may burn therein, for there is uncleanness and pollution upon them, with fire 
let them burn them. 
7. And do thou command the children of Israel that there be no uncleanness amongst 
them, for everyone who lies with his daughter-in-law or with his mother-in-law 
hath wrought uncleanness; with fire let them burn the man who has lain with her, 
and likewise the woman, and He will turn away wrath and punishment from 
Israel. 
8. And unto Judah we said that his two sons had not lain with her, and for this reason 
his seed was established for a second generation, and would not be rooted out. 
 
Once she sleeps with Judah, Tamar is no longer eligible to marry his son Shelah; Judah is 
forgiven only upon repentance; furthermore, the children born to Tamar and Judah remain part of 
the family only because Judah’s own two sons had never actually consummated their respective 
marriages with Tamar. The protestations contained in this passage, asserting several 
contradictory facts at once, reflect difficulty with the seeming happy ending to a sinful 
arrangement.  
The Testament of Judah too judges Tamar and Judah’s intercourse as illicit: 
…and I could not slay her, because it was from the Lord. For I said, Lest haply 
she did it in subtlety, and received the pledge from another woman: but I came 
near her no more till my death, because I had done this abomination in all Israel. 
Moreover, they who were in the city said that there was no bride in the city, 
because she came from another place, and sat for a while in the gate, and she 
thought that no one knew that I had gone in to her.117 
 
This source is bold: Judah only lets Tamar live because perhaps he doubts the evidence! Though 
several chapters later, Judah does recount his guilt at having “uncovered the covering of my 
                                                          





son’s shame” (ibid. 14), a clause patterned after the language of the Holiness Code (Lev. 18:15, 
20:12). In sum, Second Temple literature does not present Tamar’s actions as a loophole, and 
instead either ignores her role or hopes that she is not truly guilty. 
     While Second Temple literature damns the sexual act, the rabbis support it. Though the 
rabbis never refer to Judah and Tamar’s as a levirate union, some clearly recognize their 
relationship as completely legal: in bSotah 10b, Samuel Sabba, father in-law of Samuel b. ’Ami 
says in the latter’s name: Once he (=Judah) slept with her, he did not stop sleeping with her. In 
other words, they kept an ongoing physical (probably marital) relationship. Contrary to how 
others might read the phrase ולא יסף עוד לדעתה – “he did not continue to be intimate with her,118” 
R. Samuel b. ’Ami reads the term יסף as “stop”, as it is used in II Samuel 14.  A few lines later, 
R. Samuel b. Naḥmani quotes R. Jonathan that Tamar was the paragon of modesty in her father-
in-law’s home (prior to their incident), and was rewarded therefore with descendants who were 
kings and prophets. Though clearly R. Jonathan’s comments refer to Tamar before ever donning 
her harlot’s disguise, it is difficult to imagine that Tamar’s actions with Judah were perceived by 
those same rabbis as true harlotry or adultery. Otherwise, her promiscuity should offset any 
rewards for modesty.119 
 Even those who do claim sexual impropriety here, perhaps even adultery, with regards to 
Tamar’s actions, view her as a role model. In bHorayot 10b, ‘Ulla wonders why Tamar acted 
wantonly (זנתה) and was rewarded with royal and prophetic lineage; in response R. Naḥman b. 
                                                          
118 Gen. 38:26 
 
119 Other sources are not clear about the issue. For instance, the stam in bMeg. 25b explains that although one would 
have thought that the communal Torah reading which includes the section of Judah and Tamar should not be 
translated into Aramaic in synagogue, for fear of humiliating the character of Judah, it is nonetheless read due to his 
righteousness admission of guilt. It is striking that this source does not condemn Tamar’s actions. However, it is 
unclear whether this source approves of Tamar’s actions as a valid loophole or because despite breaking the law, she 





Yiṣḥaq (ostensibly120) learns from her the paradigm of, “A transgression performed for genuine 
ends is greater than a commandment performed for ignoble ends” -  גדולה עבירה לשמה ממצוה שלא
 This notion goes beyond accepting use of loopholes, as here the ends justify even .לשמה 
completely illicit means.121 Again, no mention of creative circumvention – just sin, but for the 
right means. 
Genesis 20 – Leaving Out Information 
Genesis 20 records a declaration that is misleading even if technically true. The second 
time Abraham asserts that his wife Sarah is actually his sister in order to protect himself from 
suitors’ harmful intentions Abraham explains to Abimelekh that Sarah actually is his sister. After 
admitting that his primary motivation was to save himself from death in a godless environment, 
he further explains: And moreover she is indeed my sister, the daughter of my father, but not the 
daughter of my mother; and so she became my wife. (12) This is a strange argument. Even if she 
is technically his sister, Abimelekh should still be upset.122 Yet, Abimelekh accepts Abraham’s 
explanation. Perhaps these passages suggest that the two arguments in combination – both fear of 
death and the partial truth of their siblinghood - mutually reinforce each other and somehow 
answer the accusation against Abraham sufficiently. Indeed, as opposed to Pharaoh who is seen 
as simply kicking Abraham out when the same trick is foiled in Genesis  12:18-20 (where, 
admittedly, Abraham offers no excuse whatsoever), Abimelekh accepts Abraham’s argument.123 
                                                          
120 R. Naḥman does not explicitly reference Tamar in his remarks; the stam places his remarks in that context. 
 
121 For an analysis of this concept and its scope within Jewish law in the Talmud and throughout history, see Aharon 
Lichtenstein הרהורים בהלכה ובמחשב -עבירה לשמה , in Ed. H. Deutsch and M. Ben-Sasson, האחר: בין אדם לעצמו ולזולתו, 
Israel: Yedi‘ot Aḥaronot (2001) 99-125; Nahum Rakover, “Violation of the Law in Order to Preserve It” in Eds. 
B.S. Jackson and S. M. Passamaneck, JLAS 6: The Jerusalem 1990 Conference Volume (1990)  
 
122 Significantly, there is a Hittite treaty which mentions a similar case of wife-sister and uses similar terminology 






After inviting Abraham to remain in his land, he tells Sarah: And unto Sarah he said: 'Behold, I 
have given thy brother a thousand pieces of silver; behold, it is for thee a covering of the eyes to 
all that are with thee; and before all men thou art righted.' (16) When speaking to Sarah, he calls 
Abraham “thy brother.”124 
 According to E.A. Speiser this reflects the phenomenon of the sister-wife in Nuzi culture.  
He bases this on two parallel contracts, one in which a woman is given to a man as his wife, and 
the second, where she is given to that same man as a sister. “It follows,” he says, “that a wife 
could have simultaneously the status of sister.”125 Samuel Greengus, however, disagrees, reading 
the same two contracts as a case of a mistaken draft that was not discarded and the true draft. 
Based on other sources regarding adoption as a sister, he claims that the sister was a designation 
for older women or manumitted slaves who had no family to provide for them. The adoptive 
brother would provide. For Greengus, the tale remains enigmatic.126 
Far from being uncomfortable with Abraham’s excuse, the Babylonian Talmud explains 
that Sarah was not even his half-sister, as the plain Biblical text suggests: she is his fraternal 
niece. Thus, Abraham’s excuse to Abimelekh is that much weaker: we are related through my 
brother born of the same father.127 Gen. Rabbah128 indicates that Abraham speaks in 
                                                          
123Tzvi Novick has pointed out the parallel between Abimelekh’s “rhetoric of self-justification” and Abraham’s. 
Both employ the term גם, also (Gen. 20:4-5,11-13). While Novick suggests that this is an indication that 
Abimelekh’s rhetoric has turned “infectious,” perhaps it also indicates a subtle critique of Abraham. (Tzvi Novick, 
“Almost, at Times, the Fool: Abimelekh and Genesis 20,” Prooftexts 24 (2004) 280.) 
 
124 While it is possible that he simply is not letting on to Sarah that he knows the truth, or perhaps he is even being 
facetious, ours is an equally likely reading, given his positive treatment of Abraham and Sarah.. 
 
125 E.A. Speiser, “The Wife-Sister Motif in the Patriarchal Narratives,” Biblical and Other Studies, Ed. A. Altmann 
(1963) 19. 
126 Samuel Greengus, “Sisterhood Adoption at Nuzi and the ‘Wife-Sister’ in Genesis,” HUCA 46 (1975) 5-31 
 
127 bSan. 58b 
 





Abimelekh’s own cultural idiom rather than going into the specifics of Sarah actually being his 
niece:  
אמר להן בשיטתן השיבן   וגם אמנה אחתי בת אבי וגו'  ויאמר אבימלך אל אברהם מה ראית וגו'
 הגןשבת אב מותרת להן ובת אם אסורה לפיכך השיבן כמנ
And Abimelekh said to Abraham: ‘Why did you, etc.? And she is truly my sister, 
the daughter of my father, etc.’ He spoke to them according to their rule. He 
responded that one’s paternal half-sister is permissible in marriage, though one’s 
maternal half-sister is not. Therefore, he responded to them according to their own 
custom. 
 
Abraham is aware that saying that Sarah is his sister leaves open the possibility that they are also 
married, as the Philistines allowed for marriage between a man and his paternal sister. In an 
effort to shift the emphasis to Abimelekh’s actions, bBava Qamma 92a ignores any sense of 
Abraham’s dishonesty and instead takes Abimelekh to task for not knowing better than to first 
ask a guest about the woman traveling with him; he should instead have offered food and drink! 
In this argument, the rabbis clearly see Abimelekh in the wrong and Abraham in the right. They 
do not, however, assert any precedent based on his clever word choice. 
Exodus 2- Baby Moses on the Nile River  
At a time when male Israelite babies are being drowned in the Nile River by Pharaoh’s 
edict,129 baby Moses’ mother places him into the Nile in a basket. Pharaoh’s own daughter finds 
him and raises him as her own. Is the salvation of baby Moses based on a loophole?  
William Propp writes: 
Our story is laced with ironies, both comic and tragic. Moses’ mother complies 
with the decree of drowning - in a fashion. Reinterpreting the verb hishlikh 
‘throw,’ she gently places Moses in a vessel and sets im among the rushes. 
Pharaoh’s law, moreover, failed to say that a baby, once deposited in the Nile 
might not be extracted by another party 130 
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130 William H.C. Propp, Anchor Bible, Exodus 1-8: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary.  New 






Pharaoh had decreed that baby boys be “thrown” into the Nile; Moses’ mother places131 him132 
there. Pharaoh’s decree assumed that the babies would die in the Nile, but what of children who 
survive the Nile? 
The rabbinic material goes in a different direction entirely, actually indicating that 
placing Moses into the basket was the equivalent of throwing him into the Nile. This was 
not a trick; it was simply the most humane way of doing the deed: 
 בבלי מגילה יד.
ותקח מרים הנביאה אחות אהרן ולא אחות משה אמר ר' נחמן אמר רב שהיתה מתנבאה כשהיא אחות 
אהרן ואומרת עתידה אמי שתלד בן שיושיע את ישראל ובשעה שנולד נתמלא כל הבית כולו אורה 
עמד אביה ונשקה על ראשה אמר לה בתי נתקיימה נבואתך וכיון שהשליכוהו ליאור עמד אביה 
אשה ואמר לה בתי היכן נבואתך היינו דכתיב ותתצב אחותו מרחוק לדעה לדעת מה יהא וטפחה על ר
 בסוף נבואתה.
And Miriam the prophetess, the sister of Aaron [took the timbrel in her hand] (Ex. 
15:20) – And not the sister of Moses? R. Naḥman said in the name of Rav: She 
prophesied [already] when she was only the sister of Aaron, and she would say, “ 
My mother will birth a son who will save Israel.” And when he was born, the 
entire house filled with light. Her father kissed her on her head and said to her, 
“My daughter, your prophecy has been fulfilled.” And when they threw him into 
the Nile, her father hit her on her head and said to her, “My daughter, where is 
your prophecy?” That is what is meant when it is written, “And his sister stood 
from afar do know,” to know what would become of her prophecy. 
 
Contrary to what many children are taught about this story in primary school, Moses’ 
mother does not leave Miriam to stand guard; rather, Jokhebed herself had thrown him into the 
Nile (apparently along with her husband) and walks away in defeat, and Miriam remains to see 
                                                          
foundling” stories, indicating another possible motive for this motif.  Herodotus (Histories 4.154) tells a comparable 
tale of  Themison: commanded to throw a princess into the seas, she merely immerses her briefly and thereby saves 
her life. 
 
131 Ex. 2:3 – the Hebrew verb ותשם is used. 
 
132 Herodotus (Histories 4.154) tells a comparable tale of on Themison: commanded to throw a princess into the 





what might happen. This was far from a well-hatched plan. It is a capitulation to Pharaoh’s 
decree. 
The rabbis place the same perspective in the mouths of the handmaidens accompanying 
Pharaoh’s daughter: 
 יב: בבלי סוטה
ותרא את התיבה בתוך הסוף כיון דחזו דקא בעו לאצולי למשה אמרו לה גבירתנו מנהגו של עולם 
מלך בשר ודם גוזר גזירה אם כל העולם כולו אין מקיימין אותה בניו ובני ביתו מקיימין אותה ואת 
 עוברת על גזירת אביך בא גבריאל וחבטן בקרקע.
And she saw the basket in the rush: When they (=her maids) saw that they wished 
to save Moses, they said to her, “Our Mistress, generally when a king makes a 
decree, even if the whole world disobeys it, at the very least his children and 
members of his household uphold it, yet you are violating your father’s decree?!” 
[The angel] Gabriel came and pushed them down into the ground. 
  
 It is only later, medieval collections that suggest a potential loophole: placing Moses in 
the Nile River is a deliberate tactic to throw Egyptian astrologers off his scent. And indeed, the 
midrash relates how well this strategy works: 
 שמות רבה )שנאן( פרשת שמות פרשה א
  .שיהו חושבים האצטגנינין שכבר הושלך במים ולא יחפשו אחריו ?ולמה השליכתו ביאור
And why did she throw him into the Nile? So that the astrologers would think that 
he had been thrown into the river and would not search for him. 
 
 שמות רבה )שנאן( פרשת שמות פרשה א
 ,שכיון שהפילו ליאור למשה בטלה הגזרה .זה נופל ליאור ?מהו זה מילדי העברים זה )שמות ב'(
וכי יאמרו אליכם דרשו אל האבות ואל הידענים המצפצפים והמהגים  :אלעזר 'כההיא דאמר ר
כל  :עמדו וגזרו ,ראו שמושיעם של ישראל במים נדון .צופים ואינם יודעים מה הוגים ,()ישעיהו ח
 .כבר הושלך מושיען במים :כיון שהושלך משה ליאור אמרו .א'( הבן הילוד היארה תשליכהו )שמות
  שעל מי מריבה הוא לוקה... ,והם אינם יודעים .מיד בטלו גזירתם
From the children of the Hebrews is this: What is “this”? “This” refers to the Nile, 
that once Moses was thrown into the Nile, the decree ended. As R. Elazar said: 
“And when they say to you: ‘Seek the ghosts and the familiar spirits that chirp 
and mutter” – they chirp, yet they do not know what they mutter: They saw that 
the savior of Israel would be judged with water, so they decreed:  Any son born, 
thrown hi into the Nile. Once Moses was thrown into the Nile, they said: their 
savior has already been thrown into the water. Immediately, they ended their 







Once Moses was in the Nile, in one form or another, the astrologers thought he was dead and the 
threat of an Israelite savior was dead letter. It seems that Jokhebed trick had worked.  But once 
again, this material is post-amoraic.  The earlier rabbis took no interest in this loophole. There is 
even one opinion that suggests that Jokhebed placed Moses in a different body of water, perhaps 
simply in an effort to hide him.133 
Imagined “Biblical” Loopholes 
 Though the rabbis themselves did not consciously use Biblical134 loopholes as their 
model for legal loopholes, they did project use of such legal gaps upon Biblical characters. Most 
famously, David is said never to have truly sinned with Bathsheba because he was technically 
divorced at the time: The Book of II Samuel tells the story of King David spotting the beautiful 
Bathsheba bathing on her roof and taking her to bed despite her marriage to Uriah, a soldier 
away at battle. Following their affair, David invites Uriah back from battle and tells him to go 
home to consort with his wife. Uriah refuses, sleeping elsewhere instead, and is sent back to war, 
where David has sent a courier with the message to the general to place Uriah on the front lines 
to be killed. The outcome of the story involves David’s marriage to Bathsheba, the death of their 
bastard child, a sharp scolding by the prophet Nathan and ultimately Bathsheba birthing 
Solomon, David’s eventual heir. Yet, the rabbis refuse to accept David’s adulterous relationship 
at face value, perhaps especially because of its ramifications for Solomon’s genetic provenance: 
 בבלי שבת נו.
האומר דוד  כל: יונתן רבי אמר נחמני בר שמואל רבי אמר
 ושכינה לידו בא חטא אפשר,' וגו עמו' וה משכיל דרכיו לכל דוד ויהיד שנאמר, טועה אלא אינו חטא
                                                          
133 R. Samuel b. Naḥmani, bSotah 12a 
 
134 The potential balance to the Biblical preference for the letter of the law is found in the Prophetic books of the 
Bible in which the Prophets scold the people for remaining loyal to the letter of ritual law while ignoring the most 
important (legal and) moral values, such as courtroom justice and the sanctity of life.  However, this does not 





ה'  דבר את בזית מדוע מקיים אני מה אלא ?עמו
  מהפך מדוד דאתי רבי :רב אמר .עשה ולא לעשות שביקש הרע שותלע
 רעה משונה :אומר רבי הרע לעשות ה' דבר את בזית מדוע ;דדוד בזכותיה ודריש
  שכל ,שבתורה רעות מכל זו
 הכית החתי אוריה אתו. עשה ולא לעשות שביקש לעשות כתיב וכאן ויעש בהו כתיב שבתורה רעות
  לאשה לך לקחת אשתו ואת .דנת ולא בסנהדרין לדונו לך שהיה - בחרב
גט כותב דוד בית למלחמת היוצא כל :יונתן רבי אמר נחמני בר שמואל רבי דאמר .בה לך יש ליקוחין
 תביא האלה החלב חריצי עשרת ואת שנאמר ,לאשתו כריתות 
 תקח ערבתם ואת לשלום תפקד אחיך ואת האלף לשר
 לבינה בינו המעורבים דברים :יוסף רב תני  ?ערבתם מאי
R. Samuel b. Naḥmani said in the name of R. Jonathan: All who say that David 
sinned is mistaken, as it is said: And David was successful in all ways, and God 
was with him.” Is it possible that sin happened upon David and the Divine 
Presence was with him? So how can I uphold, “Why have you scorned the word 
of God to do bad”? Rabbi says: This “bad” is different from all other [uses of the 
term] “bad” in the Torah, for all [instances of] “bad” in the Torah are delineated 
by “And he did,” yet here it is written “to do” – thus indicating that he wanted to 
do bad, but he did not do bad. “And you killed Uriah the Hittite by the sword”? 
That you should have judged him. “And you took his wife for yourself as a wife”? 
Indicating that your marriage to her is valid. As R. Samuel b. Naḥmani said in the 
name of R. Jonathan: All who went out to war in David’s house wrote a writ of 
divorce to his wife, as it is said: “And take these ten cheeses to the general of the 
thousands, and bring greetings to your brothers, and take their pledge. What is 
“their pledge”? Rabbi Joseph said: That which is involved between him and her. 
 
The passage protects David at every turn: Bathsheba was not really married, though this is 
unsubstantiated by the text. Uriah was deserving of death for not going home when David 
instructed him to do so, though the Bible does not describe the instructions as any sort of true 
royal command. But in order to save David’s face, and perhaps to square David’s activities with 
rabbinic laws regarding adultery, the rabbis find loopholes. Never mind Nathan’s moralizing 
call, the rabbis find loopholes.  Though David’s actions may still have been inappropriate, they 
were not technically sinful. 
 A second pertinent example relates to an imagined conversation between Abraham and 






 בראשית רבה )וילנא( פרשת וירא פרשה מט -בראשית רבה )וילנא( פרשת לך לך פרשה לט
אדא נשבעת שאין אתה מביא מבול לעולם מה את מערים על השבועה מבול של מים אין אתה  'אמר ר
  מביא אם כן לא יצאת ידי שבועהמבול של אש את  ,מביא
R. Aḥa said: You swore and said that you would not bring a flood to the world – 
why are You acting with cunning against Your oath? It is a wonder: You may not 
bring a flood of water, but You may bring a flood of fire? If so, You have not 
fulfilled Your oath! 
 
Abraham refuses to read God’s post-deluvian oath of Genesis 9:15 narrowly. This example is 
significant, as Abraham rejects God’s use of a loophole! In the end, the Bible relates that Sodom 
is indeed destroyed in a flood of fire (Gen. 19:24), but it is significant that the rabbis were 
against this loophole. It is significant because a rigidly formalistic system like that of the Ancient 
Near East would never have rejected a loophole. By definition, following the letter of the law is 
following the law.135  
 In a third case, Hannah of I Samuel bargains with God for a child, to the point of 
blackmail: 
 בבלי ברכות לא.
 מוטב  ראה אם ,עולם של רבונו :הוא ברוך הקדוש לפני חנה אמרה :אלעזר רבי אמר,תראה ראה אם
אתה  ואי ,סוטה מי לי משקו דמסתתרנא וכיון ,בעלי אלקנה בפני ואסתתר אלך ,תראה לאו ואם
 .זרע ונזרעהונקתה  :שנאמר,פלסתר תורתך עושה
If a seeing You shall see: R. Elazar said: Hannah said before God, “Master of the 
universe, if a seeing, good, and if not, You shall see: I shall go and seclude myself 
[with another man] before my husband Elqanah. And when I seclude myself, they 
will make me drink the sotah waters, and You would not wish to make Your 
Torah a joke, would You? As it says [regarding the innocently accused sotah], 
“And she shall be cleared, and she shall conceive a child.” 
 
R. Elazar turns Hannah’s ostensibly innocent supplication into blackmail. The rabbis suggest that 
Ḥannah has read her Bible; she knows that the wrongly accused sotah is promised children as 
compensation for her ordeal. Taking advantage of this promise, Hannah threatens to turn herself 
                                                          






into a sotah. The sugya cites an objection by R. ‘Aqiba from elsewhere, ultimately stepping back 
from R. Elazar’s fanciful story: 
בריו יולדת בצער יולדת היתה אם דאמר למאן אלא ,שפיר נפקדת עקרה היתה אם דאמר למאן הניחא
  :דתניא ?למימר איכא מאי ,ארוכים יולדת -קצרים ,לבנים יולדת - שחורים,זכרים יולדת - נקבות ,ח
 ונקתה
ילכו  ,כן אם :עקיבא רבי ליה אמר ;ישמעאל רבי דברי ,נפקדת עקרה היתה שאם ,מלמד  זרע ונזרעה
בר יולדת - בצער יולדת היתה שאם מלמד :אלא !נפקדת קלקלה שלא וזו ,ויסתתרו כולן העקרות כל
אם  מאי .שנים יולדת - אחד ,לבנים יולדת - שחורים .ארוכים יולדת - קצרים ,יוח
  .אדם בני כלשון תורה דברה - תראה ראה
This is acceptable according to the one who says that if the [wrong accused sotah] 
was barren, she would conceive, but according to the one who says that if the 
[wrongly accused sotah] had difficult labors she would have easier labors; if she 
had birthed girls, she would birth boys, if she had birthed black [babies], she 
would birth white [babies], what is there to so? As it was taught: And she shall be 
cleared, and she shall conceive a child – this teaches that if she was barren, she 
would conceive, according to R. Ishmael. R. Aqiba said to him, If so, let all 
barren women go and seclude themselves, and she who did not commit adultery 
would conceive! Rather, it teaches that had she birthed in pain, she would birth 
more easily, had she birthed short children, she would birth taller children, had 
she birthed black children, she would birth white children, had she birthed 
singletons, she would birth twins. So what is “A seeing you shall see”? The Torah 
speaks in human idiom. 
 
R. Elazar imagines Hannah’s shrewd use of a loophole in the sotah law: the absence of a 
stipulation preventing any woman from getting herself named a sotah. Though not discussing 
Hannah directly, R. Aqiba rightly notes that the hole is too gaping. It simply cannot be that the 
verse would offer such a shortcut. Hence, he claims that the promise for the innocent sotah is not 
to have children, but to change the nature of the labor and the children that she is meant to have. 
R. Eliezer and R. Aqiva see the potential loopholes and differ as to how to deal with them. 
 אלבק( פרשת נח פרשה לא -בראשית רבה )תיאודור
כל  ,הגיע קץ קטיגוריה שלהם ,הגיע זמנם להיעשות בוסר ,הגיע זמנם להקצץ קץ כל בשר בא לפני[
חנינא חמס שוה פרוטה גזל  'אמר ר ,אי זה הוא חמס ואי זה הוא גזל ,כך למה כי מלאה הארץ חמס
 ,עושים היה אחד מהם מוציא קופתו מליאה תורמוסיןוכך היו אנשי דור המבול  ,פחות משווה פרוטה
בא זה ונוטל פחות משווה פרוטה ובא כל אחד ואחד נוטל פחות משווה פרוטה שלא יהא יכול להוציא 
אמר הקב"ה אתם עשיתם שלא כשורה אף אני אעשה עמכם שלא כשורה הה"ד הלא נסע  ,ממנו בדין





אין משים אלא דין היך דאת אמר ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם  )שם שם איוב ד:כ(יאבדו 
 )שמות כא:א(
Because the earth is filled with violence (ḥamas) through them (Gen. 6:13). What 
is ḥamas (violence) and what is gezel (robbery)? Said R. Ḥanina: Ḥamas 
(violence) refers to what is worth a perutah. And this is what the people of the age 
of the flood used to do. When a man brought out a basket full of lupines [for sale], 
one would come and seize less than a perutah’s worth, and then everyone would 
come and seize less than a perutah’s worth, so that he hand no redress at law. 
Whereupon, the Holy One, blessed be He, said: “You have acted improperly (she-
lo ka-shurah), so I will deal with you improperly (she-lo ka-shurah).”136 
  
This final example is fascinating in that it takes notice of how unfair the use of loopholes can be 
and yet how difficult it is for an institutionalized legal system to prosecute such dodges. In this 
example, people would steal the worth of less than the lowest denomination of coinage to avoid 
prosecution. (Presumably the rabbis are projecting their own law interpretation that theft of less 
than a perutah is not covered by the prohibition not to steal.137)  The rabbis are uncomfortable 
with the idea that one could use such a loophole to commit injustice, yet human courts were 
powerless. Consequently, they suggest, God Godself exacts the punishment.138 
 These imagined loopholes by the rabbis do not stem from a close reading of the Biblical 
text. Though the rabbis seem to anchor their suggestions in the Biblical text, the text is more a 




                                                          
136 Translation by Aaron Kirschenbaum, Equity in Jewish law: Halakhic perspectives in law: formalism and 
flexibility in Jewish civil law. Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House (1991) 22-23 
 
137 bSan. 57a. According to rabbinic law, stealing less than a perutah may still be prohibited, though it may not be 
punishable. 
 
138 In the rabbinic worldview, this concept is known as חייב בדיני שמים, bearing obligation in the Heavenly court, even 





Summary: Bible Does Not Shape Rabbinic Loopholes 
 Jane Kanarek has recently shown that even Biblical narratives served as,139 or were 
presented by ancient rabbinic texts as having served as,140 a legitimate basis for law in certain 
cases – e.g., the binding of Isaac in Genesis 22 serving as a basis for rules of ritual slaughter. She 
argues that this is merely exemplary of “the ways in which stories lie behind and shape norms” 
in general.141 Yet our summary of Biblical loopholes and rabbinic responses reveals that the 
rabbis did not develop their approach to legal circumvention by looking into the Bible. Most 
often, they comment on everything in a narrative but the loophole aspect, or they efface the 
loophole by calling it a sin (as in the case of Tamar) or an exception (as in the case of the 
daughters of Zelopheḥad marrying within their tribe).  Even when they mimic the very same 
form of loophole when discussing the very same story, as in the example of women and the tribe 
of Benjamin in the Babylonian Talmud, the rabbis do not acknowledge it. Likewise, they do not 
cite Biblical loopholes as precedent for rabbinic loopholes. On the contrary, they offer Biblical 





                                                          
139 For the debate as to whether the law came first or the interpretation of the Biblical source actually came first, see: 
David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press (1986); Jacob Z. Lauterbach, Midrash and Mishnah: A Study in the Early History of the 
Halakhah, Rabbinic Essay. New York: Ktav (1973) 163-256; and E.E. Urbach, “Ha-derashah ke-Yesod ha-halakhah 
u-vayat ha-soferim,” Me-olamam she hakhamim: kovets mehkarim. Jerusalem: Magnes Press (1988) 166-82. 
 
140 Jane Kanarek, “He took the knife: biblical narrative and the formation of rabbinic law,” AJS Review 34,1 (2010) 
80 n. 49. (For a parallel discussion regarding halakhic midrashim, see Jay M. Harris, How Do We Know This? 
Midrash and the Fragmentation of Modern Judaism. Albany: State University of New York Press (1995) 3-5) 
 
141 See Robert Cover’s storied article, “Nomos and Narrative” in Eds. Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, and Austin 






A Society Governed by Formalism142 
 
 This act of rabbinic omission is striking. The fact that the Biblical examples are taken 
from legal narratives, though, somewhat explains the gap. As Barry Wimpfheimer has noted 
(with regards to talmudic legal narratives): 
While legal statutes are generally articulated in present time in order to evoke a 
universality of temporal application, the legal narratives out of which they are 
drawn construct their tales using a diachronic sequencing that allows for character 
and plot development over time…If rabbinic legal codes mark issues of law 
through binary decisions tantamount to black and white, the legal narrative 
represents a far richer palette, allowing not only for legal shades of gray, but for a 
wide range of possibilities. These differences between legal narratives and other 
legal texts all for different modes of reading, indeed for a broader legal 
discourse…143  
 
Given that stories are not to be read in a black and white fashion, it is difficult to extract clear 
legal precedent for law, especially the kind that loopholes reflect, from such material. And 
indeed, the rabbis do more often focus on the more dramatic elements of these stories – God’s 
aid to Jacob, Benjamin’s readmission to the body politic of Israel, Abimelekh’s evil, Solomon’s 
murder of his own teacher, etc., etc., rather than bottom line legal precedent. 
But there is also a historically contextual explanation, one which related to the evolution 
of legal thought in the ancient world. David Daube theorized that Biblical dodges are part and 
parcel of a genuinely uncompromising formalism, emphasizing the significance of the letter of 
                                                          
142 What we mean by formalism here is HLA Hart’s definition thereof: “he has a verbal description which he can use 
to pick out what he must do in future and when he must do it. He has only to recognize instances of clear verbal 
terms, to ‘subsume’ particular facts under general classificatory heads and raw a simple syllogistic conclusion. He is 
not faced with the alternative of choosing at his peril or seeking further authoritative guidance. He has a rule which 
he can apply by himself to himself.” HLA Hart, The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1965) 125-6. Hart 
actually questions whether language can ever be so clear-cut, and in the following chapter, we will offer less 
mechanistic approaches to formalism in the wake of his critique. 
 
143 Barry Scott Wimpfheimer, Narrating the Law: A Poetics of Talmudic Legal Stories. Philadelphia: University of 





the law even at the expense of its spirit. 144  Whether in cases of contracts or oaths, a person may 
think s/he is agreeing to something based on certain facts, only to find out later that those facts 
are not true, and yet the contract stands.145 This is why, for example, the Israelites, according to 
the plain meaning of the Bible were required to uphold their treaty with the Gibeonites, though it 
had been made based on false information.146 It is why Jacob and Laban’s agreement that Jacob 
would take only the spotted animals was upheld, though Jacob could not have anticipated that 
Laban would remove the spotted animals, and likewise Laban could not have anticipated Jacob’s 
method for causing the flock to bear a multitude of such animals.  It also explains some of the 
most perplexing ploys in the book of Genesis. Isaac’s blessing of Jacob was done under false 
pretenses, and yet it is deemed valid.147 He cannot take it away. Later, Jacob’s marriage to Leah 
is deemed valid, again done without full knowledge of Jacob.148 David Daube likewise argues 
that Esau’s sale of the birthright was just such a case: he sold his birthright in exchange for what 
he thought was life-sustaining blood broth, and though it was not, the sale was still binding.149  
As Raymond Westbrook writes:  
                                                          
144 See Andrew Huxley, “Shylock’s Bad Karma: The Buddhist Approach To Law,” Law and Critique VII:2 (1996) 
in which Huxley argues that this is essentially a western phenomenon that did not plague the far east. 
 
145 David Daube, “Summum Ius Summa Iniuria,” Studies in Biblical Law, David Daube.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (1947) 190.  
 
146 Contrary to the talmudic view cited above that would relieve the Israelites of such obligation because of the false 
pretenses. 
 
147 Raymond Westbrook suggests that the validity of the blessing is based on the payment that Isaac had received for 
it, namely the meat. (Raymond Westbrook, “Good as His Word: Jacob Manipulates Justice,” Biblical Archaeology 
Review 35:3 (2009) 55) 
 
148 Westbrook suggests that receiving conjugal privilege with Leah is what gives the legal obligation its force. He 
bases this on Ex. 22:16-17 (Westbrook, “Good as His Word”) 
 
149 Daube, “Summum,” 198. Westbrook here suggests that both the oath taken by Esau and the payment of the stew 





A legal obligation is not the same as a moral obligation. There is a formality in 
the law, especially the law of contracts, which sets it apart from the dictates of 
justice. The patriarchal narratives in Genesis derive much of their dramatic force 
– not to mention their instructive power – from this tension between legal and 
moral standards. That is one reason for their timeless appeal. The chasm between 
legal and moral responsibility has never been fully bridged. Legal forms, in the 
hands of the unscrupulous, can be an instrument of injustice in ancient times as 
today.150 
 
The phenomenon continues even beyond the Pentateuch: Jephtah is meant to carry out his 
oath to sacrifice his daughter despite the fact that he did not mean for that to happen151 at the 
time of his oath (Judges 11:30-40)152; Jonathan son of Saul violates an oath that Saul had 
foresworn his soldiers not to eat a morsel of food on the day of the great battle against the 
Philistines upon pain of death (I Samuel 14:24-28); and Saul plans to put Jonathan to death for it, 
though Jonathan had not known of the oath before he ate153 (I Samuel 14:44); as David is being 
actively being pursued by Saul, despite the prophet Samuel’s promise that Saul’s reign would 
end and David’s would begin, David still believes that he may not kill the “anointed of God with 
immunity.”154 Though the anointed of God is no longer behaving as such, and has even been 
rejected, his legal status remains, and he is untouchable.  
Granted, the Bible does, at least in the Genesis narratives, portray a measure for measure 
punishment for those who have manipulated the law to their own benefit: the person using the 
law for his or her own purposes getting tripped up by his or her very own methods. Jacob dresses 
                                                          
150 Westbrook, “Good as His Word”  
 
151 Moshe Reiss makes the point that Jephtah specified that he would sacrifice something that came out of the “doors  
of my house (Judges 11:31)”, which by definition implies a human being, as animals are not kept in the house. 
(Moshe Reiss, “Jephthah’s Daughter,” Jewish Bible Quarterly 37,1 (2009) 57) 
 
152 It is the rabbis who inject the possibility of nullifying the vow. See Gen. Rabbah 60:3.  
 
153 Though Saul’s men prevent him from doing so. 
 





as Esau to trick his father into blessing, and so Leah dresses as Rachel to trick Jacob into 
marriage.155 But regardless, the letter of the law triumphs:156   
It (=the Bible) is rooted in an epoch when the alternative to chaos was a body of 
inflexible norms on which, if you were shrewd and unscrupulous, you might 
easily take your stand while defeating their purpose. 157 As the slogan has it: 
summum ius summa iniuria, ‘utmost law, utmost injustice’. 158The community, 
though realizing what was going on, was powerless to stop it: that would have 
required a generally more advanced state of things.159 
 
The rabbis, however, were not prone to this rigidly formalistic view of the law. Thus, the 
Bible (and Ancient Near Eastern law in general) does not offer precedent for how loopholes 
function in law. In the following chapter we will argue that instead, the rabbis were influenced 
on this score by their Graeco-Roman milieu, in which rhetoricians and jurists clearly recognized 
                                                          
155 As Westbrook points out, Jacob took advantage of Isaac’s blindness, and Laban took advantage of Jacob’s 
“blindness,” namely his inability to see who he was sleeping with under cover of darkness. (Westbrook, “Good as 
His Word”) 
 
156 Daube, “Fraud on Law for Fraud on Law,” Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 1, No 1 (Spring 1981) 58. This is an 
appropriate place to say a few words the Prophetic books which deal with ritualism in a different sense. The 
prophetic ethos in the Bible has been, for good reason, associated with harangues against hypocrisy and distinction 
between the letter of the law and the spirit of the law in general. However, the guise that this distinction takes on 
within the section of Tanakh labeled Prophets points to following the letter of the ritual law while ignoring laws 
about justice and fairness, also laws, but representative of the spirit of God’s command. It does not discuss loopholes 
the way that we have defined them – namely finding a technicality in order to evade a rule or commitment.  
 
157 Boaz Cohen locates a few terms that he believes correspond to equity, as opposed to strict law. He suggests, for 
instance, that the terms מישור (Isa. 11:4; Mal. 2:6 et al.) and משפט אמת (Ps. 19:10; 18:8) refer to the notion of equity, 
as in law that conforms to morality rather than simply a strict literal reading. Whether his reading is anachronistic is 
up for debate. Regardless, it does not impact the fact that contracts stood and loopholes were accepted, whether just 
or not. (See Boaz Cohen, “Letter and Spirit,”48-49) 
 
158 The later prophets were known to have argued the importance of ethics too. See Isaiah, Amos, et al. However, 
their words must be read as a scourge against prioritizing ritual between humanity and God while failing to deliver 
justice to, or behave ethically towards, other human beings.  This is not a critique of ritual, but a critique of an 
imbalanced religious commitment. 
 
159 David Daube, “Fraud on Law,” 59. The rabbis too sometimes seek out that “measure for measure” type 
compensation in biblical stories – because one tricked, one gets tricked. Examples can be found regarding Tamar’s 
duping of Judah as punishment for his tricking his father into thinking that Joseph had been mauled by a wild 
animal. Genesis Rabbah (Vilna) Vayeshev 85. In fact, here it the use of kid goats to accomplish the deceit in both 
instances – Joseph’s brothers, including Judah, present Joseph’s torn garment dipped in goats blood, and Tamar 
takes Judah’s staff and signet ring as collateral for the kid goats that he must pay her in exchange for sleeping with 





both the spirit and the letter of the law; the rabbis shared those dual concerns. Thus, not every 
commitment would be deemed binding if agreed to under false pretense (as evidenced by 
concepts such as nullification of vows,160 mistaken transactions,161 advance notice of duress 
(which prevents any later agreement from taking hold162) and more), nor would every loophole 
will be accepted163. Whether downplaying Biblical loopholes was a conscious choice or a 
subconscious move away from what was seen as too mechanistic, there are important differences 
between rabbinic loopholes and Biblical loopholes.  
Wisdom Literature 
 Despite our protestations about the rabbinic conception of loopholes differing from the 
Biblical conception, the rabbis did adopt something incredibly significant from the Bible with 
regards to legal dodges, namely, terminology.  
Wisdom Literature contains eleven words for wisdom, each with distinct connotations. 
Michael V. Fox discerns two terms for wisdom which dominate the Book of Proverbs in 
particular, both of which are relevant to loopholes a) mezimmah, shrewdness, and b) ‘ormah, 
cunning.164 The primary meaning of mezimmah is, “hidden, private thinking,” while “the notions 
                                                          
160 bHag. 10a 
 
161 bGittin 14a 
 
162 bBB 40a 
 
163 As evidenced by Abraham’s midrashic accusation against God above, as well as the explanation for the 
generation of the flood 
 
164 There is a third term that is potentially relevant as well. The term taḥbulot, plans, Fox suggests sometimes refers 
to guidance, as in the navigation through life that is the metaphorical equivalent of the ḥovel, sailor who navigates 
the seas, while at other times “design” or “plan” is a better translation. Sir. 37:17 suggests that such taḥbulot may be 
used for good or evil, while Proverbs 12:5b suggests that taḥbulot are evil. (Michael V. Fox, The Anchor Bible Vol. 
18a, Proverbs 1-9, Doubleday: New York (2000), 37.) We do not include taḥbulot, as the term itself does not 





of planning and scheming are extensions of the primary sense.”165 In some passages within 
Proverbs – inter alia, 12:2, 14:17, 24:8; Ps 10:2; 21:12; 37:7166 - the term bears a negative 
connotation, referring to mischievous plans. For instance, Proverbs 24:8 explains  מחשב להרע לו
 He that devises to do evil, men shall call him a mischievous man.” Elsewhere“ –בעל מזמות יקראו 
in Proverbs, however – inter alia, 2:11, 5:2, 8:12167 - it carries the positive connotation of 
discretion.168 To illustrate, Proverbs 5, begins  בני לחכמתי הקשיבה לתבונתי הט אזנך לשמר מזמות ודעת
-שפתיך ינצורו  - “My son, attend unto my wisdom, incline your ear to my understanding; that you 
ay preserve discretion and that your lips may keep knowledge.”  
Mezimmah differs in its variability (within Proverbs) from ‘ormah. The term ‘ormah 
maintains a consistently affirmative character throughout the Book of Proverbs,169 though it is 
used negatively elsewhere in the Bible - e.g., Genesis 3:1, regarding the cunning serpent; Exodus 
21:14, regarding a premeditative murderer170; Joshua 9:4, about the sly Gibeonites; and Job 5:13, 
(variant form of עורם) about those who cause their own downfall through craftiness.171  In 
contrast to such examples, the stated goal of the Wisdom character in the Book of Proverbs is to 
                                                          
165 Ibid. 
 
166 Also Sir. 44.4, 
 
167 Also Job 42:2 
 
168 Michael V. Fox, Anchor Bible Vol. 18a, Proverbs 1-9, Doubleday: New York, (2000), 34 
 
169 Prov. 8:5a, 12; 12:16b, 23; 13:16a; 14:8a, 15b, 18b; 15:5; 17:2; 19:25a; 22:3; 27:12; LXX renders ‘ormah as 
πανουργία which is likewise used elsewhere in Greek literature as negative (e.g., Arist. HA 488b20 for the cunning 
of animals, Arist EN 1144a28 and Plu. 2.28a for clever) but positively in Proverbs. (Johann Cook, The Septuagint of 
Proverbs: Jewish And/Or Hellenistic Proverbs. Leiden: Brill (1997) 52. 
 
170 See Naphtali H. Tur-Sinai, חכם, חכמה, Encyclopedia Mikra’it, Vol. 3, 128 
 
171 See also I Sam. 23:22 – he is exceedingly crafty; Psalms 83:4 - they make crafty (their) counsel against Your 
people. Brown Driver Briggs’s definitions of ערמה= n.f. craftiness, prudence; 1- 'בע – craftily Ex 21:14 (E), Jos. 9:4 
(JE), 2. 'ע in Pr., in good sense, prudence Pr. 1:4, 8:5,12 (Eds. Francis Brown, SR Driver, Charles A Briggs, A 
Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament: based on the lexicon of William Gesenius as translated by 





teach the peti, the uneducated naïf,172 the ‘ormah which he lacks.  As Robert Alter explains, 
“Such usage fits with the pragmatic curriculum of Proverbs.173 Intelligence of the most practical 
sort, involving an alertness to potential deceptions and seductions, is seen as an indispensable 
tool for the safe, satisfying, and ethical life, and a fool is repeatedly thought of as a dupe.”174 The 
book opens with: 
משלי שלמה בן דוד מלך ישראל לדעת חכמה ומוסר להבין אמרי בינה לקחת מוסר השכל צדק 
 ומשפט ומשרים לתת לפתאים ערמה לנער דעת ומזמה
The proverbs of Solomon the son of David, king of Israel; to know wisdom and 
instruction; to comprehend the words of understanding; to receive the discipline 
of wisdom, justice and right, and equity; to give prudence to the simple, to the 
young man knowledge and discretion. 
 
And the theme recurs. (8:5, 9:25) It is only the ‘arum, and not the peti, who can truly recognize 
sin (22:3, 27:12) “Lady Wisdom attests to the respectability of ‘ormah by declaring her own 
proximity to it (8:12)…”175, and lavishes praise upon the ‘arum: he is able to scheme to achieve 
                                                          
172 Robert Alter translates peti as “dupe,” “because it derives from a verbal root associated with seduction and hence 
suggests gullibility. (Robert Alter, The Wisdom Books: Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes: A Translation with 
Commentary. New York: W.W. Norton & Company 190.) LXX renders peti three different ways: 1) ἄφρων – with 
the negative connotation of fool, 2) ἄκακος – with the connotation of innocent, and 3) νήπιος – with its connotation 
of childlike innocence (Cook, The Septuagint, 52, 95) 
 
173 The same theme of becoming “prudent” is found in the Wisdom of Ben Sira 6:32: “My son, if you will, you shall 
be taught; and if you will apply your mind, you shall be prudent.” The Rule of the Community also contains this 
language in discussing the point of view of the messianic figure known as the Master in 1QS 9.12 ff: 
 ל-בעצת תושיה אסתר דעת ובערמת דעת אשוכ בעדה גבול סמוכ לשמור אמנים ומשפט עוז לצדקת א
With the counsel of salvation I will conceal knowledge, and with prudent knowledge I will hedge (it) with a firm 
boundary, keeping faithfulness and strong judgment of God’s righteousness. (1QS 24-25) 
 הביטה עיני תושיה אשר נסתרה מאנש דעה ומזמת ערמה מבני אדם מקור צדקה ומקוה גבורה עמ מעין כבוד מסוד בשר
My eyes beheld what shall be salvation which is hidden from humankind, knowledge and prudent discretion (which 
is hidden) from the Sons of Adam, a fountain of righteousness and a well of strength as well as a spring of glory 
(hidden) from the assembly of flesh. (1QS XI.6) 
 לפניו ערמה ודעת הם ישרתוהואל אהב דעת חכמה ותושייה הציב 
God loves knowledge. Wisdom and prudence He has set up before Him. Craft and knowledge shall serve Him. (CD 
MS A 2.3-4) (Joshua Brand uses the terminology as an indication of the ancient provenance of the Damascus 
Document. (Joshua Brand, “Megillat brit Damesek u-zemana,” Tarbiṣ 28 (1959) 27-28.) 
(All renderings and translations of Dead Sea Scroll material is taken from James H. Charlesworth, The Dead Sea 
Scrolls Vol. 1-6b, JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck): Tübingen, 1994.) 
 
174 Alter, The Wisdom Books, 194 n4 
 





his goals (14:8, 15); he is able to ignore insults (12:16); he looks where he is going (14:15); he 
sees and consequently avoids danger (22:3, 27:12). He acts with knowledge (3:16, 14:18) but 
does not show it off (12:23): 
 ,I wisdom dwell with prudence 8:12 ְוַדַעת ְמזִּמֹות ֶאְמָצא.   ָחְכָמה, ָשַכנְִתי ָעְרָמה; -ֲאנִי  ח:יב
and find out knowledge of devices 
 A fool's vexation is presently 12:16 ְוכֶֹסה ָקלֹון ָערום.   ַבּיֹום, יִָוַדע ַכְעסֹו; --ֱאִויל  יב:טז
known; but a prudent man 
concealeth shame. 
ְוֵלב ְכִסיִלים, יְִקָרא    ָאָדם ָערום, כֶֹסה ָדַעת;   יב:כג
 ִאֶוֶלת.
12:23 A prudent man concealeth 
knowledge; but the heart of fools 
proclaimeth foolishness. 
 Every prudent man dealeth 13:16 וְכִסיל, יְִפרֹש ִאֶוֶלת.   ָערום, יֲַעֶשה ְבָדַעת; -ָכל  יג:טז
with forethought; but a fool 
unfoldeth folly. 
ְוִאֶוֶלת ְכִסיִלים    רום, ָהִבין ַדְרכֹו; ָחְכַמת עָ   יד:ח
 ִמְרָמה.
  14:8 The wisdom of the prudent is 
to     
  look well to his way; but the folly of  
  fools is deceit.176 
While Alter defines ‘ormah as an ability to detect craftiness, Fox asserts that the ‘ormah 
itself means craftiness, as it does throughout the Bible, “the ability to devise clever, even wily 
tactics for attaining one’s goals, whatever these may be.” 177 It is only Proverbs that the noun and 
verb forms of ‘.r.m. are used for cunning that is considered legitimate.178 He observes what “an 
audacious move,” it is for Proverbs to appropriate ‘ormah as a virtue (1:4, 2:11, 5:2). In his 
words: “The Prologue wants the reader to know that the book of Proverbs (rather than, say, the 
                                                          
176 There may be another mention of ‘ormah. According to the Septuagint, Proverbs 14:24 reads: “The crown of the 
wise is their shrewdness (‘ormah)” whereas the received MT version reads: “The crown of the wise is their wealth 
(‘oshram).” (See Alter, The Wisdom Books, 256 n. 24) 
 
177 Fox, Proverbs, 61. 
 
178 Michael V. Fox, “Words for Wisdom : "tevunah" and "binah"; "ormah" and "mezimah"; "ezah" and "tushiyah"” 





wise guys down the street) is the place to turn if you want the prestigious skills of cunning and 
shrewdness. As Proverbs sees it, the promised skills must be applied to worthy ends…”179 
Fox’s comments are enlightening, as the rabbis themselves use the terminology of 
‘ormah in both its serpentine and solomonic senses. While there is no generic rabbinic term for 
“loopholes,” the rabbis do use the term הערמה (pl. הערמות, and active forms:  ,מערימים, מערימין
 etc.)180 in several dozen cases throughout both mishnaic and amoraic ,יערים, תערים, הערים
literature, to refer both the acceptable and rejected manipulation of law.  In his talmudic 
dictionary, Marcus Jastrow defines the causative verb form – הערים as “to plan, act deliberately,” 
but also “to act with subtlety.”181   
Conclusion 
 We have devoted this chapter to Biblical loopholes and rabbinic commentary thereupon. 
What emerges is that though loopholes were in use in the ANE, and are recorded in the Bible, the 
rabbis did not use such loopholes as their paradigm for their own legal system. We echo David 
Daube’s assertion that Biblical loopholes are the product of an overarching and far-reaching 
formalism that recognizes the letter of the law even at the expense of its spirit.  In the coming 
chapter we will show that rabbinic loopholes, on the other hand, are influenced by a Graeco-
Roman milieu which recognizes other values besides for the letter of the law. And lastly, we 
have noted that while the rabbis did not craft their own legal circumventions based on Biblical 
examples, they did borrow the Biblical nomenclature of ‘ormah for their loopholes, both 
                                                          
179 Fox, Proverbs, 61 
 
180 Though some usages in ancient rabbinic literature simply mean “deception”-e.g., tMS 5:11, bSan. 25a; yMQ 2:3 - 
most refer to a technical, definable legal circumvention. 
 

































Dissertation Chapter 2 –Ha‘arama and Equity 
In the previous chapter we examined the use of loopholes in the Biblical corpus and 
attendant rabbinic commentary; we argued that the rabbis did not shape their own use of 
loopholes on the basis of Biblical material. This is fitting, as the Biblical milieu was one of strict 
legal formalism, while the rabbinic worldview, as shall be shown below, was more nuanced. In 
this chapter, we will contrast the Biblical case with the loopholes offered by the rabbis and argue 
that the rabbis, like their Graeco-Roman counterparts, did not view law simply as mechanistic. 
Our focus is on are those measures of legal avoidance termed ha‘arama, cunning, by the rabbis, 
vocabulary they seem to have borrowed from the Bible. 
As relayed in the previous chapter, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a loophole as “An 
ambiguity, omission, or exception (as in a law or other legal document) that provides a way to 
avoid a rule without violating its literal requirements.” Such omissions are produced, or 
uncovered, by literal reading: defining a law most narrowly, without use of analogy or 
extrapolation. For instance, a law that prohibits the sale of an item, when read literally, does not 
forbid other methods of exchange which may accomplish the selfsame result, such as gift-giving. 
And one may turn this gap into the loophole should one desire to transfer ownership of an object 
to a person to whom s/he legally may not sell that object.   
In any survey of rabbinic loopholes, prosbul will be in the top five. A taqqanah attributed 
to the first-century tanna Hillel,182 it attempts to make loans collectible even during the 
                                                          
182 For a suggestion that prosbul was not originally instituted to solve sabbatical year problems, but instead is an 
exact parallel to the Greek term prosbole, see David Bigman, “Halakhic Problem or Society Solution: On the 
Meaning of Prosbul.” The Greek prosbole, as reflected in papyri, meant approval from the court for a creditor to 





Sabbatical year. Its methods are vague:183 perhaps transferring one’s loan deeds to the courts to 
avoid the Biblical ban on individuals to collect loans; perhaps turning one’s loan deeds into a 
court document (ma‘aseh bet din), thus placing it into a category of documents which the 
Sabbatical year does not nullify. Regardless, it is built on loophole strategies: 184 the prohibition 
to collect applies to X but not to Y, even where Y is quite similar to X. 
 Another tannaitic taqqanah which resembles prosbul is oṣar bet din, literally, the court’s 
storage facility. During the Sabbatical year it is forbidden for the individual landowner to hire 
guards to watch over his produce, as the food is meant to be hefqer, ownerless, open to all for the 
taking. However, when the rabbis noticed that people were taking advantage and decimating one 
another’s fields, they ordered the court to take over all fields and hire guards to watch over the 
produce. 185 Significantly each of the aforementioned examples relate to financial health.186 As 
                                                          
“Prosbul im Lichte der griechischen Papyri und der Rechtsgeschichte,” Festschrift zum 50 jahrigen Bestehen der 
Franz-Josef-Landersrabbinerschule in Budapest, Ed. Ludwig Blau, Budapest 1927.) 
183 See David Henshke, “How Does Prosbul Work? A History of the Explanation of Hillel’s Taqqanah,” Jewish 
Law Annual 22 (5761-4) 71-106. 
 
184 Moshe Silberg, Principia Talmudica, 40-41. Solomon Zeitlin disagrees: “The taqqanah of Prosbol has no 
relation to Haarama.  Haarama is a matter of individuals. When the law is ambiguous an individual had the right to 
use a loop hole to circumvent it.  A takkanah was introduced by the sages who sought support for it in the 
Pentateuch.  With regard to the sabbatical year in relation to a loan the Pentateuch states ידיך ואת אחיך שמט, what is in 
our hand. However if the promissory note was deposited with the court the loan was in the hands of the court. This 
may be designated as a legal fiction but not Haarama. There is a vast difference between Haarama and takkanah. 
(The Need for a New Code, Solomon Zeitlin, printed in The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, Vol. 52, No. 3 - 
Jan. 1962, p 203) We disagree with Zeitlin’s distinction because the Greco-Roman milieu in which the rabbis 
thought and taught emphasized the significant of equity, i.e., determining the intent of the lawmaker himself in order 
to determine whether a law should be read narrowly or expansively.  As such, the permission for any permissible 
loopholes is based on the values of the law itself, whether or not a verse is cited. 
 
185 Mekhilta d’Rashbi Mishpatim 20; tShevi‘it 8:1. For more on how oṣar bet din is used in Israel today, see Teḥumin 
Vol. 27. Alon Shvut: Tzomet (2007) 
 
186 There are also examples of later taqqanot that arise from the use of loopholes suggested by Tannaim –e.g., tBM 
4:11, 14, where heter ‘isqa is based on the suggestion that an investor who shares the profits with his working 
partner avoids the problem of usury. (See Hillel Gamoran, “From R. Judah bar Ilai to the Heter Iska,” in Eds. Alyssa 
Gray and Bernard Jackson, Jewish Law Association Studies XVII: Studies in Mediaeval Halakhah in Honor of 





we shall see below, this theme remains significant in motivating many loopholes, especially 
ha‘arama.  
Beyond official taqqanot, the rabbis themselves recognized the private individual’s 
ability to use loopholes.  For example, mShabbat 16:4 offers that someone whose house is on fire 
on the Sabbath may wear layers and layers of clothes out of the house in order to rescue them, 
and may even do so many times over, and may even invite others to do the same;187 a forerunner 
to the modern practice of selling ḥameṣ before Passover, tPesaḥim 2:6 offers that a Jew with 
ḥameṣ on a boat just before Passover may sell that ḥameṣ to a Gentile and re-purchase it 
following the holiday.188 MNedarim 4:7189 suggests that one who has foresworn (madir) benefit 
to another may enlist the help of a third party to indirectly buy food for the foresworn person  
                                                          
187 One may wonder why this is not called ha‘arama proper, as it parallels some of the examples below from the 
Tosefta (though there is no parallel to this case in the Tosefta). Of course, it is possible that the rabbis simply were 
not consistent in their use of the terminology. But there are other possibilities as well: a) this case is not quite a 
loophole but rather a shinui (change in method) to serve as a reminder. The rabbis forbade taking too much clothing 
directly outside even where there is an ‘eruv (we may speculate that it is to keep a person from being preoccupied 
with saving her/his possessions, which may lead her/him to extinguish the fire – see PT and BT ad loc.), but doing 
so with a shinui such as wearing the clothing, may remind the homeowner that it is the Sabbath and that s/he should 
not extinguish the fire. (See Tiferet Yisrael ad loc. s.v., וחוזר ולובש); b) this is indeed a loophole similar to other cases 
of ha‘arama (which may be indicated by the stam in bShab. 65b), but the Mishnah only refers to major widespread 
cases as ha‘arama, such as those enacted to help aid in post-Temple life, as we will see below. Without a parallel in 
the Tosefta, which, as we will see below, does refer to other phenomena as ha‘arama, it is hard to tell. 
 
188 This is a very relevant example as there was a medieval version cited by the Ritba which adds the clause,  ובלבד
 so long as one does not practice cunning. Though this became the source for a rather unpopular approach ,שלא יערים
of prohibiting the annual sale of ḥameṣ (see position attributed to R. Elijah of Vilna in Ma'aseh Rav 180-181), it 
seems that this was not a very popular version of the toseftan passage, so we do not consider it here. 
 





(mudar) 190  to keep him or her from starving.191 None of these examples (or others, for that 
matter) is referred to by any special terminology; many of them revolve around financial trouble. 
Rabbinic corpora do however contain specific language for acceptable192 manipulation of 
the law.  As early as tannaitic sources, beyond referring to someone mentally competent or 
smart, the word פיקח/ת refers to someone tactful enough to use the law to his or her own 
advantage.193 The usage continues in amoraic sources as well. Consider, for instance, a later 
colorful illustration of its use in the Babylonian Talmud, as it reflects a discussion about such 
artifice between students and their teacher: 
 בבלי בבא מציעא צז.
ן דבעי למישאל מידי מחבריה וליפטר נימא ליה אשקיין מיא דהוי שאילה בבעלים אמר רבא האי מא
 :ואי פקח הוא נימא ליה שאיל ברישא והדר אשקייך
Rava said: “A man who wishes to borrow something from his peer and yet be 
absolved of responsibility, should say to him, ‘Give us a drink of water’ (so that it 
constitutes a loan together with the owner’s service).  
“But if [the lender] is wise, he should answer [the borrower], ‘First borrow it and 
then I will give you a drink.” 
 
                                                          
 
190 The מדיר may encourage a shop owner to give the hungry מודר food, and the  מדיר may pay for that food after the 
fact. Traditional commentators explain that this is not a case of the shop owner being considered the emissary of the 
madir, as the madir never promised to pay the bill, nor did he issue a command to the shop owner. In fact, the shop 
owner cannot force him to pay the bill. (See R. Obadiah Bertinoro and Tiferet Yisrael, s.v., ובא זה ונוטל מזה)  We are 
not sure why this is not called ha‘arama unless perhaps: a) ha‘arama is not something that one does for another 
person but only on behalf of oneself; b) ha‘arama in the Mishnah is again limited to pervasive use for post-Temple 
accommodation rather than a general concept; c) the rabbis were inconsistent in their use of the terminology. Again, 
without a parallel in the Tosefta, which, as we will see below, does refer to other phenomena as ha‘arama, it is hard 
to tell. 
191 R. Obadiah Bertinoro (s.v., ואין לו מה יאכל) suggests that the madir may do this even if the mudar has enough to 
eat.  
 
192 There likewise are terms for using illicit trickery and con artists – e.g. רמאין (mSheq. 5:5; tBM 2:16 et al.) 
 
193 E.g., a husband who agrees to stipulate support for his wife-to-be’s daughter from another marriage, but specifies 
the words “while we are married” in the ketubah (mKet. 12:2) rather than being tethered to a step-daughter for life; a 
Temple priest who is told הוי פקח ושתוק, to be wise by being not revealing that the two loaves offering of the Feast of 
Weeks had become impure (tMen. 3:4) so as not to undermine the sacrifice. See further examples in mKet. 13:9, 
tMen. 3, Mekhilta d’Rashbi 15; Midrash Tannaim Deut. 32; Gen. Rabbah Bereshit 12, 22; Gen. Rabbah Vayeshev 
84; Lev. Rabbah Vayiqra 6. The terminology’s use is found both in PT and BT. In PT, e.g., a woman who smoothes 
out her floors on the Sabbath day (something otherwise forbidden) by washing her dishes over the floors and 





אמר רבא מקרי דרדקי שתלא טבחא ואומנא ספר מתא כולהון בעידן עבידתייהו כשאילה בבעלים 
דמו אמרו ליה רבנן לרבא שאיל לן מר אקפיד אמר להו לאפקועי ממונאי קא בעיתו אדרבה אתון 
אנא מצי אישתמוטי לכו ממסכתא למסכתא אתון לא מציתו לאישתמוטי ולא היא  שאילתון לי דאילו
 איהו שאיל להו ביומא דכלה אינהו שאילו ליה בשאר יומי 
Rava said: A teacher of children, a gardener, a butcher, a cupper, and a town 
scribe – all [if they lend something] while at work constitute a loan in the owner’s 
presence. 
The scholars said to Rava, ‘You, Master, are in our service.’ 
He was enraged: “You wish to deprive me of my money! On the contrary, you are 
in my service! For I can change you over from one tractate to another, while you 
cannot change me!” 
But it is not so. He is in their service during the kallah days, while they are in his 
service on other days. 
 
Rava and his disciples are discussing the rules of שאלה בבעלים, borrowing an object while 
employing its owner, which would make the borrower exempt from any payment should 
anything happen to the object.194 Rava perhaps looks to entertain his students by teaching them 
how they might use this law to their advantage, by nominally “employing” an animal’s owner by 
asking him to bring over a drink of water. But if the animal’s owner is פיקח, he will know how to 
emerge unscathed – namely by pushing off his “employment” until after the borrowing is done. 
In the continuation of the passage, the students try to deploy these tactics against Rava himself. 
The master outwits the students, though, as the true פיקח who is able to turn the tables back on 
them. Such back and forth testing the limits and uses of law could easily take place in any law 
school classroom today.195 The פקח terminology, though, is still rather sparse. A term that is used 
more broadly is ha‘arama, cunning. 
                                                          
194 mBM 8:1 
 
195 For a thorough analysis of this story in the context of Rava’s general views about bailees, see Wimpfheimer, 






While it literally means cunning or subtlety, ha‘arama roughly196 conforms to the classic 
legal loophole.  Unlike the terms mentioned above, at times it is viewed approvingly (like the 
Proverbial version of ‘ormah) and at times negatively (like the serpentine ‘ormah).197 Through 
our study of the phenomenology of ha‘arama in the Mishnah, Tosefta, PT and BT, we will try to 
understand the underlying motivation of ha‘arama, as well as what ha‘arama reveals about 
rabbinic legal thinking in its Graeco-Roman environment, over and against earlier and more 
unyielding versions of formalism. 
While analyzing all rabbinic dodges is a desideratum, it is a gargantuan task. But we may 
begin the process by analyzing the subset of those circumventions known as ha‘arama. Using a 
term as guidance has both advantages and pitfalls. On the one hand, a label indicates a conscious, 
even if partial categorization. On the other hand, limiting a study to particular terminology relies 
heavily on an assumption that the term is used consistently. We will take all of this into 
consideration in our study, allowing it to qualify any absolutist thinking about the topic. 
Nonetheless, we hope that our study can serve as a point of departure for analyzing rabbinic legal 
loopholes generally. 
Ha‘arama in tannaitic literature  
 In the chapter 1 we cited the midrashic example of Abraham accusing God of exploiting 
a loophole (ha‘arama) to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah.198 While that loophole is painted in a 
                                                          
196 As we will discuss in depth in the next chapter,, the rabbinic corpus contains more than one version of  ha‘arama, 
one of which diverges slightly from the classic loophole. 
 
197 See Tiferet Yisrael Commentary to mTem. 5:1 where he makes this observation. 
 
198 Gen. Rabbah Lekh Lekha 39/Vayera 49/Lev. Rabbah Ṣav 10/Pesiqta d’Rav Kahane 19 Anokhi, Anokhi. Mekhilta 
d’Rashbi Mishpatim Masekhta d’Neziqin 4 also refers to ha‘arama negatively in discussing who is exempt from the 
category of a being a horeg b‘ormah, a premeditated killer – namely the deaf-mute, the shoteh and a minor, none of 





negative light, in two places in the Mishnah199 the rabbis legalize, and even advocate, the use of 
parallel loopholes. 
 )ןמשנה מעשר שני ד:ג )כ"י קאפמ
הילך  201או' אדם לבנו ולבתו הגדולים לעבדו ולשפחתו העברים כיצד   200מערימים על מעשר שני.
 אבל לא יאמר כן לבנו ולבתו הקטנים לעבדו את המעשר הזה   202את המעות האילו ופדה לך
 ולשפחתו הכנענים מפני שידן כידו
[We/they may] strategize203 regarding the secondary tithe.204 How? One says to his 
adult son or daughter or to his Hebrew man-servant or maid, “Take these coins and 
                                                          
199 Though we do not here involve ourselves in the question of which came first, midrash or mishnah, it might be 
quite relevant. Is Mishnah reclaiming a negative term, or is Midrash re-appropriating a positive term? For more on 
the debate regarding Mishnah and Midrash, see JN Epstein Mavo Le-Nusaḥ Ha-Mishnah 728-747, Epstein 
Prolegomena  403, Melamed, ha-Yaḥas she-ben midreshe-halakhah la-Mishnah ṿela-Tosefta, 182, Ginzberg, ‘Al 
Ha-yiḥus she-bein ha-Mishnah ve-ha’Mekhilta (esp. 68, 80, 94); Halivni Meqorot U-Mesorot BQ, 2, 61,152; 
Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara : the Jewish predilection for justified law, 52; Friedman, “The Baraitot in 
the Babylonian Talmud and their Parallels in the Tosefta” (Hebrew), Atara L’Haim, Studies in the Talmud and 
Medieval Rabbinic Literature in honor of Professor Haim Zalman Dimitrovsky, Jerusalem 2000 168, n. 14; 
Friedman, First Pesaḥ 76-77 (midrash preserves older and more raw material, mishnah is more redacted), David 
Henshke, Mishnah rishonah be-talmudam shel tanaʾim aḥaronim : sugyot be-dine shomrim,  144; Reichman Mishna 
und Sifra; Hauptman, Rereading theMishnah 
 
200 The parallel tosefta explicitly states לפוטרו מן החומש .  Tosefta may preserve the older text that was shortened by 
the mishnah, or the mishnah may preserve the older text which was then clarified by the tosefta.  For a discussion 
about which preserves more ancient text generally, Mishnah or Tosefta, see Shamma Friedman, Tosefta ‘Attiqta. 
This will be quite relevant to our discussion of the following ha‘arama regarding the animal firstling.  
 
201 Some point out that the idea of a Hebrew indentured maid redeeming secondary tithes is surprising, given that all 
Hebrew maids are minors (they are freed at age 12). Therefore, Ra'avad and the meyuhas la’Rosh suggest that there 
must have been a Sinaitic tradition that a person may redeem tithes from the age of 9 and 1 day; Maimonides (Laws 
of Secondary Tithes 5:8-9) suggests instead that even minors may redeem tithes according to rabbinic law. 
 
202 This term לך indicates that the recipient of the money was meant to keep it and in return be willing to allow the 
consecration of the fruit to devolve upon the money. Thus, the money would only be permitted to be used for 
Temple purposes. According to Lieberman, the word לך is absent in a Geniza MS of the mishnah; it is likewise 
absent from all extant Tosefta MSS, the parallel PT sugya, and bGit. 65a. Therefore, Lieberman argues that this 
word was not in the original version of the mishnah but was emended based on the discussion in the PT which 
clarifies: 
 ימין, אם בשאמר לו צא ופדה לי שלוחו הוא. צא ופדה לך שלו הן. אלא כי נן קיימין: בשאמר לומה נן קי
פדה לך משלך, פדה לך משלי, ותני כן פדה לך משלך, פדה לך משלי אינו מוסיף חומש. א"ר יוחנן כל מעשר שאינו הוא ופדיונו משלו אינו  
 מוסיף חומש.
(Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta, ad loc. 766). 
Additionally, the parallel tosefta in all extant MSS adds בהן 
 
203 Translations of Palestinian rabbinic material are this author’s variations on Neusner’s English versions of 
Mishnah, Tosefta and PT. 
 
204 tMS is more explicit: “One may act with cunning regarding the secondary tithe in order to exempt it from the 
extra ḥomesh.” In bBM 54a and elsewhere, the rabbis explain that ḥomesh does not refer to 20% of the original 





use them to redeem this tithe.” However, one may not say this to one’s minor son or 
daughter, or to one’s Canaanite man-servant or maid, for their hand is like his.205 
 
A man who redeems his own ma‘aser sheni (secondary tithe) produce rather than 
transporting it to Jerusalem pays 25% more than the worth of the produce,206 but one who 
redeems someone else’s does not.  In order to avoid the price increase, this passage suggests that 
one give(s) his money to an economically independent adult to redeem the former’s produce.  So 
long as the person in possession of the money does not own the produce (and is not officially the 
emissary of the person who does),207 there is no tax.208  By changing the facts of the case – the 
ownership of the money – the legal agent avails himself of a literal reading of ma‘aser sheni law: 
the Bible discusses a man and his produce or a man and someone else’s produce. It does not, 
however, discuss the permissibility of actively moving from one situation to the other. This type 
of dodge, involving another party to accomplish what one cannot do independently, is akin to 
ancient  Roman law’s interposita persona, today known as a “man of straw” in Britain and 
Germany, a “front man” in the US, or a “dummy” in Australia.209 Though one involves the other 
party simply to get around the law, the transaction is completely above board. 
                                                          
205 Consequently, they cannot actually own the money independently, and no transfer of money has taken place. 
 
206 See Leviticus 27:31. For a very straightforward, explanation, see Maimonides Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Ma‘aser 
Sheni 5:1 
 
207 This is made clear in the tosefta version (MS 4:3) of this ha’arama: אבל לא יאמר לו פדה לי בהן את מעשר זה 
 
208 It is the equivalent of a second party buying the produce, though the produce will actually end up in the farmer’s 
domain. (See Peter J. Haas, A History of the Mishnaic Law of Agriculture: Tractate Ma’aser Sheni. Ann Arbor: 
McNaughton & Gunn (1980) 129. 
 
209 David Daube, “Dodges and Rackets in Roman Law,” Proceedings of the Classical Association, vol. 61 (1964) 
29. Licinius Stolo, for instance, circumvented his own statute by emancipating his son and, together with him, 





Why do the rabbis accept, and even advocate, this loophole? Ephraim Elimelech Urbach 
reads this evasion simply as rabbinic capitulation to general laxity in tithing following the Bar 
Kokhba revolt (135 CE): 
…all the reasons offered [for ha’arama on the extra fifth of ma‘aser sheni] only 
explain the fact that the practice of evasion existed but do not reveal the reason 
for the practice. It would appear that evasion of the payment of the one-fifth was 
widespread and the Sages realized that insistence on their part on the strict 
observance of the law could very well lead to the populace refraining altogether 
from bringing the redemption money to Jerusalem. The halakhic sanction they 
gave to the practice of evasion was, in a sense, a takkanah to prevent the 
development of a situation in which ‘the people refrained from bringing’ similar 
to that in which ‘the people refrained from lending’ and which led to the  
takkanah of the prosbul which Hillel adopted.210 
 
Urbach’s argument is unpersuasive, not only because he offers no concrete evidence that tithing 
had waned211, but because of the parallel passage in the Tosefta.  In keeping with the latter’s 
character as more “anthropological” and “rooted in the concrete historical situations of ancient 
Palestine” than the Mishnah,212 the toseftan passage paints this ha‘arama in a more positive 
light:  
  תוספתא מעשר שני ד:ג )כ"י ערפורט(
אמ' ר' יהושע בן קרחה בראשונה היו )נר( נוהגין כך משרבו הרמאין אומ' אדם לחבירו הרי פירות 
נתונין לך במתנה וחוזר ואומר לו הרי הן מחוללין על פירות שיש לי בבית ובלבד שלא  213האילו
לו את  216לתוך ידו או עד שישכיר 215הרי הן מחוללין על מעות שיש לי בכיס עד שיזכם 214יאמר
 מקומו
                                                          
210 E.E. Urbach, The Sages. Transl. Raphael Posner, Israel: Peli Printing Works Ltd. (1986) 252-3 
 
211 Instead he theorizes that the flight from Israel following the Bar Kokhba revolt produced similar laxity in tithes 
as the Hasmonean revolt had, at which time Yoḥanan the High Priest offered dispensations to make tithing less 
burdensome. (See ibid. 46-47)  
 
212 Shamma Friedman, “The Primacy of Tosefta to Mishnah in Synoptic Parallels,” Introducing Tosefta: Textual, 
Intratextual and Intertextual Studies, Eds. Harry Fox and Tirzah Meacham, Ktav (1999) 106. 
 
213 Venice Edition: האלן 
 
214 MS Vienna, Venice Ed.: ובלבד שלא יאמר לו; MS HEB.C.16.2660 skips straight to: הרי הן מחוללין על מעות  
 






R. Joshua b. Qorḥah said: At first they behaved thus. Once the con artists 
increased, one would say to his fellow, ‘Behold, these fruits are given to you as a 
gift,’ and then he would say to him, ‘Behold they are made mundane by fruits 
which I have in the house,’ so long he does not say, behold they are made 
mundane on the coins that I have in my pocket until he places them (the fruit) in 
his hand, or until he rents the land to him. 
 
This tosefta describes just how tightly people clung to this ha’arama when it became imperiled – 
twice. There is also an ironic pitting of the con artists portrayed as the villains, and those who are 
cunning yet find themselves on the right side of the law. The rabbis side with those who are 
cunning rather than the con artists who try to undermine the circumvention. In the Palestinian 
Talmud, in fact, the change in methodology to protect this ha‘arama is initiated by the rabbis 
themselves: 
 רושלמי מע"ש פרק ד הלכה ה, דף נה עמוד א )כ"י ליידן(י
התקינו שיהו עושין בפירות  218היו עושין כן במעות היו נוטלין אותן ובור}א{)ח(ין 217בראשונה
א'ע'פ'כ' היו נטלין אותן ואוכלין אותן התקינו שיהא מזכה לו אחד מעשרה לקרקע. ר' אינייא בר סיסי 
סלק גבי ר' יונה אמ' ליה אפרוק לך בהדא סילעא אמ' אי בעא מינם נסא חזר ונסתה מיניה אמ' ר' יונה 
 פום כן יהבת יתה לה.כד שערית דעתיה דאילו נסתה לא הוה אמ' לי כלום ל
Originally they would do this with coins. But they (=the other party) would take 
[the coins] and run away [instead of returning them]. They instituted that they 
would do this with produce (=give the other party the ma‘aser sheni produce), yet 
they would take the produce [following the redemption] and eat them [rather than 
returning them]. So they instituted that he would give him ownership219 over one 
tenth of the land [where the produce was located].220 R. Inya b. Sisi went to R. 
Jonah. He (R. Inya) said to him (R. Jonah): Would you like me to redeem for you 
with this sela? He answered: If you’d like, take it. [Afterwards, R. Jonah] went 
back and took it from him. R. Jonah said: because I understood R. 'Inya’s attitude 
to be that he would not say anything if I took it (the money) back, therefore I gave 
it to him [in the first place]. 
 
                                                          
216 MS Vienna, Venice Ed.: שישכור 
 
217 MSS Moscow and London cite this as a baraita in the name of R. Joshua b. Qorḥah 
 
218 All other versions clearly read ובורחים/ובורחין 
 
219 It is not clear whether this was a gift or a rental. 
 
220 The assumption was that the other party would not be so brazen as to go to the owner’s land to take his produce. 





All versions of this PT passage, whether printed or manuscript include the verb התקינו, they (=the 
rabbis) instituted.  If this was a circumvention the rabbis were forced into, it is improbable that 
they would have gone to such great lengths to preserve it. Moreover, here it is two rabbis – R. 
Jonah and R. ’Inya – who are involved in using this ha‘arama, excusing themselves for doing it 
the old way rather than the new way (presumably, like everyone else). 
This is not to say that the rabbis did not have goals in mind that comported to their 
societal context. In fact, this dodge is quite reasonable in light a post-Temple reality. Shmuel 
Safrai shows convincingly that though m‘Eduyot 8:6 cites R. Joshua’s opinion that it remains 
appropriate to consume ma‘aser sheni in Jerusalem even without a Temple or city walls, 
tannaitic sources generally reflect that this was not accepted as common practice after the fall of 
the Temple;221 instead tannaim recommend (and are cited as doing so themselves) that one 
redeem his produce and keep the money somewhere secure until it could be used whenever the 
Temple would be rebuilt.222 Hence, the need for ha‘arama. Given that people would now always 
have to redeem ma‘aser sheni rather than bring it to Jerusalem, people would lose an added 25% 
on their secondary tithe produce every time they set aside ma‘aser sheni (namely the first, 
second, fourth and fifth years of each seven-year cycle)! To ease their burden, perhaps even at 
their behest, the rabbis offer a way to redeem the produce without the added expense.223 
                                                          
221 See tMS 3:13. Significantly, the tosefta itself makes the point that ma‘aser sheni was no longer being taken to 
Jerusalem; See also Sifri Re’eh 106; tSan. 5:6 (also bMakkot 19a; bTem. 21a) 
 
222 tMS 3:18, 4:4; mMS 2:7; See Shmuel Safrai, 'בימי הבית ובימי המשנה: מחקרים בתולדות ישראל כרך א. Jerusalem: Magnes 
Press (1994) 379.  Safrai there casts doubt on a baraita cited in bBeṣa 5a, and bRH 31b indicates that R. Eliezer 
actually did so based on the implication of R. Eliezer’s own statements in m‘Eduyot 8:6 regarding the status of 
Jerusalem without its Temple infrastructure. (Moreover, baraitot are not necessarily tannaitic in origin or in form.) 
 
223 The stam in bGit. 65a likewise suggests that the mishnah describes post-Temple times, though ostensibly for the 





Reminiscent of Proverbs’ declaration of  חכמה שכנתי ערמהאני , “I am Wisdom; I dwell in cunning 
(Proverbs 8:12),” the rabbis exhibit prudence in easing a difficult situation.  
All of Mishnah contains only one other explicit case of defined ha‘arama, again 
affirming its use:224  
 225קופמאן(משנה תמורה ה:א )כ"י 
ילדה --מבכרת שהיתה מעוברת, אומ' מה שבמעיה שלזו, אם זכר, עולה כיצד מערימין על הבכור
אם זכר עולה אם נקבה זבחי  תקרב שלמים  227זבחי שלמים ילדה נקבה 226זכר, יקרב עולה אם נקבה
 זכר ונקבה זכר יקרב עולה והנקבה תקרב שלמים. 228שלמים ילדה
How do they/we practice cunning with regards to the firstborn? [When] an animal 
[is] pregnant with its first offspring, he says, “What is inside this, if it is male is a 
burnt offering.” If she birthed a male, it shall be sacrificed as a burnt offering. 
“And if it is female, it is a peace offering.” If she birthed a female, it shall be 
sacrificed as a peace offering. “If it is a male, a burnt offering, and if a female, a 
peace offering,” - if she birthed both a male and female, the male shall be 
                                                          
224 The fact that both mishnaic instances affirm the use of ha’arama probably led to Maimonides’ assertion in his 
Commentary to the Mishnah, Temurah 5:1 that ha’arama is always permitted: 
ערמה, ושאינה מותרת מרמהוהתחבולה המותרת נקראת ה .  
And the permissible strategy is called ha’arama, and that which it forbidden is called mirma. (It seems that his 
reference to mirma alludes to the term rama’im sometimes founds in Mishnah. The term “mirma” itself never 
appears in Mishnah.) 
After all, nowhere in all of Mishnah does the term ha’arama appear to be prohibited, though ‘arum may be used 
negatively. The Tiferet Yisrael (ad. loc.) however suggests that while mirma always has negative connotations, 
‘ormah is mixed, at times negative and at times positive. 
 
225 The Sifra passage which justifies the ability to consecrate a bekhor in the womb based on a verse is challenging: 
 )כ"י לונדון(  ספרא בחוקותי פרשה ה
 על הבכור  מקדישו בבטן מיכן אמרו  מערימיןאינו מקדיש  בבטן תלמוד לומר אשר יבוכר לא יקדיש משנתבכר יכול לא יקדישנו
Might one suppose that one may not consecrate the firstling while it is still in the womb? Scripture says, ‘which is a 
firstling belongs to the Lord, no man may dedicate’ – once the beast has emerged as a firstborn, you may not 
consecrate it, but you may consecrate it when it is yet in the womb. In this connection sages have said: they 
legitimately practice cunning in connection with the firstling. 
While we have cited MS London which asserts permission for ha‘arama (and MS Oxford concurs), MS JTS and 
Venice Ed. both read אין מערימין/ם, people may not use ha‘arama. Furthermore MSS Parma and Vatican 31 read 
 seems to מיכן אמרו At any rate, the terminology of .מערימין to promise the value of the animal, rather than ,מעריכין
indicate that the midrash is citing our mishnah. This is consistent with the perspective that the midrashim from R. 
Aqiva’s school, Mekhilta d.r. Ishmael, Sifra, Sifri Deut., post-date the Mishnah. (See Menahem Kahana, “The 
Halakhic Midrashim,” The Literature of the Sages Part II, eds. Shmuel Safrai, Ze'ev Safrai, Joshua Schwartz, and 
Peter J. Tomson. Amsterdam: Fortress Press (2006) 56) 
 
226 As female eldest born do not have the status of bekhor, the female is included here for the benefit of the 
continuing mishnayot which deal with non-bekhor male and female animals which are consecrated in the womb. 
(See Albeck, Shishah Sidrei Mishnah, Vol.5, notes on page 235) 
 
227 MS Parma: ואם נקבה 
 





sacrificed as a burnt offering, and the female shall be sacrificed as a peace 
offering. 
 
According to Biblical law, one must give one’s firstborn kosher male animals to a priest. If the 
animal is unblemished, the priest sacrifices it and eats parts of the offering. 229 If, however, it is 
blemished, it is unfit for sacrifice; therefore, the priest may simply eat the food as mundane 
(ḥullin) without offering any upon the altar first.230 In this passage it seems that the animal’s 
owner would rather use the firstborn for his own private offering on the altar than as a gift to the 
priest. Consequently the mishnah suggests pre-empting the firstborn status by designating the 
animal as a private sacrifice while is it still in the womb, taking for granted that its status as a 
firstling does not take hold until it is born.231  This preemptive change is considered a concrete 
change of facts, as according to mishnaic law, mere declarations of consecration are binding.232  
Urbach again suggests that the rabbis here capitulate to a community which is already 
practicing this evasion: “It may be assumed that owners of cows bearing for the first time who 
felt an obligation to offer a Whole-offering in the Temple, used the evasion described to fulfill 
two obligations at once. The Sages accepted this state of affairs because it at least preserved the 
commandment of the Firstling of a clear animal.”233Urbach mentions one who “felt an 
obligation,” while classic medieval commentators describe one who had already verbally 
                                                          
229 Ex. 12:11; Numbers 18:18 
 
230 See mBekh. chapter 2. But he may not work it or shear it (mBekh. 3:3) 
 
231 As cited above, Sifra Beḥuqotai 5 explains that declarations of heqdesh before the animal’s birth indeed 
transforms its status based on Scripture: 
 .יכול לא יקדישוהו מן הבטן? תלמוד לומר "אשר יבוכר לא יקדיש" משיתבכר אין אתה מקדישו מקדישו אתה מן הבטן
 
232 mQid. 1:6 
 





committed to giving a sacrifice.234 But both are truly perplexing. Why would one wish to give 
the animal as a whole-offering, or a completely burnt offering rather than giving it to a priest? 
Moreover, can it be that one of the only two examples of permitted ha‘arama in all of Mishnah 
refers to a situation as rare as someone who happened to have made a pledge to give an offering 
a few weeks before a firstling is going to be born?  We have seen other mishnaic loopholes 
above which would seem more deserving of the title than this very rare example.  
It is likewise curious that this mishnah exhibits a strange penchant for imprecision. The 
pregnant animal’s owner stipulates: “If it is male, it shall be a burnt offering…If it is female, it 
shall be a peace offering…” But why would someone sanctify a firstborn animal in utero if it is 
female? The anonymous redactor(s) in bTem. 24b suggests that the beginning of the mishnah and 
its conclusion refer to different situations.  The beginning of the mishnah refers to bekhor, while 
the part about the animal being female refers to consecrating any animal in the womb.  Indeed, 
the parallel Tosefta passage discusses the possibility of sanctifying an animal while in utero but 
does not connect it to the case of the bekhor at all: 
 הלכה א רק גתוספתא מסכת תמורה )צוקרמאנדל( פ
  235האומר מה שבמעי בהמה זו הקדש מותרת בגיזה ואסורה בעבודה מפני שמכחיש את הקדשים שחטו
 העובר אסור באכילה מתה העובר אסור בהנאה
One who says, “What is in the womb of this beat is consecrated” – it is permitted  
to be sheared but prohibited to be used for ordinary labor, because one thereby  
weakens the consecrated [beast in the womb]. [If] one slaughtered it, the fetus is 
prohibited to be eaten. [If] it died, the fetus is prohibited for benefit.  
 
Therefore, we suggest that the original law that the mishnah was dealing with was consecrating 
any animal in utero,236 and it was the redactor(s) who adds the whole issue of the bekhor 
                                                          
234 Rashi s.v., ma‘arimin, Maimonides, Commentary to Mishnah ad loc. 
 






circumvention.  Like the ma‘aser sheni example, the context of post-Temple life plays a 
significant role in the redactor(s)’ choices.237 The Sifri (Re’eh 106) and tSanhedrin 2:6 (3:3?) 
report: 
ר' יוסי אומר שלשה דברים משום שלשה זקנים...רבי ישמעאל אומר יכול יהא אדם מעלה מעשר שני 
אכילת בכור למעשר לירושלם בזמן הזה ואוכלו...ואכלת לפני ה' אלוקיך במקום אשר יבחר, מקיש 
 שני. מה בכור אין נאכל אלא בפני הבית אף מעשר שני לא יהא נאכל אלא בפני הבית
R. Jose says three statements in the name of three elders…R. Ishmael says, 
Perhaps a person should bring his secondary tithe produce to Jerusalem in these 
days and eat it [there]?... “And you shall eat before the Lord your God in the place 
that He shall choose” – it analogizes eating of the firstborn [animal] to [eating of] 
the secondary tithe. Just as the firstborn [animal] is not eaten except before the 
Temple, so the secondary tithe should not be eaten except before the Temple. 
 
After the fall of the Temple, firstborn animals could only be eaten (by anyone, priest or 
otherwise) if they had become severely blemished.238 Thus, giving one’s firstborn animal to a 
priest meant that it would likely never even be eaten by that kohen, or by anyone else. The law of 
the firstborn had lost the practical value that it once had of supporting the kohanim (pl.) and had 
turned instead into an animal-sitting service where the kohen would have to hold onto an animal 
until it became blemished on its own or died. The animal would never be used for work and 
would probably never be eaten. It would literally be a waste.  
And so the tannaim take prophylactic measures to avoid such needless financial loss, but 
he/they are not prepared to allow a person to maim the animal in utero (unlike R. Judah, who will 
                                                          
236 We again touch on the question of whether Tosefta or Mishnah preserves earlier information. In this instance, we 
follow Shamma Friedman’s suggestion that indeed the tosefta here preserves the earlier material, and the mishnah 
reworks it. See n. 31 above and n. 72 and 73 below. 
 
237 It should be noted that bTem. 24b specifically asserts that this mishnah offers advice specifically for when the 
Temple stood. However, this is an interpretation offered by the stam to reconciling it with an amora’s (R. Judah) 
seemingly more effective ruling of allowing one to blemish the animal in its mother’s womb in order to avoid the 
consecration of the animal all together. The stam suggests that R. Judah’s ruling is for post-Temple times, while the 
mishnah’s ruling is for Temple times. 






suggest just that in the Babylonian Talmud’s commentary on this mishnah).239 They therefore 
offer at least something – whether in order to open the door to future ha‘aramot, or to settle for 
the next best way to get out of giving away one’s bekhor. This is how it works: if the animal’s 
owner commits the animal as a sacrifice while in utero, s/he may keep it. And when it becomes 
blemished, the owner him or herself may redeem it with money and keep the animal for his/her 
own use. This ultimately saves the animal’s owner money. (Alternatively, as offered on 
bTemurah 10b, the owner may make a sanctification of funds (qedushat damim)240 only, which 
means redeeming the animals with money to begin with, even without any blemishes.) In this 
mishnah, the rabbis are not trying to do away with the law of bekhor; they are offering a more 
livable alternative after the destruction of the Temple. Later, the amora R. Judah goes one step 
further in permitting a person even to inflict a blemish on the bekhor while in its mother’s womb, 
in order to obviate the need to wait for blemishes altogether.241 This notion of the Mishnah 
revising material relayed in the Tosefta to accommodate a post-Temple period has been argued 
elsewhere by Tzvi Novick regarding Tractate Bekhorot. 242 
                                                          
239 See bTem. 24b. The stam there tries to reconstruct R. Judah’s comments as being for a post-Temple world, and 
the mishnah being relevant for when the Temple stood, but we are convinced otherwise based on the arguments 
above. In the middle ages, R. Jacob ben Asher records a new practice used to evade firstborn status: selling part 
ownership over the animal to a Gentile so that the animal’s child would not become obligated in the requirements of 
the bekhor. (Tur Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah, 320:6) 
 
240 i.e., the animal will be sold, and the money is consecrated. 
 
241 bBekh. 35a; bTem. 24b 
 
242 Novick makes a similar suggestion regarding the list of potential animal blemishes in mBekh. Chapter 6. That list, 
as opposed to its toseftan parallel (tBekhorot chapter 4) focuses on the major blemishes which allow an animal to be 
eaten as a non-sacrifice as distinct from the appended list of minor blemishes which bar the animal from both 
sacrifice on the one hand, and consumption on the other. TBekhorot chapter 4, however, focuses on the difference 
between blemishes both minor and major and non-blemishes. He explains that tBekhorot represents an earlier 
erstwhile Temple tradition, where the key factor is whether a person may sacrifice the animal, while mBekh. 
represents a post-Temple tradition in which, because sacrifice is no longer an option, the key practical question is 
whether one may or may not consume the animal on account of its particular blemish. While his article assumes that 
the priest himself would consume the animal, it is equally possible that the owner who has performed ha‘arama, 





Granted, the mishnah sounds like it is describing a reality that is concurrent with a 
standing Temple – invoking sacrifice and sanctification – but this is indeed why the rabbis’ 
approach here is to offer a subtle and incremental shift in their presentation rather than an 
explicit one. This suggestion is part of an important discussion among contemporary Mishnah 
scholars. How are the laws from Temple times to be understood within the Mishnah? Are they 
changed in any way, rhetorically or substantively,243 to fit the post-destruction reality? Do they 
represent an idealized, even fictionalized portrait of what Temple life was like,244 or are they true 
to the reality245? Ishay Rosen-Zvi summarizes a dominant approach: “According to the new 
studies, these narratives are by and large a result of second-century debates, fashioning and 
redaction, and should, accordingly, be taken to represent the concerns of that post-Temple era. 
The Temple and its worship were studied, reshaped, and even reinvented as part of the second 
                                                          
Animal: A Case Study in Tannaitic Sources.” HUCA 76 (2005), 113-132.) It is important to note that Novick does 
not suggest that such a redactional relationship between Mishnah and Tosefta is ubiquitous, or that the Mishnah as a 
whole represents post-Temple traditions, while Tosefta on the whole represents Temple traditions. (ibid. 130) This 
will be significant in chapter three of this dissertation, as Mira Balberg’s assessment of toseftan material regarding 
im/purity law, an assessment upon which we rely, is based on the assumption that it is post-Temple material.    
 
243 See Avraham Walfish’s study on tractates Rosh Hashanah and Tamid (“Shitat,” and idem, “Megamot 
ra‘ayoniot bete ’ur hamikdash va‘avodato bemase-khet Tamid uvemasekhet Middot,” Mehkerei yehuda 
veshomron 7 (1997): 79–92), Yair Lorberbaum, Zelem ’Elohim Tel Aviv: Shocken, 2004)), Beth Berkowitz 
(Execution) and Chaya Halberstam’s (Law and Truth, Chapter 3)  respective studies on capital punishments in 
tractate Sanhedrin, Daniel Stökl Ben-Ezra on tractate Yoma (The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003)) and Ishay Rosen-Zvi on Sotah. Each shows how the mishnah narrative relating to 
Temple ritual is changed to reflect a post-destruction reality.  
 
244 Jacob Neusner was challenged for regarding Temple law and narrative reflected in Mishnah as mere 
fictionalization (Jacob Neusner, Ancient Israel after Catastrophe: The Religious World View of the Mishnah. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1983) by Shaye Cohen (“Jacob Neusner, Mishnah and Counter-
Rabbinics,” Conservative Judaism 37 (1983) 48-63) and Seth Schwartz (Imperialism and Jewish Society: 200 BCE 
to 640 CE. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2004), 8-9).  
 
245 D.Z. Hoffman argued this about tractate Yoma, suggesting that it was “old Mishnah” preserved from Second 
Temple times. (David Hoffmann, Die Erste Mischna Und Die Controversen Der Tannaïm: Ein Beitrag Zur 
Einleitung in Die Mischna (Berlin: H. Itzjowski, 1882), 18–19); JN Epstein concurred. (Mevo’ot, 36–37) See also 
Christine Hayes, “What is (the) Mishnah? Concluding Observations,” (AJS Review 32.2 (2008): 291-7) for a 





century’s all-inclusive legal system, according to the academic needs and interests of its 
sages.”246 
Based on our understanding, the term “ma‘arimin” in the Mishnah refers not to what 
people have decided upon themselves, but what the rabbis have provided as the new modus 
operandi to meet challenge in a post-destruction reality, to ensure that people are not financially 
disadvantaged by law that seems ossified. While, in typical mishnaic fashion, the Mishnah never 
provides explicit justification for ha‘arama, but only casuistic247 examples, the broader view of 
tannaitic attitudes towards the realm of qodashim after 70 CE reveals that these two citations of 
ha‘arama are cut from the same cloth.248 Not simply, as Urbach suggests, a capitulation to the 
reality, but rather a thoughtful accommodation of it. 
The Cunning Serpent 
As a legal phenomenon, the Mishnah presents ha‘arama as prudent and solomonic 
thinking for a changed reality. However, the serpent cannot be ignored. MSotah 3:2 asserts that 
the רשע ערום, the cunning wicked person, erodes the world: 
 סוטה ג:ב )קופמאן(
ר' אליעזר אומר המלמד את בתו תורה מלמדה תיפלות. ר' יהושע אומר רוצה אשה בקב תיפלות 
תשעת קבים ופרישות. הוא היה אומר חסיד שוטה רשע ערום אשה פרושה מכת פרושים הרי אלו מ
 עולם. 249מכליה
R. Eliezer says: Anyone who teaches his daughter Torah teaches her obscenity. R. 
Joshua says: a woman prefers one qab of/and obscenity to 9 qabs and continence. 
                                                          
246 Ishay Rosen-Zvi, “Orality, Narrative, Rhetoric: New Directions in Mishnah Research” AJS Review 32.2 (2008), 
242 
 
247 See Leib Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning: From Casuistics to Conceptualization, Chapter 2 –“Casuistics and 
Generalizations: Tannaitic Beginnings.” Moscovitz defines casuistics as case law rulings that “are not sufficiently 
generalized to enable us to ascertain their full, though implicit, scope.” (Talmudic Reasoning, 2) 
 
248 This is not to say that toseftan material represents a period contemporaneous with the Temple, but it is clear that 
Tosefta does not have the same interest in cataloguing law specifically tailored to a post-Temple community. 
 





He used to say: A foolish pietist, a cunning rogue, an abstinent woman250 and the 
wound of celibate251 [men] bring destruction upon the world.  
 
Without explaining what exactly the רשע ערום does, it is clear that not everyone who is ערום is a 
 but some are.252  This is essentially where Mishnah leaves the issue: the rabbis use allow ,רשע
cunning under particular circumstances, but under other (or most?) circumstances cunning is the 
trait of a wicked person.  
Also in the context of the sotah, the Tosefta refers to that very scheming serpent and his 
trait of ‘ormah: 
  תוספתא סוטה ד:ה
כשם שאסורה לבעל כך אסורה לבועל נמצאת אומר בסוטה שנתנה עיניה ]בשאין ראוי[ לה מה 
שבקשה לא ניתן לה ומה שבידה ניטל ממנה וכן אתה מוצא בנחש הקדמוני שהיה ערום מכל הבהמה 
ג( והנחש היה ערום מכל וגו' בקש להרוג את אדם ולישא את חוה ומכל חית השדה שנא' )בראשית 
אמר לו המקום אני אמרתי תהא מלך על כל בהמה וחיה ]עכשיו שלא רצית[ ארור אתה מכל הבהמה 
ומכל חית השדה אני אמרתי בקומה זקופה תלך כאדם ]עכשיו שלא רצית[ )שם( על גחונך תלך אני 
של אדם עכשיו שלא רצית[ )שם( ועפר תאכל כל ימי חייך  אמרתי תאכל מאכל אדם ותשתה ]משתאו
אתה בקשת להרוג את אדם ולישא את חוה עכשיו )שם( ואיבה אשית בינך ובין האשה נמצאת אומר 
מה שבקש לא ניתן לו ומה שבידו ניטל ממנו וכן אתה מוצא בקין ]קרח[ ובלעם ודואג ואחיתופל 
הם ]בשאין[ ראוי להם מה שבקשו לא ניתן להם ומה וגחזי ]אבשלום[ ואדוניה והמן שנתנו עיני
 ]שבידם ]ניטל מהם
Just as she is forbidden to her husband, she is forbidden to her [adulterous] sexual 
partner. Consequently, you say about the sotah who eyed something that was not 
for her, “That which she wanted was not given to her, and that which was already 
hers is taken from her.” Likewise, you find regarding the original serpent who 
was more cunning than all domesticated and wild field animals, as it is said: “And 
the serpent was more cunning than all, etc.” He wished to kill Adam and to marry 
Eve, so God said to him…“You wished to kill Adam and to marry Eve, so now, ‘I 
shall place hatred between you and womankind.’” Consequently, you say, “That 
which he wanted was not given to him, and that which he had was taken from 
him.” Likewise you find regarding Cain, Qoraḥ, Balaam, Do'eg, Aḥitofel, Geḥazi, 
Absalom, Adonijah, and Haman, who cast their eyes upon that which was 
                                                          
250 According to ySotah 3:4, 19a, this is a woman who is celibate and mocks the sex lives of Biblical characters to 
show herself more virtuous than they.  
 
251 See Meir Minkovitz, "אשה פרושה וצבועים שדומים לפרושים", Ha-do'ar 54 (5735) 136 
 
252 According to bSotah 21b, it is indeed one who suggests doing legal but inequitable activities, such as offering a 
pauper just enough money to make him ineligible to take charity from the collection plate. According to ySotah 3:4, 





inappropriate for them: that which they sought was not given to them, and that 
which they had was taken away from them. 
 
This passage presents the serpent’s cunning as problematic as it was harnessed to acquire things 
that the snake did not deserve.253 And those who act in the same way – trying to acquire by 
trickery what is not theirs – will receive the selfsame punishment as the snake: never attaining 
what they sought to attain, and losing what they already had. And so ‘ormah is not a trait that is 
viewed completely positively by either the Mishnah or Tosefta, but it certainly has its sanctioned 
moments wherein it serves a vital, Proverb-like role of resolving difficult and even systemic 
challenges. We hope to develop why some ha‘aramot are considered serpentine and others 
solomonic below. 
Tosefta  
With regards to legal uses of ha‘arama, Tosefta cites two cases which do not appear in 
Mishnah. They relate to Sabbath and Festival Law, the arena which becomes most prominent in 
later talmudic discussions of ha‘arama: 
 
 
                                                          
253 In light of the singular usage of ערום in both Mishnah and Tosefta being in context of the sotah, tannaitic 
literature paints the picture of the sotah woman as cunning and sly in her betrayal of her husband. While Lady 
Wisdom in Proverbs is associated positively with ‘ormah, the above examples make a negative association between 
women and ‘ormah. This may be related to the rabbinic rereading of ‘ormah from Proverbs in the verse  אני חכמה
 Proverbs 8:12) to suggest that ‘ormah in women, contrary to the very clear meaning of Proverbs itself, is) שכנתי ערמה
a negative attribute rather than a positive one. (See bSotah 21b where this suggestion is made by Palestinian amora 
R. Abahu) For a suggestion that this is the correct reading of Proverbs proper, see Claudia V. Camp, “Wise and 
Stranger: An Interpretation of the Female Imagery in Proverbs in Light of Trickster Mythology,” Semeia 42 (1988) 
14-36. For more on the topic of women as tricksters and manipulators in rabbinic literature see The Journal of the 
Society for Textual Reasoning 6,2 (March 2011); Dvora Weisberg, “Desirable but dangerous: Rabbis’ daughters in 
the Babylonian Talmud.” Hebrew Union College Annual 75 (2004) 121-161. For a suggestion that tannaitic material 
about the sotah woman accentuates the dangers of women, see Ishay Rosen-Zvi, The Mishnaic Sotah Ritual: 
Temple, Gender and Midrash. Leiden: Brill (2012). This also may merely be reflective of an emerging link between 
‘ormah and sexuality. See Genesis Rabbah Vayeshev 85, where the snake’s character of ‘ormah is related to him 
seeing Adam and Eve copulating. This connotation is based on the linguistic similarity and Biblical proximity of 





 )וינה(תוספתא שבת יד:ו 
מיום טוב לשבת אבל לא משבת זו לשבת אחרת ולא משבת ליום טוב ולא משבת ליום 254מצילין
 257כך יזמין ואין צורך לומ' מיום טוב לחול ולא יציל ואחר 256ולא מיום הכפורים לשבת 255הכפורים
להציל  259להציל פת הדראה פת הדראה רשאי 258אלא יזמין ואחר כך יציל הציל פת נקייה אין רשאי
 ר' יוסה בי ר' יהודה אומ' מערימין בכך 260פת נקייה ואין )מערבין( מערימין בכך
One should not save [food from a fire on the Sabbath] and afterward call [guests 
to join in], but he should first call [guests to join in] and afterward should save 
[the food]. [cf. M. Shab. 16:3D] 
[If] one has saved a loaf of bread of fine flour, he is not permitted to save a loaf of 
bread of coarse261 flour. If he saved a loaf of bread of coarse flour, he is permitted 
to save a loaf of bread of fine flour. And one should not practice cunning in this 
matter. R. Jose b. R. Judah says, “One may practice cunning in this matter [by 






                                                          
254 According to yShab. 16:3, 18d, the potential problem is saving food for a weekday on the Sabbath or holiday, in 
other words, preparation for post-Sabbath or post-holiday. According to bShab. 117b, the concern is becoming so 
swept up in saving one’s food that one ultimately extinguishes the fire on the Sabbath or the Festival. 
 
255 For a discussion about whether this refers to food for minors on Yom Kippur or breakfast for adults after the Yom 
Kippur ends, see Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta Vol. 3, 210. 
 
256 bShab. 117b: ומצילין מיום הכפורים לשבת. This may be related to a debate between R. Aqiva and R. Ishmael in 
mShab. 15:3 about other preparation on Yom Kippur for the Sabbath. 
 
257 The parallel mShab. 16:2 does not mention inviting guests, but does mention asking others to take food for 
themselves (16:3).  It is unclear whether this means that the mishnah is opposed to inviting guests in order to save 
more food, or if one is calling others to save food only in a situation in which s/he cannot save all of the food 
her/himself due to the rapidly spreading fire.  YShab. 16:3, 18d, cites two opposing baraitot about inviting guests 
before saving the food and relates this question too to the argument between tanna qama and R. Jose b. Judah 
regarding the permissibility of ha‘arama. And lastly, BShab. 117b cites the argument in the context of saving liquid 
spilling from a broken barrel on the Sabbath as opposed to this case (and the case in the relevant mishnah in BT) 
about a fire. 
 
258 MS Erfurt אין צריך – Lieberman suggests that the term צריך can mean רשאי, and does mean so here. (See 
Lieberman Yerushalmi Ki-fshuto 252, Tosefet Rishonim Vol. 1, 155, and Tosefta Ki-fshuta, Shabbat, 210.) 
 
259 MS Erfurt ואינו צריך לומר – probably a mistake. 
 
260 MS Erfurt בהן – This change probably reflects BT’s reading of the baraita, in which אין מערימין refers to the 
section about inviting guests. By changing אין מערימין בכך to אין מערימין בהן, MS Erfurt suggests that the אין מערימין 
debate is about both inviting guests and saving coarse bread. bMQ 12b, however, cites only the end of this tosefta, 
using אין מערימין בכך and does not discuss which part of the tosefta this clause refers to. The comparison this clause is 
used for is a braita about making new wine on ḥol ha-moed, suggesting that it is for the holiday, though it is truly 
for afterwards. 
 





 תוספתא ביצה ג:ב )וינה(
שנפלו לבור ר' אליעזר אומ' מעלה את הראשון על מנת לשוחטו ואינו שוחטו  262אותו ואת בנו
והשיני עושה לו פרנסה במקומו בשביל שלא ימות ר' יהושע אומ' מעלה את הראשון על מנת לשוחטו 
 264רצה שלא לשחוט את אחד מהם הרשות בידו 263ואינו שוחטו ומערים ומעלה את השיני
A dam and its offspring which fell into a pit R. Eliezer says, “One raises up the 
first on condition to slaughter it but does not slaughter it, and, for the second, one 
provides food while it is in its present location, so that it does not die.” R. Joshua 
says, “One raises up the first on condition to slaughter it but does not slaughter it, 
and, practicing cunning, one then raises up the second. [If] he wanted to slaughter 
neither one of them, he has the right [to refrain].” 
 
In the following chapter, we will analyze how these particular ha‘aramot (pl.) function, 
as they represent a slightly different iteration than what we have seen thus far. Here we will only 
point out that, like the mishnaic examples, in both cases a person stands to lose money 
(=possessions) as a result of following the law – the law of not removing excess food on the 
Sabbath in case of a house fire and the law of not handling animals except for the purpose of 
consumption on the Festival. And in each case, one tanna offers a dodge to avoid this 
unfortunate reality. There is true conflict between a person’s financial health and their religious 
commitment. Unlike the mishnaic cases, however, it there appears to be no connection between 
these ha‘aramot and navigating post-Temple life. In fact, it is hard to see the societal urgency in 
these cases at all. Did animals often fall into pits on the holiday? Were house fires common? 
                                                          
262 There is no parallel in Mishnah (or Midrash Halakha) to this toseftan passage. Instead mBeṣa 3:4 deals only with 
the case of a bekhor animal that falls into a pit on the Festival (found also in the very next toseftan passage). There, 
the question surrounds whether the animal had been maimed prior to the Festival, which would render it appropriate 
for slaughter and thus for retrieval from the pit for the purpose of slaughter. Though the case of a “regular” animal 
falling into a pit on the Festival is not found in rabbinic, some assume that the ruling would be the same: because it 
is edible, it may be retrieved, but only to be slaughtered for that day’s food. (Or Zarua, Laws of the Festival, 2:355), 
and thus assume that the case of a parent and its dam highlights R. Joshua’s position.  Others have argued 
unconvincingly that both the bekhor and the animal/dam cases are unique, and one would be permitted to retrieve a 
“regular” single animal from a pit on the Festival even without slaughtering or planning to slaughter it. (Magen 
Abraham O.C. 498:10).  
 
263 MS Erfurt, MS London and Venice Ed. add: על מנת לשחוט  
 
264 Thus, MSS Vienna and Erfurt, but MSS Leiden, London, Venice Ed. read:  רצה לשחוט רצה שלא לשחוט אחד מהן
 See also ‘Ittur, Laws of Festivals, Part III, 140; Shibbolei Ha-Leket Ha-Shalem Laws of Festivals chapter) הרשות בידו





Perhaps this is why, while both the Mishnah and Tosefta discuss the case of a bekhor that falls 
into a pit on the Festival,265 only the Tosefta brings up the animal/dam case invoking ha‘arama. 
Likewise, while the Mishnah discusses how many meals to save from a burning home on the 
Sabbath,266 it is only the Tosefta which raises the possibility of performing ha‘arama by saving 
coarse bread first “by accident” in order to save extra bread. The Mishnah’s interest in ha‘arama 
is rather narrow. It is not for solving problems caused here and there by a clash of halakhah and 
values but instead it is expressly for the purpose of working out a society need in a particular 
historical context. 
Uniquely, the Tosefta also cites explicit instances of rejected ha‘arama. For example, the 
Tosefta rejects use of ha‘arama to avoid usury restrictions:267 
 )ירושלמי ב"מ ה:א, דף י' עמוד א'( 268ב:ד תוספתא בבא מציעא
יש  269דברים שהן רבית ואינן רבית לוקח אדם הלואתו של חבירו בפחות ושטרותיו בפחותיש 
א"ל הלויני מנה אע"פ שחזר ולקח  271רבית כיצד 270מפני ערמת דברים שאינן רבית אבל אסורין
הימנו עשרים וארבעה אינו רבית אבל אסורין מפני ערמת רבית. כיצ'? א"ל אין לי מנה טול לך 
                                                          
265 Beṣa chapter 3 in both Mishnah and Tosefta 
 
266 mShab. 16:2 
 
267 The Venice Ed. of tAZ 7:7 mentions ‘ormah in connection with the prohibition of drinking wine handled by a 
Gentile, but the term is not used in any extant MSS. An interesting development in the Geonic period, Exodus 
Rabbah Mishpatim 31 offers a play on words: לא תנשכנו לא תהיה כנחש שהוא ערום לרעה 
 
268 We follow MS Vienna here, but with a slight variation by Lieberman. 
 
269 yBM 5:1, 10a cites this clause as follows:  תני יש דברים שהן רבית ומותרין.  כיצד לוקח אדם שטרות חברו בפחות ומלוותו של
 .חבירי בפחות ואינו חושש משום רבית
This is a problematic reading for the Tosefta, as tAZ 1:11: לא ישא אדם ויתן בהלואתו של חברו מפני אבק רבית 
See Tosefta Ki-fshuta ad loc. And Tosefet Rishonim page 178 for a proposed reconciliation of the two by explaining 
tAZ 1:11 differently. 
 
270 MS Erfurt: הערמת רבית; Venice Ed.: ערמית רבית 
 





 273שלחטין אע"פ שחזר ולקח ממנו עשרים וארבע אינן רבית אבל אסורין משום ]ערמת[ 272מאה
 רבית
There are practices which are usurious but are not usurious:274 One purchases the 
[right to collect] the loans of his fellow at a discount.275 There are matters which 
are not usurious, but are nonetheless prohibited because of strategizing to collect 
usury. How so? [If] he said to him, “Lend me a maneh276,” even though he bought 
it from him [for] 24 [sela], this is not usury, but is prohibited because of 
strategizing to collect usury. How so? [If] he said to him, “Lend me a maneh,” 
[and the other] said to him, “I don’t have a maneh, but take 100 [seahs] of grain.” 
Even though he then bought it from him [for] 24 [sela], this is not usury, but it is 
prohibited because of cunning usury. 
 
When a creditor receives a quantifiable financial perk beyond the actual value of the loan from 
his debtor, the two parties have transgressed usury. In one sense this happens in this passage: the 
creditor lends 100 seahs of grain, which is worth 25 sela. At some later point, the creditor makes 
a bid for the grain himself, offering only 24 sela. So, now, beyond the loan that the debtor owes, 
the debtor now becomes a salesman too. The debtor agrees to sell it because after all, he will 
only make 24 sela in the marketplace as well, assuming that those buying are interested 
eventually in selling at a profit. This seems like usury because the creditor pays less than the 
market value of the grain, which seems like a perk for having loaned the debtor in the first place. 
However, this really is not a perk at all because anyone in the market would have the paid the 
                                                          
 
272 Lieberman changes the term סאה from the MSS and printed editions, to מאה, suggesting that such a switch occurs 
with regularity. (See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta, 89, note 37) MS Erfurt: עשרים סאה של חיטין 
 
273 This is not found in MS Vienna, but because it is found in the otherwise identical line above, Lieberman adds it. 
(Tosefta Ki-fshuta, 196) 
 
274 This author has modified Neusner’s translation to accommodate Lieberman’s reading. 
 
275 There is an argument among the medieval commentators over whether this is permissible even if the seller of the 
deeds accepts responsibility to pay the buyer even if the debtor defaults. The Provencal authorities suggest that it is, 
while the Ashkenazic commentators suggest that it is not. (See Or Zarua ibid., Responsa Maharin Lev III:60) All 
agree, however, that the sale of deeds is legal even though the collection date has not yet arrived.  
 





exact same amount: the debtor has not lost anything extra, nor has the creditor gained.277  
Nonetheless, the transaction is still outlawed. 
It is difficult to know whether this example should be included in the illustrations of 
ha‘arama. Perhaps the terminology of ערימה is similar to ערום in its negative connotation. 
Commentators have difficulty explaining what ביתערימת ר  is. According to some medieval 
glosses, this indicates that there is here אבק ריבית, a hint of usury, at least rabbinically.278 
According to others, this is suspect because it looks as though the creditor only loaned the grains 
in the first place in order to ensure this future transaction.279  However, the plain meaning of the 
phrase is that this is a clever way to take interest without actually breaking the law. Perhaps the 
creditor was not planning to bother to go out to market to haggle with grain sellers about prices. 
But here is an easy way to make quick money.  
This is an above-board interest scheme: a sly businessperson is trying to game the law. 
S/he makes a mockery of the usury prohibition, a prohibition which includes five separate 
transgressions split among all parties involved (mBava Meṣia 5:12) and is considered middat 
resha'im, a trait of the wicked, in tBM 4:9.280  There is no pathos here suggesting that ha‘arama 
be permitted. And perhaps the tannaitic understanding of commerce in general comes into play 
here. Jacob Neusner has painted a picture of Aristotelian economics within the Mishnah which 
appears relevant to the Tosefta as well:281 money is a medium of exchange rather than 
                                                          
277 See Lieberman Tosefta Ki-fshuta ad loc. 196 
 
278 See Naḥmanides Novellae bBM 62b 
 
279 See R. Solomon ibn Aderet Novellae bBM 68a 
 
280 It is not clear whether this passage is academic – dealing with a potential use of ribit – or is responding to some 
scheme that is already in use. The language of יש דברים can go in either direction.  
281 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between Mishnah and Tosefta regarding the laws of usury, see Hillel 





intrinsically valuable. As he writes: “True value (in our sense) lies in the land and produce, not in 
liquid capital. Seed in the ground yields a crop. Money invested in maintaining the agricultural 
community from season to season does not. The bias is against not only usury but interest, in 
favor not only of regulating fraud but restricting honest traders.”282 The rabbis do not favor 
accumulation of coinage, even if no one is harmed in the process!283 
Also in the realm of transgressive ha‘arama, the Tosefta outlaws such evasion in cases of 
ritual im/purity law, an issue which does not arise in the Mishnah at all.284 We will take up these 
cases in further detail in chapter 3 below. 
Mishnah vs. Tosefta 
The relationship between Tosefta and Mishnah is hotly debated. On the one hand, there 
are those who argue for Tosefta’s inclusion of material which predates Mishnah; on the other 
hand, there are clearly attributions in Tosefta from rabbis who post-date Mishnah. It is therefore 
difficult to know whether the omission of toseftan material in Mishnah is purposeful or not.  In 
our case of ha‘arama, for example, regarding the toseftan arguments between R. Eliezer and R. 
Joshua, or by R. Jose b. Judah, perhaps the mishnaic redactors a) simply had no record of these 
arguments, b) knew of them but chose to leave them out, or c) the attributions in the Tosefta are 
mistaken or purposely changed and actually represent opinions from after the close of Mishnah. 
                                                          
282 Jacob Neusner, “Aristotle’s Economics and the Mishnah’s Economics: The Matter of Wealth and Usury,” 
Journal for the Study of Judaism XXI:1 (1990) 43. See also Robert P. Maloney, “Usury in Greek, Roman and 
Rabbinic Thought.” Traditio 27 (1971) 79-109. 
 
283 He offers evidence to support his claim: the rabbis greatly expand usury law, and the homeowner is always the 
borrower of money, whereas the lender of money, a person with extra cash on his hands, is consistently viewed as 
other. 
 





Moreover, the toseftan discussions about illicit ha‘aramot are anonymous, so it is difficult even 
to guess whether the Mishnah was aware of them.   
Regardless of the chronology and conscious decision-making, the ha‘arama discussion is 
clearly more prominent in the Tosefta; it appears over a dozen times – and in varied legal arenas- 
compared to the Mishnah’s mere three uses of even the root ‘.r.m.  Moreover, the Tosefta offers 
the precedent for rejected ha‘aramot, a precedent which will become significant for the 
Palestinian Talmud.285 
Palestinian Talmud 
Over and over again, the Palestinian Talmud (PT) limits the use of ha‘arama.286  Beyond 
echoing the toseftan287 prohibition of ha‘aramat ribit,288  PT offers more examples where 
ha‘arama is mentioned only to be rejected: 
                                                          
285 As alluded to above, with the debates about ha‘arama, Tosefta presents a new type of ha‘arama (to be examined 
in the following chapter), new application to less pervasive systemic issues, and examples of rejected ha‘arama. It 
entails a more robust treatment of the topic which allows one to begin to think about ha‘arama’s parameters.  
 
286 This survey of PT ha‘aramot skips one incident of ha‘arama and deals with it instead in chapter 4 specifically in 
contrast to the parallel BT sugya: 
 מתניתא כל מתנה שהיא כמתנת בית חורון שהיתה בהערמה שאינה שאם הקדישה אינה מקודשת אינה מתנה -נדרים ה:ו, לט עמ' ב 
 
287 PT also includes toseftan arguments about ha‘arama, such as the case of saving coarse bread first from a burning 
home on the Sabbath (yShab. 16:3, 18d ; it offers a different version of the toseftan text to account for people in 
different states of hunger). 
 
288 yBM 5:1, 10a-b 
 תני יש דברים שהן רבית ומותרין.  כיצד לוקח אדם שטרות חברו בפחות ומלוותו של חבירי בפחות ואינו
 .חושש משום רבית.  ויש דברים שאינן רבית ואסורין משום הערמית רבית
ר אחד חיטין טול לך וחזר ולקח ממנו בעשרים כיצד קיבל הימינו שדה בעשרה כור חיטין ואמר לו תן לי סלע אחד אמר לו אין לי אלא כו
 וארבע אין זה רבית אבל אסור משום הערמית רבית א"ל לית את צריך והב אגר כלים או אגר
  .הכתפין אקולי וסב דינרך
Many have pointed out that there is a conflation of sugyot in this situation and that the PT version should be read 
only starting from the words, אמר לו תן לי סלע אחד אמר לו אין לי אלא כור אחד חיטין. However, even so, the PT version is a 
bit different than the Tosefta’s version. In this case, “A”’s suggestion that “B” sell him the wheat for 24 dinar (=96 
zuz) is based on the money “B” will have to spend on labor to get the wheat to market. Thus, there really is no usury 
here! “B” probably even makes more than he would have otherwise, assuming that laborers cost more than 4 zuz, 
and “A” is getting paid an extra four zuz for saving “B” the labor costs! But it still has a common element with (and 
is perhaps quoting) the Tosefta: according to the plain meaning of the text, there is not true usury here, but  only 





 קידושין ג:ד, סד עמוד א' )כ"י ליידן(
והרי המקדש את האשה ואמ' סבור הייתי שהיא כוהנת והרי היא לוייה לוייה   משנה )כ"י פארמה(
 היא כוהנת ענייה והרי היא עשירה עשירה והרי היא ענייה הרי זו מקודשת מפני שלא היטעתו:
לית ראובן   אפירסן לוי.  רבי בר אחא בשם רבי אימי ראובן חייב לשמעון סמכיה גבי לוי.  ...גמרא
 הדא דאת אמר בשלא עשו בהערמה אבל עשו בהערמה חייב.  חייב לשמעון.
Mishnah: He who betroths a woman and said, "I was thinking that she is a priest, 
and lo, she is a Levite," "a Levite, and lo, she is a priest," "a poor girl, and lo, she 
is a rich girl," "a rich girl, and lo, she is a poor girl," lo, she is betrothed, for she 
has not deceived him. 
... 
R. Jacob bar Aha in the name of R. 'Immi, "If Reuben owed money to Simeon, 
and assigned to him what Levi was owing to him [Reuben], and Levi lost his 
money, Reuben does not owe Simeon money.” That statement you made applies 
when they did not practice ha‘arama   [in a conspiracy against Simeon]. But if 
they practiced ha‘arama, he remains liable. 
 
Here is the perfect dodge: a debtor makes his destitute friend289 his guarantor on a loan. The 
contract required a guarantor so he presented one who creditor thought had means,290 while the 
debtor knew otherwise.291 When the creditor comes to collect, there is nothing to collect, and the 
debtor is off the hook. As in the usury case, ha‘arama is not acceptable for use in financial 
transactions. But more significantly, ha‘arama may not be used to defraud a second party.  The 
stammaitic addition of אבל עשו בהערמה indicates an interest in snuffing out even potential 
ha‘arama, perhaps stimulated independently or in order to make the case parallel to the mishnah, 
which specifically mentions that the betrothal is effective under false pretenses so long as  לא
 .the woman did not trick him into any misconceptions about her ,הטעתו
 
                                                          
le-ʾor ʻal-pi ketav-yad Esḳoryal be-tseruf mavo ʻal-yade Eliʻezer Shimshon Rozental ; hosif mavo u-ferush Shaʾul 
Liberman; see also Saul Lieberman, Talmuda shel Kisrin) 
 
289 Alternatively, he knew that the guarantor would run away. See Qorban Ha’edah  s.v. איפרסן לוי and Shiyarei Ha-
qorban ad loc. 
 
290 Just as in the preceding mishnah the man had mistakenly thought that the woman he was to betroth was poor or 
rich. (see Ridbaz s.v., איפרסן לוי) 
 





Suspicion of Ha‘arama  
The aforementioned passage is but one example of the Palestinian Talmud’s hunt for 
potential ha‘arama. We find, in fact, the phrase חשש הערמה, suspicion of ha‘arama, used 
explicitly in PT: some tannaim and amoraim are portrayed as actively look for potential 
ha‘arama as a reason to prohibit certain activities.  The notion of suspecting ha‘arama takes for 
granted that if found, ha‘arama is prohibited.292 PT moves beyond simply outlawing ha‘arama 
(at least in some cases), and begins to deal with it more prophylactically.  
Case 1 – Indecent Proposal 
 משנה ערכין ו:א
המקדיש נכסיו,   שום היתומים שלושים יום, ושום ההקדש שישים יום; ומכריזין בבוקר ובערב.
; רבי יהושוע אומר, אינו 293רבי אליעזר אומר, כשיגרשנה, ידיר הניה--והייתה עליו כתובת אישה
ידיר --בכתובתה, והיה בעלה מגרשהכיוצא בו, אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל, הערב לאישה   צריך.
 שמא יעשו קנוניה על נכסיו של זה, ויחזיר את אשתו.  הניה:
The proclamation of the sale of goods of orphans evaluated by the court to meet 
the father's debt is for thirty days. And the proclamation of the sale of goods of 
                                                          
292 See, for instance, yPe’ah 6:1,19b: 
 ירושלמי פאה ו:א, דף יט עמוד ב' )כ"י ליידן(
יכול לחזור בו אבל  אבל אם אמ' שדי מובקרת יום אחד שבת אחת חודש אחד שנה אחת שבוע אחד אם עד שלא זכה בין הוא בין אחר }אינו{
 אחר אינו יכול לחזור בו הדא אמרה הוא זמן מרובה הוא זמן מועט ]הדא אמרה[ לא חשו על הערמה... משזכה בה בין הוא בין
But if one said: My field is ownerless for one day, for one week, for one month, for one year, for one seven-year 
period, until someone acquired it he may {not} renege, but once he or someone else has acquired it, he may not 
renege. This teaches: a long time or a short time are equivalent [this teaches] they were not concerned about cunning 
[in order to evade ma‘aser]. 
 This is the rendering of both MS Leiden and the Venice Edition, though in MS Leiden it appears to have been :}אינו{
added by a later scribe. However, MSS Vatican, Paris, London, and the Amsterdam ed. render:  אם עד שלא זכה בין הוא
ינוא Additionally, the braita is quoted without the word .בין אחר יכול לחזור בו  in BT MSS Munich, Moscow, Vilna and 
Venice Ed. of bNed. 44a. While in MS Vatican the entire sentence is reversed- 
 -עד שלא זכה בה הוא ובין אחר אינו יכול לחזור בו מי שזכה בה בין הוא בין אחר יכול לחזור בו
the argumentation found in the sugya works off of the version of the other BT MSS, indicating mere scribal error in 
transcription of the baraita. 
 Conspicuous addition by the scribe - ]הדא אמרה[
 The הדא אמרה לא חשו להערמה :.MSS Paris and London, Constantinople  and Amsterdam ed -לא חשו על הערמה
difference between להערמה  and על הערמה may be the difference between not being suspicious that ha’arama may be 
taking place, and not caring even if ha’arama is actually taking place, respectively. However, in other sugyot, such 
as yPes. 2:2, 29a,  להערמה is used in all versions. 
 
293 The parallel t‘Arakhin 4:3 (MS Vienna) reads quite differently and becomes a debate about whether one who has 
foresworn his ex-wife from his assets may remarry her: 
הנאה וגובה כתובתה מן הקדש ואם רצה להחזיר יחזיר ובית הלל אומ' אם  המקדיש את נכסיו ונתן עיניו לגרש את אשתו ר' ליעזר אומ' ידירנה
 רצה להחזיר לא יחזיר ר' ליעזר או' כדברי בית שמיי ור' יהושע או' כדברי בית הלל





the sanctuary evaluated by the court is for sixty days. And they make an 
announcements morning and night. [He who sanctifies his property, and there was 
incumbent upon it the payment of the marriage settlement - R. Eliezer says, 
"When he divorces her, he imposes on her a vow not to enjoy any benefit from 
him." R. Joshua says, "He need not do so"] Similarly, R. Simon b. Gamliel said: A 
guarantor of a woman’s ketubah, if her husband divorced her, he (=her husband) 
must take an oath [not to give her any] benefit – for perhaps they will conspire 
against this [guarantor’s] possessions, and he will remarry his wife. 
 
 ירושלמי נזיר ה:א, דף נד עמוד א' )כ"י ליידן(
תמן תנינן שום היתומין שלשים יום שום הקדש ש)ל(]ש[ים יום ומכריזין בבקר ובערב אמ' ר' מנא ר' 
 יהושע לא חשש על ה) (]ע[רמהליעזר חשש על הערמה רבי 
There we have learned: The proclamation of the sale of goods of orphans 
evaluated by the court to meet the father's debt is for thirty days. And the 
proclamation of the sale of goods of the sanctuary evaluated by the court is for 
sixty days. And they make an announcements morning and night. [He who 
sanctifies his property, and there was incumbent upon it the payment of the 
marriage settlement - R. Eliezer says, "When he divorces her, he imposes on her a 
vow not to enjoy any benefit from him." R. Joshua says, "He need not do so"] [M. 
Ar.6:1]. R. Mana said, "R. Eliezer takes into account the possibility of cunning 
[between the husband and the wife to defraud the Temple]. R. Joshua does not 
take account of the possibility of cunning. [The man will not divorce her so that 
she may get his property back in payment of her marriage settlement.] 
 
The mishnah speaks of qinunya, conspiracy, but it does not speak of ha‘arama; it R. 
Mana who filters the mishnah through that terminology.  R. Eliezer and R. Joshua, who appeared 
in the Tosefta debating the permissibility of ha‘arama in a particular case are here interpreted as 
debating the potential for ha‘arama here too. A man who has consecrated money/possessions to 
the Temple is trying to get them back without paying the twenty-five percent tax required of 
those who redeem their own heqdesh items.294 His strategy is to divorce his wife, so that she 
receives her ketubah payment from the consecrated money and then to remarry her. Unlike the 
cases of ma‘aser sheni, bekhor, the burning house or the fallen animal, there is no pathos in this 
story. The man is trying to take from sacred funds. He is not caught between a rock and a hard 
                                                          






place not of his own making; he has made a vow to the Sanctuary and does not wish to keep it.  
Likewise, in R. Simon b. Gamaliel’s case, the spouses may wish to conspire to cheat the ketubah 
guarantor out of money. This would be unacceptable, and measures must be taken to safeguard 
against such eventualities. 
Case 2 – Making Ḥameṣ Homeless 
The suspicion of ha‘arama is again projected, this time onto an amora by the anonymous 
redactor(s), in the case of ridding oneself of ḥameṣ before Passover: 
 א' )כ"י ליידן(ירושלמי פסחים ב:ב, דף כט עמוד 
בשלשה עשר לאחר הפסח מהו ר' יוחנן אמ' אסור ר' שמעון בן לקיש אמ'  296חמ)ש(]צו[ 295הבקיר 
מותר... אמ' ר' יוסה לר' פינחס נהיר את כד הוינן אמרין אתייא )ד(]ל[ר' יוחנן כר' יוסה ודר' שמעון 
לקיש לא חשש להערמה.  בן לקיש כר' מאיר.  אינה כן אלא ר' יוחנן חשש להערמה  ור' שמעון בן 
מה נפק מביניהון נפלה עליו מפולת מאן דאמ' הערמה לית כאן הערמה והוא מותר מאן דאמ' זכייה 
לית כאן זכייה והוא אסור. הכל מודין בגר שמת וביזבזו יש' את נכסיו מאן דאמ' הערמה מותר ומאן 
 297דאמ' זכייה )אסור( ]מותר[.
If [a person] renounced ownership of his leavened bread on the thirteenth, after 
Passover what is the law [regarding the status of the leaven]?298R. Yoḥanan said, 
“It is forbidden.” R. Shimon b. Laqish said, “It is permitted.”...Said R. Jose to R. 
Pinḥas, “Do you remember when we used to say that R. Yoḥanan is in accord 
with R. Jose [as in M. Nedarim 8:4, where he makes renouncing of property 
contingent on a second party’s taking possession of the property], and R. Simeon 
b. Laqish is in accord with R. Meir [the assumed anonymous disputant of R. Jose 
in M. Nedarim 8:4, who claims that taking possession is not required]? This is not 
correct. Rather R. Yoḥanan is apprehensive of ha‘arama   and R. Simeon b. 
Laqish is not apprehensive of ha‘arama.  
What is the [practical] difference between them [the two rationales]? [If before 
Passover] a ruin fell on it [the leaven]. The one [Yoḥanan] who was apprehensive 
of ha‘arama   – there is no possibility of ha‘arama   here and [the leaven, when 
dug up after Passover,] is permitted. The one [Simeon b. Laqish] who says that 
possession [by a second party cause the renounced property to leave the owner’s 
                                                          
295 Lieberman notes that Rothner found a different version with the term hifkid among six medieval commentators, 
but he rejects this reading, as the entire sugya deals with hefker rather than pikadon. He disproves each of Rothner’s 
citations one by one as being mere scribal errors. (Ha-Yerushalmi Ki-fshuto, 397) 
 
296 ( )indicates something which was erased, [ ] indicates the substituted word(s) or letter(s)  
 
297 MS Leiden: (מותר(}אסור} 
 






possession] – there is no possibility of possession here, and [hence the leaven] is 
forbidden [for it is considered to have remained the property of the Jew]. All 
agree regarding the case of a convert who died [before Passover without any 
Jewish relatives to inherit his property, which therefore became ownerless,] where 
an Israelite distributed the property [which may include leavened bread that 
remained over Passover,] that according to the one who said that possession [is 
necessary, her that requirement is not necessary either, since there is no doubt that 
the property has left the original owner’s possession and, hence,] it is permitted. 
 
A Jew who owns ḥameṣ on Passover may not eat it after the holiday as a penalty and 
deterrent for violating bal yera’eh/yimaṣe. But what if s/he does not destroy the ḥameṣ prior to 
Passover, sell it, or give it away, but instead simply declares it hefqer, ownerless, before 
Passover? Does this suffice as ridding oneself of leaven before Passover? May one eat this 
leaven following the holiday? Do the rabbis take such declarations seriously? After all, it is 
unlikely that anyone will take ownership of the “ownerless” leaven just two days before 
Passover, and the owner will be able to retrieve the food following the holiday.299  R. Yoḥanan is 
presented as concerned about ha‘arama lurking, while Resh Laqish is not. How the issue of 
ha‘arama plays out legally is unclear: perhaps the declaration of hefqer itself is invalid,300 as the 
agent does not truly want others to take his ḥameṣ, or perhaps the declaration itself is valid, but 
the rabbis discount it due to suspicion.301 Again, it is a later layer of PT, here the redactional 
layer, explaining a dispute in ha‘arama terms. While in later centuries, when Jews began to 
                                                          
299 Menahem Meiri, Bet Ha-Beḥira 9:1 (18a). On the other hand, Or Zarua (1:748; 2:246) R. Asher b. Yehiel (Piskei 
ha-Rosh, bPes. 2:4) and R. Yeruham (Toldot Adam ve-Ḥava, 5:5) read it as a concern for lying: perhaps s/he will not 
even declare the food ownerless, but will merely lie and pretend to have done so. Their definition of ha’arama is 
“lying.” We favor Meiri’s reading, as it accords better with the plain meaning of hifqir ḥemṣo. Additionally, if 
declaring ḥameṣ ownerless is problematic because a person may lie about it, burning one’s ḥameṣ should be 
problematic too – after all, a person may simply lie about it!  
 
300 See Pene Moshe yPe’ah 6:1, 19b, s.v., לישנא דמתניתא 
 
301 Pene Moshe, s.v., אינה כן; Qorban Ha’edah , s.v., חייש להערמה, suggests that the ha’arama is lying about having 
declared hefker when one never in fact declared it. He may prefer this explanation because BT (Qid. 49b) rules that 





manufacture beer, and their very livelihoods were dependent upon owning leaven, 
circumventions around the violation of owning leaven would be found.302 However, here there is 
no such worry.  There is no suggestion here that the person in question is destitute or that s/he 
has inordinate amounts of ḥameṣ and stands to lose too much money. Instead, the motivation is 
simply to shirk the law. It seems that this person is simply trying to get around the law for his/her 
own benefit. R. Yoḥanan will not allow this. Resh Laqish’s position here is interesting. It seems 
that he is not looking for ha‘arama. He will not actively seek it out. After all, such probing may 
undermine the very believability of any declaration of hefqer.  The very superficial version of 
what is taking place stands. 
Case 3 – No Snacking! 
In a third instance, the concern for ha‘arama is addressed without the specific phrasing of 
 :חשש הערמה
 ירושלמי חלה ג:א, דף נט עמוד א' )כ"י ליידן(
גילגלה בחטים וטימטמה   אוכלין עראי מן העיסה עד שתגלגל בחיטי' ותטמטם בשעורי'.  משנה
כיון שהיא נותנת את המים מגבהת חלתה ובלבד שיהא שם חמשת   בשעורין האוכל ממנה חייב מיתה.
 רבעים קמח:
מפני שהוא   אסור. 303אמ' ר' חגיי לא שנו אלא עראי אבל קבע  אוכלין עראי מן העיסה כול'.  גמרא
וא נוטל ממנה אמ' ר' יוסי אי מן הדא לית שמע מינה כלום שאפילו שה  מערים לפוטרה מן החלה.
 304דאמ' ר' יוסי  שתים שלש מקרצות מכיון שהוא עתיד להחזירו לדבר שלא נגמרה מלאכתו מותר.
בשם ר' לעזר אף מה שבלגין לא נטבל מפני שהוא עתיד להחזירו לדבר שלא  305בשם ר' זעיר' > <
                                                          
302 Unlike later centuries, there is little indication that ridding oneself of ḥameṣ prior to Passover in ancient times 
involved substantial financial loss, as one would not have had substantial amounts of ḥameṣ stored. This may be 
because milled grain that had not yet had contact with water was not considered ḥameṣ, and little grain was 
processed earlier than shortly prior to its consumption.  In fact tPes. 2:6 discusses only the urgent situation of a Jew 
who finds himself in possession of ḥameṣ on a boat on the eve of Passover and suggests that in such a situation, the 
Jew may sell the ḥameṣ to the Gentile. This implies that this was not normative practice, at least for those not aboard 
ships on the eve of Passover. It was not until the sixteenth century when Jews began to own inns and produce liquor 
that ridding oneself of ḥameṣ prior to the holiday became financially prohibitive. See chapter 2 above for further 
discussion. 
 
303 MS Vatican: היה קבוע 
 






שאינו  309מפני  308עיסתו בטהרה 307מי שאינו יכול לעשות 306והדא אמרה  נגמרה מלאכתו.
 [ עיסתו קבין.²הדא אמרה שאסור לאדם ]לעשות  אם היה יכול לא בדא. 310הא  יכול.
Mishnah: [People] may snack on dough [without first separating dough-offering 
from it] until she [i.e., the woman preparing the dough] rolls [the dough] in the 
case of [dough made from] wheat, or [until] she forms [it] into a solid mass, in the 
case of [dough made from] barley. [Once] she rolled [the dough] out, in the case 
of [dough made from] wheat, or formed [it] into a solid mass, in the case of 
[dough made from] barley, one who eats from it [without first separating ḥallah] 
is liable to death. As soon as she puts water [into the flour], she may remove her 
[portion of] ḥallah, so long as there is not five-fourths of a qab of flour [left 
unmixed with water]. 
Gemara: People may snack on dough [without first separating the ḥallah…] [M 
3:1A]. Said R. Haggai, “This teaching applies only to a snack, but making a 
formal meal of it is forbidden [until one has separated ḥallah], because [if one 
does so] one may practice ha‘arama   so as to exempt the dough from the 
requirement of separating ḥallah [by taking so much dough away as to render the 
rest of the dough too small for the requirement of ḥallah]311” 
Said R. Jose, “If the reason is [what you have said], then there is nothing to be 
learned from this passage. For even if one take two or three pieces from the 
dough, since one is going to put the dough back into a mixture on which the 
processing has not yet been completed, it is permitted [to eat such dough without 
separating ḥallah at all].”312 
As in the following: R. Jose said in the name of R. Ze’ira, and R. Jonah said in the 
name of R. Elazar, “Also [the wine in] the flagon is not placed into the status of 
what is ready for the separation of tithes and not yet tithed [=tebel] because the 
person is going to put any excess back into a batch on which processing has not 
yet been completed.  
                                                          
305 MS Vatican: בשם ר' זעיר' יונ' ור' זעיר' בן לעז'- MS Vatican presents the end of the sugya as an argument between R. 
Jose in the name of R. Ze’ira Jonah and R. Ze’ira b. R. Elazar: according to one, a person who has work left to do on 
the dough, may eat from pieces of the dough, while according to the other, this is only in a situation in which one’s 
ḥallah is ritually impure. Therefore, one may take pieces away so that there is no ḥallah requirement. But otherwise, 
this is not permissible. 
 
306 MS Vatican: וחד אמר 
 
307 MS Vatican excludes the word לעשות 
 
308 MS Moscow: (וכו') 
 
309 MS Moscow: מי 
 
310 MS Vatican: הא בדא 
 
311 See Oṣar Mefarshei ha-Talmud, ad loc. 
 
312 In other words, there is nothing wrong with taking the pieces away and eating them, even as part of a sit-down 
meal, because those pieces are not yet obligated in ḥallah, as the dough that they would be returned to has not been 





And this says [quoting Mishnah 2:2] “One who cannot separate ḥallah in purity 
[should separate the dough into several qabs rather than separating ḥallah which 
is ritually impure]”- One is only permitted [to break up the dough into smaller 
pieces so as not to require ḥallah] because one cannot [separate ḥallah in purity], 
but if one could, not in this [would we permit a person to take away small pieces 
of dough in order to exempt the dough from ḥallah.  This teaches that it is 
forbidden for one to separate his/her dough into several qabs. 
 
Two steps in the making of the dough are relevant to the requirement of removing ḥallah: the 
first is the mixing of the water and the flour, when one may already remove ḥallah in order to 
fulfill the commandment. Yet only when the flour and water have been fully integrated through 
kneading does eating from the dough without separating ḥallah become prohibited. Between 
these two steps, the mishnah allows one to snack on the dough before ḥallah has been taken but 
not to eat a full meal.313  
R. Ḥaggai attributes this limitation to a fear of ha‘arama: if one is permitted to eat a 
proper meal from the dough before separating ḥallah, perhaps one will remove hefty pieces of 
dough for the meal in order to exempt the rest of the basket of dough from the commandment of 
ḥallah, as it is now too minimal to require it. R. Jose suggests that potential ha‘arama is not the 
reason for prohibiting the consumption of a proper meal of such dough; after all, it does not yet 
require ḥallah separation.  Moreover, he argues, there are times when a person is actually 
permitted to remove large amounts of dough specifically in order to exempt the dough from the 
requirement of ḥallah, such as according to one opinion in the case of ḥallah which has become 
impure.314 While it is unclear whether R. Jose is not concerned that a person would commit 
ha‘arama or whether he simply does not mind if a person actually does commit ha‘arama (after 
                                                          
313 See Oṣar Mefarshei ha-Talmud ibid. for a discussion of what is considered snacking –whether it is measured 
quantitatively or by some other yardstick such as whether one had planned for a meal or not. 
 
314 This is the reading of the Pene Moshe, s.v., והדא אמרה. Of course, other readings are possible as well, but this is 





all, the dough does not yet technically require that ḥallah be separated), R. Ḥaggai’s position is 
clear: he understands the prohibition of eating a proper meal from dough that has yet to have 
ḥallah separated from it, even at its most initial stages, is a protective measure to guard against 
misuse of ha‘arama in order to a evade a law. 
Cases 4 & 5 – Mourning and Intermediate Festival Days 
The Palestinian Talmud furthermore weighs the likelihood of ha‘arama in different 
arenas of Jewish law, namely the laws of mourning and those of ḥol ha-moed, the intermediate 
days of a Festival: 
 ירושלמי מועד קטן ב:א, דף פא עמוד א' )כ"י ליידן( 
: מי שהפך את זיתיו ואירעו אבל או אונס או שהטעוהו טוען קורה ראשונה ומניחה לאחר משנה
 המועד דברי ר' יהודה. ר' יוסי אומר זולף וגומר כדרכו. 
...ר' יודה או' יאבד דבר ממועט ואל יאבד דבר מרובה. ר' יוסה או' אל יאבד דבר כל עיקר. ר' גמרא:
חלוקין כאן כך הן חלוקין בהילכות אבל: דתני אילו דברים יודה בר פזי בשם ר' יוחנן כשם שהן 
שעושין לאבל בימי אבלו דורכין את עבטו וזולפין את יינו וגפין את חביותיו וזיתיו הפוכין ושנויין 
טוחנ)י(ן כדרכן ומשקין בית השלחין שלו בשהגיע זמנו לשתות וזורעין את נירו פשתן ברביעה דברי 
בשבת  315ה נזרעת פשתן תזרע מין אחר אם אינה נזרעת בשבת זו תזרער' יודה. אמרו לו אם אינ
מנו "אמרו לו"? ר' יוסה. מחלפה שיטתיה דר' יודה תמן הוא אמ' יאבד דבר ממועט ואל יאבד  אחרת. 
 316דבר מרובה וכא אמ' הכין. שנייא ]היא[ תמן שדרכו להערים. וכל שכן מחלפה שיטתיה דרבי יודה
ם את אמר מותר כאן שאין דרכו להערים לא כל שכן? אמ' ר' חיננא מנו מה אית תמן שדרכו להערי
 "אמרו לו?" חכמ' שהן בשיטת רבי יודה במועד
Mishnah: He who [prior to the Festival] had turned his olives,317 and then an 
occasion for mourning or some accident befell him, or workers proved unreliable 
[so that he could not complete the processing prior to the Festival], "[during the 
intermediate days of the Festival] applies the pressing beam [to the olives] for the 
first time, but [then] leaves it until after the Festival,318" the words of R. Judah. R. 
Jose says, "He squeezes out the oil entirely and seals it in a jar in the usual way." 
... 
Judah bar Pazzi in the name of R. Yoḥanan: "Just as they differ here, so they 
differ with respect to the laws governing the mourner." For it has been taught: 
"These are the things that they do for a mourner during the period of his mourning 
                                                          
315 Constantinople Ed.:נזרעת 
 
316 Constantinople Ed.: מחלפא שיטתיה דרבי יוסה  
 
317 In order to prepare them for pressing (Albeck, Shishah Sidrei Mishnah, 379) 
 





[in the intermediate days of a Festival]" "They press his olive-mass, empty out his 
wine, and seal it in jars. As to his olives, if they have turned over once and then a 
second time, they press them in the usual way. And they irrigate his field that 
requires it when its turn has come to receive water. And they sow his furrow with 
flax at the rains," the words of R. Judah. They said to him, "If it is not sown with 
flax, it may be sown with another species. If it is not sown this week, it may be 
sown in some other week [and hence, that may not be done for him]." Now who 
was it who said this to him? It was R. Jose. The opinions assigned to R. Judah are 
at variance with one another. There he has said that he may lose some small 
volume, but her should not have to a lost a large volume [of oil], while he here 
has said this [that to avoid any loss at all, others may on his behalf press olives in 
the usual way]. 
There is a difference between the two cases. There it is usual to practice cunning 
[and that is why, on the Festival, he has not permitted pressing the grapes in the 
usual way, while, with regard to the mourner it is permitted to do so]. All the 
more so are the opinions assigned to R. Judah reversed. Now if there [with respect 
to the Festival] it is usual to practice cunning, and yet you say that it is permitted 
[to apply the pressing beam], here, where it is not usual to practice cunning, is it 
not an argument a fortiori [that we should permit the work to be done in the usual 
way]? Said R. Ḥinenah, “Who are they who said to him what they said? They are 
the sages who concur with the thesis of R. Judah in respect to the intermediate 
days of the Festival. 
 
Professional labor is restricted during both the intermediate days of the Festivals (ḥol ha-
moed) as well as during the seven-day private mourning period. This passage draws a distinction 
between the two with regards to suspicion of evasion.  During a period of mourning,319 it is 
assumed that one will not be thinking about how to manipulate the law to get work done, 
presumably due to one’s focus on his or her grief. This is not the case with regards to the 
holiday.320 One may, for instance, find a way to “accidentally” fully press olives on the holiday 
even though only an initial pressing is permitted.321  This characterization by the PT of arenas in 
                                                          
319 It is likely that the mourning period in question here is only the seven days of shiva, as a comment follows 
questioning that one may get the work done בשבת אחרת, in a different week, rather than בחדש אחר, in a different 
month. 
 
320 Though, interestingly, the Qorban Ha’edah s.v. ומשני שנייא suggests that one specifically would be cunning 
during the period of mourning, more so that on a Festival. He claims that the ha’arama here is that one lies about 
wanting to plant flax in order to perform labor during shiva 
 





which people are likely to be cunning versus those in which they are not proves more significant 
in light of the absence of such mention in the parallel Babylonian passage.322 
The same concern about people employing ha‘arama during the ḥol ha-moed recurs in 
the following chapter in the same tractate: 
 ירושלמי מועד קטן ג:א, דף פב עמוד א' )כ"י ליידן(
אית תניי תני ברגל אסור ובאבל מותר  ]שפם ונטילת צפורנים אית תניי תני ברגל מותר ובאבל אסור
)מאן דאמ'([ מאן דאמ' ברגל מותר בשיש שם רגל ובאבל אסור בשאין שם רגל מאן דאמ' ברגל 
בשם רב הל' כדברי מי  323אסור בשיש שם הערמה באבל מותר בשאין שם הערמה רב חייה בר אשי
כדברי מי שהוא מיקל בהילכות בשם ר' יהושע בן לוי הל'  324שהוא מיקל כאן וכאן ר' שמעון בר אבא
 אבל
As to trimming the moustache and cutting the nails, there is a Tanna who teaches 
that on the Festival it is permitted to do so, but in a time of bereavement it325 is 
forbidden. And there is a Tanna who teaches that on a Festival it is forbidden to 
do so, but on the occasion of bereavement it is permitted. He who has said that on 
the Festival it is permitted to do so refers to a time at which there is a Festival, 
and in a time of bereavement it is forbidden to do so - at a time at which there is 
no Festival. He who has said that on the Festival it is forbidden to do so, deals 
with a case in which there is evasion and in the case of mourning it is permitted, 
when there is no intent to practice evasion. 
 
Once again, the precise ha‘arama in use is unclear. Is it pretending to not have had time to shave 
prior to the Festival,326 or is it “accidentally” shaving one’s entire beard rather than just trimming 
                                                          
322 bMQ 11b takes them the same question as PT, namely differences between the laws for hol ha-moed and those 
for the shiva period. While BT asserts a distinction between the two, the question of whether people are prone to 
ha’arama in these two respective arenas is not discussed. In commenting on the next mishnah, bMQ 12b does 
discuss the debate over whether one may employ ha’arama on hol ha-moed, specifically in order to prepare wine for 
after the holiday ends, though it does make any indication about people’s inclinations to do so. Moreover, the braita 
cited in BT as permitting such ha’arama is clearly at odds with this cautionary PT passage about the need to rein in 
potential ha’arama on hol ha-moed. 
 
323 Const. Ed.: רב חייא בשם רב 
 
324 Const. Ed.: רשב"א  
 
325 It is unclear whether the time of bereavement refers here only to shiva or to sheloshim as well. The latter is more 
likely, as this section follows immediately after a section that contrasts the laws governing the 30 days of 
bereavement to those governing the intermediate days of the Festival. 
 





one’s moustache?327 Or perhaps it is making oneself busy in order not to have time to shave 
before the Festival?328 Regardless, there is an indication that one would use ha‘arama on the 
Festival.329 Again, unlike the mishnaic cases, it is difficult to find the motivation of the ma‘arim 
other than trying to evade the law. What monetary benefit is there to shaving? Likewise, if a 
person truly had not had time to shave or to water the field prior to the holiday, doing so would 
be completely permissible. 
A subtler symptom of PT’s discomfort with ha‘arama is its Biblical justification for the 
ma‘aser sheni loophole: 
 ירושלמי מעשר שני ד:ד, דף נה עמוד א' )כ"י ליידן(
 אמ' איתפלגון ר' לעזר ור' יוסי בר חנינה חד אמ' למה מערימין עליו מפני שכתוב בו ברכה 330ר' אבון
R. Avun said, “R. Elazar and R. Jose bar Ḥaninah disputed [over the meaning of 
Deut. 14:24’s claim that secondary tithe produce constitutes a ‘blessing,’ as 
follows]: “One said, ‘Why is it that “People may practice ha‘arama   [regarding 
the added 25%]” (M. M.S. 4:4A)? [We may infer that Scripture intends this 
money-saving leniency], because [second-tithe produce] is described [at Deut. 
14:24] as a blessing.” 
 
Ha‘arama is not to be used willy-nilly. It is not historical circumstances (as discussed above) but 
a Biblical verse that justifies it.  Predictably, no such Biblical permission331 appears in either 
Mishnah or Tosefta, or anywhere in legal midrashic collections. R. Avun, the fourth generation 
Palestinian amora, is seen quoting either R. Elazar ben Pedat332or R. Jose bar Ḥanina, both 
                                                          
327 Pene Moshe s.v. בשיש שם הערמה 
 
328 My own suggestion. 
 
329 Admittedly, here the question of whether one would do so during a bereavement period is less clear. 
 
330 MS Vatican: אבין 
 
331 Significantly, though, once this ha’arama is permitted, it gains complete protection. This sugya goes on to 
discuss how the procedure for enacting this ha’arama was changed not once, but twice, in order to protect the 
ma’arim from theft! It also mentions two rabbis, R. Inya b. Sisi and R. Jonah, who themselves utilize this 
circumvention. 
 





second generation Palestinian amoraim, regarding a justification of this ha‘arama based not 
merely on the end goal of saving money, but based on a verse from the Torah itself.333 
Parameters  
In addition to its discomfort with many ha‘aramot, PT offers the substantive contribution 
of the first examples of explicit parameters for when ha‘arama should be permitted and when it 
should be outlawed. Once again, PT projects a discussion of ha‘arama onto a mishnaic dispute 
between R. Eliezer and R. Joshua, using the opportunity to contrast it with the toseftan argument 
in their names regarding the animal and its dam that fell into a pit. 
 ביצה ג:ה, סב. )כ"י ליידן( ירושלמי פסחים ג:ג , ל./ 
כיצד מפרישין חלת טומאה ביום טוב רבי אליעזר או' אל תקרא לה שם עד  פמן()כ"י קא משנה 
בן בתירה או' תטיל לצונים אמר יהושע לא זה הוא חמץ שמוזהרים עליו בל  יראה ובל   334שתיאפה
 ימצא אלא מפרשתה ומנחתה עד הערב ואם החמיצה החמיצה
 
רוצה לוכל וזו אני רוצה לאכול( ואופה את ...כיצד יעשה? על דר' אליעזר מערים ואו' )וזו אני גמרא
רוצה ליישן ומשייר אחת. אמר לו  335כולה וכשהוא רודה מערים ואו' זו אני רוצה ליישן זו א}י{ני
קדשים ביום טוב?! אמ' לו ר' אליעזר מאיליהן הן נשרפין! אמ' לו  336רבי יושוע לא נמצאת כשורף
אמ' לו מוטב לעבור מצוה בלא תעשה שלא  יושוע לא נמצאת עובר על בל יראה ובל ימצא. 337ר'
...אותו ואת בנו שנפלו לבור ר' אליעזר או' יעלה את 338באת לפניו ממצוה בלא תעשה שבאת לפניו
הראשון על מנת לשחוט וישחוט והשיני עושין לו פרנסה  שלא ימות. ר' יושוע או' יעלה את הראשון 
מותר.  339'ע'פ' שחישב שלא לשחוט אחד מהןעל מנת לשחוט ולא ישחוט ויערים ויעלה את השיני א
בעי מחלפה שיטתיה דר' אליעזר תמן הוא אמ' אסור להערים והכא הוא אמ' מותר  340ר' בון בר חייה
                                                          
333 Is a Biblical verse required here because the extra 20% for one’s own ma’aser sheni is a Biblical law? 
Alternatively, it may be in order to suggest that the loophole upholds a value which is internal to the law as opposed 
to external to the law. (We will discuss further below.) 
 
334 MS Parma: תאפה 
 
335 Venice Ed.: אני 
 
336 Or Zarua: שורף without כ 
 
337 Lieberman, Yerushalmi ki-fshuta, 366: לר' יושוע 
 
338 MS Leiden and Venice Ed., yEruvin 10:13: מוטב לעבור על מצות לא תעשה שלא באת לידך ממצות לא תעשה שבאת לפניך 
 
339 MS Leiden and Venice Ed., yEruvin 10:13: א'ע'פ' שלא חישב לשחוט אחד מהן . Both Ahavath Sion ve-Yerushalayim 
and Lieberman (Tosefta Ki-fshuta Beṣa 3:4) consider the 'Eruvin version errant. 
 





להערים? הכא משום בל ייראה ובל ימצא תמן מה אית לך? מחלפה שיטתיה דר' יהושע תמן הוא 
חטאת. א"ר  341י כאן שבות וכאן חיובאמר מותר להערים והכא הוא אמר אסור להערים? אמ' ר' איד
 יוסה ביר' בון תמן כדי לחוס על ניכסיהן שליש' הכא מה אית לך?! 
Mishnah: How [on the Festival342] do they set apart the dough-offering [if the 
dough is in a state of] uncleanness? R. Eliezer says, "She should not designate 
[the dough=offering] before it is baked.” R. Judah b. Betera says, "She should put 
it into cold water." Said R. Joshua, "This is not the sort of leaven concerning 
which people are warned under the prohibitions, 'Let it not be seen' (Ex. 13:7), 
and 'Let it not be found' (Ex. 12:19). But she separates it and leaves it until 
evening, and if it ferments, it ferments. 
 
Gemara: How should [a person] act according to R. Eliezer [who says one can 
handle the dough until it is baked, when it is designated and then properly left till 
the evening for burning]?  
[A person] acts with shrewdness and says: “This [portion] I want to eat and this 
[portion] I want to eat];” and one bakes all of it, and when he removes it [from the 
oven, one] acts with shrewdness and says: “This [portion] I want to store away 
and this [portion]” and leaves one [the last one which is then designated as 
ḥallah]. 
Said R. Joshua to him [R. Eliezer], "Do you not end up like one who burns holy 
things on the holiday [in leaving the dough offering to burn in the over after 
baking the dough, which is a distinct violation]?” R. Eliezer said to him, "They 
burn on their own accord [without a separate act of burning, for the dough-
offering merely remains in the oven after it and the rest of the dough are baked]." 
Said him to R. Joshua, "Do you not end up violating the ban on seeing and finding 
leaven [on one's premises by allowing it to rise]?" [R. Joshua] said to him, "It is 
preferable to violate a negative commandment passively [leaving dough which 
eventually will become leaven on its own] than actively [letting the dough 
offering forthwith burn on the Festival through one's action, be it indirect]." (T 
3:7) 
... 
It [an animal] and its young that fell into a pit [on a Festival] - R. Eliezer says, 
"[One] should raise up the first with the plan to slaughter it, and the second; they 
feed it so that it not die." R. Joshua says, "[They] should raise up the first one with 
the plan to slaughter [it] but [need] not slaughter [it] and practicing ha‘arama, 
should raise up the second. Even though [one] intends/decided not to slaughter 
either one of them - it is permitted.  
                                                          
341 MS Leiden and Venice Ed. yBeṣa 3:4: חייב. Certainly the yPes. version of חיוב חטאת, at any rate, is more accurate 
than the yBeṣa version of חייב חטאת, as a person incurs lashes for infractions on the Festival (yBeṣa 1:3) and must 
offer a ḥatat only for infractions on the Sabbath. But ḥiyuv ḥatat may simply refer to the status of the transgression – 
it has the status of a ḥiyuv ḥatat because if one did such on a Sabbath, one would bring a qorban hatat.  (Pnei Moshe 
s.v. אמר ר' אידי simply states that the language is imprecise, and Qorban Ha-’edah  s.v.וכאן חיוב חטאת offers a different 
explanation all together as a result of this difficulty.)  
 





R. Bun bar Hiyya asked: "Is not R. Eliezer's logic reversed? There he says it is 
forbidden to act with ha‘arama   and here he says it is permitted to act with 
ha‘arama.”[The different positions do not make up a contradiction:] Here [he so 
rules] because of the band on seeing and finding leaven [which justifies any 
necessary means to remove the leaven]. There, what can you say [is there any 
comparable justification]?  
“R. Joshua’s logic is reversed. There [T. Beṣa] he says it is permitted to act with 
ha‘arama, and here [M. Pes.] he says it is forbidden to act with ha‘arama.” Said 
R. Idi, “Here [T. Beṣa,  where the individual moves the animal] it is a matter of a 
shevut [an added prohibition on not doing certain activities on the Sabbath which, 
though not technically constituting prohibited labors, are a violation of the ‘rest’ 
appropriate for the Day of Rest] and here [M. Pes., where the individual bakes the 
unclean dough which is not for human consumption, if it were the Sabbath, it 
would be a violation entailing] a liability for a sin-offering.” Said R. Jose b. R. 
Bun, “There [in the case of the animal caught in the pit, one can employ an 
artifice] so as to have compassion on the property of Israel; here [regarding the 
unclean Dough-offering which is to be burned and which benefits neither an 
Israelite nor a priest], what can you say [is there any such loss justifying the use 
of an artifice]? 
 
This sugya compares the ḥallah case and the parent-child animal case to present criteria 
for when ha‘arama is permissible and when it is forbidden, asserting that even R. Eliezer and R. 
Joshua do not choose for or against ha‘arama every time the question comes up.  The passage 
offers three variables: a) avoidance of sin, b) the severity of the transgression being 
circumvented, and c) financial loss. The first and third are sufficient conditions for the use of 
ha‘arama, whereas the second variable is only a necessary condition, according to R. Joshua.  
Let us begin with the sufficient conditions: sin and money. R. Eliezer allows ha‘arama 
for the avoidance of sin, while R. Joshua allows it (even) for monetary loss.  R. Joshua’s 
position, as interpreted by R. Jose b.R. Bun has been implicit in a number of ha‘arama  
examples –mishnaic concern about saving money on redemption of ma‘aser sheni along with 
PT’s observation that ma‘aser sheni meant to bring blessing (a reference to wealth); toseftan 
suggestions for saving extra bread from a house fire, etc. One may circumvent the law either by 





a number of strategies employed to uphold the maxim 343.התורה חסה על ממונם של ישראל This is the 
first instance, however, of ha‘arama as justified only in order to circumvent otherwise 
unavoidable sin. On the one hand, this is a great comment on the legitimacy of ha‘arama: it itself 
is not considered a sin. On the other hand, it is reserved as literally a last resort, only to save a 
person from definite sin.  
R. Idi’s suggestion, on the other hand, concerns what is necessary for ha‘arama to work, 
at least according to R. Joshua. According to R. Joshua, he claims, ha‘arama should work – after 
all, it is for the noble goal of saving one from sin. There is only one problem: ha‘arama may not 
be used, or perhaps simply does not work “against” a law which requires a sacrifice when 
transgressed. Such clever machinations are reserved for laws which do not carry that heavy 
penalty. 344 Regardless of one’s noble motivations to save money or to prevent sin, ha‘arama is 
limited to circumvention of lighter prohibitions only. 
Ha‘arama as Widespread Problem 
PT offers a good number of rejected cases of ha‘arama, uses the ha‘arama terminology 
consistently, begins to explicitly delineate when ha‘arama is warranted and when it is not, and 
debates whether it should be suspected.  Noting PT’s preoccupation with, and generally negative 
                                                          
343 ySan. 4:1, 22a, yPes. 1:8, 28a. Put differently, שלא להפסיד ישראל ממון  - yGit. 1:5, 43d  
 
344 YD Gilat (“Issur Shevut be-Shabbat ve-hishtalshelutam,” Peraqim be-hishtalshelut ha-halakha, 87-108) traces 
the development of the term shevut, which at some point becomes synonymous with rabbinic, as opposed to 
Biblical, transgression.  He notes that in the earliest stages – specifically midrash halakhah - shevut simply refers to 
a Sabbath transgression that is not specifically indicated in the Torah text and thus does not carry the death penalty 
when does purposely – which is the default punishment for Sabbath desecration. Such more leniently punishable 
offenses take their label from the clause שבתון, a rest, which is how the Sabbath is described consistently (Exodus 
16:23; Exodus 31:15; Leviticus 23:3; Leviticus 35:2) throughout the Pentateuch. (See Sifra Aḥarei Mot 7:9; Mekhilta 
d’R. Shimon b. Yoḥai (Epstein-Melamed) p20, p229; Mekhilta d’R. Yishmael, Bo, Parsha 9, p33; ibid. Mishpatim, 
Kaspa, Parsha 20, p332; ibid. Ki Tisa, Parsha 1, p340). However, according to Gilat, by amoraic times, the term 
shevut had already evolved from referring to a biblical prohibition which does not incur the death penalty to 





views of, ha‘arama one gets the impression that ha‘arama was becoming a problem. Within 
several generations within Palestine, a shift can be seen from advocating ha‘arama as 
permissible behavior to trying to stamp out corrupt ha‘aramot.  PT expands the discussion 
exponentially from the Tosefta both in its many examples of ha‘arama as well as in its 
willingness to reject ha‘aramot.345  Might this reflect a reality of people trying to take advantage 
of this clever method?  Perhaps people had begun to abuse ha‘arama strategies for inappropriate 
ends – to cheat others out of money, or to avoid nagging laws for no reason outside of their own 
convenience. Perhaps, people simply became accustomed to ha‘arama strategy and decided to 
use it to evade the constraints of inconvenient laws, with no loftier goal in mind.  
There is, however, a more compelling argument. In the previous chapter, we pointed out 
the early provenance of legal dodges; they had been acceptable practice in the ancient world. 346 
In the Palestinian material, the fact that dodges are outlawed is innovative. This marks a major 
shift in Jewish intellectual history. And it is perfectly expected, considering contemporaneous 
developments in Roman law, as we shall explain below. 
 
 
                                                          
345 It makes sense the PT would resemble Tosefta more than Mishnah on this score. JN Epstein’s theory that PT was 
aware of some version of our current Tosefta is widely accepted. As Abraham Goldberg writes: 
 ...just as the Tosefta will add to a topic taken up in the Mishna by a discussion of situations not brought up in the 
Mishna, so, too, will the Palestinian Talmud discuss situations not brought up in the Tosefta. The Tosefta serves the 
Palestinian Talmud as the prime source for the interpretation of the Mishna, and its interpretations of the Mishna are 
much closer, therefore,   than those in the BT; and although the latter does make use of the Tosefta, it is not to the 
same extent. Questions in the Palestinian Talmud are often resolved by recourse to the Tosefta. (Abraham Goldberg, 
The Palestinian Talmud, in Safrai, The Literature of the Sages I:311-312)    
 
346 The notion that the more ancient a society, the more strictly formalistic it is, is well-worn. See Aharon Barak, 
Parshanut Ba-Mishpat.  Jerusalem: Nevo (1994) 135 and sources there. Also, Benjamin Brown, “Formalism and 
Values: Three Models” (Hebrew), New Streams in Philosophy of Halakhah, eds. Aviezer Ravitzky and Avinoam 





Loopholes and fraus legi: (Greco-)Roman Context 
Between 100 BCE and 250 CE, Roman jurists developed a very sophisticated legal 
tradition, marked by deductive and analogical reasoning. Prior to this time period, interpretation 
of law tended to be narrowly literal,347 the way Daube describes the Biblical worldview: any 
literal reading passed muster, and so loopholes were used broadly for personal advantage.348 
David Daube in fact identifies three categories of dodges popular in ancient Rome: a) replacing 
prohibited transactions with nearly identical, but permitted, transactions - .e.g. a gift and counter-
gift to replace a sale; b) involving an interposita persona, known today as a “straw man,” who 
performs a transaction “on behalf”349 of someone else where the latter is barred from doing so; 
and c) granting new legal status in name only (i.e. without substantive change) - e.g. marital 
status for two people who are not actually domestic partners.350  Ranon Katzoff adds a fourth 
category: removing oneself from a particular legal category in order to avoid the restrictions 
attendant thereto - e.g. alienating some assets before tax season to move to a lower tax bracket. 
In the first century BCE, however, a subtle shift emerged, one which challenged the 
hegemony of the letter-of-the-law orientation in the courtroom. First came the celebrated Causa 
                                                          
347 See Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science. London: Oxford University Press (1946) 24-30. He describes 
this characterization in detail, asserting that there were some very liberal readings of the Twelve Tables at the very 
outset of their acceptance, but in time, the laws became more petrified. Moreover, he connects formalism in 
interpretation to formalism in court procedures. See also Roscoe Pound, “Common Law and Legislation,” Harvard 
Law Review, 21 (1908) 
 
348 See W.W. Buckland, Equity in Roman Law. London University of London Press (1911) who writes, “Attempts to 
evade the rules of law by keeping the letter while breaking the spirit were as common in Rome, as they have been in 
our courts.” (112); See also Bertram B. Benas, “The Legal Device in Jewish Law,” Journal of Comparative 
Legislation and International Law, Third Series, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1929), 75-80.  See also Ranon Katzoff, esp.250 
 
349 As we shall see, sometimes there are limits on how explicitly such motives may be expressed if the dodge is to 
remain legal. 
 
350 David Daube, “Fraud No. 3,” Collected Studies in Roman Law, Eds. David Daube, David Cohen, Dieter Simon, 





Curiana (92 BCE), in which the jurists chose to uphold the intention of a testator rather than his 
declared statement. The case went as follows: A Roman named Coponius, who died childless, 
had drawn up a will stating that: a) should he have a son, his son would be his heir, b) should that 
son die prior to adulthood, Manius Curius should succeed him as heir. When Coponius died 
childless, distant family members claimed their rights to the inheritance. Their pleader, Scaveola 
argued their rights based on the wording of the will: Manius Curius was to inherit only in the 
event of the death of Coponius’ son. As Coponius had no son, the arrangement was irrelevant. 
Otherwise, the will should have read: “Let my son be my heir. If my son shall not be my heir, or, 
if he shall be my heir but die before reaching proper age, then let Curius be my heir.” Cassus, the 
famed orator, pled Curius’ case, delivering a speech which would become an important part of 
Roman legal heritage. The crux of his message was that the wording of a last will and testament 
must be understood not simply in a literal and decontextualized way, but on the basis of the 
testator’s intention in writing those words. And the intention of the testator, he argued, was that 
Curius should be the heir in the event of no son coming of age at the time of Coponius’ death.  
Cassus’ argument won the day, and the case was decided by the spirit rather than by the letter of 
Coponius’ stipulation.351 
Following the Causa Curiana, a number of jurists began explicitly challenging the 
hegemony of the unqualified letter of the law: Cicero (106 – 43 BCE) famously cited the maxim 
“summum ius summa iniuria,” extreme application of the literal law can lead to extreme 
injustice, into legal theory. 352 Using the literal interpretation rather than the most sensible 
interpretation could lead to applying law for immoral ends. We offer his remarks in full: 
                                                          







Injustice often arises also through chicanery, that is, through an over-subtle and 
even fraudulent construction of the law. This it is that gave rise to the now 
familiar saw, "More law, less justice." Through such interpretation also a great 
deal of wrong is committed in transactions between state and state; thus, when a 
truce had been made with the enemy for thirty days, a famous general/a went to 
ravaging their fields by night, because, he said, the truce stipulated "days," not 
nights. Not even our own countryman's action is to be commended, if what is told 
of Quintus Fabius Labeo is true — or whoever it was (for I have no authority but 
hearsay): appointed by the Senate to arbitrate a boundary dispute between Nola 
and Naples, he took up the case and interviewed both parties separately, asking 
them not to proceed in a covetous or grasping spirit, but to make some concession 
rather than claim some accession. When each party had agreed to this, there was a 
considerable strip of territory left between them. And so he set the boundary of 
each city as each had severally agreed; and the tract in between he awarded to the 
Roman People. Now that is swindling, not arbitration. And therefore such sharp 
practice is under all circumstances to be avoided.353 
 
There are even a few examples of jurists outlawing dodges during this century. For 
instance, when a twenty-year old slave-owner, not yet of legal age to free a slave, gave his slave 
as a gift to someone of age to have him freed, Proculus invalidated the manumission, declaring 
“quoniam fraus legi facta esset.”354  More prominently, during the same century legislators355 
began the work of issuing edicts to close unwanted loopholes:356 a senatusconsult under the 
                                                          
352 See Tamás Nótári, “Summum Ius Summa Iniuria —Comments on the Historical Background of a Legal Maxim 
of Interpretation,” Acta Juridica Hungarica, 42:1-2 (2004) 301-303.  He finds earlier iterations of this concept in the 
works of Roman Terence (Heautontimoroumenos 792. Sqq), Hieronymus (Epistulae 1, 44), and Columella (De re 
rustica 1, 7, 1. Sq) See also Johannes Stroux, “Summum ius summa iniuria—Ein Kapitel in der Geschichte der 
interpretatio iuris (A Chapter in the history of legal interpretation)”, in J. Stroux, Romische Rechtswissenschaft und 
Rhetorik.  Potsdam: Stichnote  (1949) 7-66 
353 De Officiis, 1.33 
 
354 Digest 40.9.7.1. It should be noted that at the end of the Roman Republic and the beginning of the Roman 
Empire, manumissions were so many that they threatened the very socio-economic fabric of Rome. At the end of the 
first century BCE, in fact, the Emperor Augustus had passed a number of laws through the Senate to stem the 
practice. See Kathleen M.T. Atkinson, “The Purpose of the Manumission Laws of Augustus,” The Irish Jurist, Vol. 
1, new series, Dublin (1966) 
 
355 TAJ McGinn, “The ‘SC’ from Larinum and the Repression of Adultery at Rome,” Zeitschrift fuer Papyrologie 
und Epigraphik, Bd. 93 (1992) 284 n59. 
 
356 In addition to closing loopholes, it was in this era that the praetor outlawed the enforceability of any contracts 
made under duress (exceptio metus) or by virtue of fraud (exceptio doli). This too, as mentioned in the Biblical 





Emperor Tiberius (14-37 CE) removed immunity from women who became procuresses or 
actresses to avoid punishment for adultery357 (D. 48.5.11.2); a senatusconsult in 62 CE declared 
that childless men could not avoid the political disadvantages attendant to their status358 by 
“adopting” children (Tac. Ann. 15.19).359  We must note, however, that the approach was not yet 
consistent. As Roman legal historian W.W. Buckland notes, “It seems true to say that in Roman, 
and indeed in all systems, after the primitive stage, the two tendencies, to rigidity and to 
equitable relaxation, will be found existing side by side.”360 
Significantly though, certain loopholes which clearly benefitted the society were upheld. 
For example, the fideicommissum is first documented in 200 B.C.E.361, but it was the Emperor 
Augustus who legally enforced it in the first century B.C.E. According to Roman law, only 
Roman citizens (and, for members of the highest class, only male Roman citizens)362 could 
inherit a testator. The fideicommissum363was set of instructions that a testator left for his heir to 
grant property to non-family or to women. Not binding, but perfectly legal, Augustus made the 
fideicommissum enforceable. In other words, if the heir refused to comply, the potential 
beneficiary might take him to court to recover the property. Likewise, Augustus proposed the 
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359 Ranon Katzoff, 249 
 
360 W.W. Buckland, Main Institutions of Roman Private Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1931), 9 
 
361 Terence, Andria 290–98 
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loophole in certain criminal cases (such as conspiracy against the emperor!) of selling a slave to 
a state agent because slaves were not permitted to testify against their masters.364  In the first 
century C.E., the Emperor Tiberius availed himself of this loophole with the slaves of Libo 
Drussus, a Roman who he thought was conspiring against him.365  
While the prior two centuries had clearly seen much progress in expanding the 
understanding of law from its technical meaning to its intended results, it was the second century 
C.E. which marked the most sweeping change to formalistic tendencies in understanding law. As 
a century assessed as both the golden age of the Roman Republic and its most creative period in 
writing366 and interpretation of law,367 ideas that had been germinating were coming of age. 
Celsus (67-130 CE) defined Roman Law by its moral values rather than simply its posited law, 
declaring: ius est ars boni et aequi, “Law is the art of the good and the equitable.368” He likewise 
asserted, “To know the laws is not to be familiar with their phraseology, but with their force and 
effect.”369 The mechanical enforcement of norms is not the sum total of what the law is. Regard 
must be given for the impact of applying the law.  Significantly, however, Celsus himself 
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365 Tacitus, Annals 2.30.3 
 
366 It was in this century (160 CE) that Gaius’ Institutes, for all intents and purposes a Roman law textbook for 
students, was written Later, towards the end of the fourth century the Theodosian Code was compiled and was the 
earliest codification of the entirety of Roman law. (Stephen A. Stertz, “Appendix” ibid.)  It impacted the later and 
most prominent code, the Digest, a compilation of the writings of the classical Roman jurists ordered by the 
Emperor Justinian in the sixth century. (Boaz Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study Vol. 1. New 
York: Jewish Theological Seminary (1966) 15) It is from the Digest that we learn much of what we know about 
Roman law from the ancient period. (Ibbetson and Lewis, The Roman Law Tradition, ibid.) 
 
367 Stephen A. Stertz, “Appendix: Roman Legal Codification in the Second Century”, in eds. Alan J. Avery-Peck 
and Jacob Neusner, The Mishnah in Contemporary Perspective: Part I. Leiden: Brill (2002) 149. 
 
368 Digest 1.1.1.I 
 





allowed at least one cast of technical circumvention of the law: a father could not legally collect 
debt against his own son. The father installed his son as the guarantor of the loan rather than as 
the debtor in order to work around the law, and Celsus abided it.370 Perhaps he did so out of a 
sense of equity, some local reason, or because in reality he was softer on this issue than his 
words indicate.   
It was also during this century that the Roman jurist Paul (exact dates unknown) officially 
defined the concept of in fraudem legis¸ a notion that would give all future judges (not only 
legislators) the vocabulary to challenge strict formalism.371 His definition of in fraudem legis is 
preserved in Justinian’s Digest: “To do what the law prohibits violates the law, and anyone who 
evades the meaning of the law without disobeying its words, is guilty of fraud against it.”372 As 
Ranon Katzoff points out, a jurist deciding a case based on the assertion of fraus legi is a more 
evolved stage past rigid formalism than trying to stamp out circumventions through legislation. 
The latter indicates that without the legislation, jurists would not have the right to declare an 
action illegal so long as it met the letter of the law. In the second century, jurists began using 
fraus legi for adjudication, rather than relying on legislators to close loopholes.  
The jurist Julian (110-170 CE) is credited with consistent application of fraus legi: 
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371 Ranon Katzoff, “Judicial Reasoning in ‘ P. Catt – Fraus Legi,’” Transactions and Proceedings of the American 
Philological Association, Vol. 101 (1970) 249 
 
372 Contra legem facit qui id facit quod lex prohibet, in fraudem vero qui salvis verbis legis sententiam eius 
circumvenit (Digest 1.3.29), translation by S.P. Scott, The Civil Law II. Cincinnati: The Central Trust Company 
(1932). In an earlier formulation: Lex non dubium est: in legem committere eum qui verba legis amplexus contra 
legis nititur voluntatem: nec poenas insertas legibus evitabit, qui se contra iuris sententiam scaeva praerogativa 
verborum fraudulenter escusat. Fraus enim legi fit, ubi quod fieri noluit, fieri autem non vetuit, id fit.( Codex Th. I 
14,5) For more on the topic, see G. Rotondi, Gli atti in Frode Alla Legge Nella Dottrina Romana E Nella Sua 





1. As mentioned above in context of Celsus’ era, according to SC Macedonianum, loans 
made to filiifamilias (family members who are not the head of the household) may not be 
collected. A loophole was used whereby the filiusfamilias would be written in the 
document as a guarantor rather than the debtor, and a non-family member would be 
written in as the debtor. While Celsus had permitted such a ruse, Julian ruled against it as 
“fraus senatusconsulto facta.” He ruled the same way for a filiusfamilias who brought in 
a second person as his co-debtor.373   
2. According to the lex Papia Poppaea the patron of a freedman was entitled to a share of 
the freedman’s estate equivalent to that of his children, so long as the freedman had fewer 
than three children and the estate was worth at least 100,000 HS. Julian wrote that an 
attempt by the freedman to alienate some of his property to get below 100,000 HS was 
considered in fraudem legis and was thus legally ineffective.374  
3. A husband-to-be who tried to offer his undowered bride a gift which she would then 
return to him as a dowry, would not get away with it. In the event that marriage was 
terminated, she would not get receive the dowry money in return.375  
Following Julian, the concept of fraus legi became more and more widespread among jurists. 376  
Greek Rhetoric of Equity 
The development of the notion of fraus legi must be understood in the context of the 
debate between the letter of the law and the spirit of law, which the Romans inherited from their 
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Greek predecessors. The discussion amongst the Greeks was not about circumventions but 
about the general relationship between law and justice. Though the distinction between letter 
and spirit was made most famous by the apostle Paul (II Corinthian 3:6; Romans 7:6),377 
Aristotle was among the earliest378 and most influential to discuss λόγος (logos: word) and 
διάνoια (dianoia: intention, meaning).  He understood that in exceptional cases,379 or where the 
letter of the law would lead to injustice, one must try to decide as the lawgiver himself would 
have decided rather than simply following the letter of existing law.380 Aristotle referred to this 
as equity: 
This is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a rectification of law where law is 
defective because of its generality…it is then right, where the law’s 
pronouncement because of its absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to rectify 
the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present on 
the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been cognizant of the case in 
question. Hence, while the equitable is just...381  
 
Would the lawgiver insist on the most expansive reading of a law if it would lead to financial 
detriment? Would the lawgiver allow the narrowest reading if it were used solely to upend the 
spirit of said law?  The ability to interpret a law by its intention rather than having to change the 
law was helpful to the Greeks, who were attached to their laws out of a sense of religious 
                                                          
377 Boaz Cohen suggests that the terms “letter” and “spirit” probably come from Jewish sources, as Paul wished to 
preach to Jews as well. E.g. Isaiah 28:5-6 and rabbinic discussions about  אותיות התורה. He cites rabbinic use of the 
letter of the law as: 1) the literal (as opposed to allegorical) interpretation of the law, 2) the ability of the omission of 
any a single letter to change an entire law, 3) the interpretive significance of each and every letter in a word. See 
Boaz Cohen  Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study Volume 1. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary 
(1966) 36-37. 
 
378 The person credited with inventing this antithesis is the pre-Socratic philosopher Protagoras (5th c. BCE) who 
contrasted διάνoια (meaning) and ὄνομα (word) (Diogenes Laertius XI.51) See Cohen, “Letter and Spirit,” 38 n 41 
 
379 Aristotle, Rhetoric I.13 (1374b) 
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duty.382   And so, Greek rhetoricians continued Aristotle’s legacy by exploring the ῥητὸς ĸαì 
διάνoια (spoken and intended) meaning of the law.383  
Ultimately, Roman rhetoricians inherited this dichotomy from the Greeks.384  The Roman 
rhetorician Quintillian (first century CE) cites early Greek rhetoricians in his Institutes of 
Oratory regarding this binary.385 He uses the Latin scriptum (written) and voluntas (will) or 
sententia (thought).386 For the Roman rhetoricians, the exercise was one in legal dialectics 
providing advocates with both sides of a debate (utramque partem disputare), so it was largely 
academic.387  However, Quintillian does offer a few reasons to prefer the spirit to the letter. A 
major consideration is equity: 
questions in general regarding writings and the intention of the writer, depend on 
considerations of equity (Inst. Or. III.6.43) 
 
For every point of law which is certain rests upon something written or upon custom; 
whatever is doubtful must be decided on grounds of equity. (Inst. Or. XII.3.6)388 
 
While rhetoricians argued for academic purposes, Roman jurists were interested in the final 
ruling. Nonetheless, the influence of Roman rhetoric on Roman law and procedure is well 
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384 Greek rhetoric was brought to Rome in the second century BCE. (See Cohen, ibid.)  
 
385 See Inst. Or. III.6.61 
 
386 See Inst. Or. III.6.46 
 
387 Cohen, “Letter and Spirit,” 41ff 
 
388 He also mentions a preference for the voluntas over the scriptum for cases that must logically be considered an 
exception to a particular law. The following is his example: The law says, then, "Whatever son has not defended his 
father shall be disinherited." What? Whatever son, without exception? Considerations such as the following will 
then present themselves of their own accord: "Suppose that a son who was but an infant, or one who was sick, or one 
who was out of the country, or in the army, or on an embassy, did not defend his father. Would he be disinherited?" 
Something considerable has now been gained. A son may not have defended his father, and yet not be disinherited. 





established.389  In the Digest, second-century jurist Ulpian is cited as referencing the Greek 
terminology ῥητὸς ĸαì διάνoια itself: 
Fraud is committed against the law when something is done which the law did not 
wish to be done, but did not absolutely prohibit; and the difference between fraud 
against the law and violation of the same is that between ῥητὸς ĸαì διάνoια390 
 
And ultimately, the conflict between scriptum and voluntas became known as the conflict 
between ius strictum and aequitas.391  While there is no comprehensive study as to why Roman 
praetors and emperors tolerated certain dodges392 while rejecting others, based the general 
context in which the discussion of fraus legi took place, equity certainly played an important 
                                                          
389 See Cohen, “Letter and Spirit,” 45; Leopold Wenger, Institutes of the Roman Law of Procedure, translated by 
Otis Harrison Fisk. New York: Veritas Press (1940) 140  18a, 195 n 16; J. Himmelschein, “Studien zu der antiken 
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role.393 Roman magistrates and jurists394 rejected certain dodges because they undermined 
equity; following the letter of the law would violate its spirit. 
The notion of fraus legi and the attendant debate regarding law and equity provides the 
proper framework and background for the rabbinic material, specifically in PT.  Many have 
cited the pervasive influence of Roman legal thinking on the ancient world at large395 as well as 
its shared concepts and terminology with rabbinic legal thinking in particular.396 As Boaz Cohen 
                                                          
393 Daube notes that a substantial number of attempted circumventions (some accepted, some rejected) were quite 
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another.  (David Daube, Roman Law: Linguistic, Social and Philosophical Aspects.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press (1966) 92ff)  For example, an insolvent debtor (Daube assumes that this debtor too was a member 
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creditor to accept less money (In the original cum eis pactus est se soldum solver non posse (Tab. Heracl. 114g.)) 
than he owed. Another example tracks the loopholes found by masters who wished to release many or all of their 
slaves upon their deaths but were forbidden to do so due to a limitation placed by Augustus in 2 BCE (Daube, 
Roman Law, 94). An owner of four slaves who was permitted only to release two slaves, would bequeath the 
remaining two to a friend with instructions to free them. (Digest 35.1.37. Clearly, if the slave owner is interested in 
freeing his slaves upon his death, he considers them to be closer than mere lower classes) A third illustration is the 
origin of the fideicommissa: because a testator could not pass on his property to non-Romans (or women, if he was 
of the highest class), he would bequeath his land to a Roman male and instruct him in the will to hand the land over 
to whichever woman or non-Roman the testator had really wanted to inherit him. Augustus legalized this method, 
though there was strict oversight and local decision-making by the consuls over whether the non-Roman was worthy 
and should get the land. (Digest 18.1.36, Gaius 2.285. At the end of the first century, Hadrian outlawed the 
fideicommissa for aliens.)  Equity in its Greco-Roman sense should not be confused with modern notions of equity. 
Even some altruistic dodges were rejected. The question was often when the final result was best for society as a 
whole rather than whether some individual would be aided by the loophole. 
 
394 Boaz Cohen compared the rabbis to both magistrates and jurists: “Henri Berr has called attention to the enormous 
influence exercised by great individuals upon the development of Roman Law. It was they who transformed the Law 
of Custom into a Science of Law. The magistrates at Rome formulated, adapted, corrected, extended and interpreted 
the Laws. The jurists organized and classified the means by which every legal problem could be brought to a 
solution. This applies with equal force to the Tannaim and Amoraim who were both magistrates and jurists. It was 
they who expounded, expanded and transmuted the Pentateuchal law into a theoretical and applied science of law. It 
may  be truly said of the rabbis of the Talmud, that they resembled ‘the Roman jurists who were admirable casuists 
and admitted neither a priori theses nor cumbersome generalizations, relying on their subtle genius to discover in 
each case the adequate, or as they called it, the ‘elegans’ solution’ (Declaureuil, Le Quatrieme Centenairs de Cujas, 
1922, 9).” (Boaz Cohen, “Some Remarks,” 37) 
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writes, “…it is our feeling that there was an interchange of legal ideas397 between Jews and 
Romans…The influence was subtle and indirect but none the less real. The rabbis were living in 
no intellectual ghetto, and were susceptible to the ideas current in the Graeco-Roman world.”398   
As Bernard Jackson points out, direct influence is difficult to assess, even where there is access 
and even institutional relationships between two systems.399 Nonetheless, we may confidently 
assert that there are real parallels between the Roman law and Rabbinic law that can at the very 
least be attributed to a share intellectual milieu.400 This overlap may be expected to be most 
profound in the Palestinian Talmud, a product of Judaism in the Eastern Roman Empire.401  
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Indeed, many of the ha‘aramot we have seen and will examine mimic the methodologies 
of Roman loopholes.402 There is even a near exact parallel between the attempted loophole 
mentioned in PT of divorcing one’s wife and remarrying her for the purpose of acquisition of 
property. In the Roman system, gifts between husbands and wives were void. The 
circumvention arose as early as the first century B.C.E. whereby the husband would divorce his 
wife, give her a gift and then remarry her.403 However, the deeper connection between the two is 
the PT preoccupation with outlawing certain ha‘aramot and the basis on which decisions were 
made about which ha‘aramot would be permitted and which prohibited. Outlawed ha‘aramot 
are the parallel concept to fraus legi.404  
The rabbis do not use the word equity; they likewise do not explain why they reject 
certain dodges. But they do explain why they accept several dodges, and the reader is left to 
observe the overall pattern.  What the pattern reveals is that rabbinic decisions about which 
dodges to accept/advocate and which to reject are quite consonant with Greco-Roman equity. 
Does the lawgiver mean for this letter of the law to be used in this way or that?  A person may 
                                                          
Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck (1998-2002) 89); c) try a case in which one party was Jewish and one was Gentile or even 
to try a case between two Roman Gentiles who voluntarily chose adjudication in a Jewish court (Cohen, ibid. n 153); 
exposure to Roman law through urban life (Hayim Lapin, “Rabbis and Cities: The Literary Evidence,” JJS  50 
(1999) 187-207) 
 
402 E.g. the use of interposita persona in the MS case; the use of nominal status change in the R. Tarfon example 
below; declaring an animal sanctified purely for the purpose of evading bekhor status. Other loopholes too, not 
expressly labeled ha‘arama such as wearing one’s clothes out of a burning house on the Sabbath rather than 
carrying them, etc., are likewise parallel to the Roman dodges. While recent scholars such as Yaakov Elman and 
Shai Secunda have explored the relationship between Sassanian law and Babylonian talmudic law, no study has 
been done to date on the formalistic aspects of Sassanian law. 
 
403 Katzoff, “Judicial Reasoning,” 251 n. 38. See D. 24.I.64 where a string of jurists are cited condemning this 
loophole. As the jurists listed who refused to uphold this circumvention are Trebatius (1st c. BCE) and Labeo (1st c. 
CE), this is among the earliest recorded instance of a jurist rejecting a loophole. It is noteworthy, though, that they 
do not use the fraus legi nomenclature. 
 
404 Many have noted that there is no rabbinic term for equity, but that need not concern us. (See Kirschenbaum, 
Equity in Jewish Law)The rabbis also did not use the term in fraudem legis. Instead, they devised their own 





not use ha‘arama to avoid the obligation to sell his/her leaven, to cheat heqdesh, to keep from 
following the laws of ḥol ha-moed, etc. However, one may use ha‘arama to avoid sin, to keep 
from losing money, 405 etc. When R. Eliezer is said to oppose ha‘arama in one situation because 
of insufficient pathos, while supporting it in another, where there is such pathos, we see echoes 
of the equity concept.  Likewise, when PT explains the ma‘aser sheni dodge with an appeal to 
the purpose of the secondary tithe being to bring blessing, it clearly references the intent of the 
Lawgiver. While E.E. Urbach has raised the importance of the needs of the reality in determining 
which ha‘aramot were successful, the concept of equity406 is a feature more endemic to the law, 
not simply the desire to put a finger in a dike which is already leaking. Indeed, “equitable 
interpretations of statute are not regarded as intrusions or ‘reinterpretations’ of the text based 
upon extrinsic considerations. On the contrary, many equitable interpretations are the products of 
the interpreter’s search for the ‘true,’ original, and authentic meaning of the passage.”407 As Boaz 
                                                          
405 Ha‘arama is often aimed at the have-nots: those who do not have enough animals to give both a sacrifice and the 
gift of a bekhor to the kohen, those whose possessions and food are being decimated by a house fire on the Sabbath.  
Metaphorically speaking, ha‘arama is not about eating one’s cake and having it too; it is simply about having 
enough cake to eat. Interestingly, Daube has argued that many of the frauds which were outlawed were cases of the 
upper class elite that using loopholes, as the have-nots would simply break the law rather than being crafty. (David 
Daube, “Fraud No. 3,” 1409, and “Dodges and Rackets in Roman Law,” 1081-1082) For instance, a woman of high 
rank would place herself on the list of professional whores to exempt herself from punishment for adulterous acts 
(Tacitus, Annals 2.85. 1 ff.).; young men of senatorial or equestrian orders who were barred from competing in the 
arena would purposely bring upon themselves shameful defeat in a court case in order to be removed from their high 
orders and thus be admitted to compete in arena games (Suetonius, Tiberius 35.2).  There are two parallels here to 
the rabbinic system: a) in the rabbinic system, while it is people who may financially suffer who are indicated in 
permissible ha‘arama scenarios, it is those who seek only gain whose ha‘aramot are rejected; and b) there is a 
certain elitism assumed in a person’s interest in circumventing the law rather than simply breaking it; it assumes 
knowledge of the law and fealty to it. These were not characteristic of the average Jew in tannaitic/amoraic times. 
(See Seth Schwartz, “Rabbinization in the Sixth Century,” The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture III, 
Eds. Peter Schäfer and Catherine Hezser. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (2002) 55-72) 
406 There are other ways in which equity plays a broader role within rabbinic law: lifnim mi-shurat ha-din, kofin 'al 
midat sedom/zeh neheneh ve-zeh lo ḥaser, middat ha-raḥamim (as opp. To middat ha-din), rabbinic takkanot, 
hora’at sha‘ah. (See Aaron Kirschenbaum, Equity in Jewish Law) 
 





Cohen writes: “Paradoxically enough, the rabbis took deliberate advantage of the letter of the 
law to preserve its spirit…Often the rabbis resort to technicalities in interpretation.”408   
This point is further evidence by a stark example of ha‘arama that PT accepts with open 
arms - that of R. Tarfon during a famine: 
 ירושלמי יבמות ד:י "ב, דף ו' עמוד ב' )כ"י ליידן(
בא בר זבדא כת' )דברים כה( ונקרא שמו בישראל בית חלוץ הנעל.  בית שהוא ניתר בחליצה  אמ' ר'
ומהו אחת.  אף בביאה כן.  חליצה פוטר וביאה פוטר.  כמה דאת אמר בחליצה כן את אמר בביאה. 
להערים? וכי ר' טרפון אביהן שלכל יש' לא הערים? קידש שלש מאות נשים בימי רעבון על מנת 
כל אחת ואחת ראויה לוכל בתרומה ברם הכא כל אחד ואחד ראוי   409בתרומה תמן אין להאכילן
 לייבם. ר' יודן ביר' ישמעאל עבדין ליה כן
Said R. Ba bar Zabeda, "It is written, 'And the name of his house shall be called in 
Israel, 'the house of him that had his sandal pulled off' (Deut. 25:10). It is a house 
that has been undone by a single rite of ḥaliṣah, [but this allows the co-wife to 
remarry.]"What is the law as to evasion? Did not R. Tarfon, the Father of all of 
Israel practice evasion? He betrothed 300 women during a famine in order to feed 
them terumah! There were not all of them fit to eat terumah, but here can he 
actually perform levirate marriage on all of them?410 R. Judan the son of R. 
Ishmael did this for himself. 
 
R. Tarfon was a kohen, and as such could feed terumah to a woman whom he betrothed, 
at least once the wedding date passed, even if the two did not marry.411 Moreover, he was quite a 
wealthy kohen412. Consequently, during a famine, he betrothed 300 women, in order to feed them 
                                                          
408 Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law, Vol 1, 55 
 
409 MS Darmstadt 407 הן 
 
410 We have deviated here from Neusner’s translation, a translation which follows the Qorban ha-edah, s.v.  מהו
 May one trick a brother-in-law into performing yibum on the woman who is not yet forbidden to priests, or :להערים
into granting ḥaliṣah to the woman who is already forbidden to priests, even if the brother-in-law would rather do so 
for the other woman? The reason to allow such deceit is to prevent a woman who may currently marry a priest from 
becoming forbidden from ever doing so, thus losing potential terumah privileges. While this is a creative reading, it 
is far from parallel to the R. Tarfon case, in which providing terumah is literally a matter of life and death. 
Therefore, our explanation follows that of R. Joshua Isaac bar Yehiel Shapiro in the Noam Yerushalmi, 8a. 
 
411 mKetubot 5:2; in tKet. 5:1, R. Tarfon opines that one may feed a betrothed woman completely from terumah food 
once twelve months have passed and the couple has not married. According to Saul Lieberman, this is a case in 
which the groom, R. Tarfon, had stipulated the condition to feed here once twelve months of betrothal passed. 
(Tosefta Ki-fshuta ad loc.)   
 





produce which was otherwise off-limits. Though this story about R. Tarfon is originally found in 
Tosefta, it is PT that suggests using it as a paradigm for a parallel case of levirate marriage: if the 
deceased was a kohen and had multiple wives, leave each of the wives of the deceased in limbo 
as the possible recipient of yibum, in order to continue to provide them with terumah in a case in 
which the family is one of priests.413  In terms of ultimate ends, these cases are similar: the 
women need food to eat! (A relevant factor in this discussion may be the economic downturn in 
Palestine which began early in the amoraic period and continued into the fourth century. Perhaps 
R. Tarfon’s actions could serve as precedent.)  
Yet the ruling diverges: while R. Tarfon could have married all three hundred women 
(i.e., there was no law against it), ultimately the levir may only marry one of the women, as ruled 
explicitly in the Mishnah. This case is significant because of both its ends - lives are saved – and 
its means – the ruse has potential to become a reality.  This is a significant contribution to the 
ha‘arama discussion, as it may be the underlying logic of ha‘arama:  it is permitted because it 
has the potential to be true. At the very least, it offers yet another requirement for permitting 
ha‘arama. 
A comparison of two cases of food preparation on Festivals illustrates the difference 
between ha‘arama for the “correct” motivation and ha‘arama used simply for the purpose of 
undermining law: 
 ירושלמי ביצה ב:א, דף סא עמוד א' )כ"י ליידן(
ב:א יום טוב שחל להיות ערב שבת לא יבשל בתחילה מיום טוב לשבת אבל מבשל הוא לי"ט  משנה
 ואם הותיר הותיר לשבת
                                                          
 
413 While mKetubot 5:2 rules that a shomeret yabam from betrothal does not eat terumah, it says nothing of a 





אמר ר' אבהו בדין היה שיהו אופין  414׳ איתא חמי דבר תורה הוא אסור ועירובי תבשיליו מתיריןגמ:
חמי מציעין   415יתאאם או' את כן אף הוא אופה ומבשל מיום טוב לחול. א ומבשלין מיום טוב לשבת
אמ' ר' אילא ולמה מציעין מיום  416את המיטות מיום טוב לשבת ואין אופין ומבשלין מיום טוב לשבת
טוב לשבת? שכן מציעין את המיטות מלילי שבת לשבת. ויאפו או יבשלו מיום טוב לשבת? אין אופין 
 ' ובלבד שלא יערים אמ 417ומבשלין )מיום טוב( מלילי שבת לשבת ר' כהנא בריה דר' חייה בר בא
Mishnah: One a Festival which coincided with the eve of the Sabbath [Friday] - a 
person should not do cooking to begin with on the Festival day [Friday] for the 
purposes of the Sabbath. But she prepares food for the Festival day, and if he 
leaves something over, he has left it over for us on the Sabbath. 
... 
Gemara: Now see here! Is there a matter which is forbidden by the law of the 
Torah, but rendered permissible by the preparation of a meal of commingling 
[that is, preparing food prior to the Festival for use on the Festival and on the 
Sabbath following]? Said R. Abahu, "In strict law people should be permitted to 
bake or cook on a Festival day food for use on a Sabbath. But if you should say so 
[and decide the law in that way], they a person will cook also on a Festival day 
food for use on an ordinary day. [For see here, people make beds on the Festival 
for use on the Sabbath. Should they not be permitted to bake or cook on a Festival 
day food for use on the Sabbath? R. Kahana b. R. Hiyya bar Ba said, "That is on 
condition that one not practice ha‘arama   [by baking or cooking a great deal of 
food, ostensibly for the Festival itself]." 
 
Here, the Palestinian amora R. Kahana the son of R. Ḥiyya b. Abba rejects ha‘arama for 
the evasion of the decree not to cook on the Festival day for a non-Festival day. 
 ביצה א:ה, דף ס' עמוד ג' )כ"י ליידן(
ב"ש אומרים אין נוטלין את העלי לקצב עליו בשר ובית הלל מתירין ב"ש אומרים אין נותנין   משנה
עליו בשר וב"ה מתירין ב"ש אומר אין מסלקין את את העור לפני הדריסה ולא יגביהנו אלא א"כ יש 
 התריסין בי"ט ובית הלל מתירין אף להחזיר:
...שוין שלא ימלחנו תני אבל הוא מולח עליו בשר לצלי חברייא בשם רב מולח הוא אדם דבר גמרא
מרובה א'ע'פ' שאינו יכול לוכל ממנו אלא דבר ממועט ר' אחא בשם רב מולח ומערים מולח ומערים 
 לח הכא ומלח הכא עד דו מלח כוליהמ
Mishnah: The House of Shammai says, “They do not take up a pestle to hack 
meat on it.418” And the House of Hillel permits [doing so]. The House of 
                                                          
414 MS Darmstadt: אתא חמי מדבר תורה הוא שאסור לבשל ולאפות מיום טוב לחבירו ומיום טוב לשבת ועירובי תבשילין מתירין? 
 
415 MS Darmstadt: אתא 
 
416 MS Darmstadt: בלא עירוב 
 
417 MS Darmstadt: רב כהנא בר בא 
 







Shammai says, “They do not place a hide419 before the tread,420 not may one lift it 
up, unless there is an olive’s bulk of meat on it.” And the House of Hillel permits. 
The House of Shammai says, “They do not remove shutters on the Festival.” And 
the House of Hillel permits – even putting them back 
Gemara:…And they concur that they do not salt hides on the Festival day. But on 
it one puts salt on meat which is for roasting. Associates in the name of Rav: “A 
man may salt a sizable piece [of meat], even though he can eat only a small part 
of it.” R. Aha in the name of Rav: “One may put on a little salt and practice 
ha‘arama   by [indicating that he wishes to eat only this spot, and then he may 
change his mind] and again put on salt and practice ha‘arama   until he salts the 
entire piece of meat.” 
 
The trouble in this case is not the interest in extra food for after the Festival, but  
the concern that one will lose valuable meat by eating any meat on the Festival. When 
one slaughters an animal, the excess meat must be salted in order to be preserved. 
However, it is forbidden to salt food on the Festival that is not for the Festival itself. The 
early Babylonian amora Rav suggests salting a large piece at once, even if one plans to 
eat only part of it. Significantly, R. Aḥa, a Palestinian amora cites Rav as allowing the 
ha‘arama of salting each piece under the pretense of wishing to eat it. The fact that the 
Babylonian amora (Rav) does not mention ha‘arama, whereas the Palestinian amora (R. 
Aḥa) does is consistent with an overall difference between PT’s preoccupation with 
ha‘arama as contrasted with BT’s treatment. We will study this trend more in depth in 
chapter 4, below. For the moment, however, it is important to contrast the reasons for the 
ha‘arama in the two aforementioned cases: the first, where ha‘arama is rejected, is a case 
of simply trying to undermine the law for convenience: cooking on the Festival for 
afterwards. The second is a situation of making sure that food does not go to waste, thus 
                                                          
419 Of an animal that was slaughtered and flayed for food on the Festival. (Albeck, ibid.) 
 





causing financial hardship on each and every Festival, and essentially making 
slaughtering and animal and cooking it for a Festival meal quite a costly undertaking. 
 A short passage earlier in yBeṣa 1:5, dealing with the last debate presented in the 
mishnah, shows R. Aḥa to be consistent in this: 
 ליידן( ביצה א:ה,  דף ס עמוד ג' )כ"י
שמואל אמ' המלחם את התריסין ביום טוב חייב משום בונה וקשיא דבר שאילו עשאו בשבת חייב 
חטאת בית הלל )אומ'( מתירין אף להחזיר? ר' חנניה בשם ר' יוחנן התירו סופו )משם( ]מפני[ 
טוב תחילתו שאם אומ' את לו שלא יחזיר אף הוא אינו פותח. ולא יפתח? אף הוא ממעט בשמחת יום 
 אמ' ר' אחא מחזיר ובלבד שלא יחזיר כל צורכו
Samuel said, “He who inserts the shutters on a Festival day is liable on the count 
of building.” Now this poses a problem. In regard to doing something which, if 
one did it on the Sabbath, one would be liable for a sin offering, does the House 
of Hillel permit – even to put them back? R. Ḥananiah in the name of R. 
Yoḥanan: “They permitted the matter at the end because of the considerations at 
the outset. For if you tell someone that he may not put them back, then he will not 
open them to begin with.” So let him not open them [at all, and what difference 
does it make]? [If you maintain that view,] you diminish the pleasure of the 
Festival day. Said R. Aha, “One may return them, on condition that he not put 
them back firmly… 
 
R. Ḥananiah in the name of R. Yoḥanan offers, “They permitted the matter at the end 
because of the considerations at the outset” as a framing concept for leniency regarding the laws 
of the holidays. In particular, the situation cited herein is one in which a person will refrain from 
removing the shutters from a shop or a storage facility where food for the Festival is being 
stored421 for fear of not being able to replace the shutters on the Festival. (After all, the food 
might spoil, be stolen, etc.) This is not unlike the salting issue raised in the sugya above. In 
order to eat any amount of meat, one must slaughter an entire animal, and if one may not 
preserve the extra meat by salting it, why would s/he even slaughter an animal for the Festival to 
begin with?422 
                                                          
421 See Albeck, Shishah Sidrei Mishnah, 288 
 





R. Aḥa appears consistent in his application of the rulings of the House of Hillel in both 
the meat case and the door case. Whether R. Aḥa would have used R. Ḥanania’s phrasing, he 
clearly values the significance of simḥat yom tov, though he seems more conservative about how 
to accomplish that goal.  In the case of replacing doors, one will diminish enjoyment on the 
Festival by not opening the shutters in the first place if one may not replace them; likewise, we 
may presume that one would be reticent to prepare any meat on the Festival if all of the extra 
meat may not be salted but must be discarded. However, unlike the opposing opinions 
throughout the section, R. Aḥa is unprepared to give carte blanche permission either to replace 
the doors or to salt a bigger piece of meat than is necessary for the holiday simply because the 
ends are noble. Instead, he mandates that one not replace the doors too firmly. However, in both 
cases, he seems concerned with a financial threat posed by the laws of the Festival, and he is 
determined to prevent it.  
Rabbi Hoshaya 
To this point, we have suggested that a) the innovation of the rabbis was not employing 
loopholes, but like their Roman counterparts, rejecting some loopholes while accepting others; 
and b) that the rabbis decide which loopholes to accept based on some concept akin to equity, 
namely what the lawgiver himself would want the application of the law to be.  Because of this 
pattern, the following teaching of R. Hoshaya is surprising: 
 ירושלמי ברכות ה:א, ח' עמוד ד' )כ"י ליידן(
 423ם עליו לפוטרו מן המעשרותתני ר' הושעיא מרבה אדם דגן בתבן ומערי
                                                          
And I may answer that the evasions here are only in situations in which the [financial] loss comes as a result of the 
enjoyment of the Festival (=the commandment to eat meat), not as a result of his negligence, like the case of salting 
a hide or salting piece by piece; for it is impossible for him to eat meat for the Festival without slaughtering, and he 
will lose all of the remaining pieces. Therefore, evasion is permitted. But regarding ‘eruv tavshilin (=mixture of 
foods, a case which we will deal with below in depth), where his own negligence caused it, either because he never 
set out an ‘eruv tavshilin or because it was lost or eaten due to his negligence, as they were not properly guarded, 
therefore, they forbade all evasion for him. Likewise for similar situations. 





R. Hoshaya taught: One may increase one’s grain with straw and be crafty in its 
regard in order to exempt it from tithes. 
 
Two things remain unclear: 1) what this evasion entails, and 2) why it is permitted.  Regardless 
of what exactly the evasion is, it depends on the fact that grains that are brought into the house 
while (still) mixed with chaff are not subject to the laws of tithes.  According to some, R. 
Hoshaya here refers to a situation in which one has not yet removed the wheat from its chaff, its 
straw.424 According to others, this is a case of adding straw to already processed grain, thus 
returning it to a less processed state.425  Likewise, there is an argument over whether the purpose 
of this activity is to allow people to eat the grains without tithing or to allow only animals to do 
so.426 It is not clear what warrants the use of ha‘arama here. Urbach would undoubtedly say the 
motivation was simply accepting an evasion already in use. The talmudic context here can be 
read either way: this law is mentioned as something for a person to recite prior to the private 
‘amidah in order to pray following study. On the one hand, it is possible that this is the rabbis’ 
way of trying to drill in the message that there is a licit way to avoid tithing, and it is preferable 
to simply transgressing the law. But the context may equally be read as support for this loophole 
as an indication that it was not mere capitulation to common practice but an ante factum rabbinic 
dispensation similar to how we read the mishnaic cases of ma‘aser sheni and bekhor.  The 
analysis that we have proposed thus far, as to what leads the rabbis to embrace some dodges and 
to reject others leads us to surmise that the rabbis believed that this circumvention was necessary, 
                                                          
 
424 See R. Elazar Ezkari, Sefer Ḥaredim s.v., תני ר' הושעיא who tries to interpret this passage in light of its BT 
parallels which read: מכניסה במוץ שלה, brings it inside in its chaff. 
 
425 See Pene Moshe s.v., מרבה אדם דגן בתבן, Ḥiddushei R. Yonah BT 22a in Alfasi 
 
426 Those who wish to reconcile PT and BT, such as Pene Moshe, assume that the purpose is to feed one's animals 
untithed foods, as BT reads: כדי שתהא בהמתו אוכלת ופטורה מן המעשר. MSS Paris and London add the words  ומאכיל





whether due to economic downturn or under an assumption that people would only use this 
dispensation when in economic straits..427 
According to the Biblical conception, the letter is the law, regardless of the consequences. 
Even if that means marriages based on kidnapping, contracts based on ignorance and even 
sacrifice of one’s daughter! Thus, what is most surprising about rabbinic loopholes is not that 
they are endorsed but that more often, they are outlawed. This is legally innovative and fits well 
within the rabbis’ Graeco-Roman historical context. PT struggles with the issue of ha‘arama 
being used for the wrong purposes, but where the ends are appropriate, ha‘arama may be 
considered for the means, PT weighs heavily on the notion of serpentine ‘ormah and less on the 
side of Proverb-ial ‘ormah. 
Babylonian Talmud:  
We will focus on the role of ha‘arama in the Babylonian Talmud in chapter 4, but here 
we offer a brief overview.  
I. Parameters 
Though not identical to PT’s suggestions, BT offers variations428 on relevant variables for 
when ha‘arama may or may not be used: a) avoiding sin, b) saving money, and c) the category 
of transgression being circumvented. Paralleling yPesaḥim 3:3, for example, in bShabbat 117b 
                                                          
427 Louis Ginzberg points out that the PT version is more lenient that the BT version in that it permits people to eat 
too. (See Louis Ginzberg, Perushim ve-ḥiddushim be-Yerushalmi IV. New York: JTSA (1961) 120-121) According 
to one opinion in R. Solomon ibn Aderet’s Novellae (bBerakh 31a), restricting consumption to animals prevent a 
person from abusing the loophole. However, he also includes a second opinion that in fact people may eat of the 
food as well even according to BT. Others suggest the latter as well. See bMen. 67b Tos. s.v., כדי 
 
428 This is consonant with the work of both Zvi Dor and Richard Kalmin, indicating that Palestinian material shows 
up among fourth century Babylonian amoraim and beyond. In our case, it is Abaye (d. 339) who offers the first PT 
parameters for ha‘arama. The stammaim follow suit, as we shall see below. (Ẓvi Dor, Torat Ereẓ Yisrael be‐Bavel 
(Tel Aviv: Devir, 1971), for example, pp. 11–84; Richard Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia between Persian and Roman 





the anonymous redactor(s) posits respective boundaries for R. Joshua and R. Eliezer with regards 
to ha‘arama.  
 בבלי שבת קיז: )כ"י מינכן(
נשברה לו חבית בראש גגו מביא כלי ומניח תחתיה ובלבד שלא יביא כלי אחר ויקלוט כלי  429גופה
ויקלוט כלי אחר ויצרף ולא אחר )ויצרוף ולא יקלוט(]ויצרוף נזדמנו לו אורחים מביא כלי אחר 
ואין מערימין בכך משום ר' יוסי  430ואחר כך יקלוט יקלוט ואחר כך יזמין אלא יזמין ואחר כך יקלוט[
בר יהודה אמרו מערימין לימא בפלוגתא דר' אליעזר ור' יהושע קמפלגי דתניא אותו ואת בנו שנפלו 
את הראש]ו[ן על מנת לשוחטו ושוחטו והשני עושה לו פרנסה  431אליעזר אומר מעלין  'לבור ר
במקומו בשביל שלא ימות ר' יהושע או' מעלין את הראשון על מנת לשוחטו ואינו שוחטו ומערים 
 433ממאי דילמא עד כאן לא קאמ' ר' אליעזר התם 432ומעלה את השני רצה זה שוחט רצה זה שוחט
עד כאן לא קא"ר יהושע התם אלא  436א אי נמיבפרנסה ל 435אבל הכא דאפשר 434דאיפשר לפרנסה
 ד[ליכא צער בעלי חיים לא 437משום דאיכא צער בעלי חיים אבל ]היכא
The main text: If one’s barrel is broken on the top of his roof, he may bring a 
vessel and place it underneath, provided that he does not bring another vessel and 
catch [the dripping liquid] or another vessel and attach it [to the roof.] if guests 
happen to visit him, he may bring another vessel and catch [the dripping liquid], 
but must first invite [them] and then catch [the liquid]; and one must not evade the 
law in this matter. In R. Jose son of R. Judah’s name it was said: We may evade 
[the law]. Shall we say they argue the same argument as R. Eliezer and R. Joshua? 
For it was taught: If an animal and its young fall into a pit, R. Eliezer said: One 
may haul up the first in order to slaughter it, and for second he makes provision 
where it lies, so that it should not die. R. Joshua said: One may haul up the first in 
order to slaughter it, and not slaughter it; then he practices an evasion and hauls 
up the second and kills whichever he desires. Why? Perhaps R. Eliezer rules thus 
only here, because provisions can be made [to save the animal in its place], but 
not here, seeing that it is impossible [to make provisions].  And perhaps R. Joshua 
                                                          
429 MS Oxford: גופא 
 
430 MS Oxford and Soncino Ed. Lack the repetition of ואחר כך יקלוט  
 
431 MS Oxford: מעלה instead of מעלין (in both instances); Soncino Ed. changes to singular only in the first instance.  
 
432 MS Oxford: second רצה זה שוחט absent. Probably scribal error. 
 
433 MS Oxford makes the phrase more explicit: עד כאן לא קאמר ר' אליעזר התם ]אלא[ משם דאיפשר בפרנסה 
 
434 MS Oxford, Soncino and Vilna Eds.: דאפשר בפרנסה. MS Munich reflects the לפרנסה - to feed it, while בפרנסה 
leaves out the animal and just refers to the act of sustaining itself. 
 
435 MS Oxford, Soncino Ed.: אבל הכא דלא אפשר בפרנסה. Given that the sentence does not read logically without the 
word לא, MS Munich probably reflects a scribal error. 
 
436 MS Oxford omits the phrase אי נמי, and has instead ...ועד כאן 
 





rules thus only there because suffering of animals is involved, but not here where 
there is no suffering of animals. 
 
Immediately prior to this passage, BT makes clear that carrying a vessel through the 
public thoroughfare (for the purpose of catching more of the leaking liquid) is the concern here. 
And the debate about ha‘arama is about saving extra for guests: either a) inviting guests just to 
have reason to save extra wine,438 b) inviting guests who likely will not drink the wine in order to 
save extra wine and have leftovers.439 For R. Eliezer, monetary loss is significant, but only 
warrants ha‘arama if there is no other way to protect the animal without resorting to it.  For R. 
Joshua, on the other hand, monetary loss is not the relevant factor, but rather it is the suffering of 
the animal – either because it is against the letter of the law or because it is against the spirit of 
Jewish law. Though it riffs on some of the same issues as PT, money and sin, it is the stam who 
makes these proposals rather than an amora. 
Likely, the distinction made by the stam between the possibility of sustaining the second 
animal in the pit without circumventing the law (both here and again on bShabbat 124a), is taken 
from the comments of Abaye in bBeṣa (37a). Abaye reacts to R. Joseph who suggests that   
a) ha‘arama is identical to outright violation (though R. Joshua allows it anyway in order to 
avoid financial loss!), b) R. Eliezer never permits bending or breaking the law for the purpose of 
saving money, and c) R. Joshua permits ha‘arama on the Festival only440: 
 בבלי ביצה לז. )כ"י מינכן(
כל אילו בי"ט אמרו ורמינהי משילין פירות דרך ארובה בי"ט אמ' רב יוסף לא קשי' הא ר' אל]י[עזר 
הא ר' יהושע דתניא אותו ואת בנו שנפל לבור ר' אליעזר או' מעלה את הראשון על מנת לשוחטו 
 ושוחטו והשני עושה לו פרנסה במקומו בשביל שלא ימות ר' יהושע או' מעלה את הראשון על מנת
                                                          
438 Bet Ha-Beḥira ad loc. 
 
439 Rashi ad loc.; Ran Novellae ad loc. 
 
440 As opposed to the Sabbath (Rashi s.v., הא ר' אליעזר). Perhaps this comports with the view offered in yPes. 3:3, 





א"ל אביי ממאי דילמ' עד  לשוחטו ואינו שוחטו וחוזר ומעלה את השני רצה זה שוחט רצה זה שוחט
כאן לא א"ר אליעזר התם דאיפשר בפרנסה אבל הכא דלא אפשר בפרנסה לא אינמי דילמ' עד כאן 
 לא קא"ר יהוש' התם דאפשר בהערמה אבל הכא דלא אפשר לאערומי לא
All these things they forbade on a Festival: But the following contradicts this: 
One may let down fruit through a trap-door on a Festival but not on a Sabbath. 
Said R. Joseph: There is no contradiction: the one is according to R. Eliezer; the 
other is according to R. Joshua. For it was taught: If it and its young fell into a pit, 
R. Eliezer says: He may bring up one of them in order to slaughter it and must 
slaughter it; and as for the other, he feed it in the very place [it fell], so that it 
should not die. R. Joshua says: He brings up one in order to slaughter it but does 
not slaughter it, and he uses cunning and again brings up the second; and he may 
slaughter whichever he desires. Abaye said to him: Whence [do you know that 
this is so]? Perhaps R. Eliezer said so only where provisions can be made, but not 
here where no provisions can be made. Or R. Joshua rules thus only there, where 
one can make use of subtlety, but no here where it is not possible to make use of 
subtlety! 
 
Abaye argues for the distinction presented in bShabbat 117b: financial loss notwithstanding, R. 
Eliezer does not permit ha‘arama if there is a licit way to sustain the second animal. Moreover, 
he makes clear that there is truly a difference between ha‘arama and outright violation. We will 
take up this second issue in following chapter, where we will study BT’s motivations and 
analysis more in-depth. 
As in this passage, Abaye is a central character in ha‘arama debates within BT: he 
delineates who the mishnaic rasha ‘arum is441 and it is a query of his regarding ha‘arama which 
the leads the stam to further define the exact borders of ha‘arama’s permissibility: 
 בבלי שבת סה: )כ"י מינכן(
בעי אביי אשה מהו ש]תערים[ תפרוף על האגוז ותוצי' לבנה קטן בשבת תיבעי למאן דאמ' מערימין 
מערימין בדלק' התם הוא דאי לא שרית  'דאמבדליקה ותיבעי למאן דאמ' אין מערימין תיבעי למאן 
נמי לא שרית ליה לא קאתיא לאפוקי לא או דילמא אפי' למאן דאמ'  ליה אתי לכבויי אבל הכא דאי
 אין מערימין בדליקה התם הוא דדרך הוצאה בכך אבל הכא דאין הוצאה בכך אימ' לא תיקו
Abaye asked: May a woman evade [the Sabbath prohibition] by weighting [her 
cloak] with a nut in order to carry it out to her infant child on the Sabbath? This is 
a problem on the view of both the one who maintains that an artifice may be used 
and one who maintains that an artifice may not be used. It is a problem on the 
view that artifice may be used in the case of a fire: that is only there, because if 
                                                          






you do not permit it, he will come to extinguish it; but here, if you do not permit 
it, he will not come to carry it (=the nut) out. Or perhaps, even on the view that all 
artifice may not be used; there that is a normal way of carrying [clothes] out; but 
here this is not a usual way of carrying it, and therefore I might say that it is well. 
The question stands. 
 
Abaye questions the use of ha‘arama here. Why? Is this because it is Sabbath rather than 
the Festival? Is it because the need is not monetary or in order to avoid sin? By analogizing the 
situation to the case of a fire on the Sabbath in which ha‘arama is permitted, the anonymous 
redactor(s) suggested that a) ha‘arama is warranted as deterrent from sin but not otherwise 
(similar to yPesaḥim 3:3 concern for committing a sin442), and b) whether the ha‘arama is 
similar to the way the transgression itself might be committed, which also may be related to the 
question of whether the circumvented law is a ḥiyuv ḥatat or simply a shevut.443  
There is one more pericope which indicates BT’s interest in keeping a person from sin 
through the use of ha‘arama: 
 כד:בבלי תמורה 
 : כיצד מערימין על הבכור?...משנה
אמר רב יהודה מותר להטיל מום בבכור קודם שיצא לאויר העולם. תנן, אומר מה שבמעיה של  גמ:
זו עולה. עולה אין שלמים לא? ואת אמרת דמצית מפקעת ליה מקדושתה? אמר לך רב יהודה ה"מ 
קרבה. אי בזמן הזה מאי למימרא? בזמן שבית המקדש קיים כי קאמינא אנא בזמן הזה דלא חזי לה
מהו דתימא נגזר דלמא נפיק רוב ראשו וקשדי ביה מומא ואימא הכי נמי! אפילו הכי הא עדיפא 
 מדאתי ביה לידי גיזה ועבודה.
Mishnah: How does one evade bekhor status?... 
Gemara: R. Judah said: It is permissible to maim a bekhor before it exits [the 
womb] to the world’s atmosphere. [But] we learn in the mishnah: He says, that 
which is in the womb of this one is a burnt offering. A burnt offering, but not a 
peace offering? Yet, you (=R. Judah) said that you can remove it from its sanctity 
[completely by maiming it]? R. Judah would tell you: That was when the Temple 
stood, but I am speaking about today, when the animal is not usable as an 
offering. And if this is about today, what does this add? What might you have 
                                                          
442 Although, significantly, the sin mentioned in yPes. 3:3 of owning ḥameṣ is arguably out of the hands of the 
owner, while in this case, it would be up to a person to try not to get swept away by the need to save his or her  
possessions. 
 
443 Ran and Ritba novella ad loc.; See also bKet. 31b and bShab.102a where the term דרך הוצאה is used bearing the 





thought? That we should decree [against it] lest the majority and the head of the 
animal comes out [first] and a person maims it [anyway]. And do say so! Even so, 
it is better than a person coming to use it for shearing or for labor. 
 
R. Judah offers his own version of ha‘arama – making an animal completely ḥullin 
before it ever becomes a bekhor. The stam indicates that the reason this is permitted, despite the 
fact that one might err and maim the animal once it already has the status of bekhor, i.e., it has 
mostly entered the world, is to keep a person from the transgression of using a bekhor for its 
wool or its milk, both of which are tempting options if the animal cannot be eaten and yet may 
not be used in any other way. 
No Suspicion of Ha‘arama 
BT seems much less preoccupied with ha‘arama as a phenomenon than either PT or 
Tosefta. Most of its citations of ha‘arama are baraitot444 rather than amoraic statements. 
Likewise, the terminology is scarcer. What PT labels ha‘arama, BT does not.445 And lastly, BT 
generally does not suspect ha‘arama unless it is clear and present: there is no suggestion for 
instance that people are more likely to use evade the laws of labor on ḥol ha-moed than during 
bereavement. 446 There is likewise no discussion about making ḥameṣ ownerless just before 
Passover. 
                                                          
444 In addition to the aforementioned examples, see also bMQ 12a; bShab. 139b. bBeṣa 18a is not a baraita but is 
still an earlier amoraic source, cited in the name of Rab. 
 
445 See bNed. 44a where the PT concern for ma‘arimin becomes a concern for rama’in. Or bNed. 48a-b, where the 
term ha‘arama is completely left out of the Bet Ḥoron story. Likewise, b’Arakhin 23a-b discusses the PT case not as 
ha‘arama but קנוניא על ההקדש. At one point in the sugya, however, the stam does suggest that Abaye would call such 
a person a רשע ערום, a cunning wicked person, but significantly Abaye does not mention this in his statement, where 
he gives the very advice to circumvent the law itself. The suggestion is then rejected in a situation in which such 
cunning is used to help a family member or to help a ṣurva me-rabanan. The distinction between a ṣurva me-
rabanan and others will play an important role in our analysis of BT’s portrayal of ha’arama 
446 In fact, bMQ 14a suggests that the rules for the Festival and one’s bereavement period are identical. And even 
when the sugya challenges that assumption on 17b, the reconciliation is that one the law is identical to Festival law 
only in cases of unanticipated bereavement. There is no citation of a braita that indicates that the Festival law would 
ever be stricter than bereavement law.  And thirdly, bMQ 12a cites an opinion that one may utilize ha‘arama during 





It is interesting that a very rare case in BT that involves suspicion of ha‘arama involves 
an early Babylonian amora who is a) answering a query from the land of Israel and b) using the 
terminology of ‘.r.m. more as trickery than as loophole: 
 (115: )וטיקן -בבלי ב"מ צ.
יתהון מהו שלח להו הערמת איתעביד בהו ערימי  448הנהו תורי דגנבין ארמאיי וגנחין 447דשלחו ליה לאבוה דשמואל
 עליהו' ואיזדבנין
They sent [a question] to Samuel’s father: These oxen that the Arameans steal and spay, what is 
the law regarding them? He sent to them: a trick has been done with them.  Trick them and sell 
them. 
 
In the context of the BT sugya, the discussion is about violations relating to animals that obligate 
only Jewish owners, not Gentile owners.  Jews, for example, may not spay their animals, while 
Gentiles may. Thus, Gentile friends/employees of the Jews were “stealing” the animals and 
spaying them, and presumably returning them to the Jew.  Abuha de-Shemuel, also known as 
Abba b. Abba disapproved of this practice as a simple trick and suggested that his questioners 
trick these Jewish people by putting their animals up for auction. 
There is however an interesting phenomenon that begins in the fourth generation of 
Babylonian amoraim, which we will detail further in the coming chapter: the aramaicized term 
 begins to refer to lying about the past rather than to tricking about איערומי קא מערים/אתי לאיערומי
the future – e.g. that a litigant might lie449 in order to avoid punishment. Beyond חשש הערמה in 
                                                          
447 Significantly, MS Florence cites the Babylonian amora Shmuel as the recipient of the query. If this is the case, it 
does not fit as neatly with our theory. That said, it is possible that Shmuel is using the term in its sense of trickery 
rather than legal evasion per se. Likewise, MS Hamburg reads: ני מערבא לא?ב?וה דשמואלשלחו ליה ב . It is strange to 
suggest that Palestinians sent a question to a fellow Palestinian. 
 
448 MS Munich substitutes גנחין with גזזין (shear); MS Vatican cites no verb whatsoever, which is probably a scribal 
error owing to the similarity of the terms גנבין and גנחין. 
 
449 Some interpret BT’s version of the mixed grain case in this light. כדי שתהא בהמתו אוכלת...- One lies about one’s 
grain…offering that it is mixed so that one’s animals may eat, when truly the person him or herself intends to eat of 





PT,450 this terminology marks a new and very negative meaning of the term.451 The term הערמה 
itself has been removed from its original shrewd but licit connotation and has been transformed 
to simple lying. We will study this trend in depth in the upcoming chapter within the context of a 
broader understanding of BT. 
We have observed four differences between PT and BT’s respective treatments of 
ha‘arama: a) comparing ha‘arama to outright violation, b) visible ruse vs. undetected ruse, c) 
ha‘arama terminology as outright lying, and d) a parallel case to the mishnaic institutions of 
ha‘arama. We will place these in context of a broader understanding of ha‘arama in the 
upcoming chapter. 
Legal Theory 
In concluding this chapter, we update our discussion by filtering ha‘arama through the 
lens(es) of contemporary legal theory.  In our Introduction, we cited Haim Tchernowitz’s 
modeling of ha‘arama on Historical Jurisprudence; and we discussed the strengths and 
weaknesses of the comparison. It should be obvious to any student of rabbinic law that it does 
not and cannot correspond perfectly to any one secular jurisprudential theory whether because 
rabbinic law is a religious system and is being compared to secular models, or simply because 
the models are relatively new.452  However, the endeavor is still fruitful for at least three reasons: 
first, it is the natural continuation of the earlier parallels between Roman law and rabbinic law, as 
                                                          
450 See chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
 
451 Excepting, of course, the example from bShab. 148b mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
 
452 For a detailed explanation of the ways in which rabbinic law does not perfectly match any secular theory of law, 
see Bernard S. Jackson, “Secular Jurisprudence and the Philosophy of Jewish Law: A Commentary on Some Recent 
Literature,” Jewish Law Annual 6 (1987) 3-44.  We likewise cannot and should not ignore the religious motivations 
of Jewish law, the existence of a Divine Lawmaker, etc., which by definition sets it apart from Anglo-American 
theory. (See Suzanne Last Stone, “In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in 





Roman law served as the foundation for Western legal science. Second, the comparison offers a 
more systematic approach and a vocabulary for a diffuse phenomenon. And third, it presents 
rabbinic law as confronting the very same challenges that legal systems confront still today. 
Perhaps this is why the enterprise of comparative jurisprudence between Jewish and Western 
“secular”453 legal systems has been both popular and successful.454 Below, we will first sketch 
two theories of law that touch on significant dimensions of ha‘arama but are inadequate for 
describing the phenomenon as a whole. We will then conclude with a theoretical model, 
corresponding to the Roman model that we have seen, that thoroughly captures the rabbinic 
phenomenon. 
Two Inadequate Lenses: Realism and Formalism 
Debate about the desirability of loopholes is as ubiquitous as loopholes themselves.455  
Until now, we have indicated that early (Biblical/ANE) use of loopholes is a result of a purely 
formalistic reading of the law, a preference for the letter over the spirit. But in the field of Anglo-
American legal theory, there are other reasons to accept loopholes as well. For Legal Realists, for 
example, loopholes are acceptable because law is fundamentally instrumental.456 As Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote, “A case is on one side of a statutory line or the other, and if on the safe 
side, it is none the worse legally because the full measure of what the law permits is availed of; 
                                                          
453 Hanina Ben-Menahem compellingly points out that even secular legal system bear some of the same 
characteristics as religious legal systems, such as accessibility and formalistic considerations. (Hanina Ben-
Menahem, “Is Talmudic Law a Religious Legal System? A Provisional Analysis,” Journal of Law and Religion 24 
(2008-2009)) 
 
454 For a discussion of the pitfalls and the successes of this comparative enterprise, see Jackson, “Secular 
Jurisprudence…” 
 
455 Though the debate about acceptance of loopholes is generally about what lawyers and judges should do after the 
fact, we still consider this an apt parallel to the rabbinic suggestions of ha‘arama.  
456 For further development to of this notion, see Katherine R. Kruse, “The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics,” 53 





to condemn an act as an evasion it must be on the wrong side of the line as indicated by the 
policy, if not by the mere letter of the law.”457  The legal realist concept of law “stresses 
[law’s]…manipulability over its certainty; and its instrumental possibilities over its normative 
contents.” 458 As Judge Louis Brandeis famously said: 
I live in Alexandria, Virginia. Near the Supreme Court chambers is a toll bridge 
across the Potomac. When in a rush, I pay the dollar toll and get home early. 
However, I usually drive outside the downtown section of the city and cross the 
Potomac on a free bridge. This bridge was placed outside the downtown 
Washington, DC area to serve a useful social service, getting drivers to drive the 
extra mile and help alleviate congestion during the rush hour. If I went over the 
toll bridge and through the barrier without paying the toll, I would be committing 
tax evasion ... If, however, I drive the extra mile and drive outside the city of 
Washington to the free bridge, I am using a legitimate, logical and suitable 
method of tax avoidance, and am performing a useful social service by doing so. 
For my tax evasion, I should be punished. For my tax avoidance, I should be 
commended. The tragedy of life today is that so few people know that the free 
bridge even exists. 
 
Use the law to your advantage. It is a tool.  (Many are actually skeptical about the legality of 
loopholes because of this manipulative aspect.) 
Legal realists likewise recognize the significance of equity, though they accord it the 
ability to override the law: “the law empowers courts to act as courts of equity”459; they must 
prevent an unfair result of the law’s application.  Realists deny that the law is complete and 
univocal and instead see choice where the law is over-inclusive or under-inclusive. On the 
                                                          
457 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916) He famously wrote: “if you want to know the 
law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge entails him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or 
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”  (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. “The Path of the Law,” 10 Harv. 
L. Rev. (1897) 457, 459) 
 
458 Stephen Pepper, “Lawyers’ Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem and some Possibilities,” Am. B Found. 
Res. J.  (1986) 624-26 
 





Realistic model – sometimes called a jurisprudence of ends,460 the desirability of outcome – what 
is best for communal policy, what is most just, etc. – determines what the law should be. As 
Holmes writes: 
We must think things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our 
words into facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and true. I 
sometimes tell students that the law schools pursue an inspirational combined 
with a logical method, that is, the postulates are taken for granted upon authority 
without inquiry into their worth, and then logic is used as the only tool to develop 
the results. It is a necessary method for the purpose of teaching dogma. But 
inasmuch as the real justification of a rule of law, if there be one, is that it helps to 
bring about a social end which we desire, it is no less necessary that those who 
make and develop the law should have those ends articulately in their minds.461 
The significance of “bring[ing] about a social end which we desire” resonates with 
Ephraim Urbach’s understanding of ha‘arama; it is for social ends, specifically a response to 
pressure from the public in changing historical moments: 
The various methods of evasion discussed by the Sages were all connected with 
changes which occurred, and their utilization was intended to make possible the 
observance of commandments and laws in changing historical conditions. 
However, as we have already indicated, the sensibilities of the Sages and their 
evaluation of the various factors involved played a role in shaping their attitude 
towards evasion. Their attention was directed to the casuistry of life with all its 
complications as they were reflected in the confrontation between the specific 
case and the Halakhah. It is, therefore, not legitimate to conclude from the fact 
that a specific tanna sanctioned a specific evasion that he was in favor of evasion 
in principle or that, conversely, one who objected to a specific instance objected 
to the whole idea of evasion.462 
 
We reject Urbach’s claim that this was the rabbis’ dominant reason for employing 
ha‘aramot, but this does not mean that public policy does not matter to the rabbis: in fact, 
returning to the previous chapter’s examples, when Rabbi Aqiva rejects the opinion that an 
                                                          
460 See Hanoch Dagan, “The Realist Conception of Law,” University of Toronto Law Journal 57 (2007) 607-660 
 
461 Holmes, “Law  in Science and Science in Law,” 12 Harvard L. Rev. (1899) 460. 
 





innocent woman forced to drink the sotah waters will get pregnant, it is clearly for reasons of 
public policy: he worries that all women might take advantage of this loophole, thus rendering 
sotah a joke (bBr. 31a). Likewise, the passage in Genesis Rabbah (Noaḥ 31) which claims that 
the ancient deluge was punishment for people using a theft loophole en masse clearly reflects 
anxieties about the impact of legal dodges on society. However, as we wrote above concerning 
Aristotelian equity, considerations such as societal impact can be viewed as internal to the law 
rather than external to it.  
While there is certainly a degree of legal manipulation that most people notice about 
rabbinic loopholes which certainly gives off the sense of “where there’s a will, there’s a way,” 
similar to Realism, the rabbis clearly were not Realists in any true sense of the word: they did not 
favor any and all exploitations of the law; they did not broadly abandon the written law in pursuit 
of other interests; and, as we have mentioned above, their leading motivations were not truly 
external to the law. 
The balance to legal Realism is Legal Formalism, which until now we have offered as 
somewhat of a mechanical caricature of itself. Legal formalists463 view existing law as complete 
and argue that one must make decisions on the basis of limiting rules rather than other 
variables.464 Frederick Schauer defends being a “slave to marks on a page,465” by arguing that a 
                                                          
463 Frederick Schauer, “Formalism,” 510 n1 offers an impressive array of definitions offered for the term over the 
years. 
 
464 S. Levinson, “What Do Lawyers Know (and What Do They Do with Their Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer 
and Moore,” 58 S. Cal. L. Rev.  (1985)  441, 445; Schauer points out (n. 42) that this definition has parallels in 
literary theory. See, e.g., W.B. Michaels, “Against Formalism: The Autonomous Text in Legal and Literary 
Interpretation,” 1 Poetics Today (1979) 23 
 
465 Schauer describes two other versions of formalism in depth,  both revolving around the denial of choice: either  
a) the denial of choice within the interpretation of a norm (about the language of that norm) – a la HLA Hart who 
attacks formalism for its refusal to acknowledge choice as it relates to the “open texture” of legal language. Hart 





rule is only a rule if it stands independent of reason: “If every application that would not serve 
the reason behind the rule were jettisoned from the coverage of the rule, then the decision 
procedure would be identical to one applying reasons directly to individual cases, with the 
mediation of rules. Under such a model, rules are superfluous except as predictive guides, for 
they lack any normative power of their own.”466 Thus, Schauer equates Formalism with “taking 
rules seriously.”467 While he realizes that rules may lead to unjust consequences, he lauds their 
ability to inject stability into a system and to condition decision-makers with modesty.468  
Ernest Weinrib, however, sees Formalism differently. In his view, formalism is not 
primitive or simply about the rule of law, but it is about the internal coherence (intelligibility) of 
law: “The formalist’s concern is not with whether a given exercise of state power is desirable, 
either in its own terms or in terms of the larger ends that it serves, but with whether it is 
intelligible as part of a coherent structure of justification.”469 The rationale for interpreting the 
law this way or that must come from within the law itself rather than on the basis of external 
politics or desiderata.  As Suzanne Last Stone writes, “…the characterization of rule application 
as mechanical is a polemical term invented by formalism’s opponents. Formalism is evaluative, 
but, crucially, its evaluative criteria are internal to law, reflecting law’s inner morality.”470 And 
                                                          
in questionable cases. Formalists simply refuse to acknowledge the penumbra in cases of questionable application of 
a word and instead remain pure literalists; or b) the denial of choice about whether to apply a norm. 
 
466 Schauer, 535 
 
467 Schauer, 537 
 
468 Also, he posits “presumptive formalism” in which decisions are made formalistically by a lower court but may be 
reviewed by a higher court taking “less locally applicable norms,” including the reason behind the rule in question, 
into account, should there be a pressing reason to do so (Schauer, 547) 
 
469 Ernest Weinrib, “Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law,” Yale Law Journal 97 (1988) 973 
 
470 Suzanne Last Stone, “Halakha and Legal Theory,” The Journal of the Society for Textual Reasoning, Vol. 6, No. 





Noam Zohar writes, “The formalistic image of deductive-technical interpretation is an image that 
is completely outdated, both concerning legal systems in general and with respect to the halakhic 
system in particular.”471 This second version of Formalism sounds a bit closer to the rabbinic 
project, in that there is consideration for rules and an understanding that one may not desert them 
in favor of certain ends, but there is likewise an inner morality guiding how these rules are read. 
Unfortunately, Weinrib does not posit a clear methodology of how to determine what that 
morality is. 
On these definitions, were the rabbis Formalists or Realists? Daniel Statement suggests 
that both are simply polemical straw man positions: “The argument…that halakhic interpretation 
is non-formalistic, namely that it relies on human judgment or human discretion, in contrast to 
formalistic interpretation…is simply trivial. To be sure, halakhic interpretation is not ‘a simple 
act of applying the written law to reality,’ but this is the case with all legal interpretation, and, in 
fact, with any kind of interpretation…Whereas the claim that the halakhic interpretation is non-
formalistic is trivial, the opposing claim which describes halakhic interpretation as a ‘simple act 
of applying the written law to reality’ is so embarrassing that it is hard to believe that anyone 
seriously uphold it.”472 
Although pharisaic and later rabbinic law has been famed for its formalism, the 
phenomenology of ha‘arama suggests that the truth is more complex. The contours of 
ha‘arama’s use suggests a curious nexus of Formalism and Realism. On the one hand, ha‘arama 
                                                          
471 Noam Zohar, “Developing a Halakhic Theory as a Necessary Basis for a Philosophy of the Halakha,” New 
Streams in Philosophy of Halakhah, Eds. Aviezer Ravitzky and Avinoam Rosenak (Jerusalem: Magnes Press and 
Van Leer Institute, 2008), 48 
 
472 Daniel Statman, “Halakha and Morality: A Few Methodological Considerations,” The Journal for the Society of 
Textual Reasoning, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Dec. 2010). Benjamin Brown has similarly suggested that rabbinic law is 
somewhere on the continuum between formalism and values-based jurisprudence. Benjamin Brown, “Formalism 





generally entails a very literal reading of the law – give a gift and a counter-gift rather than a 
sale; on the other hand, the rabbis decide when to manipulate the law perhaps based on external 
considerations such as which loopholes were already widespread and which could have dire 
consequences if outlawed. It seems that literal reading is tolerated, for example, for certain ends, 
while it is rejected for others. For the good of public policy, literal readings of laws may be 
outlawed or advocated. While, for instance, it would not serve policy well for people to 
accomplishing what amounts to usury, even if it is technically legal, while it is certainly helpful 
to aid the post-destruction era in avoiding burdensome taxes. It would not serve policy well for 
ridding oneself of ḥameṣ to basically become dead letter because people can always rely on 
declaring such food ownerless a day before Passover and reclaiming it after the holiday, while it 
does serve public policy well to prevent people from losing animals to pits on the Festival. What 
our study of the rabbinic development of ha‘arama reveals is that, its method shares elements of 
both realism and formalism and yet is not completely consonant with either.  
Natural Law Theory 
If we return to the context of Roman law, we find a path that leads us ultimately to a 
modern jurisprudential theory that does adequately describe the phenomenon of ha‘arama, even 
if cannot explain other facets of rabbinic law.  Our description of the Greco-Roman legal 
tradition as emphasizing equity as a counterbalance to the letter of the law (and sometimes as its 
fulfillment) has echoes in modern day Anglo-American theories of jurisprudence.  
For Roman jurists, the concept of in fraudem legis was understood within the context of 
developing notions of equity and natural law:  
Some fifty years before Plato, a notion of natural law had already appeared in 
Euripides. It received its most active development among the Stoic philosophers. 





naturale as one of the major foundations of jurisprudence…The various “natural 
laws” constitute a common element in a large variety of codes and conventions, 
referred to by some Roman jurists as ius gentium, and this became the basis for 
the modern conception of international law.”473  
 
Cicero’s original definition of natural law theory is as follows: 
True law is right reason in agreement with Nature...it is of universal application, 
unchanging and everlasting...Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and 
denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst 
penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.474 
Natural law theory asserts the significant of morality475 in determining the 
legitimacy of “true law.” 
Ronald Dworkin has offered a particularly appealing version of natural law theory.476 He 
illustrates his view through the famed 1882 New York Supreme Court case of Riggs v. 
Palmer.477 A certain Elmer Palmer stood to inherit most of his grandfather’s estate. Concerned 
that his grandfather might change the terms of the will in light of his recent remarriage, Elmer 
murdered his grandfather before he could alter a word of the will.  Should Elmer inherit his 
grandfather?  Judge Gray, who wrote the dissenting opinion, argued that by literal interpretation 
of the statute of wills, which said nothing about restricting an heir’s rights should she murder the 
                                                          
473 Norman Lamm and Aaron Kirschenbaum, “Freedom and Constraint in the Jewish Judicial Process,” Cardozo 
Law Review 1 (1979) 107 
 
474 Cicero, De Re Publica, III, xxii.33 (trans. Clinton Walker Keyes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1928)) 
 
475 In the ellipses section, Cicero claims that morality is universal and is determined by God. Among theorists of 
Jewish law, the question is still asked: Is morality dictated by the halakhah or does it exist in nature, independent of 
halakha? It is a restatement of the Euthyphro dilemma: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it 
pious because it is loved by the gods?” (Plato, Euthyphro 10a)  For full bibliographic information about this issue, 
see articles and footnotes in The Journal of Textual Reasoning, Volume 6,1  (Dec. 2010), dedicated to Halakha and 
Morality, which cite most of the relevant literature on this issue.  For secular theorists of natural law, the question is 
somewhat different: Is morality universal and transcendent, or is it conventional, impacted by history and culture? 
William Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?” 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1995) 1899.) 
 
476 For other applications of Dworkinian theory to rabbinic law, see Christine Hayes, “Legal Truth, Right Answers 
and Best Answers: Dworkin and the Rabbis,” Dine Israel 25 (2008): 73-121. 
 





testator, Elmer should inherit. However, the majority voted for Elmer not to inherit.  Judge Earl, 
writing for the majority opinion, suggested two reasons not to simply read the statutes literally 
and contextually. The first, relates to the legislators’ intentions: “It is a familiar canon of 
construction that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within 
the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not 
within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the makers.”478 And second was the 
question of general principles of law. Rather than reading a statute in isolation from other legal 
texts, one must understand the statute in light of “principles of justice assumed elsewhere in the 
law”479: “Besides, all laws as well as all contracts may be controlled in their operation and effect 
by general, fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his 
own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong…These maxims, without any statute given 
them force or operation, frequently control the effect and nullify the language of wills.” This is 
important both because the legislators probably did so as well, and because this takes the view of 
a legal corpus as coherent. 
Dworkin explains: “the dispute about Elmer was not about whether judges should follow 
the law or adjust it in the interests of justice…It was a dispute about what the law was, about 
what the real statute the legislators enacted really said.”480 Dworkin suggests that the principles – 
the values woven throughout the legal corpus must be considered as part of one’s interpretation 
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479 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press (1986)19. Moshe Halbertal points 
out that finding out what a statute really says, according to Dworkin, does not mean what exactly the lawgiver had in 
mind when writing the legislation. Rather, it is a question of how the lawgiver would want it to be interpreted in 
light of his/her entire legal project. (See Moshe Halbertal, Interpretive Revolutions in the Making (Jerusalem: 
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of a given statute.  As Bernard Jackson, explains: “Dworkin’s legal theory attaches supreme 
importance to the value of rationality in the form of consistent application of the morality of the 
community, and thus implementation of the rights which that community morality confers.”481  
This schema is very fitting for ha‘arama.482  On the one hand, it takes into account the 
significance of the laws themselves; they are not to be abandoned simply in the face of other 
needs. On the other hand, he can do that is because he posits that the laws themselves, rather than 
being viewed in a vacuum, must be viewed as a system, which purports to serve moral ends. 
Thus, the law speaks for itself out of more than just its letter. Based on our study of what 
motivates ha’arama, saving money, preventing transgression – it seems that these goals are 
actually internal legal principles within rabbinic law. On the other hand, those ha‘aramot which 
are rejected are rejected because they do not further the principles of the law overall. The rabbis 
want law that is “morally coherent.”483 Rules must be authentic, not simply valid.484 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed the developed of the ha‘arama terminology from 
Mishnah through BT, tracing it from its mishnaic reference to post-Temple rabbinic strategies to 
keep people from losing money on rituals which were no longer practicable to a predominantly 
                                                          
481 Bernard S. Jackson, “Secular Jurisprudence and the Philosophy of Jewish Law: A Commentary on Some Recent 
Literature.” Jewish Law Annual Vol. VI, 22. He further points out that rationality is not equivalent to 
demonstrability – as only a herculean judge can figure out the correct answer – but cares more about the proper 
application of moral criteria than the utilitarian preference of predictability. 
 
482 Dworkin himself notes his perspective as a compromise position between “conventionalism” and “pragmatism.” 
(See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle. Mass.: Cambridge University Press (1985) Chapters 4 and 5; See also 
See Moshe Halbertal, Interpretive Revolutions, 188) 
 
483 Michel Rosenfeld, “Dworkin and the One Law Principle: A Pluralist Critique,” Revue Internationale du 
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accomplished, what kind of law might it apply to, etc.   
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rejectionist stance towards it in PT (perhaps because of abuse by its practitioners for ignoble 
ends), to the parameters for ha‘arama as indicated in Tosefta, PT, and BT. Pathos plays a 
significant role. We have endeavored to show that it is not the use of ha‘arama which is unique 
in this literature, but rather its rejection, as it reflects the Greco-Roman understanding of in 
fraudem legis. Thus, the rabbis move beyond the rigid version of formalism reflected in ANE 
sources and begin to consider equity, the element which ultimately determines which loopholes 
are accepted and which are spurned. To explain this phenomenon in modern theoretical terms, 
we have offered identified parallels with three jurisprudential schools, each emphasizing a 
different aspect of ha‘arama. 
Within this chapter we have also alluded to a slight variation on straightforward loophole 
ha‘arama. In the coming chapter, we will explore this variation and identify what it contributed 
















Chapter 3 - Ha‘arama and the Internal Self  
The previous chapter dealt with ways in which the phenomenon known as ha‘arama       
(literally, cunning), the term used for a subset of rabbinic loopholes,485 does not reflect a simple 
and rigid formalism, but instead parallels contemporaneous Graeco-Roman considerations of 
equity, the inner spirit of the law. This parallel is most pronounced in the Palestinian Talmud.  In 
this chapter, we will explore a subset of ha‘arama cases which concern manipulation of inner 
thought rather than external, empirical fact.  We will analyze how such ha‘arama functions 
within the context of the earlier type of ha‘arama discussed. The connection between the two 
types reveals much about how the rabbis understood the role of mental process, or intention, in 
defining actions.  
Ha‘arama of Intention          
            As mentioned above, Tosefta486 offers what appears to be a new variation of ha‘arama, 
somewhat different in method from that of Mishnah.  This kind of ha‘arama concerns not the 
                                                          
485 As discussed at length in chapter 1 of this dissertation, the rabbinic term for ha‘arama most probably derives 
from the use of the root ע.ר.מ.  in the book of Proverbs, in which Wisdom personified invites the simpleton to come 
learn shrewdness and cunning from her rather than from the wicked. And while there is no specific term used for all 
loopholes in rabbinic literature, the term הערמה or some variation thereof is used some several dozen times 
throughout ancient rabbinic corpora to refer to such phenomena. (See Chapter 2 for a full discussion of rabbinic 
terminology for loopholes, as well as for the general discussion as to whether taqqanot (decrees) such as prosbul and 
'eruv fall into the “loophole” category.) In addition to referring to legal dodges or to cunning, ‘.r.m. means wise or 
clever with a completely positive connotation: see Gen. Rabbah Vayeshev 86 and Miqeṣ 90.  It can even mean wise 
in a profound way. See bBerakh. 17a. 
 
486 Whether Tosefta is viewed as an early commentary on Mishnah (JN Epstein, Introduction to Tannaitic 
Literature: Mishnah, Tosefta, and Halakhic Midrashim (Heb.; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1959), 242-62; Abraham 
Goldberg, “The Tosefta - Companion to the Mishna,” in The Literature of the Sages Part I, Ed. Shmuel Safrai 
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1987), 283-302.), as a competing free rendition based on the same text as the one stylized by 
Mishnah (Martin Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth: Writing and Oral Tradition in Palestinian Judaism, 200 
BCE-400 CE (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 39-61; Elizabeth Shanks Alexander, 
Transmitting Mishnah: The Shaping Influence of Oral Tradition (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 35-55.), as the earlier text and the main source of Mishnah (Judith Hauptman, Rereading the Mishnah: 
A New Approach to Ancient Jewish Texts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), as an amoraic redaction. (Hanoch 
Albeck, Studies in the Baraita and the Tosefta (Heb.; Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1954), 87-8, 182-4; While 
Albeck dates the redaction of Tosefta to the end of the amoraic period (approximately to the fifth century C.E.), he 





external, physical facts of a case, but the (ostensibly) internal, intangible element: the agent’s 
intended purposes in committing the action. Predictably, such ha‘arama is specific to those areas 
of Jewish law in which such intention plays a definitive role, such as Sabbath/Festivals and ritual 
purity law.487 As Michael Higger writes in his classic, Intention in Talmudic Law, “...in many 
cases in Jewish Religious Law where the commission of the act may involve purposes488 which 
are permitted or prohibited, it is the purpose proper that decides the validity of the act.”489 In 
such situations, ha‘arama entails (re)defining an action490  or object491 by representing and, 
presumably, by misrepresenting, one’s subjective purposes with regard to said action or object. 




                                                          
materials both antedating and post-dating Mishnah (Shamma Friedman., “Mishna-Tosefta Parallels” (Heb.), 
Proceedings of the 11th World Congress of Jewish Studies (1994): 15-22; idem, “The Primacy of Tosefta to 
Mishnah in Synoptic Parallels,” in Introducing Tosefta: Textual, Intratextual, and Intertextual Studies, eds. Harry 
Fox, Tirzah Meacham, and Diane Kriger (Hoboken: Ktav, 1999), 99-121), it is clear that the Tosefta is 
fundamentally relevant to the Mishnah. 
 
487 Surprisingly, it is not found in context of sacrificial law. 
 
488 He uses the term “purpose” as distinct from “intention,” as intention is merely the conscious choice to act, 
whereas purpose is about why someone acts. (Higger, Michael. (1927) Intention in Talmudic Law (Doctoral 
Dissertation) Columbia University, New York, 18) In this paper, we use both terms to refer to “purpose.” 
 
489 Higger, Intention, 35. He later presents an exception to this rule: acts that are malum per se, such as idolatrous 
actions, “disregard purpose entirely.” (36) 
 
490 This will limit its scope basically to the realm of rabbinic laws regarding the Sabbath or Festivals such as 
marginalized objects (muqṣeh) or preparation for after the Sabbath/Festival (hakhana), Again, while might have 
expected the terminology therefore to emerge in rules regarding ritual sacrifice, where intention proves definitive, 
the term ha‘arama is absent from such discussions. 
 
491 For instance, much in the realm of ritual im/purity, such as the status of certain objects as ritually defile-able, 







 תוספתא ביצה ג:ב )וינה(
שנפלו לבור ר' אליעזר אומ' מעלה את הראשון על מנת לשוחטו ואינו שוחטו  492אותו ואת בנו
והשיני עושה לו פרנסה במקומו בשביל שלא ימות ר' יהושע אומ' מעלה את הראשון על מנת לשוחטו 
 494רצה שלא לשחוט את אחד מהם הרשות בידו 493ואינו שוחטו ומערים ומעלה את השיני
An animal and its offspring which fell into a pit R. Eliezer says, “One raises up 
the first on condition to slaughter it but does not slaughter it, and, for the second, 
one provides food while it is in its present location, so that it does not die.” R. 
Joshua says, “One raises up the first on condition to slaughter it but does not 
slaughter it, and, practicing cunning, one then raises up the second. [If] he wanted 
to slaughter neither one of them, he has the right [to refrain].” 
 
One may not handle animals on a Festival day.495 One may, however, handle animals which one 
intends to slaughter, as food preparation is permitted.496 Therefore, if two animals fall into a pit 
on a Festival day, one may only retrieve them for the purpose of slaughter for the day’s meal.  
The case of a parent-child pair, however, presents further limitation: Leviticus 22:28, prohibits 
the slaughtering of both parent and child animals on the same day: אותו ואת בנו לא תשחטו ביום אחד 
– “It and its dam though shall not slaughter on one day.” Though leaving either animal in the pit 
                                                          
492 There is no parallel in the Mishnah (or Midrash Halakhah) to this toseftan passage. Instead mBeṣa 3:4 deals only 
with the case of a bekhor animal that falls into a pit on the Festival (found also in the very next toseftan passage). 
There, the question surrounds whether the animal had been maimed prior to the Festival, which would render it 
appropriate for slaughter and thus for retrieval from the pit for the purpose of slaughter. Though the case of a 
“regular” animal falling into a pit on the Festival is not found in rabbinic, some assume that the ruling would be the 
same: because it is edible, it may be retrieved, but only to be slaughtered for that day’s food. (Or Zarua, Laws of the 
Festival, 2:355), and thus assume that the case of a parent and its dam highlights R. Joshua’s position.  Others have 
argued unconvincingly that both the bekhor and the animal/dam cases are unique, and one would be permitted to 
retrieve a “regular” single animal from a pit on the Festival even without slaughtering or planning to slaughter it. 
(Magen Abraham O.C. 498:10).  
 
493 MS Erfurt, MS London and Venice Ed. add: על מנת לשחוט  
 
494 Thus, MSS Vienna and Erfurt, but MSS Leiden, London, Venice Ed. read:  רצה לשחוט רצה שלא לשחוט אחד מהן
 See also ‘Ittur, Laws of Festivals, Part III, 140; Shibbolei Ha-Leket Ha-Shalem Laws of Festivals chapter) הרשות בידו
252). PT and BT both read differently, an issue that will be considered further below. 
 
495 tBeṣa 1:13 – Elsewhere, we will refer to the prohibition to handle such animals as muqṣeh (lit., marginalized), as 
this is the term used in classical Jewish law codes (e.g., Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Sabbath, Laws 
of Festivals, and Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, 308-334, 495-518) to refer to an item which may not be moved on 
the Sabbath or Festival. 
 





exposes it to potential risks – inclement weather, injury, death by predators, or even poaching – 
one may not retrieve both for the day’s meal. So says R. Eliezer.  
In his epic Eliezer ben Hyrcanus: A Scholar Outcast, Yitzhak Gilat posits the R. Eliezer, 
as one who “never spoke a word which he had not heard from his master” (tYeb. 3:4) possessed 
an “excessive attachment and adherence to the earlier halakhah,”497 which was  stricter than later 
Halakha.498 While this image is consistent with R. Eliezer’s rigidity in this case, there may be yet 
an additional layer.  R. Eliezer’s opinion exhibits parallels to sectarian law, specifically the 
Sabbath Code of the Damascus Document: 
 תפיל אל בור ואל פחת אל יקימה בשבתאל יילד איש בהמה ביום השבת ואם 
Let no man deliver (the young of) an animal on the Sabbath day. And if it falls 
into a pit or a ditch, let him not raise it on the Sabbath.499   
 
While this citation refers to the Sabbath, a day on which one would not be permitted to 
slaughter the animals, and therefore there would be no permissible way to retrieve them, 
Matthew 12:11-12 and Luke 14:5 testify that the Pharisees found a way around the issue: 
12:11And he said unto them, What man shall there be of you, that shall have one 
sheep, and if this fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not lay hold on it, and 
lift it out? 12:12How much then is a man of more value than a sheep! Wherefore it 
is lawful to do good on the Sabbath day. 
 
Jesus’ accusation implies that the Pharisees (as opposed to the sectarians) would find a way to 
retrieve an animal even on the Sabbath. Perhaps R. Eliezer’s position echoes that of the 
                                                          
497 Yitzhak Gilat, Rabbi Eliezer Ben Hyrcanus: A Scholar Outcast. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press (1984), 12. 
Jacob Neusner criticizes Gilat for taking the rabbinic allegation that R. Eliezer never said anything he had not heard 
from his teachers at face value. It is this assumption which leads Gilat to connect R. Eliezer to older Pharisaism, 
though there is little reliable evidence of what older Pharisaic law looked like and thus little basis for verifying such 
a thesis.  (Jacob Neusner, Eliezer ben Hyrcanus: The Tradition and the Man. Leiden, EJ Brill (1973), 2:277ff)  
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sectarians. This is speculative, as perhaps even the sectarians would be more permissive on the 
Festival than on the Sabbath; likewise, the rabbis might be less permissive generally if the person 
owned more than one sheep. Perhaps if two animals have fallen into a pit on the Festival, saving 
one would be enough. Though speculative, viewing this example as a case of R. Eliezer 
advocating sectarian law belongs to a broader argument that R. Eliezer’s perspectives generally 
evoke not simply stricter halakha, but specifically a non-Pharisaic form of halakha. Vered 
Noam, for instance, identifies500 cases from legal arenas as varied as ritual purity, sexual ethics 
and Sabbath law that indicate parallels between R. Eliezer’s positions and those preserved in the 
Dead Sea Scrolls.  Furthermore, Aharon Shemesh suggests that R. Eliezer’s very philosophy of 
halakha is reminiscent of such sectarian views: he views divine inspiration501 as that basis for 
legal authority. This stands in marked contrast to the later and more daring rabbinic view that 
halakha is the result of “human exegetical activity.”502 Hence, R. Eliezer appears more rigid and 
linear in his legal interpretation.503 For our purposes, whether R. Eliezer’s positions or thought 
                                                          
500 She writes, “The similarity between some of Eliezer b. Hyrcanus’ halakhot and parallel sectarian passages may 
explain the hostility that he aroused and his problematic status in the tannaitic world.” (Vered Noam, “Traces of 
Sectarian Halakhah in the Rabbinic World,” in eds. Steven G. Fraade, Aharon Shemesh, and Ruth A. Clements,  
Rabbinic Perspectives: Rabbinic Literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls. Proceedings of the Eighth International 
Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, January (2003), 
69.) 
 
501 Aharon Shemesh, Halakhah in the Making: the Development of Jewish Law from Qumran to the Rabbis, 
Berkeley/London: University of California Press (2009) 46. 
 
502 Shemesh, 39. The famous story of the “Oven of Akhinai” underscores this difference of opinion specifically 
between R. Eliezer and R. Joshua, as R. Eliezer summons God to offer proofs to support his halakhic position, while 
R. Joshua rises to his feet with the charge that “It is not in heaven” and thus not the province of Divine oracles. 
 
503 There is an interesting wrinkle here. Gilat argues that R. Eliezer and R. Joshua represent the schools of Shammai 
and Hillel respectively, especially regarding intention: for R. Eliezer, the deed is primary, whereas for R. Joshua 
intention plays a role. (Gilat, R. Eliezer, 44ff ; Gilat, “Kavvanah u-ma‘aseh be-mishnat ha-tannaim,” Bar Ilan IV-V 
(1967) 104-116; others, such as  Noam, echo this point (Noam, “Traces,” 73) On the one hand, R. Eliezer focuses on 
the deed, namely that the animal must be slaughtered at the end of the process, whereas R. Joshua asserts that intent 
to slaughter is sufficient even if no animal is slaughtered. On the other hand, though, one must question what type of 
intention R. Joshua really demands here and whether that is consistent with one who emphasizes the significance of 





process evince sectarian perspectives or simply a more inelastic approach to halakha, his 
position in this case of ha‘arama is consistent with how he presents generally within rabbinic 
literature. 
R. Joshua, however, is more willing to employ human ingenuity.504 R. Joshua’s position 
permitting ha‘arama 505 is consistent what we have seen in chapter 2 above.  Ha‘arama is 
permitted (by at least one tanna or amora) in cases with evoke true pathos – where a person 
stands to lose money as opposed to where s/he seeks profit; where a person is forced into 
transgression, as opposed to where s/he seeks evasions of convenience. Likewise in this case, 
why consign a person to losing an animal due to a situation that was thrust upon him or her? 
Why should the Festival law cause a person to lose money through no fault of his or her own? 
We return to R. Joshua’s solution: raise one up in order to slaughter it, but do not 
slaughter it; raise the other, but do not slaughter it. How does this work? Ostensibly, this is quite 
different from the type of ha‘arama that would have a person hand money over to his/her child 
to redeem secondary tithes, or packing produce in its chaff while bringing it indoors in order to 
exempt it from tithes. Those are empirical, verifiable, and even physical changes. R. Joshua’s 
                                                          
Neusner, on the other hand, challenges this, stating that “Eliezer’s consistency with the House of Shammai in 
respect to intention… seems…well-established in some areas of law, not in others.” (Jacob Neusner, Eliezer ben 
Hyrcanus: The Tradition and the Man, Leiden: EJ Brill (1973), 2:284) Furthermore, he argues that Eliezer was 
independent of the Houses of both Hillel and Shammai rather than a strict adherent of either. (Ibid., 309) And both 
H. Tchernowitz and Y. Baer argue that in fact the House of Shammai prized intention over action, whereas the 
House of Hillel held the reverse priorities. (See Tchernowitz, Toldot Ha-halakhah 4:307; Y. Baer, Yisrael Ba-'amim, 
100). The whole issue of R. Joshua, R. Eliezer and intention, however, may take on a different valence according the 
nominalistic interpretation of ha‘arama offered below. 
 
504 While there may be a temptation to cite the Talmudic Oven of Akhinai story (bBM 59b/ yMQ 3:1, 81c) as 
evidence as R. Joshua’s belief that Torah “is not in Heaven,” but is a result of human creativity, it is difficult to 
know what part of the story may be amoraic or stammaitic editorializing about R. Joshua and what part can be 
asserted as fact. 
 
505 Interestingly, though R. Joshua champions ha‘arama in these two cases, he condemns the רשע ערום in mSotah 





example, however, seems simply mendacious. What true legal change has been made? Most 
extant versions of R. Joshua’s opinion present a definitive purpose for raising both the first and 
the second animal from the pit, namely על מנת לשחוט - “in order to slaughter,” yet sincerity seems 
improbable. Given the agent’s ultimate objective of removing both animals from the pit, is not 
 ,in order to save the animal? Even the language of ha‘arama – על מנת להציל truly על מנת לשחוט
cunning, undermines presumptions of authenticity. It also should not surprise that R. Joshua does 
not use the term כוונה, intention, which may be used to denote true subjective mental processes 
regarding Sabbath (and by extension, Festival) law,506 or mahshava, plan, the tannaitic term for 
one’s intended plans for an object.507 
Furthermore, according to versions in both Tosefta and PT, R. Joshua does not require 
that either animal be slaughtered. MSS Vienna and Erfurt both read:  רצה שלא לשחוט אחד מהן
 If he wishes to slaughter neither of them, he has permission.” But this is“ ,הרשות בידו
                                                          
506 e.g., mShab. 22:3: 
 משנה שבת כב:ג
 שובר אדם את החבית לאכל הימנה גרוגרות ובלבד שלא יתכון לעשות כלי
A person may break the barrel [on the Sabbath] in order to eat olives, so long as he does not intend to make a vessel. 
 tShab. 16:13: 
ישב אחד על הפתח ונמצא צבי בתוכו אע"פ שמתכוין לישב עד שתחשך פטור מפני שקדמה צידה למחשבה ]אין לך שיהא חייב אלא המתכוון 
צפורית בתוכה אע"פ לצוד אבל קדמה צידה למחשבה פטור[ למה זה דומה לנועל את ]המגדל[ ונמצא צבי בתוכו ולמתכסה בטלית ונמצא 
 .שמתכוין לישב עד שתחשך פטור מפני שקדמה צידה למחשבה אין לך שחייב אלא המתכוין לצוד אם קדמה צידה למחשבה פטור
 If one person sat in the doorway, and a deer turns out to be inside, even if he plans to sit there until nightfall, he is 
exempt, because the trapping preceded the thought. The only one who is obligated is one who intends to trap, but if 
the trapping precedes the thought, he is exempt. 
 
507 e.g., m’Ohalot 7:3: 
ישב להוציאו באחד מהן, או בחלון שהוא ארבעה על ח  הוא טמא, וכולן טהורין.--כולן טמאין; נפתח אחד מהן--המת בבית, ובו פתחים הרבה
  .בית שמאי אומרין, והוא שחישב, עד שלא ימות המת; בית הלל אומרין, אף משמת  הציל על הפתחים.--ארבעה טפחים
If one dies in a house, and it has many doorways – they are all impure. If one is opened, it becomes impure and the 
others become pure. If he intended to take the corpse out of one of them, or out of a window which is four by four 
handbreadths, he has saved the [other] doorways [from impurity]. The House of Shammai say: And that is only if he 
intended before the person died. The House of Hillel say: Even once he has died.  
tToh. 9:7?: 
 .חטין היוצאין עם גללי הבקר ושעורין היוצאין עם גללי הבהמה אע"פ שחשב עליהן לאוכלין אין מטמאין טומאת אוכלין
Wheat that comes out with the cattle’s manure, and barley that comes out with the animal’s manure, even if one 





surmountable. While this can be read as exempting him from slaughtering either animal, it can 
also be read as exempting him from slaughtering both of them: even though one raised each one 
from the pit for the purpose of slaughter, it is sufficient that only one be slaughtered. But MSS 
Leiden and London, and the Venice printed edition, are unambiguous:  רצה לשחוט רצה שלא לשחוט
 (If he wishes to slaughter, he may, and if he wishes not to slaughter (either – אחד מהן הרשות בידו
one, he may. Surely, the option to slaughter does not extend to both animals, as this would 
constitute violation of Biblical law. Therefore, R. Joshua’s position offers the option of slaughter 
one or neither of the two animals. 508 
YPesaḥim 3:3, 30a, expresses R. Joshua’s suggestion even more radically, which supports 
the aforementioned readings of the tosefta: 
אותו ואת בנו שנפלו לבור ר' ליעזר אומר יעלה את הראשון על מנת לשחוט וישחוט והשני עושין לו 
הראשון ע"מ לשחוט ולא ישחוט ויערים ויעלה פרנסה במקומו שלא ימות. ר' יהושע אומר יעלה את 
 את השני אע"פ שלא חישב לשחוט אחד מהן מותר
An animal and its dam that fell into a pit [on the Festival], R. Eliezer says, Bring 
up the first on condition to slaughter it, and then slaughter it; care for the second 
one where it is so that it will not die. R. Joshua says, Bring up the first on 
condition to slaughter it, but do not slaughter it; and practice ha‘arama, and bring 
up the second. Even if one did not think of slaughtering/plan to slaughter either of 
them, it is permitted. 
 
Some traditional commentators509 soften R. Joshua’s position:  although the owner had not 
thought of slaughtering the animals before they fell into the pit, once they have fallen into the pit 
he may retrieve both of them so long as he slaughters one of them.510 Alternatively, the wording 
                                                          
508 While it is possible that MS Erfurt is more authentic, it is equally likely that the scribe removed the first few 
words for brevity’s sake or by error (Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta, Vol. 5, 965), or that MS Erfurt was made more 
compatible with the BT version of this braita, which reads: רצה זה שוחט, רצה זה שוחט – indicating that one must 
slaughter either of the two animals but not both. According to Louis Ginzberg, “there is no doubt that MS Erfurt was 
very influenced by BT” (Ginzberg, Louis. Perushim ve-Ḥiddushim be-Yerushalmi. New York: Jewish Theological 
Seminary of America (1941), 57.) Saul Lieberman makes the same observation in his introduction to Tosefta Ki-
fshuta Moed, (1955) 14, and elsewhere. 
 






is understood as in the tosefta above: even if he decided/thought not to slaughter either of them 
after removing them from the pit, the action is permissible.511  The word חישב, however, 
generally carries the connotation of planning rather than deciding.512 Hence, the simple reading, 
one may retrieve both animals through cunning “in order to slaughter” even though in truth one 
plans to slaughter neither of them. This is the most explicit presentation of the absence of 
genuine intention advocated by R. Joshua’s position. While s/he may be raising the animal “on 
condition” to slaughter it, her/his mahshava, true plans, are otherwise! 
In light of this close look R. Joshua’s positions, it is understandable that scholars are 
confounded by this version of ha‘arama. Shmuel Shilo, for instance, has posited a categorical 
difference between the ha‘arama accomplished by physical action and the ha‘arama 
accomplished using intention, understanding the former as more concrete and objective – the 
“use of a rule of law in order to bypass another rule,” – and fearing that the latter may amount to 
mere fabrication: “It is difficult to define this category since it is very close to deception and 
fiction (though not legal fiction).513” Others, pressed by the same issue, have tried to downplay 
the role of intention within rabbinic law. Samuel Atlas does just this: “One is using it to follow 
the law and only transgresses in thought…514” This position would certainly complicate the 
                                                          
510 Shitat Qadmonim, s.v., af 'al pi 
 
511 See Qorban Ha'edah, David b. Naftali Frankel, 18th c., ibid.  
 
512 See Michael Sokoloff, Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic חשב where he translates it as “to think, to 
calculate, to plan.”  
 
513 Shilo, Shmuel. “Circumvention of the Law in Talmudic Literature”, Israel Law Review Vol. 17, No. 2, (1982) 
153; See also, Shilo, Shmuel. “Evasion of the Law in the Talmud,” Eds. Hanina Ben-Menahem and Neil Hecht, 
Authority, Process and Method: Studies in Jewish Law. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998.  We will 
address the relationship of ha‘arama to legal fictions in the first appendix to this chapter. 
 
514 Samuel Atlas, “Ha‘arama Mishpatit ba-Talmud,” Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume: On the Occasion of his 





mishnaic picture of kavvanah, given that the tannaim actually introduced the relevance of 
intention as an essential part of action.515  Furthermore, R. Joshua himself is a major advocate of 
the significance of intention in defining sin.516 Still others have suggested that because intention 
cannot be conclusively proven, it is possible that the person really does now want to eat one of 
the animals, and the rabbis use this ambiguity to the agent’s benefit.517 But this position too is 
difficult to understand. Ambiguity is a reason not to prosecute an agent after the fact; it is not 
something for judges themselves to encourage a priori. Thus, in order to handle the complexity 
of R. Joshua’s position in particular, and this “version” of ha‘arama in general, we compare two 
alternatives.518 
                                                          
515 See Higger, Intention, 15, and Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, The Human Will in Judaism: The Mishna’s Philosophy 
of Intention. Atlanta: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies (1986) 
 
516 tKer. 2:14 
 
517 Thus, Haim Tchernowitz, Toldot Ha-halakhah, n.3 
 
518 In his book on loopholes in the American legal system, Leo Katz discusses a similar problem regarding the 
Jesuits’ loophole of “tinker[ing] with one’s state of mind.” For instance, the servant of a criminal may direct his/her 
attention to his/her own paycheck rather than to the crimes of his/her master. To explain this clever trick, Katz 
presents the distinction between killing someone intentionally versus just killing the person knowingly. According to 
the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code from 1962, he says, to kill intentionally is to have killing as one’s 
“conscious object” whereas to kill knowingly is to be “aware that it is practically certain that [one’s] conduct” will 
cause death. “Intentional acts,” he writes “are judged to be morally worse than knowing acts.” Applied to our case of 
the animals, R. Joshua’s position can be explained as follows: While the owner knows that a muqṣeh animal may be 
removed from the pit, he intends for an animal which will be his food for the day to be removed from the pit. While 
this may seem like a perfectly reasonable justification for the loophole, Katz argues that it is self-defeating. To cite 
Katz’s full argument: 
Intentional acts are judged to be morally worse than knowing acts, which in turn are worse than reckless ones, which 
in turn are worse than negligent ones, which in turn are worse than accidental (and therefore not at all blameworthy) 
ones. Realizing all of this, the Jesuits recommend to a would-be criminal that he make sure he commits his bad act 
with a less rather than a more culpable mental state. Instead of killing intentionally, they recommend he try doing so 
only knowingly, recklessly, negligently, or, better yet, altogether accidentally. But how is one supposed to do that? 
If I try to kill accidentally – or knowingly, recklessly, or negligently – well, then I have really killed intentionally! 
It’s like trying to deliver a well-planned spontaneous repartee. (Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains, 35-6) 
Katz’s challenge strikes clear at the heart of R. Joshua’s position. While R. Joshua identifies a clear intent or 
purpose for one’s actions, namely לשחטו על מנת  - “in order to slaughter it,” the mental gymnastics are insincere. 
Given the actor’s ultimate objective of removing the animals from the pit, does not the על מנת לשחטו activity become 
truly a case of על מנת להצילו – in order to save it? 
Another way of framing the issue is that of willful blindness. The actor simply makes him or herself willfully blind 
to the fact of his/her need to save the animal and instead refocuses on a different goal. But, as political scientist Jon 





Living in a Social World: Marit ‘Ayin 
There is something quite performative about R. Joshua’s suggestion. In fact, it is difficult 
to see the scenario with an audience – whether another party, the animal owner him or herself or 
God and/or the eyes of the law. The notion of מעלה על מנת לשוחטו for someone who did not have 
this intention a moment ago implies that someone is now being told of this new goal. If no one 
else is present as the animals’ owner looks down forlornly into the ditch, must s/he say 
something aloud about wishing to slaughter the animal in order to be innocent in the eyes of the 
law, or before God? Alternatively, is one supposed to sit down and tell him or herself to “want” 
to slaughter one of the animals? Alternatively, if others are watching, is the performance truly for 
the audience?  
Perhaps R. Joshua’s ha‘arama is not about dodging the law at all, but only about a 
performance that deceives (potential)519 onlookers. Perhaps R. Joshua is being conservative 
rather than innovative: as indicated in the Matthew passage cited above, a person would be 
exempt from the laws of muqṣeh in cases such as this, where financial loss would ensue (or 
perhaps where an animal would be pained in the process).520 In a more ideal world, where 
everyone watching would understand the nuance521 of permitting muqṣeh only in such cases, and 
                                                          
And having achieved this impossible feat, how does one achieve that of believing at will what one also believes that 
there are no adequate grounds for believing? (Jon Elster, Sour Grapes, 149) How would R. Joshua have his actor 
forget about the desire to save the animals and spontaneously decided to possibly slaughter one, or both, of them? 
 
519 It is unclear from the sources whether there is even an audience to the agent’s actions. 
 
520 Both PT and BT discuss these motivations in their respective treatments of the issue. See yPes. 3:3, bBeṣa 37a, 
bShab. 117b, 124a. Moreover, bShab. 124a actually compares this case of ha‘arama to another case of leniency on 
the Festival due to monetary loss, an instance which does not even require use of ha‘arama. 
 
521 The logic of worrying that one individual’s apparent “violation” of the law would have deleterious impact on the 
observance of others, is suspect. See Nahum Rakover, מבוא ,מטרה המקדשת את האמצעים, Jerusalem: Sifriyat Mishpat 
Ha-Ivri (2000), 16, who distinguishes between cases in which an institution is flexible with the law and one in which 
an individual is. It is thus possible that mareit ‘ayin is not as much about actual impact on others as it is about one’s 





human nature were such that seeing the exemption applied would not erode at one’s commitment 
to muqṣeh in general, the animals’ owner would not need ha‘arama. S/he could simply retrieve 
the animals at once, for obviously they do so only to save the animal. It is only because popular 
perception and human nature are not that way, namely because people might become lax in their 
commitment to muqṣeh, to find other reasons to override it; people might misunderstand the 
permissibility in this one case, and therefore the legal agent must hide his/her true deeds using a 
ruse. The ha‘arama is not then about circumventing the law, but about keeping leniencies 
private.522 This approach is reminiscent of the rabbinic concern for marit ‘ayin, appearance of sin 
even where there is none.523   
While this explanation bypasses accusations of deception, it has several critical 
weaknesses: a) the term marit ‘ayin (appearance) is found at least eight times524 in Tosefta and 
could easily have been mentioned here, yet it is absent from this passage; b) ha‘arama does not 
read like a marit ‘ayin case: marit ‘ayin is generally introduced in the following manner: X is 
permissible, but the rabbis forbade it due to marit ‘ayin. For example: 
  א ד:א )וינה(תוספתא יומ
יום הכפורים אסור באכילה ובשתיה ברחיצה ובסיכה בנעילת הסנדל בתשמיש המטה אפי' באנפיליא 
 של בגד קטנים מותרין בכולן ואסורין בנעילת הסנדל מפני מראית העין
On the Day of Atonement it is forbidden to eat, drink, bathe, anoint, put on 
sandal, [and] have sexual relations.  It is not permitted to put on even felt shoes. 
                                                          
522 The question of whether there is truly an implied human audience in the case of mareit ayin (as is assumed by the 
major commentators) is challenged by Rav’s dictum that, “Every situation in which the sages prohibited due to 
appearance is prohibited even in the most private room.” (bShab. 64b and 146b, bBeṣa 9a) While classical 
commentators suggest that the prohibition remains because it is still possible that a person may witness and 
misinterpret the deed nonetheless (viz. Maimonides, Laws of the Sabbath 22:20), or just to keep law uniform 
(Mishnah Berurah 301:165), there is a third possibility: for Rav, it is not about the onlooker at all but about the  
agent him or herself. S/he must keep the law in a manner which objectively is beyond scrutiny. (See Abraham Arzi, 
“Mipnei mareit ha-ayin,” Sinai 74 (1974) 161-170, for a discussion as to whether Rav’s dictum was accepted by 
medieval halakhists.) 
 
523 See mBeṣa 1:3 for the source of mareit ‘ayin as a Jewish legal concept 
 





Minors are permitted to do all of them except putting on sandals, for appearance’s 
sake. 525 
 
In this case, children may do any of the activities prohibited to adults in this passage, but they 
may not wear leather shoes because of how it looks. X is permitted, but then it is outlawed due to 
marit ‘ayin. A phrase that encapsulates the prohibitive nature of marit ayin is found in mKil. 3:5 
 All that the sages prohibited [here] is because of“ ,כל מה שאסרו חכמים לא גזרו אלא מפני מראית העין –
appearance to the eye.” Ha‘arama cases, on the other hand, are permissive: person A is 
forbidden to do X; therefore s/he should use cunning to accomplish X. In other words, ha‘arama 
offers leniency, while marit ‘ayin restricts. Moreover, in the particular case at hand, R. Joshua’s 
leniency is placed in stark contrast with R. Eliezer’s demands; c) if the term ha‘arama truly is 
about being stricter than the letter of the law (that is, in the requirement to deceive onlookers), 
then the term has two completely different definitions – the one, a technical loophole that 
achieves leniency, and the other a covering up of special legal dispensation, essentially adding 
stricture. Though it is true that legal terms may not be used completely consistently within 
rabbinic texts, the marit ‘ayin approach places the various uses of the term at odds with each 
other as completely different legal methods. A loophole specifically obviates the need for special 
dispensation, while a cover-up is contingent on such dispensation.526  In light of the 
aforementioned challenges, we turn to a second possibility to explain R. Joshua’s opinion. 
                                                          
525 It should be noted that bYoma 78b cites this last sentence as a braita without mention of marit ‘ayin. In fact, the 
sugya there begins with the suggestion of marit ‘ayin, but concludes that there simply is a ban on adults putting 
leather shoes on minors on Yom Kippur because such shoes are not necessary for the latter’s health (as opposed to 
feeding and washing minors on Yom Kippur, which are permissible because they are necessary for the children’s 
health). In other words, according to the Bavli, minors may put leather shoes on for themselves on Yom Kippur.  For 
a fuller discussion, see Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta, 808-811. Because people will think that an adult put the shoes 
on the minor on Yom Kippur, and directly giving something forbidden even to a minor is considered halakhically 
problematic. (See Rashi, bYoma 78b, s.v. אינשי עבדו ליה) 
 
526 There may yet be a point of contact between mareit ‘ayin and ha‘arama in that, in both, visibility is considered 





Intention: Organic or Constructed? 
Adam B. Seligman advanced the opposition between the “ritual self” and the “sincere 
self.” Seligman claims that ritual is “not necessarily concerned with what we term sincerity” and 
is not simply “the nonessential husk of something else that is ‘more’ real (the visible sign of an 
invisible grace, as it were).527” Rather, the performance of ritual is a world of construction in 
which one is defined by his or her outward performance. The world of ritual is by definition 
social, interactive – it is shared space.528 This is in contrast with the “sincere” model of action 
which downplays social convention and emphasizes instead “individual soul-searching.” In other 
words, the "self" need not be defined as what we moderns call the subjective self. 
The concept of ritual self is very appealing in understanding R. Joshua’s position. When 
an agent raises each animal “in order” to slaughter it and then “changes” his/her mind, the 
criterion for intention is more outward than inward;  it is not about what is in his/her heart of 
hearts but about what intention s/he actively (and perhaps externally)529 binds to the action. 
Intention is more mechanical than organic: it is about defining the action rather than defining the 
agent. This explanation of ha‘arama differs from Atlas’ position that it is accepted because, 
                                                          
these two phenomena, one in which the rabbis charge a person to go beyond the letter of the law in order to satisfy 
the external view(er), while in the other they allow a person to do something non-normative so long as the change is 
invisible?  
 
527 Adam B. Seligman, “Ritual, the Self, and Sincerity,” Social Research 76:4 (Winter 2009), 1073-1106 
 
528 As Ruth Anna Putnam puts it, “The relevance of intention to the fulfillment of religious obligations is itself part 
of a wider topic, that of the role of intention in religious ritual. Here I want to draw attention to the role of 
convention in religious ritual. Even if intention is required (at a minimum the awareness that one participates in a 
religious ritual), intention is not enough. Just as one cannot make one’s words mean what one likes, so one cannot 
turn any behavior one chooses into a religious ritual.  Religious Ritual is irreducibly social, even if it is practiced by 
oneself.” (Ruth Anna Putnam, “Must We Mean What We Do?” S’vara 2,2 (1991) 55) 
 






“one…only transgresses in thought…530”; whereas Atlas claims that intention is not present, we 
suggest that perhaps intention is present, but it a ritualized intention.  
This may be especially true regarding avoiding violation, in that, in exigent 
circumstances, even tipping one’s hat to Jewish law even by projecting the proper intention, may 
be sufficient. Moreover, from what we argued in chapter two, for ha‘arama to work, the entire 
scenario must be defined by being done for the right reasons, for the purpose of equity, of living 
up to the inner spirit of the law.  Thus, there is indeed a “correct” purpose standing behind the 
agent’s actions.  Interestingly, even these second-order volitions are not determined by the inner 
world of the agent, but by the variables of the scenario itself. 531 The rabbis are not interested in 
the individual’s subjective intentions – I love my animal and need to save it – but in objective 
situational characteristics – animals have fallen into a pit on the Festival, and that, by definition, 
creates a situation beset by pathos, whether I am rich and own thousands of animals, whether I 
care about my animals’ pain or not, or whether I am impoverished and need this animal 
specifically; ma‘aser sheni involves unnecessary financial loss, and therefore a dodge must be 
found; an animal in a pit necessarily involves potential loss or pain; a house fire by definition 
means financial forfeiture. Pathos and motivation are legally defined rather than subjectively 
defined. Thus, the scenario itself constructs equitable intentions, above and beyond which one’s 
actions indications of lifting the animal out of the pit “in order” to slaughter further outline one’s 
purpose as licit.            
                                                          
530 Samuel Atlas, “Ha‘arama Mishpatit ba-Talmud,” 2 n3.  
 
531 This is quite different than the very subjective role that Eilberg-Schwartz posits for intention in defining sin: he 
suggests that whether the actor has repudiated God's authority depends upon the actor's intention. (Eilberg-Schwartz, 
“Intention,” 57ff) Here the question of repudiation versus acceptance may be based on external factors rather than 






But perhaps there is a second layer to this perspective on ha‘arama. It is specifically R. 
Joshua who suggests this ha‘arama, a tanna who generally asserts that one’s purpose in acting is 
a defining feature of sin; without it, one is exempt from punishment. 532  Recently, Ishay Rosen-
Tzvi has argued that rabbinic notions of the “self” as reflected in Mishnah are more performative 
than one might expect: “Rabbinic ‘thoughts’ are subject to the laws of the external world; they 
are concerned with prohibitions and commandments, not with truth statements… intentions… 
[do] not only fashion subjects but create external reality.533” Thus, all intention, not all that 
which is countenanced in cases of ha‘arama is not truly about subjectivity, reflecting the 
exclusive “I” of each individual person. Rosen-Tzvi observes that kavvanah is consistently 
defined in reference to external activity, such as the recitation of the shema, or the blowing of the 
shofar. Likewise, the categories of mahshava and raṣon in the realm of purity law indicate that 
the chief function of intention is to qualify and to define outward action. Contrasting his view of 
the rabbinic self with those of Mira Balberg534 and Joshua Levinson,535 he concludes that the 
rabbis did not conceive of the “self” as the subjective, self-reflective being that the Graeco-
Roman world (based on Stoic thought) did,536 but instead conceived of the self as the external 
world internalized, always within the context of outward action:  
The inner world does indeed rise in the Mishnah, but it is markedly different from 
the Platonic-Stoic one. This is not an ‘inner person’ or ‘real self,’ a soul or a logos 
                                                          
532 See supra n491. See also YD Gilat כוונה ומעשה במשנת תנאים, Bar Ilan Annual 4-5 (1967). 
 
533 Ishay Rosen-Tzvi, “Realism and Nominalism in the Mishnah,” Halakha and Reality Conference, NYU (Fall 
2012) 
 
534 Recomposed Corporealities: Purity, Body and Self in the Mishnah, Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, 
2011 
 
535 Levinson, “From Narrative Practise…” 
 
536 Lawrence Rosen argues that even the Greeks did not quite have that sense of the individual self: Lawrence 





that stands in contrast to ‘external’ parts of ‘me’ such as body or appetites, as in 
Plato or Paul. This is also not a self that thinks itself into being, as in the Stoic 
asceticism studies by Pierre Hadot, or a confessional Christian self, celebrated by 
Foucault and Peter Brown as the birth of the subject. The Mishnaic truth cannot 
be found by looking inwards – as in Augustine – and there is no hidden ‘inner 
truth,’ known only to ‘me,’ of the type which created the modern radical 
dichotomy between inside and out…The inner world in the Mishnah…is a far cry 
from all these exotic inner realms. It is a ‘primitive’ world that merely replicates 
the outer world and is subject to its rules.537  
 
Rosen-Tzvi’s point about rabbinic views of intention parallels what Sacha Stern538 has 
posited about rabbinic views of time. Rather than viewing time as “a reified abstraction” or “an 
entity that flows on its own, independently from the rest of reality” as the Greeks did, the rabbis 
(following most ancient Near Eastern cultures) viewed time as “concrete, embedded, and 
process-linked.”539 Hence, early rabbinic references to time in terms of human activity or natural 
phenomena such as when the sun sets, or when the priests eat their terumah.540 Stern and Rosen-
Tzvi picture the rabbis as very concrete thinkers and are wary of using modern concepts to 
understand ancient perspectives, even when such concepts may themselves be rooted in thinking 
that was contemporaneous with the rabbis.541  
                                                          
537 Ishay Rosen-Tzvi, ibid. 
 
538 I thank Professor Elisheva Carlebach for bringing Stern’s work on time to my attention. 
 
539 Sacha Stern, Time and Process in Ancient Judaism. Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2003, 
16-18. 
 
540 mBer. 1:1 
 
541 There are certain factors which support Rosen-Tzvi’s thesis with regards specifically to intention to fulfill 
commandments. For example, the intention that is discussed in the Mishnah: is it intention of a personal, intimate 
variety? Some would argue not. In the case of the shema for example, Jacob Bazak points out that there is clearly a 
requirement (mBer.) to read with intention of fulfilling the commandment of reciting the shema, but perhaps there is 
no requirement to intend to understand or to identify oneself with the content of what s/he is reading. Jacob Bazak, 
“The element of intention in the performance of ‘mitsvot’ compared to the element of intention in current criminal 
law,” the Jewish Law Association Studies 14: The Jerusalem 2002 Conference Volume, ed. H. Gamoran, 
Binghamton: Global Academic Publishing, 10-11; See also Shalom Albeck  האם קיים המושג "כוונה" במשפט הפלילי





This is very different from the picture that Howard Eilberg-Schwartz paints of intention, 
namely that it is indeed subjective, and that action is merely evidence thereof: 
…the Mishnah always takes account of an agent’s purpose; but sometimes it 
appeals to the purpose the agent actually had in mind, whereas at other times it 
examines the nature of the action and imputes a purpose to the agent…therefore, 
we must distinguish between two types of purposes. First, we can speak about an 
actor’s subjective intention, that is, how would he or she answer the question, 
“Why did you do that?” Second, we can speak about the purpose an observer 
would ascribe to an actor on the basis of observed behavior. That is, if a bystander 
were to observe the act in question, what would he or she think the actor was 
trying to accomplish? ... It turns out that all the cases in which the Mishnah takes 
account of an actor’s subjective purpose have one thing in common: they involve 
situations in which the person’s action supports alternative interpretations. For 
example, suppose a person were to break a bottle. From the action alone we 
would not know whether the individual intends to produce a weapon or merely to 
remove something stuck inside the bottle. In cases such as this, the Mishnah takes 
into account the purpose the actor actually had in mind.542  
 
Only when an action cannot indicate one’s intentions it is important to uncover an agent’s 
subjective intentions. Rosen-Tzvi’s theory of intention differs markedly. For him, the action and 
intention do not exist in two different realms: they are both in the realm of the performative.  
While we disagree with the “hard” version of Rosen-Tzvi’s thesis that the rabbis did not 
conceive of a reflective self, a “soft” version dealing specifically with purposive action is helpful 
in explaining the ha‘arama that R. Joshua advocates.  Action and intention are on a continuum: 
they are not completely dualistic, not completely disparate. Just as actions are constructed by the 
agent, so intentions may be constructed by the agent. When confronted with a difficult situation, 
such as potential loss of one’s livestock, R. Joshua is willing to slide to the more objective side 
of the continuum to permit a more superficially constructed intention. 
 
                                                          






Ha‘arama: Unity in Superficiality 
 There is an important advantage to this reading of R. Joshua’s opinion.  If ha‘arama truly 
does rely upon a more fabricated (as opposed to natural and subjective) understanding of 
intention, then it is quite similar to the original type of ha‘arama described in the previous 
chapters – one which requires concrete empirical change for the purpose of legal circumvention 
– e.g., the inclusion of a third party, release or acquisition of property, etc. Ha‘arama of intention 
likewise relies on outer change – a change in one’s external, ritualized intentions. If an action is 
only legal if the agent had X intention, then the agent must legally fulfill the requirement of 
having X intention for the action.  It does not seem that legally having a certain intention 
necessarily is equivalent to subjectively having those intentions.  Thus, having intention X in a 
superficial way is a loophole as well. After all, legally speaking, the agent has intention X. 
Indeed there is a deep connection between these two versions of ha‘arama: both rely on 
accepting a surface view of reality. When the father hands his adult son money to redeem his 
produce, does it matter that his first order desires amount basically to ulterior motives? Whether 
the rabbis’ ideal transaction would involve a full heart or not is unclear, but there is clearly room, 
at least in cases of need, to rely upon outward projection. Likewise with ha‘arama regarding 
intention – it is the motions themselves rather than underlying feelings that determine the 
classification of the agent’s activity.  At their core, both subsets of ha‘arama rely upon a 
projection of the agent’s performance rather than his or her inward feelings. It is for this reason 
that neither Tosefta nor PT make any explicit distinctions between the two versions of ha‘arama. 
They are indeed of one type. And both are supported by the overriding second order desire for 





for this reason only, is the complete appearance version of an action or purpose considered 
acceptable. 
Other Examples  
 Several other ha‘aramot should be read in light of this paradigm: 
Tosefta: Coarse Bread 
 תוספתא שבת יד:ו )וינה(
משבת ליום טוב ולא משבת ליום מיום טוב לשבת אבל לא משבת זו לשבת אחרת ולא 543מצילין
 546כך יזמין ואין צורך לומ' מיום טוב לחול ולא יציל ואחר 545ולא מיום הכפורים לשבת 544הכפורים
להציל  548להציל פת הדראה פת הדראה רשאי 547אלא יזמין ואחר כך יציל הציל פת נקייה אין רשאי
 מערימין בכך ר' יוסה בי ר' יהודה אומ' 549פת נקייה ואין )מערבין( מערימין בכך
One should not save [food from a fire on the Sabbath] and afterward call [guests 
to join in], but he should first call [guests to join in] and afterward should save 
[the food]. [cf. M. Shab. 16:3D] [If] one has saved a loaf of bread of fine flour, he 
                                                          
543 According to yShab. 16:3, 18d, the potential problem is saving food for a weekday on the Sabbath or holiday, in 
other words, preparation for post-Sabbath or post-holiday. According to bShab. 117b, the concern is becoming so 
swept up in saving one’s food that one ultimately extinguishes the fire on the Sabbath or the Festival. 
 
544 For a discussion about whether this refers to food for minors on Yom Kippur or breakfast for adults after the Yom 
Kippur ends, see Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta Vol. 3, 210. 
 
545 bShab. 117b: ומצילין מיום הכפורים לשבת. This may be related to a debate between R. Aqiva and R. Ishmael in 
mShab. 15:3 about other preparation on Yom Kippur for the Sabbath. 
 
546 The parallel mShab. 16:2 does not mention inviting guests, but does mention asking others to take food for 
themselves (16:3).  It is unclear whether this means that the mishnah is opposed to inviting guests in order to save 
more food, or if one is calling others to save food only in a situation in which s/he cannot save all of the food 
her/himself due to the rapidly spreading fire.  YShab. 16:3, 18d, cites two opposing baraitot about inviting guests 
before saving the food and relates this question too to the argument between tanna qama and R. Jose b. Judah 
regarding the permissibility of ha‘arama. And lastly, BShab. 117b, cites the argument in the context of saving liquid 
spilling from a broken barrel on the Sabbath as opposed to this case (and the case in the relevant mishnah in BT) 
about a fire. 
 
547 MS Erfurt אין צריך – Lieberman suggests that the term צריך can mean רשאי, and does mean so here. (See 
Lieberman PT Ki-fshuto 252, Tosefet Rishonim Vol. 1, 155, and Tosefta Ki-fshuta, Shabbat, 210.) 
 
548 MS Erfurt ואינו צריך לומר – probably a mistake. 
 
549 MS Erfurt בהן – This change probably reflects BT’s reading of the braita, in which אין מערימין refers to the section 
about inviting guests. By changing אין מערימין בכך to אין מערימין בהן, MS Erfurt suggests that the אין מערימין debate is 
about both inviting guests and saving coarse bread. bMQ 12b, however, cites only the end of this tosefta, using  אין
 and does not discuss which part of the tosefta this clause refers to. The comparison this clause is used for מערימין בכך






is not permitted to save a loaf of bread of coarse550 flour. If he saved a loaf of 
bread of coarse flour, he is permitted to save a loaf of bread of fine flour. And one 
should not practice cunning in this matter. R. Jose b. R. Judah says, “One may 
practice cunning in this matter [by taking the loaf of coarse flour first and then 
going back for the one of fine flour].” 
 
If a house catches fire on the Sabbath, the homeowner may not save more bread than is 
needed for the day. However, if the homeowner happens to retrieve coarse bread first, s/he may 
go back for fresh bread, though this means saving extra food.  While not specifying exactly how, 
R. Jose b. Judah allows the homeowner to act shrewdly to save extra bread. Presumably, s/he 
should “happen to retrieve coarse bread first” purposely in order to go in for more bread without 
making his/her true plans known.  As in the immersion case presented above, it is possible that 
simply retrieving the coarse bread first without saying anything projects the proper intentions.  
As an aside, R. Jose b.R. Judah descended from a family line that did not shy away from 
discussions about ha‘arama in general. For instance, his father, R. Judah b. 'Ilai, is mentioned in 
a baraita in BT as advocating ha‘arama: During the intermediate days of Festivals, a limitation 
is placed on the production of ritual objects such as tefillin, mezuzah or ṣiṣit for business 
purposes – that is, to sell them. R. Judah b. Ilai therefore suggests that one sell his own 
phylacteries, thus not producing the phylacteries for profit on ḥol ha-moed; he then is allowed to 
write new phylacteries for himself, even during ḥol ha-moed.551  On the other hand, R. Judah bar 
Ilai also bemoans his son’s use of ha‘arama – taking food in via the rooftop rather than the door 
in order to exempt the food from the tithing requirement.552 As R. Jose’s grandfather, R. Ilai, was 
                                                          
550 Based on Lieberman (ibid.) - פת חזרא( מורסן)  
 
551 bMQ 19a 
 
552 yMa‘aserot 3:1, 50c; This story, ostensibly about R. Judah bar Ilai’s own family is changed in BT (Gittin 81a) to 
the general statement about how wonderful the earlier generations were in terms of their commitment to tithing, as 





a student of both R. Eliezer and R. Joshua,553 perhaps discussions about ha‘arama were part of 
their family’s intellectual heritage.  
PT554: Salting Food 
 ביצה א:ה, דף ס' עמוד ג' )ליידן(
ב"ש אומרים אין נוטלין את העלי לקצב עליו בשר ובית הלל מתירין ב"ש אומרים אין נותנין   משנה
בשר וב"ה מתירין ב"ש אומר אין מסלקין את את העור לפני הדריסה ולא יגביהנו אלא א"כ יש עליו 
 התריסין בי"ט ובית הלל מתירין אף להחזיר:
...שוין שלא ימלחנו תני אבל הוא מולח עליו בשר לצלי חברייא בשם רב מולח הוא אדם דבר גמרא
מרובה א'ע'פ' שאינו יכול לוכל ממנו אלא דבר ממועט ר' אחא בשם רב מולח ומערים מולח ומערים 
 א ומלח הכא עד דו מלח כוליהמלח הכ
Mishnah: The House of Shammai says, “They do not take up a pestle to hack 
meat on it.555” And the House of Hillel permits [doing so]. The House of 
Shammai says, “They do not place a hide556 before the tread,557 not may one lift it 
up, unless there is an olive’s bulk of meat on it.” And the House of Hillel permits. 
The House of Shammai says, “They do not remove shutters on the Festival.” And 
the House of Hillel permits – even putting them back 
 
Gemara: And they concur that they do not salt hides on the Festival day. But on 
it one puts salt on meat which is for roasting. Associates in the name of Rab: “A 
man may salt a sizable piece [of meat], even though he can eat only a small part 
of it.” R. Aḥa in the name of Rab: “One may put on a little salt and practice 
cunning by [indicating that he wishes to eat only this spot, and then he may 
change his mind] and again put on salt and practice cunning until he salts the 
entire piece of meat.”558 
                                                          
553 m‘Eruvin 2:6; tPe'ah 3:1; tḤallah 1:6; tSukkah 2:1 
 
554 The case of R. Aḥa is found in BT as well. 
 
555 As during the week, it is used to crush non-Festival items, thus rendering it muqṣeh. (Albeck, Shisha Sidrei 
Mishnah, 288) 
 
556 Of an animal that was slaughtered and flayed for food on the Festival. (Albeck, ibid.) 
 
557 In order to keep it from getting ruined before one is able to properly treat it after the Festival. (Albeck, ibid.) 
 
558 A short sugya earlier in yBeṣa 1:5 regarding the final debate in the mishnah sheds light on the position of R. Aḥa 
in the aforementioned passage: 
 ביצה א:ה,  דף ס עמוד ג' )ליידן(
שמואל אמ' המלחם את התריסין ביום טוב חייב משום בונה וקשיא דבר שאילו עשאו בשבת חייב חטאת בית הלל )אומ'( מתירין אף להחזיר? 
משם( ]מפני[ תחילתו שאם אומ' את לו שלא יחזיר אף הוא אינו פותח. ולא יפתח? אף הוא ממעט בשמחת ר' חנניה בשם ר' יוחנן התירו סופו )
 יום טוב אמ' ר' אחא מחזיר ובלבד שלא יחזיר כל צורכו
Samuel said, “He who inserts the shutters on a Festival day is liable on the count of building.” Now this poses a 
problem. In regard to doing something which, if one did it on the Sabbath, one would be liable for a sin offering, 
does the House of Hillel permit – even to put them back? R. Ḥananiah in the name of R. Yoḥanan: “They permitted 
the matter at the end because of the considerations at the outset. For if you tell someone that he may not put them 






R. Aḥa’s ha‘arama is quite like R. Joshua’s ha‘arama: preparing something for 
consumption and then deciding not to eat it; the purpose here is to preserve the extra meat on the 
Festival.  Surely, the meat of an entire animal will not be eaten in one or two days.  Here, as in 
the case of the house fire, there is no specification of “על מנת,” salting each piece in order to eat it 
and then changing one’s mind and deciding not to do so. Instead, one’s salting of each piece and 
then putting it aside projects certain intentions which are deemed sufficient for evading 
transgression. 
PT: Ḥallah on Passover? 
 
 ביצה ג:ה, סב.  ירושלמי פסחים ג:ג , ל./ 
כיצד מפרישין חלת טומאה ביום טוב רבי אליעזר או' אל תקרא לה שם עד  )כ"י קאפמן( משנה 
בן בתירה או' תטיל לצונים אמר יהושע לא זה הוא חמץ שמוזהרים עליו בל  יראה ובל   559שתיאפה
 ימצא אלא מפרשתה ומנחתה עד הערב ואם החמיצה החמיצה
 
...כיצד יעשה? על דר' אליעזר מערים ואו' )וזו אני רוצה לוכל וזו אני רוצה לאכול( גמרא )ליידן(
רוצה ליישן ומשייר אחת.  560ואופה את כולה וכשהוא רודה מערים ואו' זו אני רוצה ליישן זו א}י{ני
                                                          
[If you maintain that view,] you diminish the pleasure of the Festival day. Said R. Aḥa, “One may return them, on 
condition that he not put them back firmly… 
R. Ḥananiah in the name of R. Yoḥanan offers, “They permitted the matter at the end because of the considerations 
at the outset” as a framing concept for leniency regarding the laws of the holidays. In particular, the situation cited 
herein is one in which a person will refrain from removing the shutters from a shop or a storage facility where food 
for the Festival is being stored (See Albeck, Shishah Sidrei Mishnah, Vol. 2, 288( for fear of not being able to 
replace the shutters on the Festival. (After all, the food would spoil or simply be unguarded.) This is not unlike the 
salting issue raised in the sugya above. In order to eat any amount of meat, one must slaughter an entire animal, and 
if one may not preserve the extra meat by salting it, why would s/he even slaughter an animal for the Festival to 
begin with? 
R. Aḥa appears consistent in his application of the rulings of the House of Hillel in both the meat case and the door 
case. Whether R. Aḥa would have used R. Ḥanania’s phrasing, he clearly values the significance of simḥat yom tov, 
though he seems more conservative about how to accomplish that goal.  In the case of replacing doors, one will 
diminish enjoyment on the Festival by not opening the shutters in the first place if one may not replace them; 
likewise, we may presume that one would be reticent to prepare any meat on the Festival if all of the extra meat may 
not be salted but must be discarded. However, unlike the opposing opinions throughout the sugya, R. Aḥa is 
unprepared to give carte blanche permission either to replace the doors or to salt a bigger piece of meat than is 
necessary for the holiday simply because the ends are noble. Instead, he mandates that one not replace the doors too 
firmly and that one salt the meat, not outright, but via ha‘arama. (It is interesting to note that ha‘arama appears here 
as the stricter approach, rather than the more lenient approach.) 
 
559 MS Parma: תאפה 
 





קדשים ביום טוב?! אמ' לו ר' אליעזר מאיליהן הן נשרפין!  561אמר לו רבי יושוע לא נמצאת כשורף
יושוע לא נמצאת עובר על בל יראה ובל ימצא. אמ' לו מוטב לעבור מצוה בלא תעשה  562אמ' לו ר'
...אותו ואת בנו שנפלו לבור ר' אליעזר או' יעלה 563שלא באת לפניו ממצוה בלא תעשה שבאת לפניו
שיני עושין לו פרנסה  שלא ימות. ר' יושוע או' יעלה את את הראשון על מנת לשחוט וישחוט וה
 564הראשון על מנת לשחוט ולא ישחוט ויערים ויעלה את השיני א'ע'פ' שחישב שלא לשחוט אחד מהן
בעי מחלפה שיטתיה דר' אליעזר תמן הוא אמ' אסור להערים והכא הוא אמ'  565מותר. ר' בון בר חייה
ל ימצא תמן מה אית לך? מחלפה שיטתיה דר' יהושע תמן מותר להערים? הכא משום בל ייראה וב
חטאת.  566הוא אמר מותר להערים והכא הוא אמר אסור להערים? אמ' ר' אידי כאן שבות וכאן חיוב
 א"ר יוסה ביר' בון תמן כדי לחוס על ניכסיהן שליש' הכא מה אית לך?! 
Mishnah: How [on the Festival567] do they set apart the dough-offering [if the 
dough is in a state of] uncleanness? R. Eliezer says, "She should not designate 
[the dough=offering] before it is baked.” R. Judah b. Betera says, "She should put 
it into cold water." Said R. Joshua, "This is not the sort of leaven concerning 
which people are warned under the prohibitions, 'Let it not be seen' (Ex. 13:7), 
and 'Let it not be found' (Ex. 12:19). But she separates it and leaves it until 
evening, and if it ferments, it ferments. 
 
Gemara: How should [a person] act according to R. Eliezer [who says one can 
handle the dough until it is baked, when it is designated and then properly left till 
the evening for burning]?  
 
[A person] acts with shrewdness and says: “This [portion] I want to eat and this 
[portion] I want to eat];” and one bakes all of it, and when he removes it [from the 
oven, one] acts with shrewdness and says: “This [portion] I want to store away 
and this [portion]” and leaves one [the last one which is then designated as 
ḥallah]. 
 
                                                          
561 Or Zarua: שורף without כ 
 
562 Lieberman, Yerushalmi ki-fshuta, 366: לר' יושוע 
 
563 MS Leiden and Venice Ed., yEruvin 10:13: מוטב לעבור על מצות לא תעשה שלא באת לידך ממצות לא תעשה שבאת לפניך 
 
564 MS Leiden and Venice Ed., yEruvin 10:13: א'ע'פ' שלא חישב לשחוט אחד מהן . Both Ahavath Sion ve-Yerushalayim 
and Lieberman (Tosefta Ki-fshuta Beṣa 3:4) consider the 'Eruvin version errant. 
 
565 R Avun bar Ḥiyya was in the time of R. Yoḥanan- see Albeck, Mavo le-Talmudim, 218-20 
 
566 MS Leiden and Venice Ed. yBeṣa 3:4: חייב. Certainly the yPes. version of חיוב חטאת, at any rate, is more accurate 
than the yBeṣa version of חייב חטאת, as a person incurs lashes for infractions on the Festival (yBeṣa 1:3) and must 
offer a hatat only for infractions on the Sabbath. But ḥiyuv ḥatat may simply refer to the status of the transgression – 
it has the status of a ḥiyuv ḥatat because if one did such on a Sabbath, one would bring a qorban hatat.  (Pnei Moshe 
s.v. אמר ר' אידי simply states that the language is imprecise, and Qorban Ha’edah s.v.וכאן חיוב חטאת offers a different 
explanation all together as a result of this difficulty.)  
 





Said R. Joshua to him [R. Eliezer], "Do you not end up like one who burns holy 
things on the holiday [in leaving the dough offering to burn in the over after 
baking the dough, which is a distinct violation]?” R. Eliezer said to him, "They 
burn on their own accord [without a separate act of burning, for the dough-
offering merely remains in the oven after it and the rest of the dough are baked]." 
Said him to R. Joshua, "Do you not end up violating the ban on seeing and finding 
leaven [on one's premises by allowing it to rise]?" [R. Joshua] said to him, "It is 
preferable to violate a negative commandment passively [leaving dough which 
eventually will become leaven on its own] than actively [letting the dough 
offering forthwith burn on the Festival through one's action, be it indirect]." (T 
3:7) 
... 
It [an animal] and its young that fell into a pit [on a Festival] - R. Eliezer says, 
"[One] should raise up the first with the plan to slaughter it, and the second; they 
feed it so that it not die." R. Joshua says, "[They] should raise up the first one with 
the plan to slaughter [it] but [need] not slaughter [it] and practicing ha‘arama, 
should raise up the second. Even though [one] intends/decided not to slaughter 
either one of them - it is permitted.  
R. Bun bar Hiyya asked: "Is not R. Eliezer's logic reversed? There he says it is 
forbidden to act with ha‘arama   and here he says it is permitted to act with 
ha‘arama.”[The different positions do not make up a contradiction:] Here [he so 
rules] because of the band on seeing and finding leaven [which justifies any 
necessary means to remove the leaven]. There, what can you say [is there any 
comparable justification]?  
 
“R. Joshua’s logic is reversed. There [T. Beṣa] he says it is permitted to act with 
ha‘arama, and here [M. Pes.] he says it is forbidden to act with ha‘arama.” Said. 
R. Idi, “Here [T. Beṣa,  where the individual moves the animal] it is a matter of a 
shevut [an added prohibition on not doing certain activities on the Sabbath which, 
though not technically constituting prohibited labors, are a violation of the ‘rest’ 
appropriate for the Day of Rest] and here [M. Pes., where the individual bakes the 
unclean dough which is not for human consumption, if it were the Sabbath, it 
would be a violation entailing] a liability for a sin-offering.” Said. R. Jose b. R. 
Bun, “There [in the case of the animal caught in the pit, one can employ an 
artifice] so as to have compassion on the property of Israel; here [regarding the 
unclean Dough-offering which is to be burned and which benefits neither an 
Israelite nor a priest], what can you say [is there any such loss justifying the use 
of an artifice]? 
 
We mentioned this case in the previous chapter, only to point out the developing parameters for 





Ḥallah, a portion of dough set aside for priests, must be taken from both pure and impure 
dough,568 but only ritually pure ḥallah may actually be eaten by the priest. Impure dough, 
however, is burned in order to keep anyone from eating it or making use of it. The mishnah here 
addresses taking ḥallah from impure dough on a Festival day569 of Passover. The unstated 
assumption is that separating pure dough would pose no problem on the Festival,570 as baking it 
is part of food preparation for the day.571  Impure ḥallah which will not be eaten, however, may 
not be baked or burned on a Festival day.572 On Passover, the complication arises that leaving 
dough aside, allowing it to rise, will result in the agent owning ḥameṣ, a distinct prohibition on 
Passover. 
While R. Joshua is unconcerned about this dough rising, and Ben Beterah solves the 
problem by throwing the dough into cold water (so that the dough will not rise), R. Eliezer 
chooses ha‘arama. In order to separate ritually impure ḥallah from the rest of the dough on 
Passover, R. Eliezer suggests holding off one’s labeling of the ḥallah portion until the entire 
dough has been baked. While in past examples, ha‘arama has been presented as the bolder 
halakhic position, here it is conservative relative573 to R. Joshua’s position. This is consonant 
                                                          
568 mḤallah 2:3, tḤallah 1:8. Shamma Friedman points out that R. Aqiva is the one who requires separation of 
ḥallah from impure dough, while the earlier law was to obviate the requirement for ḥallah from impure dough by 
preparing it in smaller quantities that those that would require ḥallah to be separated. As such, R. Eliezer, Ben 
Betera, and R. Joshua, all of whom predated R. Aqiva must be discussing a case in which the dough only became 
impure once it had already been kneaded; for if not, they would have simply suggested that one prepare the dough in 
smaller baskets in order to exempt it from the separation of ḥallah altogether. And, in fact, this PT sugya does say 
 Shamma Friedman, Tosefta ᾿Attiqta: Masekhet) .מתניתא בשניטמאת לאחר גילגולה, אבל אם ניטמאת קודם לגילגולה יעשנה קבין
Pesaḥ Rishon – Maqbilot Ha-Mishnah We-Ha-Tosefta Perush U-Mevo Kelali, Bar Ilan (2003), 278. 
 
569 As opposed to ḥol ha-moed, when one may directly burn it. 
 
570 See mBeṣa 1:6  
 
571 tBeṣa 1:14; It is unclear whether Mishnah permits separation of impure ḥallah on a Festival, though Tosefta does 
 






with the picture we presented earlier in the chapter of R. Eliezer and R. Joshua’s relative 
halakhic stances. While R. Joshua confidently asserts that there is no problem of ḥameṣ all 
together, presumably because the ḥameṣ belongs to the priest or to God574 rather than to the 
agent in question,575 R. Eliezer reflects the stricter and more ancient view of halakha that having 
even someone else’s leaven in one’s possession on Passover is a violation of bal yera’eh and bal 
yimaṣe.576 
                                                          
573 True, it is more liberal compared to B. Beterah, but the switch between R. Eliezer and R. Joshua is noticeable and 
significant. 
 
574 Mekhilta d’R. Shimon b. Yoḥai 13:7/Sifri Devarim 131 –  ולא יראה לך חמץ רואה אתה לאחרים ולא יראה לך חמץ רואה אתה
אה לך מחץ רואה אתה לפלטירלגבוה ולא יר  (Sifri version uses the word שאר instead of חמץ.) 
 
575 See bPes. 46b, Rashi s.v. לא זהו. David Weiss Halivni observes that it is problematic to suggest that R. Joshua 
rejects any prohibition of bal yera’eh  and bal yimaṣe in the mishnah, and yet both PT and Tosefta cite him as 
suggesting that there is a problem of bal yera’eh  and bal yimaṣe, but at least the agent comes upon it passively.  
Ultimately, Halivni suggests that R. Joshua indeed offered both of these reasons as possible ways around the 
problem of bal yera’eh  and bal yimaṣe. However, Mishnah cites one, and Tosefta cites the other. (One finds a 
similar phenomenon of R. Joshua offering two opinions (even contradictory opinions!) in mZev. 8:10). Halivni 
concludes that: ן שצריכים להיות זהירים כשיש סתירה בתשובה בין המשנה והתוספתא )או בין מקורות אחרים( שלא להסיק מיד מכא
 שע"כ רק אחת היא מקורית. יתכן שכולן הן מקוריות אלא שכל מקור ומקור מסר רק תשובה אחת )עיין תוס' שבת יד. סוף דבור המתחיל תנא(
“From here [we learn] that we must be careful when there is a contradiction in the answers between Mishnah and 
Tosefta (or between other sources) not to immediately assume that only one must be original [and the other copied 
from a different context]. Rather, it is possible that they are all original, but each source passed down only one 
answer. (See Tos. bShab. 14a s.v., Tanna, end)” (Meqorot u-Mesorot, Pes. 413) Shamma Friedman explains R. 
Joshua’s position differently, asserting that it is only the stam in BT (see chapter 4) that discusses the issue of who 
owns the ḥameṣ, whereas the amoraic parts of the sugya do not discuss this at all.  He asserts that R. Joshua actually 
does see the problem of bal yera’eh and bal yimaṣe here, but it is the better of the two options (the other option 
being to bake the impure ḥallah. He bases his argument on similar wording in mTerumot 8:11:  אמר ר' יהושע לא זו היא
 In that context, R. Joshua argues for the permissibility of actively .תרומה שאני מוזהר עליה מלטמאה אלא מלאכלה ובל תטמאה
making terumah impure if non-interference will cause great financial loss. He does not claim that there is no 
prohibition to do so, only that one is considered forced rather than willing to transgress: it is the lesser of two evils. 
Likewise, in our context: מץ שמוזהרים עליולא זה הוא ח  does not mean that there is no prohibition of owning this ḥameṣ. 
It is simply the lesser of two evils to passively allow the dough to rise rather than actively placing it into the oven to 
cook/burn it. This reading is consistent with Friedman’s general argument that Tosefta, which here (tPes. 3:7) 
assumes that R. Joshua does indeed apply bal yera’eh and bal yimaṣe here and simply sees passive/unwilling 
transgression as preferable to active transgression, represents the earlier sources, while Mishnah represents a later, 
more redacted version (Friedman, Tosefta ᾿Attiqta, 279-280, 288).  Professor Lieberman, offers yet a third reading of 
R. Joshua, on the basis of PT: R. Joshua holds that one is not commanded to burn bread that leavens on the Festival 
itself, as it is forbidden to do so  Therefore, the notion of bal yera’eh  and bal yimaṣe simply does not apply to bread 
that has risen on the Festival. (Tosefta Ki-fshuta, Beṣa, 502) 
 
576 See YD Gilat, “Leaven Belonging to Gentiles or to the Sanctuary” (Heb.), Tarbiṣ 33 (1963) 20-27. This argument 
is problematic for two reasons: a) mPes. 2:2 records anonymously/unanimously that one may eat ḥameṣ that 
belonged to a Gentile over Passover after the holiday because of לא יראה לך חמץ, and b) excluding the leaven of a 





As the PT pericope progresses, it focuses on the exact workings of R. Eliezer’s position. 
In the excerpt cited above, R. Joshua and R. Eliezer engage in an argument imported from 
tPesaḥim 7:3 about the relative weight of a) prohibition of owning ḥameṣ and b) the prohibition 
of burning qodashim on the Festival. Though the plain reading of R. Joshua in the mishnah is 
that bal yera’eh/yimaṣe simply does not apply,577 R. Joshua is presented as preferring passive 
transgression by allowing the dough to rise over the active transgression of placing inedible 
qodashim into the oven.578 R. Eliezer, on the other hand, allows one to place the food in the oven 
without violating anything: like the salting case above, or the parent-child animal case, simply 
claim to want each and every piece of dough and place it in the oven for baking; once the dough 
is fully baked, scrape off each piece of dough from the oven, again claiming to want it. At the 
very end, leave one piece as ḥallah in the oven. That final piece will be burned, but not due to 
any active transgression!579 In this case, as in the aforementioned, the method is an 
externalization of intention. 
Hybrid Case 
 Also, apropos of the connection between intention and action, and the singularity of the 
two “types” of ha‘arama, PT contains an example that is truly a combination of the two: 
 ירושלמי תרומות ב:ג, דף מא עמוד ג' )שבת ב:ז, ביצה ב:ב(  )כ"י ליידן(
המעשר והמבשל  בשוגג ישתמש בהן ומזיד לא ישתמש בהן  580:...המטביל כלים בשבתמשנה ב:א
מזיד לא יאכל הנוטע בשבת שוגג יקיים מזיד יעקור ובשביעית בין שוגג בין מזיד  בשבת בשוגג יאכל
 יעקור
                                                          
577 This is actually the way BT reads this mishnah, in contrast to PT. 
 
578 While this may soften R. Joshua’s stance and make him seem less audacious, in the context of tPes. 7:3 he is still 
the more courageous one. There, R. Eliezer does not have the confidence of waiting to name the ḥallah until after 
the dough has been baked. Rather, R. Eliezer is seen asking, “Who can decide between the two prohibitions – 
owning ḥameṣ and not cooking non-Festival food on the Festival day?” R. Joshua confidently responds: אני אכריע, I 
will decide – and follows up with his distinction between passive and active transgressions. 
 







  581׳...מתנית' בכלים גדולים אבל בכלים קטנים מערים עליהן ומטבילן. ותני ר' הושעיאהלכה ג
נפל דלייו בתוך הבור נפל כלייו  582ממלא הוא אדם כלי טמא מן הבור ומערים עליו ומטבילו ותני
לתוך הבור מערים עליהן ומטבילן . תרין אמוראין חד אמ' בכלים שניטמאו באב הטומאה וחרינה אמ' 
מתיב מאן דאמ' בוולד הטומאה למאן דאמ' באב הטומאה ואפילו  583בכלים שניטמאו בולד הטומאה
ר' זעירא בשם   584ר ירמיה  ה. בחול טעון הערב שמש? אמ' ליה ברוצה להשתמש בהן חולין בטהר
קערה כן תמחוי כן נמצאת מרבצת ביתה   586ס כן585[²ר' חייה בר אשי אשה פיקחת מדיחה ) (]כו
  בשבת
One who immerses vessels on the Sabbath out of ignorance may use them, but 
knowingly, one may not. One who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath out of ignorance 
may eat the food, but knowingly, one may not. One who plants on the Sabbath out 
of ignorance may retain the plant, but knowingly one must uproot it, and in the 
Sabbatical year, one must uproot it whether it was planted out of ignorance or 
knowingly. 
 
…Our Mishnah refers to large vessels, but one may employ cunning for smaller 
vessels to immerse them. And R. Hoshaya taught: One may fill an unclean vessel 
from the pit and use cunning to [thus] immerse it,587 and it was taught: If one’s 
[unclean] pail fell into the pit [on Sabbath] one may employ cunning and [thus] 
immerse them. Two amoraic sages: one says this refers to vessels that were 
contaminated to a primary degree, while the other said this was about vessels that 
                                                          
580 Though one may not immerse vessels on the Sabbath to remove impurity, one may immerse oneself, as people 
immerse for more than just ritual purification; they immerse for pleasure too. (See Albeck, Shisha Sidrei Mishnah, 
mShab. ad loc., 291; this accords with Rava’s opinion in bBeṣa 18b, which outlaws immersion of vessels because it 
looks like a repair on the Sabbath or Festival.)  According to yBeṣa 2:2, the reason is somewhat different: because a 
man may immerse for a seminal emission that occurred on the Sabbath, one may do the same for impurities that 
impacted him or her before the Sabbath. 
 
581 MSS Moscow, London: אושעיא 
 
582 MS London: ותני כן 
 
583 MS Vatican reverses the order of אב and ולד and likewise reverse the order of the two tannaitic statements 
 
584 MS Vatican: בעא ר' ירמיה 
 
585 [²] refers to letter(s)/word(s) added by a second scribe.  
 
586 MSS Moscow, London substitute כן with כאן, meaning in various locations 
 
587 It should be noted that the practice of finding evasions for this problem continued into the Middle Ages and 
beyond, not for impure vessels, but for new vessels which could not halakhically be used for food without being 
immersed, as per bAZ 75b, and could not be immersed on the Sabbath or the Festival just as a ritually impure vessel 
could not, by law, be immersed on those days. The evasion method suggested was to give the vessel as a gift to a 
Gentile, who need not immerse his/her vessels, and to borrow them for use on the Sabbath or Festivals. As the 
vessels belong to a Gentile, they need not be immersed even before a Jew uses them. (Mordekhai Beṣa 677; Shulḥan 






were contaminated to a secondary degree.588 The one who said secondary degree 
questions the one who said primary degree: Even on a weekday, one requires the 
sun to go down [before using the vessel for any qodashim]?! He answered him, In 
this case one wishes to use them for ḥullin in purity. R. Jeremiah said in the name 
of R. Ze’ira in the name of R. Ḥiyya bar Ashi: A wise woman will wash a cup 
here, a plate there, and a platter there: she ends up leveling her home on the 
Sabbath. 
 
One may not immerse impure vessels on the Sabbath589 or Festival.590 BBeṣa18b is the 
only pericope that offers a reason for this limitation: either so that one does not leave all 
immersing of vessels until the Festival or Sabbath, when one is free from other work, thus 
spending the Sabbath/Festival engaged in weekday work; or because immersing vessels makes 
them more usable and thus is similar to repairing a vessel, which is forbidden on the Sabbath.591 
However, the baraitot592 cited in this PT passage suggest that one may in fact immerse small593 
contaminated vessels on the Sabbath/Festivals by using them to retrieve water from a well.594  
                                                          
588 YPes. 1:6 and ySheq. 8:3 cite an argument between Bar Qappara and R. Yoḥanan over whether secondary 
contamination is Biblical or only rabbinic. As no amoraim are cited by name in our sugya’s debate, it is impossible 
to know why one of them distinguishes between the two types of tum’ah as they relate to the use of ha‘arama. 
Might it be the same distinction as in yPes. 3:3, 30a – a lesser status change versus a greater status change: 
ha‘arama  may be used to circumvent the former but not the latter? 
589 mShab. 2:7, tShab. 2:8 
 
590 mBeṣa 2:2-3, tBeṣa 2:5-6 
 
591 mShab. 7:4 
 
592 Based on tBeṣa 2:6 and tShab. 2:8 
 
593 Larger vessels are ineligible for this ha‘arama as they cannot fit into the well.  
 
594 The act of immersing vessels by drawing water from a well is distinct from two other situations, both discussed 
in Mishnah and Tosefta, of a) submerging a stone vessel in a miqveh in order to purify the water that is already in the 
vessel, and b) immersing a non-stone vessel that is impure in a well ostensibly in order to purify the water that is in 
the vessel (see mBeṣa 2:2; tBeṣa 2:9; yPes. 2:2, 61b; bBeṣa 18b). The amoraim who discuss R. Hoshaya’s 
permission to immerse a vessel surreptitiously on the Sabbath: bring up the distinction between vessels which are 
impure at a primary level, and those which are ritually impure at a secondary level. YPes. 1:6 and ySheqalim 8:3 
cite an argument between Bar Qappara and R. Yoḥanan over whether secondary contamination is biblical or only 
rabbinic. As no amoraim are cited by name in our sugya’s debate, it is impossible to know why one of them 
distinguishes between the two types of tum’ah as they relate to the use of ha‘arama. Might it be the same distinction 
as in yPes. 3:3, 30a – a lesser status change versus a greater status change: ha‘arama   may affect the former but not 
the latter? Or specifically circumventing rabbinic injunctions is permissible while circumventing biblical injunctions 





This case is reminiscent of ambiguous images595 that can be viewed as two different 
subjects, depending on one’s perspective. Is it a rabbit or a duck?596 Is it an elegant young 
woman or a haggard, aging one?597  Is one immersing a vessel or fetching water? Because the 
vessel is full of water, the answer is both. There is evidence in both directions – that one is 
simply immersing the object and that one is drawing water. The same is true of the anonymous 
baraita: the fact that the vessel has fallen into the water is what allows one to remove it from the 
water while simultaneously immersing it.  
Unlike the parent-child animal case, in which the two interpretations of the activity are 
mutually exclusive – saving an animal or slaughtering it -  and one’s presentation of his/her 
intention offers the choice between them, here the two activities are simultaneous  and do not 
conflict.  According to the presentation of the baraita in this PT passage, 598  one need not say 
anything, but merely draw the water, in order to indicate that one’s primary goal is in fact 
protected by law, and the immersion is just a side benefit. While Eilberg-Schwartz suggests that 
Mishnah only probes one intention in ambiguous cases, in this PT passage, we have a most 
                                                          
a primary degree, as they are not fully usable for sancta until sundown. Therefore, by definition they are not for 
Sabbath use, or the use of eating ḥullin in purity is insufficient to warrant such ha’arama. 
 
595 Some have challenged the use of “illusion” for these images, as illusions “illustrate the role of unconscious 
inferences in perception, while the ambiguous figures illustrate the role of expectations, world-knowledge, and the 
direction of attention (Long, G.M., & Toppino, T.C “Enduring interest in perceptual ambiguity: Alternating views of 
reversible figures,” Psychological Bulletin 130 (2004) 748-768.) 
 
596 The duck-rabbit illusion has been attributed variously to the Austrian Logician Ludwig Wittgenstein and to 
American psychologist Joseph Jastrow. See Malach, R., Levy, I., & Hasson, U, “The topography of high-order 
human object areas.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 178-184, and Jastrow, J, “The mind's eye.” Popular Science 
Monthly 54 (1899) 299-312. 
 
597 British cartoonist WE Hill first published the Young Girl/Old Woman image in Puck humor magazine, though it 
was based on a concept that was popular throughout the world on trading and puzzle cards. 
 
598 Though some, such as the Qorban Ha‘edah, suggest that one declares his/her intentions: ואומר שרוצה להעלותן – see 






ambiguous case and no one probes. Essentially, the action of collecting water is what defines the 
intention of the agent. What is intended and what is unintended is determined by what part of the 
action is primary and what part of the action is secondary. Action imputes, or defines, intention. 
The potential that this affords is not lost upon the redactor(s), as R. Jeremiah and R. 
Ze’ira cite a parallel case which is not called ha‘arama but has the same characteristics: 599 a 
woman washing dishes on the Sabbath and allowing the water to drip onto the floor, thereby 
smoothing out the floor, which technically is forbidden on the Sabbath as an act of ḥoresh, 
plowing. Here too, the agent accomplishes two actions simultaneously – washing dishes and 
washing down the dirt floor – and these actions are not mutually exclusive. 
MS Vatican adds the word בעי to the beginning of the statement, turning the statement 
into a question: If one may immerse vessels while “drawing water,” what is to stop someone 
from smoothing one’s dirt floor by washing dishes? This certainly would be consistent with PT’s 
general approach to ha‘arama: Do not utilize ha‘arama simply in order to take advantage of 
loopholes in the law.  Only use it if it is truly warranted!600  Most MSS though, do read it as a 
statement.601    
This example of redefining an act by physical “evidence” is an important bridge between 
the two “types” of ha‘arama. On the one hand, it is very close to the concrete mishnaic 
ha‘arama in that it attempts to change the facts of the case by adding the layer of drawing water. 
                                                          
599 In terms of the term פיקח)ת()ין), there are a few contexts within PT in which it appears as a person who outsmarts 
others or the law – See yHor. 3:2, 47b; yKet. 12:5, 35c; yShab. 16:3, 15d; yNazir 2:2, 52a (based on mNazir 2:2) 
 
600 The original context of this statement though, as a comment on a mishnah which specifies that one wash dishes 
on Friday night and Sabbath morning, but not on Sabbath afternoons, does not appear to be a question at all. Rather, 
it is presented as wise advice! 
 
601 As a separate issue, this may be indicative of a general disagreement between BT and PT. While BT prohibits 
what is called a pesiq reishe ve’lo yamut (bShab. 103a), PT contains no such prohibition. (See yShab. 13:6 for the 





On the other hand, this ha‘arama simply cannot change the facts of the case without 
incorporating human intention. Even if this person is now drawing water s/he is still immersing a 
vessel at the same time, and these are not mutually exclusive acts. Which act takes precedence 
should be in the mind of the actor, or at least in how s/he presents the situation?  And yet, it is 
not. Intention and action are not two different modes; rather, action defines, and even creates, 
intention. 
Ritual Purity and Ha‘arama 
There are three main legal uses for intention in rabbinic literature: 1) evaluating potential 
violations, 2) determining whether a religious duty has been discharged, and 3) classifying 
objects.602  Ha‘arama, however, is deployed only with regards to the first category. There are no 
instances of using ha‘arama to fulfill a ritual obligation, such as the recitation of the daily 
shema. This is most likely because ha‘arama as a means of getting out of a bind created by 
restrictive circumstances simply is not relevant to the realm of fulfillment of mitzvoth. Regarding 
classification of objects, though, in the case of ritual im/purity law, ha‘arama is consistently 
raised only to be rejected.  We turn to these latter cases below:  
1. Is This Vessel Complete? 
 (603תוספתא כלים מציעא ה:ט )כ"י וינה
כלי נצרין  גמלין התירן טהורין קשרן טמאין ומיטמאין ומיטהרין אפי' עשרה פעמים ביוםהסלין של 
משתמש בהן עראי  שלא קינבן ומשתמש בהן עראי טמאין היה עתיד לחסם ולקנב אע'פ שהוא
 ומשליכן טהורין ובלבד שלא יערים ואם הערים הרי אילו טמאין
The baskets of camels [which] one has untied are pure. [If] one has tied them, 
they are again susceptible to impurity. They may be made impure and purified 
even ten times in the day. Vessels of twigs which one has not smoothed and 
which one uses at random are susceptibility to impurity. [If] one was destined to 
make a rim and to smooth it (=the rim),604 even though one may [nonetheless] 
                                                          
602 Eilberg-Schwartz, Introduction, 3ff 
 






make use of them at random and throw them away, they are unsusceptible to 
impurity.605 And [this rule applies] solely [on condition that] one not practice 
cunning [falsely indicating that he plans to do more to finish off the vessel]. And 
if one has practiced cunning, lo, these are susceptible to impurity. 
 
The context of this toseftan passage is defining at what point an item becomes a vessel 
from the perspective of halakha, such that it can contract ritual impurity. As described here, there 
is some subjectivity involved, in that, when it comes to baskets of twigs, people manufacture and 
use them in one of two ways: with a smoothed rim or without one. If one plans to make such a 
rim, an un-rimmed basket is not considered a vessel and thus is not yet susceptible to ritual 
impurity. Thus, using such a basket with ritually impure hands or ritually impure foods has no 
impact on its status.  One can easily see how this might inspire ha‘arama: why not claim that 
there are finishing touches yet to come (even if there are none) in order not to bother with purity 
law just yet? Clever, but the tosefta squashes it. 
2. Is the Process Complete? (1) 
 תוספתא טהרות י:ג )כ"י וינה(
 היתה לו אם של זתים ומבקש לעשותה בטהרה אע'פ שהוא עתיד להוסיף קב אחד או שני קבין הרי
 אילו טהורין ובלבד שלא יערים ואם הערים הרי אילו טמאין
[If] he had a clump of olives606 and wants to prepare them in purity, even though 
he is going to add [only]607 a qab or two qabs of olives to the clump, lo, these are 
insusceptible to impurity; and on condition that he not practice cunning;608 but if 
he practiced cunning [falsely indicating that he would add to the clump], lo, these 
are susceptible to impurity. 
 
                                                          
604 Based on the translation of R. Samson of Sens, mKelim 16:2, which Lieberman prefers (See Tosefet Rishonim, 
ibid.) 
 
605 The continuation of this passage, not cited here, points out that this leniency does not apply to reed baskets. 
Whereas reed baskets are considered susceptible to ritual impurity as soon as they are usable, baskets made of twigs 
are only susceptible to impurity when their user has determined that they are complete vessels. 
606 This refers to olives that clump together at the bottom of the vat or basket. (Lieberman, Tosefet Rishonim, 95) 
 
607 See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Tum’at 'Okhlin 11:8 
 
608 Neusner uses the term “deception” here, but we have chosen not to translate it in light of the question as to what 





 Olives become susceptible to impurity based on the oil that drips from them. However, 
there is debate as to at what point the dripping oil is considered to have that effect. This passage 
assumes that olives (even if they are sweating or dripping beforehand) only become susceptible 
to impurity once all of the olives have been picked and gathered, an opinion attributed to R. 
Gamaliel.609  If, however, even just a few more olives are meant to be added to the clump, the 
olives are considered less than fully gathered and their sweat does not make them susceptible to 
impurity.  According to this passage, one may not employ ha‘arama as a method of creating 
such a situation. Saul Lieberman reads the rejected ha‘arama as purposely leaving a few olives 
out of batch when processing the rest just in order to be able to handle the majority of the 
product while impure or with impure utensils or machinery.610 Once again, the tosefta rejects 
such manipulation. 
3. Is the Process Complete? (2) 
 תוספתא טהרות י:יב )כ"י וינה(
ונעשו ]אם[ ר' או' אינן חיבור ר' יוסי בר' יהודה אומ' חיבור אם עד  612שנשרו בסים 611גרגר?ן?
אחד או שני בדין בית שמיי או' קוצה בטומאה  שלא נגמרה מלאכתן חישב עליהן ורצה ליטול מהן בד
מחפה בטומאה ובלבד שלא יעקר את כל  613ומוליך לבית הבדובית )א( הלל או' אףומחפה בטהרה 
בד בידידה מניח ?כ?די בידידה קתכו מניח  615בד מניח בדי 614להניח בדי האם אלא מקום שנהגו
ובלבד שלא יעקר את כל האם ואם עקר את כל האם הרי אילו טמאין ר' ישמעאל בר'  קתכו 616?כ?די
                                                          
609 mTaharot 9:1, tTaharot 10:1 
 
610 Lieberman, Tosefet Rishonim, 95. Jacob Neusner, however, reads this as a prohibition to indicate a false desire to 
add more olives to the batch, similar to many of the “intention” ha‘arama examples in this chapter. His 
interpretation may be a result of the false dichotomy between the “two types” of ha‘arama 
 
611 Venice Ed.: גרגרין  
 
612 Venice Ed.: במים 
 
613 Venice Ed. omits אף 
 
614 Venice Ed.: כדי 
 
615 Venice Ed.: כדי 
 





ובלבד שלא יערים ואם הערים הרי  אילו טהורין אע'פ שעקר את כל האם הרייוסי אומ' משם אביו 
 אילו טמאין
Shriveled olives which are soaked in water617 and made into a mass, Rabbi says, 
“It is not connected.618” R. Jose b. R. Judah says, “It is connected.” If thye have 
not yet been fully gathered, he gave thought to them, and he wanted to take from 
them [enough olives for] one pressing or for two – the House of Shammai say, 
“Let him set apart in impurity and cover619 in purity620 and bring it to the press.” 
And the House of Hillel say, “Also: he covers in impurity.”  And on condition 
that he not uproot the whole clump. But in a place in which they are accustomed 
to leave a sufficient amount for a pressing, one leaves enough for a single 
pressing. In a place in which they are accustomed to leave a sufficient amount for 
a small olive press, one leaves sufficient for a small olive press. [If they are 
accustomed to leave enough for] a small olive press with a cylindrical beam, one 
leaves enough for a small olive press with a cylindrical beam. And on condition 
that one not uproot the whole clump. And if one has uprooted the whole clump, 
lo, these are susceptible to impurity. R. Ishmael b. R. Jose in the name of his 
father says, “Even though one has uprooted the whole clump, lo, these are 
insusceptible to receive impurity.” And on condition that one not practice cunning 
[falsely indicating his desire for each small clump by taking each separately]. And 
if one has practiced cunning, lo, these are susceptible to impurity.  
 
Given that olives do not become susceptible to impurity until they have been completely 
gathered for pressing,621 the House of Shammai, the House of Hillel and R. Ishmael son of R. 
Jose argue. Supposed more olives are meant to be added to the already gathered clump, but some 
of the olives there are already being taken to be pressed for oil: according to the House of 
Shammai, the part that is removed is not yet susceptible to impurity because more is to be added 
to the clump, whereas the remaining olives that have not been taken are now susceptible to 
                                                          
617 Supra note 600 
 
618 When foods are considered “connected,” if one part of the mass becomes ritually impure, the entire mass 
becomes impure.  The reason for the debate is that these olives became attached accidentally. 
 
619 the remainder. 
 
620 Beit Hillel considers the remaining olives susceptible to impurity because now that the others have been 
removed, the rest of the group seem complete. 
 
621 Our understanding of this tosefta is based on the comments of R. Ovadiah Bertinoro regarding its parallel 





impurity because it is considered as though all of the olives have been gathered. According to the 
House of Hillel, though, none of the olives become impure because more olives are supposed to 
be gathered. The House of Hillel, however, does qualify this leniency. If a person removes the 
whole clump of olives (presumably piece by piece), the olives are considered susceptible to 
impurity already, as clearly no more will be collected. R. Ishmael, though, in the name of R. Jose 
his father, says that one may indeed remove the entire clump without anything becoming 
susceptible to impurity, though he does not explain why. He does, however, specify that this 
leniency does not apply if one is simply trying to outsmart the system: namely, if the agent 
knows that the olives are completely gathered and plans to remove all of them for use, yet 
removes clumps bit by bit in order to suggest that the bunch is not yet complete, s/he is guilty of 
ha‘arama, and the olives are susceptible to impurity.  
4. Exit Strategy 
 (622תוספתא אהלות ח:ד )כ"י וינה
המת בבית ולו פתחים הרבה כולן נעולין כולן טמאין. נפתח אחד מהן אף על פי שלא חישב עליו 
טיהר את כולן. היו בו חלונות הרבה וכולן מגופות כולן טהורות נפתחו כולן טמאות ולא הצילו על 
שב להוציאו בקטן טיהר הקטן את פתחים. פתח קטן בתוך פתח גדול המאהיל על גבי שניהם טמא. ח
להוציאו באחד מהן הרי חבירו טהור  הגדול. היו שניהם מתאימין המאהיל על גבי שניהם טמא. חישב
וחישב להוציאו בצפונו ואחר כך באו אחיו או קרוביו  היה לו פתח אחד לצפון ופתח אחד לדרום
בלבד שלא יערים ואם הערים הרי אלא בדרומו טיהר דרומי את הצפוני ו ואמרו אין מוציאין אותו
 אילו טמאין
The corpse is in the house, and it has many doors – [if] all are locked, all are 
impure. [If] one of them is opened, even though one did not give thought to it, he 
has purified all of them. [If] there were in it many windows, [if] all of them are 
locked, all of them are clean. [If] they were open, they all are impure, and they 
have not afforded protection for the doors. A small door in the middle of a larger 
door- he who overshadows both of them is impure. [If] one gave thought to 
remove it through the small [door], the small one has purified the large one. [If] 
they were parallel to one another, he who overshadows both of them is impure. 
[If] one gave thought to remove it through one of them, lo, its fellow is pure. [If] 
it had one door to the north and one door to the south, and one gave thought to 
remove it through the northern one, and afterward his brethren or relatives came 
                                                          





and said that they [should] remove him only through the southern one, the 
southern one has purified the northern one. [And this is so] only on condition that 
one not practice cunning [to falsely indicate a plan to remove the corpse through a 
particular exit through which he does not truly plan to remove it]. But if one has 
practiced cunning, lo, these both are impure.  
 
The general rule regarding the impurity of a corpse found in a building or tent is that the 
impurity must escape somehow: 623.סוף הטומאה לצאת  This is a very physical view of ritual 
impurity: if one door of the tent is open, the impurity is presumed to escape through it. If, 
however, no doors are open, the impurity bursts through, as it were, all of the closed doors, and 
anything found under the overhangs of those doorways becomes impure. If one of the doors is 
then opened, it alone again is presumed to be the exit for the impurity.624  In context of this 
phenomenon, the tosefta offers further discussion about the significance of mahshava, one’s 
plans for the removal of the deceased. If one originally plans to remove the deceased through one 
exit, even if s/he has not yet opened that door, the other doors are considered pure, and the 
impurity is presumed only to exit through the intended doorway. (This is so even with regards to 
two doorways standing side by side under the very same awning. Only the intended doorway 
becomes a passage for the impurity.) And the final scenario in the tosefta at hand offers the most 
complicated issue: when one intends to remove the body through door A (=the northern exit), but 
then one’s family members suggest that door B (=the southern exit) be used instead. When that 
happens, door B becomes the new intended exit while door A is no longer in danger of impurity, 
at least from that moment forward.625  
                                                          
 
623 m’Ohalot 7:3 
 
624 The BT version of this ruling indicates that there is an argument over whether ultimately the doorways become 
purified for the future once a doorway is opened, or whether even retroactively the doorways themselves are 
considered pure from the moment of death. (See bBeṣa 10a) 
 





 The final line of the tosefta –  יערים ואם הערים הרי אלו טמאיןובלבד שלא  – is taken by 
traditional commentators to refer to final case only,626 though that is not clear from the tosefta 
itself. If it does refer to that last case, we believe the following to be the best explanation: the 
person knows that the proper exit door is the southern one and that eventually s/he will remove 
the body via that path, but s/he wishes to prevent the southern doorway from becoming impure in 
the interim. To do so, s/he “claims”627 to wish to remove the body through the northern doorway. 
According to the tosefta, the result of such behavior is הרי אלו טמאין, in the plural, as in, both the 
northern and the southern doorways become impure! Alternatively, the final line may refer back 
to the entire tosefta: one may not misrepresent one’s intention to take the body out a certain exit 
simply in order to keep the other exits from becoming impure. On this interpretation הרי אלו טמאין 
might simply mean that all of the other exits are impure then too, as the individual has not truly 
decided through which door s/he will remove the corpse. 
5. How Do You Plan to Use This? 
 628תוספתא חגיגה ג:י, תוספתא פרה ד:י
                                                          
 
626 See Ḥiddushei Ha-Ra’ah Beṣa 10a, Maimonides, Hilkhot Tum’at Ha-met 7:6 
627 As in the other cases of ha‘arama discussed, it is unclear whether any verbal declaration or physical indication of 
this plan is made. 
 
628 Our version of the Tosefta follows Lieberman’s, which is based on R. Samson of Sens. (Tosefet Rishonim, Parah, 
229) As this Tosefta passage appears twice, the notes will point out significant differences between the same MSS 





לתרומתו אין חבר  630חבר לוקח ממנו לחטאתו ולתרומתו הביא 629לחטאתועם הארץ שהביא כלים 
הביא לחטאתו ולתרומתו של חטאת חבר לוקח הימנו לחטאתו   631לוקח ממנו לחטאתו ולתרומתו.
 אין חבר לוקח ממנו לחטאתו ולתרומתו. 633של תרומה 632ולתרומתו.
                                                          
 
629 MS Vienna (Ḥagigah) omits the words כלים לחטאתו, but MS Vienna (Parah) includes them. 
 
630 MS London (Ḥagigah) omits the word הביא 
 
631 MSS Vienna (Ḥagigah), London (Ḥagigah) and Venice Edition (Ḥagigah): לא לחטאתו ולא לתרומתו. (But MS 
Vienna Parah and Venice ed. Parah: לחטאתו ולתרומתו). At this point, MS Vienna (Parah) and Venice ed. (Parah) 
skip straight to the cases of חבר שאמר לעם הארץ and include ושל תרומה אין חבר לוקח ממנו לחטאתו ולתרומתו as a new 
section (after ואם הערים הרי אלו טמאין) about an am ha-'areṣ who had originally planned to use a vessel for hatat, but 
then decided to use it for terumah. MS Erfurt (Parah) does not skip the line here, but does add it a second time in 
the same place as MS Vienna (Parah)/Venice ed. (Parah). 
 
632 Lieberman adds this clause based on R. Samson of Sens. Though the first line of the Tosefta established that an 
am ha-areṣ is believed regarding ritual purity of vessels used for the red heifer, but not of vessels used for terumah, 
this line still teaches something: though one may have thought that bringing both vessels may have made the am ha-
areṣ believable regarding both or suspect regarding both, as they were brought together, instead, the same ruling as 
the first line obtains (Lieberman, Tosefet Rishonim, Parah, 229-30).  
 
633 Thus in MSS London (Ḥagigah), Erfurt (Ḥagigah) and Geniza fragments (Ḥagigah); MS Vienna (Ḥagigah) and 
Venice edition (Ḥagigah): (ו)לתרומתו rather than ושל תרומתו.  This latter girsa seems to be a mistaken repetition of 





הביא   636תרומתו.חבר לוקח ממנו לחטאתו ול 635כלים לחטאתו 634חבר שאמר לעם הארץ הביא
של חטאת חבר  639הביא לחטאתו ולתרומתו  ולתרומתו.638אין חבר לוקח ממנו לחטאתו  637לתרומתו
   טמאין. 642ובלבד שלא יערים ואם הערים הרי אלו 641ובין לאחר 640לוקח ממנו בין לו
An ordinary person who brought utensils for [use in connection with] his 
purification water- an associate purchases from him both for his purification 
offering and for use in connection with his heave offering. [If] he brought them 
for his heave offering, an associate does not purchase them from him either for his 
purification water or for his heave offering. [If] he brought one for his [an 
associate’s] purification rite and one for his heave offering, that which is brought 
for use in connection with the purification offering an associate purchases from 
him for use both in his purification offering and in his heave offering. But that 
which he brought in connection with his heave offering an associate does not 
                                                          
634 MS Vienna (Ḥagigah and Parah) and Venice ed. (Ḥagigah) use the spelling of the past tense הביא rather than the 
command form הבא, though this may be a scribal error based on the word הביא from the opening of the Tosefta.  
Geniza fragments (Ḥagigah), MSS Erfurt (Ḥagigah), Vienna (Ḥagigah), London (Ḥagigah), Venice ed. (Parah) all 
use the proper spelling of the command form, הבא. 
 
635 MS London (Ḥagigah) skips this part of the scenario completely; MS Vienna (Ḥagigah) and Venice Ed. 
(Ḥagigah): לחטאתי, while MS Vienna (Parah) and Venice ed. (Parah): לחטאתו; Geniza fragments (Ḥagigah) and MS 
Erfurt (Ḥagigah): לחטאת 
 
636 One might have doubted this, as perhaps the am ha-areṣ is only trustworthy when he brings the vessels of his 
own accord, rather than when the associate asks him, thus indicating that the associate will believe what he says. 
(Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta, Ḥagigah (find the citation)) 
 
637 This is the rendering of MS Erfurt (Ḥagigah), MS Vienna (Parah) (though MS Vienna (Ḥagigah) omits the word 
 and Venice ed. (Parah). Other versions – Geniza fragments (Ḥagigah), MS London (Ḥagigah) and Venice ,(הביא
Ed. (Ḥagigah) - though, use the term לתרומתי though. According to this latter reading, the clause is a continuation of 
the associate asking the ‘am ha-‘areṣ to bring vessels to sell. Lieberman (Tosefet Rishonim, ibid.) rejects this, as the 
odds of an associate asking an am ha-areṣ to sell the former vessels for terumah is unlikely, as the associate knows 
that an am ha-areṣ is not generally diligent in that area of ritual purity. Instead, he suggests that the haber asked for 
vessels for hatat waters, but the am ha-areṣ admitted that he had none and instead offered vessels for terumah. One 
may have thought that the am ha-areṣ in this case would have been believed, as he admitted to not having hatat 
vessels, but in fact, he is still not believed. (Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta, Ḥagigah ad loc.) 
 
638 Venice Ed. (Parah) omits לחטאתו, probably a scribal error, as it retains the "ו" in ולחטאתו 
 
639 Thus, according to MS Erfurt (Ḥagigah), MS Vienna (Parah) and Venice Ed. (Parah). Other versions, however, 
are not as clear. Some make it seem like another request by the haber (See Geniza fragments, Ḥagigah and Venice 
Ed., Ḥagigah). Others appear unclear as to whether this is a request by the haver or the initiative of the ‘am ha-’areṣ 
in response to the ḥaver asking only for a ḥatat vessel (See MS Vienna, Ḥagigah). And MS London (Ḥagigah) skips 
this section all together and ends the sugya with the previous sentence. 
 
 (is absent in MS Erfurt (Ḥagigah בין לו  640
 
641 One may have thought that because the ‘am ha‘areṣ is desperate to sell both vessels, even though the ḥaver only 
requested one, that the ‘am ha‘areṣ be believed about neither vessel. However, the tosefta here rules that the ‘am 
ha‘areṣ is still reliable regarding the ḥatat vessel. (Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta find citation, Ḥagigah) 
 





purchase from him either for use in connection with his purification offering or in 
connection with his heave offering. 
 
An associate who said to an ordinary person, “Bring utensils for use in connection 
with my purification offering”- the associate purchases these utensils from him 
for use both in connection with his purification rite and in connection with his 
heave offering. But if he brought utensils for use in connection with his heave 
offering instead [despite the associate’s request], the associate does not purchase 
them from him either for use in connection with his purification offering or for 
use in connection with his heave-offering. [Likewise, if] he brought them for his 
use in connection with both his purification rite and his heave offering, that which 
is brought in connection with the purification rite the associate purchases from 
him, whether he brought it for himself or for someone else, on condition that [an 
associate] not practice cunning [asking for utensils for a purification rite when he 
needs them for heave offerings]. And if one has practiced cunning [falsely 
indicating the use of the vessels for the purification offering], lo, these [utensils 
bought] are unclean. 
 
Though the earliest strata of tannaitic literature do not use ‘am ha-'areṣ pejoratively, the 
main stratum generally uses it in contrast to ḥaverim. Ḥaverim observed food restrictions – 
concerning tithes and purities – scrupulously, while the ‘amei ha-'areṣ did not.643 In order for 
such people to do business with one another the ḥaver must know what gaps to look for. Hence, 
Mishnah specifies that ‘amei ha-‘areṣ are careful about the ritual purity of the red heifer ash 
mixture, but they are not careful about the ritual purity of terumah.  
This tosefta takes this as a given in presenting a scene in which an ‘am ha-‘areṣ has 
vessels for sale, and the ḥaver is buying.  According to this passage it is the ḥaver’s intended use 
for the vessels which determines whether or not the vessel should be presumed pure or impure: if 
either the ‘am ha‘areṣ or the ḥaver specifies that the vessels are for the purification rite, the 
ḥaver may even use the vessels for his terumah.644  If, however, there is any ha‘arama involved, 
                                                          
643 ‘Am Ha-Areṣ, Moshe Greenberg and Stephen Wald, Encyclopedia Judaica Vol. 2, 2nd Ed., Eds. Michael 
Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik, Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA (2007) 66-70. For examples of this contrast, see 
mDemai chapters 2 and 6; mTohorot 7:4, 8:5; mShevi’it 5:9; mGit. 5:9; tTaharot chapters 8 and 9; tDemai chapters 






all vessels are presumed to be impure. It is once again unclear what the ha‘arama is. Traditional 
commentators645 have suggested that perhaps it is the ‘am ha-‘areṣ who lies in order to sell his 
product. This is a problematic statement, as a) it is obvious that if the ‘am ha-‘areṣ is lying, the 
vessels are ritually impure; and b) why not always assume that the ‘am ha-‘areṣ is lying just to 
sell his product? Therefore, we prefer the following explanation: the ḥaver lies about his 
intended us of the vessels - he claims to be purchasing vessels for heifer ash water, something 
which will ensure that the ‘am ha-‘areṣ will sell him only pure items, when really the ḥaver 
intends to us the vessels for terumah. The tosefta rejects the ploy and rules that the vessels are 
considered ritually impure even if the ‘am ha-‘areṣ himself was duped.  
In Summary: No Ha‘arama             
Human intention plays an important role for purposes of defining vessels, foods, and 
exits, and ultimately for purpose of determining susceptibility to impurity.646 Each toseftan 
example cited above deals with this dimension of impurity law: human decision making. Will 
this food be processed further? Will something be added to perfect this vessel? What are the 
agent’s plans for this vessel? In each case, the agent may be tempted to use artifice to keep an 
object, food or edifice from becoming impure or from becoming susceptible to impurity. 
However, the consistent terminology “And if one has practiced cunning, lo, these are susceptible 
to impurity647” makes the toseftan position on such attempts very clear: they are off limits.  
                                                          
644 Lieberman points out that tOhalot 5:9 contradicts this and instead would limit the use by the haver to purification 
water only. Maimonides, Hilkhot Parah Adumah, at the close of chapter 13, sides with the tosefta in 'Ohalot. 
(Tosefet Rishonim, ‘Ohalot 602:37) 
 
645 R. Samson of Sens, mParah chapter 5 
 
646 For paradigmatic examples, see mTohorot 8:6 and mKelim 22:2 
 





Regardless of the reason for attempting the ha‘arama, whether out of pure laziness in keeping 
purity law, or even to preserve vessels for the good of priests or priestly foods, ha‘arama is 
simply not an option.  
Given that these toseftan examples do not distinguish on the basis the agent’s 
motivations,648 we are left to understand why the doors are completely closed to ha‘arama in this 
arena. Perhaps the rabbis were animated by the potential (and actual) atrophy of purity law in 
their own day. As indicated both by archaeological649 and textual650 evidence, following the loss 
of the Temple,651 observance of purity law had waned,652 and perhaps the rabbis felt had to be 
preserved more strongly than those still relevant to the everyday. Another attack on the central 
meaning of purity and impurity may be traced to the Pauline epistles, which replaced concrete 
notions of this law with metaphorical uses such as purity and impurity of heart and mind.653   
                                                          
648 And one should not argue that there is no legitimate reason to dodge one’s way to ritual purity; after all, the PT 
example of immersing a vessel on the Sabbath clearly indicates that there is a legitimate reason to want to do so. 
 
649 Ronny Reich, Miqwa’ot (Jewish Ritual Immersion Baths) in Eretz-Israel in the Second Temple and the Mishnah 
and Talmud Periods (Heb.; Doctoral Dissertation, The Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 1990) 143 
 
650 H. Birenboim, “Observance of the Laws of Bodily Purity in Jewish Society in the Land of Israel during the 
Second Temple Period” (Doctoral Dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2006), 66-7; Yair Furstenberg, 
Eating in a State of Purity during the Tannaitic Period: Tractate Taharot and its Historical and Cultural Contexts 
(Doctoral dissertation, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 2010), especially 254-62. 
 
651Regarding the centrality of the Temple for Biblical purity law, see Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 
1-16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, Anchor Bible 3 (New York: Doubleday, 
1991), 718-42. 
 
652 The extent to which it had waned was contested. According to Jacob Neusner, during the mishnaic period, purity 
practices were refocused from part of everyday life such as eating practices to overall abstract questions about 
reality. Yair Furstenburg, however, citing Ya’akov Sussman, maintains that purity practices remained relevant to 
everyday eating (in Palestine) even during the post-mishnaic period, though their observances were indeed 
decreasing. (Jacob Neusner, A History of the Mishnaic Law of Purities (Leiden: Brill, 1977); Yair Furstenberg, 
Eating in a State of Purity, 1 n2; Ya’akov Sussman, Babylonian Sugyot for Zerai’m and Tohorot (Heb.; Doctoral 
Dissertation, The Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 1969), 310 n16.  Balberg, however, maintains agnosticism on the 
issue and maintains instead that rabbinic texts suggest more about what the rabbis thought than about what they 
actually did (Balberg, 11). 
 
653 Mira Balberg, Recomposed Corporealities: Purity, Body and Self in the Mishnah (Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford 





Mira Balberg offers another perspective. She has argued for the significance of  
mahshava in ritual im/purity law as a focus on the self. In her schema, it is precisely because of 
the fall of the Temple that the rabbis sought to make im/purity law relevant654 by highlighting its 
relationship to the individual rather than the community or the Temple.655  In line with 
Stoicism,656 the dominant Greek philosophy during the tannaitic period, the underlying principle 
guiding tannaitic impurity law became, “only what matters to me can affect me, and only what I 
can control can control me.”(123) This explains the need for human mahshava to determine 
whether an item is considered a vessel, or whether food is considered edible or waste (or, for that 
matter, which door one will use for removing a corpse), in order to determine susceptibility to 
impurity: 
By distinguishing between what matters and what does not matter to me, I can 
become less vulnerable to the world around me. The Stoics did not assume that a 
                                                          
(SNTSMS 53; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 52-116; L. William Countryman, Dirt, Greed, and 
Sex: Sexual Ethics in the New Testament and Their Implications for Today (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 97-
123. For Countryman’s critique of Newton, see p.98, n2; Balberg notes that the metaphorical conception of impurity 
did not displace the concrete conception, but that does not mean that it did not cause the rabbis to hold tighter to 
their own conception. 
 
654 Eric Ottenjeim the interest in the self not with the fall of the Temple, but with Jesus’ critique in Mark 7, 14-15:  
There is nothing outside the man (entering into him) which defiles him, but those things coming out of the man are 
what defile him. (Eric Ottenjeim, “Impurity Between Intention and Deed,” Purity and Holiness, Eds. MJHM 
Poorthius and J. Schwartz, Leiden: Brill (2000) 129-148)   
 
655 The trouble with using Balberg’s full thesis in support of ha‘arama is that it is strange that Mishnah, which many 
believe recasts material specifically for a post-Temple reality, would not discuss ha‘arama in cases of ritual 
im/purity law. If it is so important specifically for a post-Temple world that the self be a true subjective self, why not 
include the rejection of ha‘arama to underscore that point? This is especially true if Mishnah’s cases of ha‘arama 
are specifically post-Temple cases. On the other hand, one might argue that the very same point about the subjective 
self is made by not bringing up the possibility of ha‘arama at all in this realm. And secondly, the two cases that 
Mishnah does discuss are clearly about qodashim and about financial loss. Ritual im/purity law does not fit that 
theme. 
 
656 Specifically the Stoic doctrine of assent (synkatathesis) – the principle that one may and should choose not to be 
moved by those things that are beyond one’s control, though they are potentially destabilizing forces. See Pierre 
Hadot, The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 101-27; Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (New York: Clarendon 
Press, 1985), 40-101; Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate (New York: Oxford University 






person can go through life entirely unharmed: they simply maintained that by 
cultivating a knowledge of which harm is really germane to the self and which is 
not, the world can become less threatening. In a somewhat similar manner, the 
rabbis accepted the potential impurity of objects as a fact of life, and did not 
assume that people can do anything to change this fact; but they did think that 
knowing which objects are susceptible to impurity and how they become 
susceptible and insusceptible will make the management of impurity easier. 
Consciousness was not introduced to the mishnaic system in order to help prevent 
things from becoming impure, but in order to minimize the number of objects 
with which one needs to be concerned, so that one can manage the material world 
more efficiently and skillfully. If one can distinguish between things that are 
susceptible to impurity and things that are not, one can devote one’s attention to a 
more limited number of objects. (Balberg, 126) 
 
In other words, the role of intention in purity law is to understand human subjectivity. Thus, any 
intentions required must be truly internalized.657  
While Balberg’s offers Stoicism as the rabbinic model, Eilberg-Schwartz offers imitatio 
dei: 
From the sages’ standpoint, ‘being created in God’s image’ means being able to 
exercise one’s mind in the same way that God exercises the divine will…Most 
                                                          
657 Mira Balberg challenges the assumption that intentions are necessarily nominalistic. She observes that the 
dichotomy between nominalism and realism is based on Cartesian distinctions between the physical and natural, 
which are considered “real” and mental constructs, which are considered unreal. In the ancient world, however, both 
the physical and the mental were considered “real,” as the physical existence was not the marker of what was real; 
rather, the effect that something had on the world determined its “realness.” As Plato writes: “anything which 
possesses any sort of power to affect another (to poiein heteronn otioun), or to be affected (to pathein) by another, if 
only for a single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect, has real existence” Therefore, 
Balberg follows the observations of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which place body as both object “like any other object” 
and as subject which “experiences and reflects on the world.” (Balberg, 96) It is intriguing in this regard, as Balberg 
points out, that the term adam is used throughout Mishnah to refer to both a person acting volitionally, intentionally, 
subjectively, as well as one who is being acted upon as an object akin to animals or inanimate objects. However, in 
all cases but one (mMakkot 1:10), the term adam is accompanied by references to animals or inanimate objects when 
referring to the human self as an object being acted upon, but never when referring to the human self as subjective 
subject.  (Balberg, 100).  (See M.F. Burnyear, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkely 
Missed,” The Philosophical Review 91:1 (1982): 3-40; R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An 
introduction to Hellenistic  Philosophy, (NY: Routledge, 1996), 32-5; Dale Martin, The Corinthian Body (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 6-14. See Rene Descartes, “On the Nature of the Human Mind, and how it is 
Better Known than the Body,” Meditations on the First Philosophy. (In Rene Descartes, Selected Philosophical 
Writings, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugal Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 80-6); Plato, Sophist, transl. Benjamin Jowett, (Charleston BiblioBazaar, LLC, 2008), 98, 247D-E; Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 137.) Balberg’s claim, though, that the mind impact reality, however, 







significantly, they ascribe to human intention the same characteristics that the 
priestly writer attributes to God’s will in the Biblical story of creation (Gen. 1:1-
2:4)…In the Biblical account God wills the world into existence. Likewise, in the 
mishnaic system, human beings have the power to transform the character of 
objects around them. Merely by formulating a plan to us an object for a particular 
purpose, an Israelite alters one of the most basic properties of that object, namely, 
its ability to absorb or withstand cultic contamination.658 
  
Imitatio dei should be more than superficial, legal fact. According to both Balberg and Eilberg-
Schwartz, there is something deeply real about the subjective element in ritual im/purity law.  
Beyond Stoicism and imitatio dei, there is yet another reason why ritual im/purity law 
may concern one’s intimate internal thoughts. Vered Noam argues that tannaitic halakha offers 
two basic and opposing tendencies in legislating issues of ritual purity: an immanent, naturalistic 
perception of impurity (which she calls Realistic) and a perception of impurity as ruled by 
human intention and awareness (Nominalistic).659  The Nominalist conception revolves around 
the fact that human intention and awareness determine susceptibility to impurity as well as 
im/purity itself, as seen in the toseftan examples cited above. 660 (Noam points out that thought as 
a determining factor of ritual im/purity is first observed in tannaitic sources and has no precursor 
in the Bible.)661  The Realist conception, however, is the view of impurity as a physical fact of 
                                                          
658 Eilberg-Schwartz, The Human Will, 182-3 
 
659 Vered Noam, “Ritual Impurity in Tannaitic Literature: Two Opposing Perspectives,” Journal of Ancient Judaism 
1 (2010) 102-3 
 
660 This emphasis on subjectivity and human consciousness has led some, such as Eric Ottenheijm, to suggest that 
the rabbis turned the physical impurity described in the Bible into a subjective category dependent on personal 
dispositions. (Ottenheijm, “Impurity…”) It has led others to suggest that the rabbis were basically nominalistic in 
their conception of impurity (See Jeffrey Rubenstein, “Nominalism and Realism”). For Eilberg-Schwartz, the 
significance of human subjectivity is in the human ability to imitate God by “naming” objects similar to how God 
named objects in the world when creating it. Balberg, however, sees a flaw in this suggestion, as it reflects usability 
more than controllability and it accounts for artifacts and food only, while neglecting body parts and human beings, 
both of which have susceptibility to tum’ah not determined by their “usability” to human beings. (Balberg, 122) 
 






reality: “The tannaitic halakhah understands impurity as an entity in nature that bears quasi-
physical characteristics of movement, spreading out, flowing, and the like.”662 In attempting to 
negotiate these two vectors within rabbinic thinking of impurity, Noam posits that the 
nominalistic applications of purity law are mere “footnotes” or “secondary” layers added to a 
primarily realistic conception.663 In other words, impurity is primarily physical, though there are 
situations in which the human mind turns the impurity switch on and off, so to speak. 
 Noam relates the element of human intention to the nominalistic, or formalistic, strand of 
impurity, divorced from reality. Some have argued against such an anachronistic dichotomy 
between nominalism and realism;664 it is based on Cartesian distinctions between the physical 
and natural on the one hand, which are considered “real,” and mental constructs on the other, 
which are considered unreal.665 In the ancient world both the physical and the mental were 
considered “real,” as the physical existence was not the marker of what was real; rather, the 
effect that something had on the world determined its “realness.”666 Moreover, even among those 
                                                          
662 Vered Noam, From Qumran to the Rabbinic Revolution: Conceptions of Impurity (Heb.; Jerusalem: 
Yad Ben Zvi Press, 2010) 226. 
 
663 Noam, From Qumran, 247-8 For example, the tannaim distinguish between the Biblical categories of אהל, which 
does not transfer impurity to someone who touches its walls on the outside, and קבר, which does transfer impurity to 
one who touches its walls on the outside, by defining the latter as a construction with no openings and the former as 
a construction with at least one opening. This, argues Noam, is a realistic conception, as in an אהל the impurity can 
drain to the doorway, while in a קבר, it bursts forth through the walls. However, on top of this realistic view, there is 
a nominalistic footnote: so long as there is a doorframe, even if the frame if completely plugged up, the architectural 
frame suffices as a doorway, and can render a construction an אהל. 
 
664 See Leib Moscovitz, From Casuistics, 170 n 28 
 
665 See Descartes, “On the Nature of the Human Mind…” 80-6 
 
666 Balberg, supra n. 645 – See Burnyear, “Idealism ,”; Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics,32-5; ] Martin, The 
Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) 6-14.)  As Plato writes: “anything which possesses any 
sort of power to affect another (to poiein heteronn otioun), or to be affected (to pathein) by another, if only for a 
single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect, has real existence” (Plato, Sophist, transl. 





who accept the use of the dichotomy667 for analyzing the rabbinic corpus, there are some who 
clarify that nominalism does not mean that something does not exist in nature.668 Rather, it 
means that one’s mind, or even one’s declaration, creates that reality.669 Thus, if impurity is 
primarily a force in nature, it follows that when it depends upon human intentions, it depends 
upon the most subjectively “true” version thereof.  Thus, the job of determining the identity of an 
object for the purposes of ritual im/purity cannot be defined superficially or artificially. If it is to 
rule a force of nature, mahshava cannot be defined by games or manipulations, but must be a 
product of the most sincere and subjective self. 
                                                          
667 For the thread of this discussion over the past several decades, see Y. Silman, “Halakhic Determinations of a 
Nominalistic and Realistic Nature: Legal and Philosophical Considerations,” Dine Israel 12 (1984-85) 251 
(Hebrew); Moshe Silberg, “The Order of Holy Things as a Legal Entity,” Sinai 52 (1962), 8-18; Daniel Schwartz, 
“Law and Truth: On Qumran-Sadducean and Rabbinic Views of Law ,” Eds. D. Dimant and U. Rappaport, The 
Dead Sea Scrolls: Forty Years of Research, Leiden: EJ Brill (1992) 229-240; Jeffrey L. Rubenstein, “Nominalism 
and Realism in Qumranic and Rabbinic Law: A Reassessment," Dead Sea Discoveries, Vol. 6, No. 2, Studies in 
Qumran Law (Jul., 1999), 157-183; Christine Hayes, “Legal Realism and the Fashioning of Sectarians,” Ed. Sacha 
Stern, Sects and Sectarianism in Jewish History, 121; (Yair Lorberbaum,  Halakhic Realism, 4 (abbreviated version 
of “Halakhic Realism,” Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-‘Ivri 27, 2010)) 
 
668 See Jeffrey Rubenstein, “Nominalism and Realism,” 158-161 
 
669 Christine Hayes explains: “Realism -- and here is the technical definition – asserts the mind-independent 
existence and reality of universals and it asserts the mind-independent existence and reality of abstract entities (like 
properties, numbers, propositions, etc.).  By contrast, nominalism in its earliest version maintained that there are no 
universal forms (like whiteness or squareness) that exist outside particular things.  There are only particular things 
and these particulars are not instantiations of universal forms; a slightly later version of nominalism maintains that 
there are no abstract objects because everything is concrete (not material but concrete).  So nominalism is anti-
Platonic.  Platonism is a realism that asserts the mind-independent existence and reality of abstract entities…   
So much for metaphysics or ontology (an account of what exists) – what about ethics and law?  Ockham’s view of 
ethics is instructive – his is a will-based ethics in which intentions count for everything and external behavior or 
actions count for nothing.  In themselves, all actions are morally neutral. Abelard’s morality is also radically 
intentionalist: the agent’s intention alone determines the moral worth of an action.  In themselves, deeds are morally 
indifferent and the proper subject of moral evaluation is the agent, via his or her intentions.  Thus we see that for the 
nominalists Abelard and Ockham, thoughts “create reality” – this is the technical definition of what it is to be a 
nominalist about ethics …the Mishnah’s assignment of various legal statuses based on mental events of various 
kinds are perfectly, precisely and efficiently described as examples of a legal “nominalism”…Thus, kavvanah in the 
case of shema, megillah and shofar …is a classic instance of nominalism.  The case explicitly contrasts two cases – 
in both, the same action occurs – an act of hearing.  In one case kavvanah is present and in the other it isn’t and it is 
the presence or absence of the actor’s intention or kavvanah that determines the status of the action as fulfilling a 
religious obligation or not…ke’ilu…legal fiction [is] a step-child of legal nominalism found first in Roman law and 
rabbinic halakhah.  In legal fictions, we call things into legal existence by naming them as legally existent.” 





Summary: Problematizing a Neat Dichotomy 
 The tannaitic material indicates a strong dichotomy between the use of ha‘arama in 
different realms. Perhaps this points to a general disparity in rabbinic views of intention in 
different arenas of law, which would indicate that neither Rosen-Tzvi nor Balberg is completely 
correct. Perhaps the question is not whether the rabbis understood the inner self concept but 
simply what role the mind was meant to play in different legal arenas. For the rabbis, action and 
thought are on a continuum, but the balance tips towards the internal in the realm of ritual 
im/purity law670 and toward the external in Sabbath and Festival law. The balance changes, 
however, in the Babylonian material, as the emergence of self as subject becomes increasingly 










                                                          
670 Ishay Rosen-Tzvi struggles with this issue of intention impacting the physical world and suggests as a result that 
intention is really just “internalized action.” He emphasizes the “materiality” of intention by showing how it is 
always connected to action: “’Thought,’ just like ‘intension’ and ‘will’, is not an independent psychic phenomenon 
in the Mishnah, but a mental gesture which always accompanies an external act, and is judged as part of this same 
realm of actions.”  (Ishay Rosen-Tzvi, “Realism and Nominalism in the Mishnah: the Case of Thoughts, ”NYU 
Halakha and Reality Conference, fall 2012, 16) We do not believe it is necessary to say this, as will be explained in 





Chapter 4 – The Babylonian Talmud and Interiority 
In the previous chapter, we argued that the two types of ha‘arama presented in the 
Palestinian material parallel one another. Just as the rabbis may accept externalized actions, 
despite internal intentions to evade the law, they may accept constructed intentions, despite 
internal intentions to evade the law.   In this chapter, we will show that the Babylonian Talmud 
does not reflect the same tolerance for such ritualization of intention. On the contrary, the 
material regarding ha‘arama in BT leans in the direction of the “sincere self” as definitive and 
expresses concern in cases of disparity between the sincere self and the ritualized self.   
Parallel Sugyot 
A most noticeable difference between the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmuds is simply 
the scarcity of ha‘arama or suspicion thereof in BT.  This expresses itself both in form and in 
content. Sometimes BT simply uses different terminology for ha‘arama, while at other times, BT 
is not even interested in the circumvention phenomenon at all in its debate.671 This becomes 
obvious when viewing parallel sugyot in PT and BT side by side. The following is a preliminary 
list of such parallels:672 
 BNed. 48a does not use the term ha‘arama in the Bet Ḥoron case, whereas yNed. 5:7, 39b 
does. 
 Whereas yNaz. 5:1, 54a, understands R. Eliezer and R. Joshua’s positions about making 
swearing off benefit when remarrying one’s ex-wife in order to keep from conspiring to 
                                                          
671 PT and BT have practically the same number of distinct ha‘arama-as-loophole cases. This is astounding, 
considering their relative lengths. 
 
672 The lack of interest on the part of amoraim and the lack of interest on the part of the stam work together in a few 
ways: a) sometimes ha‘arama is left out of a sugya simply because no amora included it; b) the fact that the 





acquire consecrated funds (see chapter 2 above) as being about ha‘arama, bErkh. 23a 
simply retains the mishnaic terminology of qinunya, conspiracy. 
 Whereas yPe'ah 6:1, 19b, brings up ha‘arama in a case of making one’s field hefqer 
solely in order to avoid having to tithe its produce, bNed. 44a brings up the problem using 
the term רמאין (in all MSS and Ed.) rather than ha‘arama. 
 Whereas yTer. 2:3, 41c, refers to drawing water with impure vessels on the Festival as 
ha‘arama, bBeṣa 18a suffices without any ha‘arama terminology.673 
 Whereas yQid. 3:4, 64a, in the context of betrothal based on misunderstanding, discusses 
a case of ha‘arama (purposely appointing a guarantor who is be penniless), BT does not 
mention this case at all (bQid. 62a-63a). 
 BT never mentions the yPes. 2:2, 29a, case of one who makes leavened foods hefqer, 
ownerless, just a few days before Passover in order to be able to eat them after the 
Festival. 
 YḤallah 3:1, 59a, regarding snacking on unfinished dough has no parallel in BT, though 
that may simply be due to the paucity of Babylonian material from Seder Zera'im.674 
 Whereas yMQ 2:1, 81a, and yMQ 3:1, 82a, offer distinct laws for a mourner and someone 
observing ḥol ha-moed respectively, because the latter is more likely to commit evasion, 
bMQ 14a suggests that the rules for the Festival and one’s bereavement period should be 
                                                          
673 To be fair, the terminology is missing from tBeṣa 2:3/ tShab.  17:8 as well. This may say more about PT’s 
preoccupation with ha‘arama than BT’s lack thereof. However, Maimonides does suggest that BT is stricter than PT 
(yPes. 2:2, 61b) about this law: PT allows it both on Sabbath and Festivals, while BT, he argues, allows this only on 
Festivals and not on the Sabbath. (See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Festival 5:18; Mirkevet ha-
Mishneh, Laws of the Sabbath 23:8) 
 
674 There is, however, a passage in bMen. 67b indicates that a person might licitly evade the ḥallah requirement by 





identical. There is no citation of a baraita that indicates that the Festival law would ever 
be stricter than bereavement law for reasons of suspected ha‘arama. Where BT does cite 
an instance of ha‘arama (of selling phylacteries to make a living, bMQ 12a) on ḥol ha-
moed it is a tannaitic citation rather than amoraic or stammaitic discussion. 
 BGittin 65a raises the case of ha‘arama for ma‘aser sheni only tangentially, in order to 
prove a point about the status of children’s acquisitions (though, again, this may simply 
be due to the paucity of Babylonian material from Seder Zera'im). 
 R. Tarfon’s heroism in feeding three hundred women terumah during a famine by 
betrothing them (yYeb. 4:12, 6b) is nowhere mentioned in BT.  
      For an in-depth comparison between a PT and BT sugya, consider the parallel 
Babylonian sugya describing the fate of impure ḥallah on the Festival of Passover, one which 
is considered the locus classicus in the Palestinian Talmud (yPes. 3:3, 30a) for establishing 
the criteria for when ha‘arama may be used.675  
כיצד מפרישין חלת טומאה ביום טוב רבי אליעזר או' אל תקרא לה שם  )כ"י קאפמן( משנה פסחים ג:ג 
בן בתירה או' תטיל לצונים אמר יהושע לא זה הוא חמץ שמוזהרים עליו בל  יראה ובל   676עד שתיאפה
 ימצא אלא מפרשתה ומנחתה עד הערב ואם החמיצה החמיצה
Mishnah: How [on the Festival677] do they set apart the dough-offering [if the dough 
is in a state of] uncleanness? R. Eliezer says, "She should not designate [the 
dough=offering] before it is baked.” R. Judah b. Betera says, "She should put it into 
cold water." Said R. Joshua, "This is not the sort of leaven concerning which people 
are warned under the prohibitions, 'Let it not be seen' (Ex. 13:7), and 'Let it not be 
found' (Ex. 12:19). But she separates it and leaves it until evening, and if it ferments, 
it ferments. 
 
                                                          
675 See chapter 2, above. 
 
676 MS Parma: תאפה 
 





Unlike the PT sugya which we analyzed in detail in both chapter 2 and 3 above, the 
Babylonian amoraim do not present R. Eliezer’s position as ha‘arama at all. Indeed, in the 
mishnah, R. Eliezer simply suggests declaring ḥallah after the food has already been baked; 
it is only PT which describes his elaborate piece by piece monologue about the bread. Thus, 
the Babylonian amoraic explanations of this mishnah do not discuss ha‘arama at all,678 but 
instead frames the issue in terms of the potential for guests: 
 95) )מינכן .מח בבלי פסחיםתלמוד 
מחלוק' ר' אליעזר ור' יהושע דר' אליעזר סבר אמרינן הואיל  679...אמ' רמ' בר חמא הא דרב חסדא ורבה
ור' יהושע סבר לא אמרינן הואיל אמ' רב פפא ודילמא לא היא עד כאן לא קא"ר אליעזר התם דאמרינן 
כל חדא וחדא חזייא ליה לדידיה אבל הכא דלאורחים הוא דחזי  680הואיל דבעידנא דקא עיילינהו לתנורא
א נמי דלא אמרינן הואיל אמ' רב שישא בריה דרב אידי ודילמא לא היא עד כאן הא לדידיה ]לא[ חזי הכ
לא קא"ר יהושע אלא דאיכא חדא דלא חזיא לדידיה ולא לאורחים אבל הכא דחזי מיהת לאורחין הכי נמי 
 ירמיה קיבלה ר' זירא לא קיבלה... 'דאמרינן הואיל אמרוה קמיה דר' ירמיה ור' זירא ר
…Rami b. Ḥama said: This [argument between] R. Ḥisda and Rava681 corresponds to 
the arguments between R. Eliezer and R. Joshua, that R. Eliezer held that we do say, 
‘Since [guests are coming to eat it, it may be cooked on the Festival]’ and R. Joshua 
held that we do not say: ‘Since […].’ R. Pappa said: And maybe this not [correct]. 
Until now, R. Eliezer only said there that we say ‘since’ because at the time that he 
puts them into the oven, each one is possible for him [to eat], but here, as it is 
possible for guests to eat, but not for him to eat [all of it], here too we do not say, 
‘Since.’ R. Shisha the son of R. Idi said: And may be it is not [correct]. Until now, R. 
Joshua only said [no to ‘since’] because there is one [piece] that is not fitting682 for 
him [to eat] or for guests to eat], but here where all of it is fitting for guests to it, 
                                                          
678 bPes.48a – See Rashi s.v., maḥloket R. Eliezer, where he explains that one might take a small piece of each roll 
of bread as ḥallah rather than an entire roll. Thus, each roll has the potential to be eaten and may be baked on the 
Festival. 
 
679 MSS Munich 6, JTS 1608, 1623, Columbia, Oxford, Lunzer-Sassoon: רבא; MSS Vatican 109, Vatican 125, 
Vatican 134, Venice Ed., Vilna Ed.: רבה 
We presume that רבה is the correct reading as Rabbah was R. Ḥisda’s contemporary, while Rava was R. Ḥisda’s 
student. It is more likely that two contemporaries will have a major legal disagreement like ho’il than that a teacher 
and student would. 
 
680 MS Munich 6, et al.: אפי להי rather than דקעיילינהו לתנורא 
 
681 See supra n718 
 





here683 too we say ‘since.’ They said it before R. Yirmiyah and R. Zera. R. Yirmiya 
accepted it R. Zera did not. 684 
 
As a fourth generation amora and student of R. Ḥisda, presumably Rami b. Ḥami is quite 
familiar with the concept of ho’il, which is discussed more fully earlier in the sugya, bPes. 46b. 
The full terminology is הואיל ואיקלעו ליה אורחים, because guests may come over.685 As mentioned 
above, on the Festival, there is a prohibition to cook food which is not for that day’s 
consumption. According to this concept of ho’il however, if a food may theoretically be eaten on 
the Festival day itself by guests, 686 even though it likely will not be eaten because the members 
of the household have already eaten687 and no guests have been invited, cooking such food is not 
a punishable offense. (It is unclear whether according to Rabbah it is prohibited but not 
punishable,688 or it is completely permissible.689 Here, either may be possible, as the owner of the 
bread is in a bind not of his own choosing and is looking for any way out.)  
                                                          
683 Though the Aramaic is הכי, we translate as הכא in order to parallel the earlier sentence. 
 
684 We exclude the part of the sugya that describes why R. Zera would not accept the ho’il interpretation because it is 
not germane to our discussion per se. 
 
685 Another application of הואיל regards ownership – namely if one has the potential to redeem an item or to take 
back the item after having designated it as belonging to someone else, the item is considered to be his/hers though 
s/he does not have full rights of ownership over it. Earlier in the sugya, our case is related to this: considering the 
ḥallah to be in the bread owner’s possession, though s/he may not eat it, simply because s/he may rescind the ḥallah 
designation over a particular piece after having made it. Usually, the significance of ownership is not for the purpose 
of personal use but for the purpose of transgressing an ownership prohibition, or fulfilling a requirement of 
ownership for ritual purposes. In our case, the ownership over the ḥallah dough which had risen would cause a 
violation of bal yera’eh/bal yimaṣe, owning leaven on Passover. 
 
686 There must be enough time left in the day for guests to eat the food. If it is cooked just before sundown, even 
Rabbah does not allow it. See Tos.  bPes. 46b s.v. Rabbah 
 
687 See Meiri, Bet Ha-Beḥira bPes. 46b, who cites on behalf of most traditional medieval commentators that even R. 
Ḥisda agrees that if the member(s) of the household has not eaten yet, there is no punishment for cooking the food 
because s/he himself may eat it!  Rabbah’s innovation is that he permits this even once the member(s) of the 
household has eaten. 
 
688 See R. Zeraḥiah Ha-Levi, Ba‘al Ha-Ma'or bPes. ad loc. 
 





Rami b. Ḥama makes the logic of ho’il to the case at hand: he suggests that for R. Eliezer, 
each piece of bread may potentially be eaten, as either a) each piece may or may not ultimately 
become ḥallah,690 or b) perhaps the person baking will choose to break off a small portion of 
each separate piece of bread as ḥallah rather than designating any single piece as ḥallah.691 Thus, 
all of the pieces may be baked before any ḥallah has been designated.  This is quite different 
from PT’s explanation of R. Eliezer’s position, according to which a person must indicate an 
active interest in eating each and every piece: R. Eliezer requires a person to have a 
“conversation” that suggests that s/he wishes to eat each separate piece of bread. The fifth 
generation amora R. Pappa continues the discussion by challenging that R. Eliezer may suggest 
ho’il in one instance and not in another. Ultimately R. Zera rejects this reading of the tannaitic 
dispute (on the basis of a discussion between R. Joshua and R. Eliezer which is recorded in 
Tosefta). R. Yirmiyah, however accepts it. 
Ho’il is not about a person’s constructed intentions or monologues;692 it is instead about 
the legal definition of an item. If the item may possible be eaten on the Festival, it may be 
cooked. If it will most certainly not be eaten on the Festival, it may not be cooked. This takes the 
discussion away from the actor him/herself and puts the emphasis on the food.  The fact that 
Rami b. Ḥama, R. Pappa, and R. Yirmiyah all prefer a ho’il explanation to a ha‘arama 
explanation may be a general symptom of discomfort with, or simply a disconnection from, 
                                                          
690 See R. Samson of Sens cited in Tos. bPes. 46b s.v., הואיל 
 
691 See Rashi bPes. 48a s.v., מחלוקת 
 
692 There is, however, a debate among traditional commentators over whether even Rabbah would punish a person 
who outright says that s/he is baking for after the Festival, despite the fact that there is still time for guests to arrive. 





ha‘arama among BT amoraim. Unlike fraus legi in PT, ha‘arama is not a pressing issue for 
these rabbis.  
All this, of course, is not to suggest that the amoraim or the redactors were aware of and 
made active changes to Palestinian sources and positions that they alrady knew about, but only 
that the term, and perhaps even the notion of ha‘arama as a significant phenomenon simply was 
not a prominent part of their analysis or thought process. This observation are is to be expected 
in light of the connection between the Palestinian material and the Roman material, the latter 
being quite preoccupied with the issue of fraus legi.  
Language 
But the omission of ha‘arama terminology may also reflect a discomfort with ha‘arama 
as a legitimate legal instrument, and perhaps specifically the type of ha‘arama that relates to 
intention. To that end, there is an interesting phenomenon attributed to the third and fourth 
generation amoraim which continues into stammaitic strata: the aramaicized term  אתי
 begins to refer to lying about earlier facts in order to avoid legal איערומי קא מערים/לאיערומי
consequences. The term הערמה itself has been removed from its original connotation of 
shrewdness or cunning and has been transformed into mendacity.   
I. Divorce and Compensation 
 פ. -בבלי כתובות עט:
המוציא יצאות על ניכסי אשתו הוציא הרבה ואכל קימעה קימעה ואכל הרבה מה  693משנה: )פרמה(
 שהוציא הוציא ומה שאכל אכל הוציא ולא אכל ישבע כמה הוציא ויטול
One who spends on his wife’s possessions: if he spent a lot and consumed only a 
little; spent a little and consumed a lot, whatever he has spent is spent, and 
whatever he has consumed he has consumed. If he spent and did not consume at 
all, he takes an oath as to how much he spent and takes [that amount in return 
when the couple divorces]. 
 
                                                          






שבח כנגד הוצאה למאי הילכתא אמ' אביי  694אמ' רב אסי והוא שהיה ישבע כמה הוציא ויטול:
אתי לאיערומי אלא אמ'  696שבח יתר על הוצאה נוטל הוצאה בלא שבועה א"ל רבא 695שאם הייתה
 רבא שאם היתה הוצאה יתירה על השבח אין לו אלא הוצאה שיעור שבח ובשבועה
R. Jose said: And [he swears how much he spent and takes it] only when there is 
profit equivalent to what was spent. For what legal end [did R. Jose make his 
statement]? Abaye said: that if there was more profit than money spent, he can 
take back the money that he spent without an oath. Rava said to him: If so, he will 
lie [about how much he spent]! Rather, Rava said: if the money spent was more 
than the profit, he only gets the amount from what he spent up to the amount of 
profit. 
 
It seems that Rava,697 the fourth generation amora, uses ‘.r.m. here to mean perjury. 
According to David Weiss Halivni, Abaye and Rava’s discussions are recorded and/or 
reconstructed by the stammaim fairly accurately.698 Thus, Rava indeed may have used these very 
words.  And though according to Richard Kalmin Rava and Abaye had very few face-to-face 
                                                          
694 MSS Vatican 113, Vatican 487.11, Soncino Ed., Vilna Ed.: והוא שיש; MS Vatican 130: שיש בה 
 
695 All others: היה 
 
696 MSS St. Petersburg, Vatican 130, Vatican 487.11, Soncino Ed., Vilna Ed. add אם כן; all extant MSS and Eds. cite 
Rava rather than Rabbah as Abaye’s interlocutor. 
 
697 According to Shamma Friedman, originally the names Rava and Rabbah were spelled identically, and only over 
time (after the close of the Babylonian Talmud) did the suggestions for two different spellings arise to minimize 
confusion.  (Shamma Friedman, “The Spelling of the Names רבה and רבא in the Babylonian Talmud,” Sinai 110 
(Spring 1992) 140-157, esp. 144-5) 
See R. Hai Gaon’s comments at the ends of bAZ: 
במקום רב.  -אלו כֻּלן ראבה נכתבין בהי והֵבי דגש. אבל ראבא נכתב באלף, והֵבי רפוי... ודעו כי ראבה ַאָבה שמו, וזה ריש שהוסיפו עליו "
 ".כמו רב. ופירוש ַאָבה כמו שאומר ָאִבי, ופירוש ֲאָבא כמו שאומר אבא סתם -ַראָבא ֲאָבא שמו, וזה ריש המוסיף עליו ו
(JTS MS, Abramson print); See also, Elyakim Weissberg, “The writing of the names Rabbah and Rava: Rav Hai 
Gaon’s perspective and conflicting opinions,” Meḥqarim b’lashon 5-6 (1992) 181-214; Aharon Shweka, “Studies in 
the Halakhot Gedolot: Text and Redaction,” Doctoral Dissertation: Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2008) 71-73) 
Here we are convinced that this is indeed Rava rather than Rabbah  even simply because Abaye, Rava’s older 
colleague, speaks first, whereas Abaye’s teacher Rabbah would have spoken first. This is a relatively stable rule of 
thumb according to traditional commentators.  (R. Isaiah di Trani Responsum #93; Naḥmanides, Novellae BM 52a) 
 
698 Due to chronological proximity. This is as opposed to the lost havayot de-Rav u-Shmuel, argumentation between 
Rav and Shmuel, which came much earlier than the late anonymous editors. During the amoraic period, a time 
characterized by interest in precise preservation of apodictic statements rather than such rigorous preservation of 
shaqla v’taria, dialectical debate, Rav and Shmuel’s many conversations were lost, and there was little for the later 
editors to reconstruct: “the Amoraim did not deem it important enough to have the discursive material committed to 






interactions, 699 and this conversation is probably not one of them, this only means that their 
comments were juxtaposed as a dialogue by amoraim or post-talmudic scribes. Thus, Rava’s 
original language was likely preserved just as faithfully as any other attributed statement in the 
Talmud. Significantly, there is another sugya in which Rava uses this terminology when 
speaking to his student R. Naḥman b. Yiṣḥaq700 to suggest that someone is lying about being 
religiously rehabilitated. Again, this may indicate that Rava actually “uses” such terminology, or 
that he used it once, so those seeking to construct or to reconstruct a conversation might insert it 
here. 
II. A Watched Pot Will Not Boil 
 701קד(-לח. )ע"פ הגהות דוד הלבני, מקורות ומסורות מסכת שבת עמ' קג-בבלי שבת לז:
למחר נפק  703שכח קדירה על גבי כירה ובשלה בשבת מהו אשתיק 702בעו מיניה מר' חייא בר אבא
ודרש להו המבשל בשבת בשוגג יאכל במזיד לא יאכל ולא שנא מאי ולא שנא רבה ורב יוסף דאמרי 
                                                          
699 See Richard Kalmin, Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia. Atlanta: Scholars Press (1994) 
175-192. Also, Shamma Friedman has suggested that Rabbah and Rava spelled their names the same way and that 
the difference in spelling is a relatively late phenomenon See Shamma Friedman, “The spelling of the names רבה 
and רבא in the Babylonian Talmud,” Sinai 110 (Spring – Summer 1992) 140-164.  
 
700 It is possible that the stam attributed this terminology to Rava because he is cited issuing a similar 
(though not the same) type of warning to a naïve R. Naḥman in bSan. 25a: 
 בבלי סנהדרין כה.
אמר  נחמן לאכשוריהסבר רב   פסליה רב נחמן ועבריה אזל רבי מזיה וטופריה ההוא טבחא דאישתכח דנפקא טריפתא מתותי ידיה
אין לו  על הטריפותהחשוד  אידי בר אבין דאמר רב אידי בר אבין 700כדרב  דילמא איערומי קא מערים אלא מאי תקנתיה ליה רבא
  או שיוציא טריפה מתחת ידו בדבר חשוב משלו ויחזיר אבידה בדבר חשוב תקנה עד שילך למקום שאין מכירין אותו
The butcher who sold terefa meat, R. Naḥman declared him [an] unfit [witness] and removed 
 him [from his post]. He grew his hair and nails long. R. Naḥman thought to declare him a  
proper witness. Rava said to him: Perhaps he is being deceptive? Rather, what is the solution? Like R. Idi b. 
Avin, that R. Idi b. Avin said: One who is suspected of selling terefot has no repair until he goes to a place 
where no one knows him and he returns a lost object that is expensive, or he gives up an expensive terefa. 
In this example too, ha‘arama bears a deceptive connotation. It is not, however, an example of perjury. 
 
701 MS Munich is very difficult to parse as it cites a practically nonsensical position for R. Naḥman b. Yiṣḥaq:  רב
לנחמן בר יצחק אמ' לאיסורא מבשל להו דלא אית לאיערומי בשוגג נמי לא יאכ ; likewise, MS Oxford is problematic, as it 
embellishes the suggestion that Rabbah, R. Yosef and R. Naḥman b. Yiṣḥaq argues about the content of R. Ḥiyya b. 
Abba’s statement, which is highly unlikely, considering that R. Ḥiyya b. Abba lived in the same generation as they 
and probably fully explained his statement. Thus, there should be no debate about its meaning. Halivni prefers to 
read this as an argument between R. Ḥiyya b. Abba on the one hand and Rabbah, R. Yosef and R. Naḥman b. 
Yiṣḥaq on the other, as we shall explain in the body of the paper. 
702 MS Munich: ר' חייא בר אבין – It is unlikely that Rabbah and R. Yosef would argue about a statement by R. Ḥiyya 






תרוייהו להיתרא מבשל הוא דקעביד מעשה במזיד לא יאכל אבל האי דלא קעביד מעשה במזיד נמי 
אתי יאכל רב נחמן בר יצחק אמ' לאיסורא מבשל להו דלא אתי לאיערומי בשוגג נמי יאכל האי ד
 לאיערומי בשוגג נמי לא יאכל
They asked R. Ḥiyya b. Abba: If one forgot a pot on the fire, and it was cooked on 
the Sabbath, what is the law? He was silent and said nothing to them. The next 
day, he went out and expounded to them: One who cooks on the Sabbath out of 
error may eat it; purposely, he may not; and there is no distinction. What does 
“and there is no distinction” mean? Rabbah and R. Joseph, the two of them say it 
is for permission: one who cooks, who does an action, if purposely, may not eat, 
but this [person who left the pot on the stove] who did no action [on the Sabbath] 
even [when he does so] purposely, he may eat. R. Naḥman b. Yiṣḥaq704 said: “For 
prohibition”: one who actually cooked on the Sabbath who will not lie [about 
whether he did so purposely or in error], may eat if he cooked in error, but this 
[person, who left the pot on the stove] who will lie [claiming that he left it there in 
error] may not eat even when [he left it] in error. 
 
R. Ḥiyya b. Abba asserts that the law is the same for one who forgot a pot on the stove on 
Friday, thus allowing its contents to boil on the Sabbath, and one who accidentally cooked on the 
Sabbath itself:705 the offender may not eat the cooked food. Rabbah and R. Yosef, however,706 
think that even one who left a pot on the stove purposely on Friday to boil on the Sabbath should 
be allowed to eat from it, as s/he has not performed any act of violation on the Sabbath itself.  R. 
Naḥman agrees that the one who leaves a pot on purpose and by accident should be judged the 
same way, but for him, this means stricture rather than leniency: If a person who puts the pot on 
the stove on Friday is permitted to eat its contents, there will be reason to do so on purpose and 
claim it was mere forgetfulness. There is no such concern for someone to do this on the Sabbath 
                                                          
703 MS Oxford: אישתיק is absent. 
 
704 R. Naḥman b. Ya’aqov according to Ḥiddushei Ha-Rashba ad loc. (No MSS or printed versions confirm this 
reading.) 
 
705 Halivni points to the edition of the Ba‘al Halakhot Gedolot (Jerusalem: Hildesheimer, 1972): ולא שנא שכח 
 
706 Halivni asserts that the question מאי ולא שנא is a later addition, based on the historically challenging suggestion 
that Rabbah/R. Yosef and R. Naḥman did not know what their contemporary, R. Ḥiyya b. Abba meant. Thus, he 
chooses to ignore it and suggestion that the following statements are not trying to elucidate R. Ḥiyya b. Abba’s 
position but to oppose it, but suggesting that the law of one who forgot the pot or put the pot on purposely on Fri. 





itself – place a pot on the stove purposely and lie about it – as a person would be willing to 
perform a lighter violation such as placing a pot on the stove before the Sabbath but not a more 
severe violation such as directly cooking on the Sabbath.707  
  The terminology of איערומי means lying in this case, but it is likely that the amora himself 
did not use it: perhaps, he simply said לאיסורא, and the stam chose to explain his words. 
Moreover, according to MS Oxford which reads רבה ורב יוסף להיתרא רב נחמן בר יצחק לאיסורא, even לאיסורא 
is not a direct quotation, but mere paraphrasing by the redactors.  
III. Ketubah Collection 
 בבלי כתובות פז: )מינכן(
מי אמרי' כיון )דאיכ'( דקא דייקא כולי האי איבעיא להו פוגמת כתובתה פחות משוה פרוטה מהו 
 דילמא איערומי קא מערמיא מאי תיקו 708 קושטא קאמרה או
It was asked of them: If one collects her ketubah less than a perutah at a time, 
what is the law? Do we say that because she is so meticulous she is telling the 
truth, or perhaps is she is being crafty? The matter stands. 
 
The context of this passage is a case in which a woman in possession of her marriage 
settlement contract admits that her ex-husband has already paid her half of what he owes, but the 
two parties argue over whether he has paid her the other half. The question posed has something 
to do with the woman’s ability to identify the dates on which each penny was given to her, or 
perhaps to be able to name the amount she has been given even to the decimal place.  The 
question is whether her exacting recollection of the money indicates that she is telling the truth, 
or perhaps she is lying in a convincing manner. Again, ha‘arama here refers to lying. This time it 
is clearly the stammaim who employ the terminology. 
IV. Lying Litigant 
 בבלי ב"מ ד: )מינכן(
סלעי' דינרי' מלוה או' חמש ולוה או' שלש ר' שמעו' )או'( בן אלע' או' הואיל והודה מקצ' הטענ' ישב' 
ר' עקי' או' אינו אל' כמשיב אביד' ופטור... ר' עקי' או' אינו אל' כמשי' אביד' ופטו' טעמ' דא' שלש הא 
                                                          
707 See Rashi and Ritva Novellae ad loc. 
 





תי' חייב... לא לעול' אימ' לך שתי' נמי פטו' והאי דקתני שלש לאפו' מדר' שמעו' בן אלעזש דא'  '
מודי' מקצ' הטענ' הוי וחייב קמ"ל דמשי' אביד' נמי הוי ופטו' הכי נמי מסתבר' דאי ס"ד שתי' חייב 
בשלש היכי פט' ר' עקי' האי איערומי709 קמיערם סבר כי אמינ' שתי' בעינ' אשתבועי אימא שלש קא 
 'הוי משי' אבד' ואיפטר
[If a loan document says] “coins” [without specifying a number], and the lender 
says, “Five,” while the borrower says, “Three,” R. Shimon b. Elazar says: 
Because he (=the borrower) admitted to some of the claim, he must swear [that he 
owes that much and no more]. R. Aqiva says: He is nothing but one who returns 
lost property [for he could have claimed only two], and he is exempt [from 
swearing that he does not owe the remainder]…710 
 
R. Aqiva says: He is nothing but one who returns lost property, and is exempt. 
This [exemption] is only because he said three, but [had he said] two, he [would 
be] obligated [to swear regarding the remainder]… No, I say to you that [had he 
said] two, he would also be exempt. The reason [the baraita] taught “three” is to 
exclude [his perspective] from [that of] R. Shimon b. Elazar who said the he is 
considered as one who admits to part of the claim and is obligated [to take an 
oath]. Instead, this teaches us that he is [according to R. Aqiva, even where he 
claims three] considered as one who returns lost property and is exempt [from 
taking an oath]. This is also logical, for if you thought that [for saying] two [the 
borrower] would be obligated [to take an oath], for three, how could R. Aqiva 
exempt him? [R. Aqiva reasoned that perhaps] He would be crafty, thinking: If I 
say two, I will have to take an oath, so I shall say three so that I can be considered 
like one who returns lost property, and I shall be exempt. 
 
One whose true position is that s/he has been paid two sela’im or two dinarim may end 
up perjuring her/himself in court in order to abstain from taking an oath. Again, ha‘arama 
indicates lying to avoid legal consequences. 
                                                          
709 MS Vatican 114: ערומי 
 
710 The intervening segment regards the rabbinic issue known as helakh (composite of הא לך - “this is for you”), 
situation in which the creditor demands amount X while the debtor admits to owing half of X and offers it to the 





 While there have been earlier instances of ha‘arama as deception:711 tMS 5:11, for 
example, uses ha‘arama to mean misrepresenting one’s plans for a given vessel,712 those 
instances referred to projecting one’s future intentions rather than lying about what has already 
happened. אתי לאיערומי, however, deals with lying about past facts,  such as whether a person has 
(past tense) placed a pot on the stove purposely or by accident; whether a person found two coins 
or three; whether a woman has received her ketubah payment or not, etc. In the stammaitic 
material and perhaps as early as the fourth century amoraim, the terminology of איערומי becomes 
a synonym for perjury about established fact.713 Michael Sokoloff in fact, offer the connotation 
of the reflexive  איערומי as “to deceive,” while offering the connotation of the simple verb form 
 as “to beguile.”714  This terminology indicates an attitude not simply about these particular ערם
cases, but about ha‘arama itself as something that involves a denial of facts rather than simply a 
construction of “new” facts. 
                                                          
711 In addition to indicating anxiety about the overuse of ha’arama, PT also uses the term for situations of outwitting  
convention, often in a tricky way. For instance, PT says about the high priest Joshua b. Gamla who tricked a woman 
into marrying him –הערמה עשה (yYeb. 6:4, 7c); scholars who devise a method of invisible ink are known as  ערימין
 very clever people (yShab. 12:4, 13d; yGit. 2:3, 44b),” tricking a mesit into instigating others in front of“ -סגין
witnesses is introduced by the question כיצד עושין לו להערים עליו? - What can they do to trick him (yYeb. 16:6, 15d; 
ySan. 7:12, 25d), and meat salesmen taking advantage of a prohibition to weigh bekhor meat and charging for how 
big the steaks look rather than for how large they actually are – מערימין עליו ומוכרין אותו ביוקר (yMQ 2:3, 81b) There 
are likewise sources in midrash halakhah which use ‘.r.m. similarly: Mekhilta d’R. Ishmael Masekhta D’shira 6; 
Sifri Bemidbar Naso 7 
 
712 Similarly, bAZ 14b describes how an idolater might specifically ask a Jewish vendor for a type of turkey not 
considered best for idolatry so that the Jew will sell it to him, not suspecting that he will use it for idolatry. See also 
yMQ 2:3, 81b, where a meat salesman takes advantage of a prohibition to weigh bekhor meat and charges for how 
big the steaks look rather than for how large they actually are – מערימין עליו ומוכרין אותו ביוקר . 
See also Lamentations Rabbah 1 where the Zealots question whether R. Yoḥanan b. Zakkai’s body in a coffin is a 
case of ha‘arama.  
 
713 See also bGit. 54b; bKet. 52a and 80a 
 
714 Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic of the Talmudic and Geonic Periods. Ramat Gan: 






This approach may be hinted to even earlier than the fourth generation amoraim, by the 
third generation amora R. Joseph. The following exchange between R. Joseph and Abaye is 
suggestive of a more skeptical view of ha‘arama: 
 בבלי ביצה לז. )כ"י מינכן(
ורמינהי משילין פירות דרך ארובה בי"ט אמ' רב יוסף לא קשי' הא ר' אל]י[עזר  כל אילו בי"ט אמרו
לבור ר' אליעזר או' מעלה את הראשון על מנת לשוחטו  715הא ר' יהושע דתניא אותו ואת בנו שנפל
ושוחטו והשני עושה לו פרנסה במקומו בשביל שלא ימות ר' יהושע או' מעלה את הראשון על מנת 
ממאי דילמ'  716א"ל אביי לשוחטו ואינו שוחטו וחוזר ומעלה את השני רצה זה שוחט רצה זה שוחט
אבל הכא דלא אפשר בפרנסה לא אינמי דילמ' עד עד כאן לא א"ר אליעזר התם דאיפשר בפרנסה 
 לא 718אבל הכא דלא אפשר לאערומי 717כאן לא קא"ר יהוש' התם דאפשר בהערמה
All these things they forbade on a Festival: But the following contradicts this: 
One may let down fruit through a trap-door on a Festival but not on a Sabbath. 
Said R. Joseph: There is no contradiction: the one is according to R. Eliezer; the 
other is according to R. Joshua. For it was taught: If it and its young fell into a pit, 
R. Eliezer says: He may bring up one of them in order to slaughter it and must 
slaughter it; and as for the other, he should feed it in the very place [it fell], so that 
it does not die. R. Joshua says: He brings up one in order to slaughter it but does 
not slaughter it, and he uses cunning and again brings up the second; and he may 
slaughter whichever he desires. Abaye said to him: Whence [do you know that 
this is so]? Perhaps R. Eliezer said so only where provisions can be made, but not 
here where no provisions cannot be made. Or, R. Joshua rules thus only there, 
where one can make use of subtlety, but not here where it is not possible to make 
use of subtlety. 
 
 The mishnah on which this section is commenting asserts that there is only one distinction 
between Sabbath and Festival law: the permissibility of cooking (on the latter).  A baraita is 
cited to contradict: fruit that has been drying on a roof may be pulled into the house through the 
skylight on a Festival, but presumably not on the Sabbath. R. Joseph understands this as typical 
                                                          
715 MSS Goettingen, London: שנפלו  
 
716 MS Vatican 134 does not attribute this comment to Abaye; MS Oxford skips the entire section distinguishing the 
cases on the basis of ha‘arama being different from full exemption and moves directly to R. Pappa’s explanation. 
On the one hand, in other places in BT (Shab. 117b and 124a), the stam offers the challenge of ממאי   , so perhaps the 
same is true here too. However, we see no reason why Abaye would not have been responding to, and challenging 
his teacher, R. Yosef’s comparison. Thus, we presume this to be properly attributed to Abaye. 
 
717 MSS London, Vatican 134: דאפשר לאערומי rather than דאפשר בהערמה 
 





R. Joshua, given his permissive stance regarding ha‘arama on Festivals.  R. Joseph’s comparison 
is fascinating though: he equates a dispensation to disobey the law (in favor of avoiding financial 
loss) with using ha‘arama (for the very same purpose). In R. Joseph’s view, allowing one’s to 
construct intention is the same as simply allowing one to override the law.  
 What does such a comparison imply? While one might try to strenuously argue that this is 
simply an indicator that R. Joshua would be lenient in both cases, the straightforward reading of 
R. Joseph’s position is more troubling. Nowhere in the Palestinian material is ha‘arama 
analogized to not having to follow the law in the first place. Perhaps then R. Joseph does not see 
ha‘arama as constructed intention at all, on the model that we have proposed thus far. Perhaps he 
understands ha‘arama as simply keeping one’s exemption from the law hidden, whether from 
onlookers or from oneself, similar to the marit ‘ayin understanding of ha‘arama that we 
suggested and rejected in the previous chapter. What this would imply is that projected intentions 
are no true substitution for true organic intention; they are only a cover-up to allow for special 
dispensations in unique cases. 
 Nor does Abaye fully disabuse R. Joseph of this comparison: rather than arguing for an 
intrinsic difference between the two cases, he argues for what appears to be an incidental one. He 
agrees that R. Eliezer may approve of the dispensation for the drying fruits, but not for the 
animals because the latter can be cared for in the pit. On the other hand, R. Joshua may see a 
difference between using the dispensation without ha‘arama and with ha’arama. The 
terminology of דאפשר בהערמה is intriguing. If Abaye truly believes that ha‘arama is completely 
above board, he should ask incredulously: how can you even compare the two? Instead, he too 





openly and not following it, but being surreptitious about it. Does Abaye too subscribe to this 
perspective on ha‘arama, that it is merely a cover-up? 
In a similar vein, the sixth generation amora R. Ashi is quite harsh in his judgment about 
ha‘arama in the case of cooking on a Festival in preparation for the Sabbath, asserting that this 
act is punished more severely even than purposeful transgression: 
 )מינכן(  בבלי ביצה יז:
ת"ש מי שהניח ערובי תבשילין הרי זה אופה ומבשל ומטמין ואם רצה לאכל את ערובו הרשות בידו 
אכלו עד שלא אפה עד שלא בישל עד שלא הטמי' הרי זה לא יאפה ולא יבשל ולא יטמין לא לו ולא 
לאחרים ולא אחרים אופין לו ומבשלין לו אבל מבשל הוא ליום טוב ואם הותיר הותיר לשבת ובלבד 
שלא יערים ואם הערים אסור אמ' רב אשי הערמה קאמרת שאני הערמה דאחמירו בה רבנן טפי 
 ממזיד 
Come and learn: One who left “combined cooked foods” – may bake, cook and 
insulate, and if he wishes to eat his “combination,” he may. If he ate it before 
baking or insulating, he may not bake, cook or insulate, neither for himself or 
others, and others may not bake or cook for him. He may, however, cook for the 
holiday itself, and if he had leftovers, he has left them for the Sabbath, so long as 
he does not practice cunning [to cook extra]. And if he did practice cunning [to 
cook extra], it is forbidden. R. Ashi said: You are comparing (the earlier case, not 
brought here) to ha‘arama? Ha‘arama is different, as the rabbis were stricter in 
its regard than in cases even of purposeful transgression! 
  
The “combination of foods” is a rabbinically created mechanism719 to permit cooking for 
the upcoming Sabbath on a Festival that falls out on a Thursday or Friday, while otherwise such 
cooking would be forbidden. It involves setting aside one cooked item and one baked item before 
the Festival begins as a representation of the beginning of the cooking process. If one eats the 
two items, s/he may no longer cook for the Sabbath on the Festival. One may, however, eat any 
food which happens to remain from the Festival days on the Sabbath.  The baraita specifies that 
in such a case, one may not purposely cook excess food on the Festival in to create “leftovers” 
for the Sabbath.  R. Ashi is cited here as polemicizing against ha‘arama: it is worse to practice 
                                                          





ha‘arama (in this situation)720 than it would be to purposely and obviously cook on the Festival 
for Sabbath without having ever made an ‘eruv tavshilin in the first place.721  Thus, the rabbis are 
stricter about it. R. Ashi’s comment, taken alone, may simply underscore the seriousness of the 
prohibition of ha‘arama in this case – after all, the agent had an ‘eruv tavshilin and chose to eat 
it rather than to utilize it – there is no pathos here. Moreover, such use of ha‘arama threatens to 
undermine the institution of ‘eruv tavshilin altogether.722 But when compared to the parallel PT 
sugya, R. Ashi’s comments may be seen more transparently as an emphatic stance against 
ha‘arama as akin to breaking the law: 
 ירושלמי ביצה ב:א, דף סא עמוד א' )ליידן(
ב:א יום טוב שחל להיות ערב שבת לא יבשל בתחילה מיום טוב לשבת אבל מבשל הוא לי"ט  משנה
 ואם הותיר הותיר לשבת
אמר ר' אבהו בדין היה שיהו אופין  723הוא אסור ועירובי תבשיליו מתירין ׳ איתא חמי דבר תורהגמ:
חמי מציעין   724אם או' את כן אף הוא אופה ומבשל מיום טוב לחול. איתא ומבשלין מיום טוב לשבת
אמ' ר' אילא ולמה מציעין מיום  725את המיטות מיום טוב לשבת ואין אופין ומבשלין מיום טוב לשבת
טוב לשבת? שכן מציעין את המיטות מלילי שבת לשבת. ויאפו או יבשלו מיום טוב לשבת? אין אופין 
 אמ' ובלבד שלא יערים  726ומבשלין )מיום טוב( מלילי שבת לשבת ר' כהנא בריה דר' חייה בר בא
Mishnah: On a Festival which coincided with the eve of the Sabbath [Friday] - a 
person should not begin cooking on the Festival day [Friday] for the purposes of 
the Sabbath. But he prepares food for the Festival day, and if he leaves something 
over, he has left it over for use on the Sabbath. 
Gemara:...Now, see here! Is there a matter which is forbidden by the law of the 
Torah, but rendered permissible by the [rabbinic creation of] using the 
‘combination of foods’ meachanism? Said R. Abahu, "In strict law people should 
be permitted to bake or cook on a Festival day for use on the Sabbath. But, if you 
should say so [and decide the law in that way], then a person will cook also on a 
                                                          
720 R. Ashi’s comments seem to reflect a general negative orientation towards ha‘arama as opposed to a rejection in 
this case only. 
 
721 This is the context in which the redactors place R. Ashi’s comments.  
 
722 Rashi ad. loc.s.v., shahni ha‘arama                
 
723 MS Darmstadt: אתא חמי מדבר תורה הוא שאסור לבשל ולאפות מיום טוב לחבירו ומיום טוב לשבת ועירובי תבשילין מתירין 
 
724 MS Darmstadt: אתא 
 
725 MS Darmstadt: בלא עירוב 
 





Festival day for use on an ordinary day. For, see here: people make beds on the 
Festival for use on the Sabbath. Should they not be permitted to bake or cook on a 
Festival day food for use on the Sabbath? R. Kahana b. R. Ḥiyya bar Ba said, 
"That is on condition that one not practice cunning   [by baking or cooking a great 
deal of food, ostensibly for the Festival itself]." 
 
Once again, the danger is that a person might choose to defraud the law by baking or 
cooking extra food on the Festival ostensibly for the Festival itself, but truly in order to have 
leftovers for the Sabbath. In contrast to R. Ashi’s assertion in BT that ha‘arama is more 
egregious than obviously flouting the law, R. Kahana does not polemicize against ha‘arama; he 
merely states that one is forbidden to take advantage of it in this case. And, one might argue that 
R. Kahana had even more to polemicize about, as in this case, the agent had not even bothered to 
prepare an ‘eruv tavshilin. 
Optics 
A contribution of BT which strikes right at the heart of whether inner intentions matter is 
BT’s discomfort when disparity between one’s inner intention and external action is discernible 
when using ha‘arama. Placing the PT and BT versions of the Bet Ḥoron incident side by side 
brings this into focus:  
מתנה  727: המודר הנייה מחבירו ואין לו מה יאכל נותן לאחר משם)כ"י פארמה(נדרים ה:ו משנה 
  730מודר ממנו הנייה והיה משיא את בנומעשה בבית חורון באחד שהיה אביו 729מותר בה 728והלה
שיבוא אבא ויאכל עימנו  732בפניך עד 731אמר לחבירו הרי החצר והסעודה נתונין לך במתנה והן
                                                          
727 MS Kaufmann: משום 
 
728 MS Kaufmann: והלא 
 
729 This has already been mentioned in mNed. 4:8, but it is here as well in order to provide the legal basis for the 
Ḥoron story. (Albeck, Shishah Sidrei Mishnah, Vol. 3, 164) 
 
730 MS Kaufmann: בתו 
 
731 MS Kaufmann: אין 
 





שתקדישם  733בסעודה אמר לו אם שלי הם הרי הן מוקדשים לשמים אמר לו לא נתתי לך את שלי
ים ומתרצים זה לזה ויהא לשמים אמר לו לא נתתה לי את שלך אלא שתהא אתה ואביך אוכלים ושות
 אמרו כל מתנה שאינה שאם הקדישה תהא מקודשת אינה  734עוון תלוי בראשי וכשבא דבר לפני חכמ'
 מתנה
Mishnah:735 One who is prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another, 
and has nothing to eat, the person [from whom he is vowed benefit] gives [food] 
to a third party as a gift, and this [prohibited party] may partake of it. There was 
someone in Bet Ḥoron whose father was prohibited by vow from deriving benefit 
from him. And he [the man in Bet Ḥoron] was marrying off his son, and he said to 
his fellow, "The courtyard and the banquet are given over to you as a gift. But 
they are before you only so that father may come and eat with us at the banquet." 
The other party said, "Now, if they really are mine, then lo, they are consecrated 
to heaven!" Said he to him, "I did not give you want's mine so you would 
consecrate it to heaven!" He replied, "You did not give me what is yours except 
so that you and your father could eat and drink and make friends again, while the 
sin [for violating the oath] could rest on his [my] head"! 
 
 736)מינכן(  בבלי נדרים מח?
מעש' לסתור חסו' מחסר' והכי קתני אם הוכי' סופו על 
אסור ומעש' נמי בבי' חורון באחד דהוה סופו  737תחיל'
על תחלתו א' רבא לא שנו אל' דא'ל ואינן לפניך אלא 
שיבא ) (]א[בא ]אבל[ א'ל והן בפניך כדי שיבא  738כדי
 עמ' ב )ליידן( ירושלמי נדרים ה:ז, לט
ואמר ר' יוחנן ניכר הוא זה שהוא תלמיד חכם. אמר ר' 
יוסי ביר' בון אכין הוה עובדא יונתן בן עוזיאל הדירו אביו 
מכנסיו ועמד וכתבן לשמי מה עשה שמי מכר מקצת 
והקדיש מקצת ונתן לו מתנה את השאר ואמר כל מי 
                                                          
733 MS Kaufmann adds the word אלא here. 
 
734 MS Kaufmann skips וכשבא דבר לפני חכמים אמרו; instead אמרו חכמים כל מתנה... 
 
735 All PT translations are taken from Jacob Neusner, The Talmud of the Land of Israel: Based on the English 
Translation of Baruch M. Bokser with Lawrence Schiffman. Atlanta: Scholars Press (1998) 
736 MS Munich and the editio princeps offer the most cogent version. I have used MS Munich here, but translated 
based on a combination of the two versions.  
 
737 See bGittin 66a/Ḥullin 39b for a similar usage of הוכיח סופו על תחילתו to resolve a מעשה לסתור situation. David 
Weiss Halivni points out that one must have a particular version of the Bet Ḥoron story in order to view it as  הוכיח
 as) והן בפניך )כדי( שיבא אבא as in MS Parma) and not) והן בפניך עד שיבא אבא The madir must have said  .סופו על תחילתו
in Rava’s reading in the sugya). According to the first version, the gift only belongs to the third party until the father 
eats from the food. In other words, it is a מתנה על מנת להחזיר, a gift that is given only on condition that it is ultimately 
returned by the recipient. Halivni favors this reading because of the characterization that the Bet Ḥoron case is one 
of הוכיח סופו על תחילתו. If the madir had originally said, “This is yours only so that father may eat,” this would be a 
case of הוכיח תחילתו על תחילתו. After all, the madir admits to his/her motivations at the outside. If, however, the madir 
simply stipulated that the gift should be returned once the father has eaten, it is only the comment that the madir 
makes after the third party tried to consecrate the food to heqdesh – namely, that he may not do so – that makes the 
madir’s motivations clear. And that statement is made not at the outset but later, which makes it a case of  הוכיח סופו
 It further explains why the Bet Ḥoron case and the line prior to it in the mishnah about feeding a mudar  .על תחילתו
through a third party might be viewed as contradictory. (Meqorot U-Mesorot 315-316.) 
 
738 Although Halivni suggests that the stam was using the version of עד שיבא אבא, because on 48b Rava compares Bet 
Ḥoron to a case where one gives a gift only in order to the recipient to give it to someone else )קני על מנת להקנות(, he 






הו' דא'ל ל'א אמרי לה א' רבא לא תימ' טע'  אב' מדעת'
דא'ל ואינן לפניך הו' דאסור אבל א'ל והן לפני' כדי שיבא 
 ויאכל אסור מאי טע' סעודתו מוכח' עליו
Does [the mishnah bring] an incident [to] 
contradict [itself]? There is material missing 
[from the mishnah], and so it was taught: If 
the end proves [the motivations of] the 
beginning is prohibited. And there was 
likewise an incident in Bet Ḥoron with 
someone, where its ending [shed light]739 
upon its beginning. Rava said: They only 
learned [that it is prohibited] if he said to him: 
And they are only yours so that my father will 
come. If [however] he said to him: And they 
are yours so that father may come, then it is 
from his own mind. They reported another 
version: Rava said: Do not say that the reason 
[this is prohibited] is that he said to him, “and 
they are only yours,” etc., but if he had said: 
“So that he will come and eat [it is 
permissible.”740 Rather] it is forbidden. Why? 
Because his meal741  sheds light upon him 
(i.e., his intentions). 
 שיבוא ויערער על המתנה הזאת יוציא מיד הלקוחות ומיד
ההקדש ואחר כך יוציא מזה. ר' ירמיה בעי מעתה אין אדם 
נותן מתנה לחבירו על מנת שלא יקדישנה לשמים כיני 
מתניתא כל מתנה שהיא כמתנת בית חורון שהיתה 
 בהערמה שאינה שאם הקדישה אינה מקודשת אינה מתנה
And R. Yoḥanan said: it is clear that he is 
scholar. R. Yose b.R. Bon said: So it was the 
case with Jonathan b. Uzziel. His father 
foreswore him from his possessions and 
wrote them away to Shim’ei. What did 
Shim'ei do? He sold some, he sanctified 
some, and he gave the rest [to Jonathan] as a 
gift. And he said: Anyone who comes to 
challenge this gift [to Jonathan] must also 
remove [the property that I sold] from the 
buyers and [the property I sanctified] from 
heqdesh. R. Yirmiyah asked: From here to we 
learn that one may not give a gift to a friend 
on condition that the latter not sanctify it? 
Yes, it is taught: Any gift which is like the 
gift of Bet Ḥoron which was done with 
cunning, that is not [a gift] that if he 
sanctified it is not sanctified, is not 
considered a gift. 
 
A person who foreswears benefit from his/her property to another is called the madir; the 
one from whom benefit is foresworn is called the mudar.  The mishnah cites two cases: one in 
which the mudar is hungry, the other in which a madir essentially tries to invite his mudar father 
to a family wedding. Only the BT version cites a contradiction between the two cases, whereas 
PT makes no such claim. Rather, the PT version is occupied specifically with the condition that 
                                                          
739 Venice Ed.: ומעשה נמי בבית חורון באחד דהוה סופו מוכיח על תחילתו 
 
740 Venice Ed.: 
אבא ויאכל מותר אלא אפילו אמר ליה הן לפניך יבא אבא  'הוא דאסיר אבל אמ' ליה הן לפניך שיב אמר רבא לא תימא טעמא דא"ל והינן לפניך
 ויאכל אסור מאי טעמא סעודתו מוכחת עליו
 
741 According to Maimonides, it is the largesse of the meal that sheds light on his purpose for giving the food away 
(see Commentary to Mishnah ad loc.; Mishneh Torah 7:15); Halivni suggests that the fact that the madir handed the 







has been made on the gift, namely that the recipient may not consecrate it. This condition 
impacts the legality of the transaction. In the earlier case, there was no such condition made on 
the gift. R. Yirmiya then wonders about the final line of the mishnah, whether all gifts with such 
a limiting stipulation are not considered gifts.  The redactor seems to provide the answer from 
the mishnah with the additional modifier of בהערמה: it is not that one may never give a gift with 
such a stipulation, but only that a gift done for the purpose of legal circumvention cannot have 
such a stipulation: any gift like that of Bet Ḥoron which was done with cunning, that is not truly 
a gift, for if one declared it sanctified, it is not sanctified, cannot be considered a gift.  
The role of ha‘arama in PT is not in distinguishing between the two cases in the 
mishnah, but in distinguishing among gifts given on condition that they not be consecrated: when 
such a gift is given for legitimate purposes, it is permissible, but when given as evasion, it is not 
permissible. Why is this? The redactors do not explain. According to some commentators this is 
because the madir has not true intention to give the food to the third party as a gift.742 This seems 
to echo the discussion from the PT levirate marriage case, where R. Tarfon’s skin deep betrothals 
may not be applied to a levir seeking to support both of his brother’s widows because he cannot 
possibly marry both of them.  Regardless of how noble743 the motives are, the means are 
insufficient.  As Moshe Silberg writes, “the ha‘arama of Bet Ḥoron was…not forbidden, but 
                                                          
742 Pene Moshe, s.v. ר' ירמיה בעי; Qorban Ha’edah  s.v. ר"י בעי 
 
743 We are not sure what role equity plays here: the starving mudar is a clear question of equity. The purpose of the 
law of oaths is not for people to die of hunger. But is the case of a son ensuring that his father eats at a family 
wedding considered an issue of equity? On the one hand, one might argue that the law never wished for oaths to 
result in grandparents missing their grandchildren’s weddings. On the other hand, is that result any worse that 
grandparents not being permitted on their grandchildren’s property in general? Ultimately, this would uproot any 
laws of oaths between parent and child! And perhaps all ha‘aramot should specifically be allowed between parents 






ineffective.”744 The same seems to be the case here: one may not offer a gift which may not be 
used as fully as a gift would be.  
BT has an entirely different focus. While the first reading of Rava echoes the perspective 
that focuses on the gift’s limiting condition,745 the second version of Rava reads differently. It is 
not the fact of ha‘arama but that the ruse is obvious which causes the problem. The rabbis do 
indeed care about the internal intentions of the son, and if they become obvious, the ha‘arama is 
rejected.  It is this same concern which animates the BT stam. The stam’s interest is  סופו מוכיח על
 the end of the story reveals the true intentions of the son from the beginning.  In the ,תחילתו
Palestinian material, we had not seen such an interest in the “true motives” of the agent.  The 
notion of one’s “true intentions” being too obvious indicates that intention is viewed as internal 
rather than merely performative. If intention were merely performative, the performance would 
by definition delineate its own interpretation. 
This same issue arises again in the context of a statement made by R. Ashi.  He rather 
explicitly professes anxiety about ha‘arama, specifically of the intention variety: 
 (746Vatican 108בבלי שבת קלט: )
אמ' רבה בר רב הונא מערים אדם על המשמרת ביום טוב לתלות בה רמונים ותולה בה שמרים אמ' 
 [רב אשי והוא דתלה בה ]רמונים
Rabbah b. R. Huna said: One may be shrewdly [place] a strainer [on a barrel] on 
the Festival day to place pomegranates there, and place dregs there [instead]. R. 
Ashi said: And that is if he places pomegranates there. 
 
According to the mishnah (137b), though one presumably may use a strainer which is already in 
place on the Festival, one may not first place the strainer on top of a barrel on the Festival. The 
                                                          
744 Silberg, Principia, 37  
 
745 See Rashba Novellae s.v., ואינן לפניך. The problem is that the madir has made feeding his father a condition on the 
gift. 






sugya that follows indicates that the issue is a rabbinic prohibition of performing weekday 
activities on the Festival (138a, top). Rabbah b. R. Huna then offers a way around the issue: put 
the strainer there not for straining purposes, but “in order to hold pomegranates,” which is not a 
weekday use for a strainer.  Indicate somehow that your intention is to use the cloth to hold 
pomegranates. Offer a projected intention rather than a true, subjective intention. But for R. 
Ashi, this is insufficient. He insists that the ha‘arama be more concrete, that there be some actual 
change in empirical reality, in order to permit this: actually place pomegranates on the cloth, so 
that it is being used for holding pomegranates rather than for straining. R. Ashi’s demand for 
physical action is significant, whether it is in order to hide one’s true intentions or because one’s 
intentions must perfectly align with one’s actions. By either explanation, one’s internal 
perspective counts. 
 Consistent with what we have seen to this point, the stam prefers the cover-up 
understanding of R. Ashi’s opinion: 
לצורך המועד ושלא לצורך המועד אסור אחד שכר ומאי שנא מיהא דתניא מטילין שכר במועד 
תמרים ואחד שכר שעורים אע"פ )שלא( שיש לו ישן מערים לשתות ושותה מן החדש התא לא 
 מוכחא מילתא הכא מוכחא מילתא
How is this different from the following taught in a baraita: “One may produce 
beer on the intermediate days of the Festival for the purpose of the Festival, but if 
it is not for the purpose of the Festival, it is prohibited. Whether date beer or 
barley beer, even if he has old beer, he may be shrewd [and make beer for beyond 
the holiday] and drink from the new.”  There,747 it is not obvious, here it is 
obvious.  
 
                                                          
747 In a related sugya, bMQ 12b, the stam indicates that there is an entire tannaitic perspective that outlaws ha‘arama                
all together by comparing the baraita which allows making new wine on the intermediate days of the Festival with a 
braita which prohibits doing so. It is, to my knowledge, the only source to definitively suggest that a tanna might 
outlaw ha‘arama under all circumstances. Both bShab. 117b and 124a offer that possibility as an initial suggestion 






The transparency of the ruse is definitive.748 Our earlier explanations of ha‘arama being about 
acceptance of a superficially constructed intention is insufficient here. One’s inner intentions are 
“real,” and threaten to undermine his or her actions.  On this model, the whole notion of 
externalized intentions has vanished.  As we have discussed, this is inconsistent with the earlier 
Palestinian material which does not express the same concern.749  This is yet another indication 
of the significance of subjective intention and discomfort with disconnect between the inner 
subjective self and the outer world.750 
Editorial Changes 
While we have seen explicitly that the stam evinces concern for obvious ruses, there is 
more to say about the stam’s intervention in the topic of ha‘arama in BT. Aside from the use of 
 as perjury, and the explicit concern for obvious versus tactful ruses, BT איערומי קא מערים
redactors do indeed make important changes to earlier baraitot dealing with ha‘arama. Let us 
begin with the position of R. Joshua about the parent-child animal case, the very epitome of 
externalized intention ha‘arama.  BT consistently cites R. Joshua’s position as requiring that the 
                                                          
748 The distinction of מוכחא מילתא and לא מוכחא מילתא for determining whether an act is permitted or prohibited in 
other contexts  is well-worn for the stam. See b‘Eruvin 39a; bBekh. 31b; bTem. 8b 
 
749 The farthest the Palestinian material went was to suggest that a ha‘arama must have the potential to come to 
fruition, as in the extrapolation from R. Tarfon’s actions of multiple betrothals which could not be used in a regular 
levirate marriage case to allow a priest to betroth two sisters-in-law in order to feed them: in R. Tarfon’s scenario, he 
could have married all three hundred women the levir may only actually marry one of the women. This, however, is 
not necessarily about the believability of the ha‘arama, or intentions about it, but rather the question of what 
constitutes betrothal for the purposes of feeding the betrothed terumah.  
 
750 It is, however, significant to note that this view is possibly indicated in PT’s example of immersing a vessel by 
drawing water (yPes. 2:2, 61b), as the dispensation is for small vessels only. Saul Lieberman understands this as 
being because using large vessels to draw water would be too obviously a ruse (Tosefta Ki-fshuta, Shabbat chapter 
16). Though this is not the only way to read this (perhaps larger vessels would not fit down the well), it is a very 
probably read. It is possible that notions of the obvious ruse were in the air even earlier, but it was the stammaitic 
voice that gave it explicit vocabulary. This fits in with the general picture of the stammaim as giving explicit 
terminology to earlier concepts. This indicates that the concept had ripened, so to speak. (See Leib Moscovitz, 






owner slaughter at least one of the two animals for the day’s meal in order to justify the ruse of 
removing them from the pit:  שני את המעלה את הראשון על מנת לשוחטו ואינו שוחטו וחוזר ומערים ומעלה
 Neither Tosefta nor PT required this. They were content with lifting .רצה זה שוחט, רצה זה שוחט
the animals out “in order” to slaughter them without any slaughtering ever taking place. This is 
quite a significant development, in that it bars a situation in which one’s subjective intentions 
and one’s projected intentions are completely disparate. It is a major change in R. Joshua’s 
position.751 
BT changes a baraita about evading tithes in a similar manner. YBerakhot 5:1, 8d, cites a 
teaching of R. Hoshaya that, “One may increase one’s grain with straw and be crafty in its regard 
to exempt it from tithes.” As we explained in chapter 2, this strategy is used to exempt one from 
tithing by mixing processed grains with unprocessed grain when bringing the produce into one’s 
home. This exempts the produce from the requirement to tithe, as only produce which has been 
fully processed when it “sees the face of the house” is subject too the laws of tithing.  The straw 
makes the entire pile seem like animal food, which is perhaps why two of the manuscripts, Paris 
and London, specify that the food should be eaten by an animal. Strikingly, every752 extant 
manuscript or printed edition of BT specifies some version of כדי שתהא בהמתו אוכלת, so that his 
animal will eat.  By inserting or preserving this clause, the BT redactors indicate an 
                                                          
751 Here I subscribe to Shamma Friedman’s understanding that BT baraitot which differ from toseftan are not 
necessarily reflective of two different traditions; rather, BT actively expands, reworks and changes tannaitic material 
to suit its own assumption and theories. (See S. Friedman, “Uncovering Literary Dependencies in the Talmudic 
Corpus", S.J.D. Cohen ed., The Synoptic Problem in Rabbinic Literature, Providence, 2000, pp. 35-57; idem, “The 
Baraitot in the Babylonian Talmud and their Parallels in the Tosefta” (Hebrew), Atara L’Haim, Studies in the 
Talmud and Medieval Rabbinic Literature in honor of Professor Haim Zalman Dimitrovsky, Jerusalem 2000, pp. 
163-201; idem, "Towards a Characterization of Babylonian Baraitot: Ben Tema and Ben Dortai", in: Neti'ot 
Ledavid: Jubilee volume for David Weiss Halivni. Y. Elman et al eds., Orhot Press, 2007, 195-274. 
 
752 This is true of all five instances in BT where the teaching of R. Hoshaya is cited: bBrakh 31a; bPes. 19a; bAZ 





unwillingness to allow a person to present his/her produce as though it is animal food but to 
subsequently eat it him/herself. Rather, the intentions expressed through the action of bringing 
the food indoors in this way must be carried out in practice: only an animal may eat the food.753 
In each of these examples, BT reduces the tension between a person’s presumed or 
stipulated intention and the outcome of his/her actions. Indeed, this dovetails nicely with the 
concern on bShabbat 139b with obvious the ruse is on. Returning to an earlier portion of the 
ho’il passage from bPesaḥim 48a cited above, the stam indicates a similar insistence on actions 
which reflect true thoughts: 
 754בבלי פסחים מח. )מינכן(
האופה מיום טוב לחול רב חסדא אמ' לוקה לא אמרינן ליה הואיל ומקלעי ליה אורחין חזי ליה  איתמר
אמ' אינו לוקה אמרינן הואיל... איתיביה בהמה מסוכנת לא ישחוט אלא אם כן יכול לאכול  755רבה
ממנה כזית צלי מבעוד יום כדי שיכול לאכול ממנה אע"ג דלא אכל בשלמ' לדידי דאמרינן הואיל 
בעי למיכל מצי אכיל משום הכי שחיט אלא לדידך דאמרת לא אמרינן הואיל אמאי שחיט א"ל ואי
משום הפסד ממונו ומשום הפסד ממונו שרינן איסורא דאורייתא אין משום הפסד ממונו גמר בלבו 
 ...לאכול כזית מבעוד יום ואי אפשר לכזית בשר בלא שחיטה
It was said: One who bakes on the Festival for a mundane day, R. Ḥisda says, He 
gets lashes; we do not say, ‘Because guests come to him, it is [considered] fit 
[food for] him [to eat, and thus, to cook]. Rabbah said, He does not get lashes; we 
say, ‘Because…’…A challenge was posed from a baraita: One may not slaughter 
[on the Festival] an animal in danger [of dying] unless one can eat an olive’s 
worth of roasted [meat] from it during daylight. That is that one can possibly eat 
from it, even though [in the end] one did not eat. This is harmonious with my 
opinion, that we say, ‘Because if he wishes to eat it, he can, therefore he may 
slaughter it.’ But according to you[r opinion], that you say, ‘We do not say 
‘Because,’ why may he slaughter? He said to him, Because of his financial loss. 
And because of financial loss we permit a Biblical violation? Yes, because of his 
financial loss, he decides in his heart that he will eat an olive’s worth of meat 
during daylight, and one cannot eat [even] and olive’s worth of meat without 
slaughter[ing the animal].  
                                                          
753 See supra n. 437. The limitation on eating likewise may be related to the question of snacking versus eating a 
proper meal. Snacking, known as akhilat 'arai, is permitted for food that has not been tithed, whereas eating a proper 
meal is not. Animal food is defined as a snack, while human consumption would be defined as a proper meal. See 
bMen. 67b Tos. s.v., כדי שתהא בהמתו אוכלת ופוטרת מן המעשר 
 
754 With the emendation of changing Rava to Rabbah. 
 
755 MS Munich 95 (and MSS Munich 6, JTS 1608, JTS 1623, Columbia, Lunzer-Sassoon) actually renders רבא, but 






Rabbah paints R. Ḥisda into a corner, offering a baraita which seems to rely upon ho’il – one 
may slaughter an animal that is in danger of (dying? Becoming a terefa?) on the Festival day if 
one will be able to eat at least an olive’s worth from the animal on that day. This is the case even 
if one does not eat. For Rabbah, this indicates a reliance upon ho’il: because the agent can eat, 
the food is considered Festival food. R. Ḥisda retorts that this is only permitted because of 
money loss. Rather than simply leaving this as a dispensation to prevent financial loss, the stam 
offers the interpretation: “Because of his financial loss, he concluded in his heart that he would 
eat an olive’s worth that day, and one may not eat an olive’s worth of meat without slaughter[ing 
the animal].” The terminology of גמר בלבו, concluded in his heart, resonates as an internal 
"sincere-self" decision. This is not merely a performative intention, but a subjective, internal 
decision. 
Who May Utilize Ha‘arama? 
 The continuation of R. Ashi’s comments (cited above) in bShabbat 139b adds yet another 
element which does not emerge in the Palestinian corpora: who may employ ha‘arama to 
circumvent the laws? 
ן שמיה ואמרי לה רב הונא אמרו ליה רבנן לרב אשי חזי מר האי צורבא מרבנן ורב הונא בר ר' חוי
בר' חלוון שמיה, דשקל ברא דתומא ומנח בברזא דדנא ואמר לאצנועיה קמיכוינא ואזיל ונאים 
במברא ועבר להך גיסא וסייר פירי ואמר אנא למינם קמיכונא. אמר להו הערמה קאמרת? הערמה 
 היא וצורבא מרבנן לא אתי למיעבד לכתחילה. 756בדרבנן
Said the disciples to R. Ashi: "We would call the attention of the master to this 
young scholar, R. Huna bar Ḥivan or Ḥeluvan by name, who takes the clove of 
garlic and stops up a hole in a wine barrel with it, saying, that he intends merely 
to preserve the clove of garlic. He also goes and lies down on a ferry, presumably 
to sleep; in the meantime he is ferried across the river, and on the other side he 
watches his fields, saying, however, that he merely intended to sleep." Answered 
R. Ashi: "You speak of cunning. All the acts mentioned by you are prohibited by 
                                                          





rabbinical laws only, and in the case of a scholar, there is no danger that he will 
commit them ante factum. 
 
R. Ashi’s students question his strong stance mentioned above against intention oriented 
ha‘arama using the example of a young scholar whose intentions are empirically suspect. R. 
Ashi allows it because he is a rabbinical student. While the exact nature of R. Ashi’s comments 
is elusive - is R. Ashi is suggesting that ha‘arama is only rabbinically prohibited,757 that it is 
permissible only where circumventing a rabbinic law,758 or that ha‘arama is a tool offered by the 
rabbis themselves?759 – the conclusion of his comments is clear. It is only the young scholar who 
has the scruples760 and thus the right to use this type of shrewdness.761 He is trusted not to use 
ha‘arama when he does not need to, or alternatively he is trusted not to allow this to erode his 
respect for the law and ultimately to simply directly sail across the river with no ruse at all. A 
less learned person in the very same predicament would not be so trusted.  
 This is an important turn in the politics of ha‘arama: it is meant only for a certain type of 
person with a certain level of commitment to the rules. In fact, in the several examples in which 
God was seen as the perpetrator of a ha‘arama back in our opening chapter (above), God’s 
actions were frowned upon.  Is R. Ashi giving carte blanche permission for ha‘arama to Torah 
                                                          
757Based on MS Oxford –הערמה מדרבנן היא- see Sefer Ra’avya chapter 296 
 
758 The language of MS Vatican הערמה בדרבנן היא became, for pre-modern and modern traditional commentaries, the 
source for a position that ha’arama is only permitted in cases of circumventing rabbinic laws. See, for instance, 
Rabbi Alexander Shor’s commentary to bPes. 21b in Bekhor Shor ‘al ha-Shas. (BGit. 65a offers similar support for 
ha‘arama as a phenomenon used specifically to circumvent rabbinic, as opposed to Biblical, law.) 
 
759 MS Oxford:  הערמה מרבנן היא– it is from the rabbis 
 
760Less knowledgeable people, however, might not distinguish between the two situations. See Rosh bShab. 20:5. 
 
761While some do suggest that the clause לא אתי למיעבד לכתחילה should be read as a denial that the young rabbinic 
scholar described in this very scenario is even practicing ha‘arama, this is a very forced reading. (Sefer Ra’avya 





scholars? Is this a local statement or a general dispensation? 762 Regardless of the precise 
parameters of R. Ashi’s qualification, the more elite-oriented perspective, preferring the ṣurva 
me-rabanan763 is characteristic of Babylonian amoraic perspectives in general, as secluding 
themselves from non-rabbis and looking down upon them. This is quite pronounced compared to 
Palestinian amoraim who were much more integrated into society.764 As Richard Kalmin writes: 
Palestinian sources depict informal relations between Palestinian rabbis and non-
rabbinic Jews: they casually greet one another in the street, dine together in each 
other’s homes, and literally and figuratively touch one another. Babylonian sages, 
in contrast, are depicted maintaining social distance from non-rabbinic Jews, 
interacting with them in formal settings: issuing verdicts in court cases, answering 
halakhic questions, delivering lectures in public, and the like. Babylonian rabbis 
are wary even of casual relationships with non-rabbis, which they fear could lead 
to more intimate relationships and eventually to marriage, and tarnish their highly 
prized purity of lineage.765 
 
And while Kalmin has recently suggested that the rabbis became more integrated 
beginning in the fourth century, as a result of influence from the Roman Empire, this does not 
                                                          
762  According to the medieval commentator, Ra'avya, R. Ashi’s comments permit all ha‘aramot to Torah scholars, 
even where forbidden for the hoi polloi. He thus assumes that R. Ashi’s comments are not simply about this local 
case, but are a global statement regarding ha‘arama. (R. Eliezer Yoel Ha-Levi of Bonn, Laws of the Festival, 
chapter 752; Laws of the Ḥol Ha-moed, chapter 827) 
 
763 The term צורבא מרבנן may also be used to indicate someone who is at the beginning of their studies rather than a 
full scholar (bBrakh. 33b; bBeṣa 16b; bGit. 37b, et al.). In such examples, it is used to denote the inferiority of a 
young scholar and can even be condescending in tone. 
 
764 See Richard Kalmin, The Sage in Jewish Society of Late Antiquity. London: Routledge (1999). He writes: 
“Babylonian rabbis resembled late antique monks and holy men, both Christian and pagan, who managed to be both 
dissociated from and part of the world, detached from society in certain contexts and capable of exercising a 
leadership role in others.” (Introduction) Kalmin has recently suggested that the rabbis became more integrated 
beginning in the fourth century, as a result of influence from the Roman Empire, but this does not necessarily mean 
that they no longer distinguished between the religious commitments of rabbis and non-rabbis. It simply means that 
they were more willing to interact with non-rabbis socially, and even to marry them. (Richard Kalmin, Jewish 
Babylonia between Persia and Roman Palestine: Decoding the Literary Record. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2006) Conclusion, esp. 181ff.) 
 
765 Kalmin, “Sage,” 27. He attributes this difference between Palestinian and Babylonian rabbis to several factors: a) 
cultural differences between a more egalitarian structure in Roman Palestine and a more hierarchical culture in 
Zoroastrian Babylonia, and b) the weaker station of Palestinian rabbis which led to their dependence on non-rabbis, 






necessarily mean that they no longer distinguished between the religious commitments of rabbis 
and non-rabbis. It simply means that they were more willing to interact with non-rabbis socially, 
and even to marry them.766 As Jeffrey Rubenstein writes, “there stands out a radical and hostile 
elitist streak unique to the Bavli. A number of Bavli traditions express a degree of contempt and 
disgust for non-rabbis that is completely absent from other rabbinic works.”767 After all, the 
distinction between the צורבא מרבנן and others is clear especially in the generation of Abaye and 
Rava,768 R. Ashi himself,769 as well as the anonymous editors.770 
 There is another example of the special ha‘arama permissions for a ṣurva me-rabanan:  
 בבלי ערכין כג. )קאפמן(
המקדיש נכסיו והיתה עליו כתובת אשה ר' אליעזר אמ' כשיגרשנה ידיר הנייה ר' יהושע א משנה: 
אינו צריך כיוצא בו אמ' ר' שמעון בן גמליא' הערב לאשה בכתובתה היה בעלה מגרשה ידיר הניה 
 על נכסיו של זה ויחזיר את אשתו 771קינונוייאשמא יעשו 
הוה ורב הונא בריה צורב'  773ערבא דכתובתא דכלתא 772משה בר עיצוראי ...כג. גמרא )מינכן(:
ליכא דליסברה עצה לרב הונא וליגרשה לדביתהו  775ליה מילתא א' אביי 774מרבנן הוה ודחיקא
]ו[תסב כתובתה מאבוה וליהדרה ניהליה א"ל רבא והאנן ידור הנא' תנן ואביי אטו כל דמגרש בבי 
דינא קמגרש איגלאי מילתא דכהן הוא א' אביי בתר עניי אזלא עניותא ומי א' אביי הכי והא' אביי 
 י' כר"ג בריה שני וצורבא מרבנן שאניאיזהו רשע ערום זהו המשיא עצה למכור בנכס
                                                          
766 Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia, Conclusion, esp. 181ff. 
 
767 Jeffrey L. Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 
(2003) 124ff. Rubenstein attributes the phenomenon to stammaitic pseudepigraphs (130). We do not analyze this 
here in full but only take note of the elitism evinced here by R. Ashi. 
 
768 bBB 22a,168a; bBerakh 15a; (bYoma 26a – not about differences in attitudes, but about differences in lineage), 
bTa‘anit 4a (about the  צורבא מרבנן ’s passion for Torah) et al. 
 
769 bYeb. 121a – but this is not about rabbinic elitism, just a difference in law based on realities within the culture; 
bShevuot 41a (interlocutor of R. Ashi) 
770 E.g., bBM 19a, 42a; bBB 168a; bBer. 19a; bBekh. 35a; bKet. 20a-b 
 
771 MS Parma: קינוניא 
 
772 Different MSS and Ed. offer different spellings of his name. 
 
773 All other MSS and Ed. use the possessive כלתיה, his daughter-in-law 
 
774 MSS London, Vatican 119: רחיקא, probably a scribal error 
 
775 MS Vatican 120 leaves Abaye out in this instances, but includes him in all other relevant places in the sugya. 





Mishnah: If a man dedicates his possessions to the sanctuary while still liable for 
his wife’s ketubah, R. Eliezer says: When he divorces her he must vow [that he 
will not derive any further] benefit [from her]. R. Joshua says: He need not do so. 
Likewise said R. Simeon b. Gamliel: Also if one guarantees a woman’s ketubah 
and her husband divorces her, the husband must vow [to derive no] benefit [from 
her] lest he make a conspiracy against the property of that man and take his wife 
back again. 
Gemara:…Moses b. Aṣri was the guarantor for [the ketubah of] his daughter-in-
law. Now R. Huna, his son, was a young scholar, and his financial circumstances 
became challenging. Said Abaye: Is there no one to advise R. Huna to divorce his 
wife so that she might claim her ketubah from her father-in-law, and he (=R. 
Huna) might take her back? Said Rava to him: But we learned, he must vow [that 
he will not derive any further] benefit [from here]? And Abaye [said/would say]: 
Does everyone who divorces his wife do so before a court? [Later] it was revealed 
that he was a priest (which is why he had not gotten such advice in the first place]. 
Abaye said: Poverty follows the poor. But did Abaye really say this? Did not 
Abaye said: Who is a cunningly wicked person?776 He who offers advice to sell 
property in accord with R. Simeon b. Gamliel? His son is different, and a young 
scholar is different. 
 
As we have explained in the previous chapter regarding the PT version of this law, there is a 
concern that a husband might divorce his wife in order to make her ketubah money available and 
then remarry her to get hold of it himself. In this BT sugya, Abaye suggests that R. Huna the 
young scholar in financial straits, and his wife, perform just such a ruse against his father, who 
                                                          
776 There is another explanation for רשע ערום that is cited by some MSS/Ed. in the name of Abaye: 
 עו:-בבלי סנהדרין עו.
ואביי ורבא האי אל תחלל את בתך להזנות' מאי עבדי לי' א"ר מני זה המשי' בתו לזקן ר' עקי' או' זה המשה' בתו בוגר' א' רב כהנא 
א' אביי הכי א' )קר'(  'בישר' אל' רשע ערו' והמשה' בתו בוגר' אטו המשה' בתו בוגר' לאו רשע ערום הומשו' ר' עקי' אין לך עני 
 איזהו עני ורש' ערו' זה המשה' בתו
And Abaye and Rava, this: “Do not profane your daughter to cause her prostitution,” what do they do with 
it?  R. Mani said, This is one who marries his daughter off to an old man. R. Aqiva says, This is one who 
delays his daughter [from marriage] as an adult. R. Kahana said in the name of R. Aqiva, There is no 
poorer man in Israel than a cunning knave and one who delays his daughter as an adult. But is not one who 
delays his daughter as an adult not a cunning knave? Abaye said, This is what he says: “Who is a poor 
man? This cunning knave who delays his daughter as an adult.” 
Following Halivni, we do not believe this to be Abaye’s statement for several reasons: first, he is cited in several 
places in BT asserting the rasha ‘arum is about giving advice to a primary heir about how to fend off his secondary 
heir; second, this definition of rasha ‘arum is excluded from the litany of explanations offered by amoraim on 
bSotah 27b.  Hence, we exclude this from our discussion of Abaye’s attitudes toward ha‘arama. (See Meqorot U-
Mesorot Sanhedrin-Horayot, 139) Indeed MS Jerusalem (Yad HaRav Herzog) excludes his name, preferring  הכי
 with no attribution. It is possible that Abaye’s name is there because he and Rava are the subjects of the קאמר





was the guarantor of the ketubah. Clearly it is because Abaye sympathizes with the man’s plight, 
as is consonant with his statement, ‘Poverty follows the poor.” The stam, however, questions 
Abaye’s statement, as he is specifically the person who condemns the rasha ‘arum as a person 
who encourages such ruses.777 Therefore, the stam posits a distinction between one’s child and 
others, between a young scholar and others.   
While the traditional commentators778 distinguish the young scholar as a person who 
deserves financial support and has more right to such support than others,779 in context of R. 
Ashi’s comments about the permissibility of cunning for young scholars specifically, we can add 
a second layer to the preference of the young scholar. Though generally such conduct might be 
                                                          
777 Significantly, Abaye’s definition of the rasha ‘arum meets our expectations – one who takes advantage of 
loopholes. It is cited elsewhere as well, in a pericope in which basically all of the definitions amount the too doing 
something that is within the letter of the law but not within its spirit. 
 כב. -בבלי סוטה כא: 
(For the sake of clarity, we use Venice Ed. here; all MSS are riddles with blank spaces and difficulties) 
זה הנותן דינר לעני להשלים לו מאתים זוז ’ אבהו אומ’ שיבא בעל דין חברו ר’ יוחנן זה המטעים דבריו לדיין קוד’ ר’ היכי דמי רשע ערום אמ
’ אסי אמ’ אלף נותנין לו כאחת הרי זה יטול ר ’זוז לא יטול לקט שכחה ופיאה ומעשר עני היו לו מאתים חסר דינר אפידתנן מי שיש לו מאתים 
זה ’ אסי א"ר יוחנן יתומים שקדמו ומכרו בנכסין מועטין מה שמכרו מכרו אביי א’ ר’ יוחנן זה המשיא עיצה למכור בנכסים מועטין דאמ’ ר
’ רשב"ג אומ’ דברי ר’ "ג דתניא נכסיי לך ואחריך לפלוני וירד הראשון ומכר ואכל השני מוציא מיד הלקוחוהמשיא עצה למכור בנכסים כרשב
זריקא אמר רב הונא זה המקיל לעצמו ’ באורחתיו ר’ רב ששת זה המכריע אחרי’ אין לשני אלא מה ששייר ראשון רב יוסף בר חמא אמ
 ’תלמידי חכמיומחמיר לאחרים עולא אמר זה שקרא ושנה ולא שימש 
What is a cunning knave? R. Yoḥanan said: This is one who explains his case to the judges before the other litigant 
arrives. R. Abahu says: This is one who give a denar to a poor person in order to bring him to a total of 200 zuz, as 
we learn, “One who has 200 zuz may not collect the fallen [grain], forgotten [grain] or the corner [of the field] or the 
tithes of the poor. If he has 200 minus one denar, even if one thousand people give him [food/money] at once, he can 
take. R. Asi said in the name of R. Yoḥanan, This is one who gives counsel to sell one’s few possessions. As R. Asi 
said in the name of R. Yoḥanan, Orphans who hastened to sell with few possessions, that which they have sold is 
sold. Abaye said, This is one who gives counsel to sell possessions according to the position of R. Simeon b. 
Gamaliel. As it is taught, [If a testator writes] “My possessions are yours, and after you, they will belong to so-and-
so,” and the first one went and sold and consumed [the inheritance], the second person may remove [the 
inheritances] from the hand of the buyers. These are the words of Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says: The second 
person has [rights] only [to] what the first person left over. R. Yosef b. Ḥama said in the name of R. Sheshet: This is 
one who judges others in his own way. R. Zeriqa said in the name of R. Huna: This is one who is lenient for himself 
but strict for others. Ulla said: This is one who read and repeated but did not apprentice with Torah scholars. 
 
778 See R. Gershom ad loc.; the Vilna Gaon argues that the exception is that R. Huna is both the son of the guarantor 
and a young scholar (hagahot u-beurim me-rabbeinu ha-gadol ha-gra mi-vilna ad loc.) 
 
779 See Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia, Conclusion, for a discussion of BT amoraim encouraging non-rabbis to support 





viewed by Abaye as illicit trickery, a young scholar has permission to use it; he uses it 
judiciously and thus will not abuse the dispensation.   
 The other part of this equation is the concern about the average person’s slippery slope, 
the erosion of his/her commitment to the law, which is also echoed elsewhere in BT by the stam: 
 בבלי ביצה יח.
ת"ש דאמר רב חייא בר אשי אמר רב נדה שין לה בגדים מערמת וטובלת בבגדיה ואם איתא נגזור 
 דלא אתי לאטבולי ביענייהו שאני התם מתוך שלא הותרה לה אלא על ידי מלבוש זכורה היא.
Come and learn, as R. Ḥiyya b. Ashi said in the name of Rav: a menstruant 
woman who has no [pure] clothes, employs cunning and immerses [for 
purification] in her clothes [thus purifying the clothes as well].780 And if this is so, 
let us decree [that she not do this] so that she will not immerse [the clothes] 
directly [which would be an infraction]? It is different there, because it is only 
permitted to her by way of wearing clothes, she will remember [not to immerse 
clothes directly on the Festival]. 
 
Neither Mishnah, nor Tosefta, nor PT brought up the possibility of forbidding a ha‘arama 
practice for fear that one might do worse. The stam in BT, however, following R. Ashi’s 
suggestion, does.781  While this is different from the other manifestations of the importance of 
intentions in defining actions, it shares something in common: the turn to the subjective self. 
How will this affect the person’s general observance of the law? 
A Sampling of Non-Ha‘arama loopholes 
There is but one clear citation of a fourth generation amora, Rabbah b. ‘Ulla who is 
described as מערים איערומי in order to retrieve a loan during the Sabbatical year.  It is unclear who 
is characterizing his actions as ha‘arama and what those actions actually entail, and no debate 
follows.  There is also a tradition that R. Ada b. Ahava  782מערים ומלח גרמא גרמא: when he 
                                                          
780 For a discussion about whether this sugya refers solely to Festivals or to Sabbath too, see Halivni, Meqorot u-
Mesorot ad loc, 298-300. 
 
781 The stam does the same for the suggestion of drawing water from a well with an impure vessel in order to purify 






slaughtered an animal on the Festival in order to eat it, rather than losing any of the meat that 
was not to be eaten that day,783 preserved all of the meat by salting each piece individually as 
though it was for that day’s meal and then “decided” not to eat it.784 We do not, however, know 
if he is a fourth generation amora or a second generation amora.  
But it is not our intention to say that the rabbis did not use loopholes. They certainly did. 
However, a) they did not use the ha‘arama nomenclature as often as PT, b) and they were 
concerned with integrity in situations of inner intentions and outer intentions not corresponding 
to one another. We mentioned in our Introduction that a comprehensive analysis of all rabbinic 
loopholes, whether labeled ha‘arama or not, is a desideratum. While this is beyond the scope of 
our project, below we offer a brief representative sampling of BT loopholes which are not 
labeled ha‘arama but use the same or similar methodologies to the examples we have seen. In so 
doing, we may that some of the trends we have observed regarding BT’s general approach to 
ha‘arama are in evidence in these other examples as well. 
I. Forced Consent 
 :-בבלי ערכין כא.
ייבי עולות ושלמים : חייבי ערכין ממשכנין אותן חייבי חטאות ואשמות אין ממשכנין אותן חמשנה
ממשכנין אותן אע"פ שאין מתכפר לו עד שיתרצה שנאמר לרצונו כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני. 
 וכן אתה אומר בגיטי נשים כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני
ואע'פ שאין מתכפר לו: תנו רבנן יקריב אתו מלמד שכופין אתו יכול בעל כורחו ת'ל  גמרא )מינכן(:
וכן בגיטי א' רב ששת האי מאן דמסר מודעא אגיטי ...כיצד כופין אתו עד שיאמר רוצה אנילרצונו הא 
מודעא מודע' פשי' לא צריכא דעשאה ואירצי מהו דתימ' בטולי בטליה קמ"ל א"כ ליתני עד שיתן מאי 
 עד שיאמר עד דמבטל ליה למודעיה
Mishnah: Those obligated in donations of worth, [we may] take collateral. Those 
obligated to bring sin offerings or guilt offerings, [we] do not take collateral. Those 
                                                          
782 bBeṣa 11b according to all MSS and printed editions 
 
783 Salting the meat for after the Festival would be considered preparing for after the Festival, and would be 
forbidden. 
 
784 The PT version (yBeṣa 1:5, 60c) is more explicit, though it names R. Aḥa rather than R. Ada. (Given that R. Aḥa 
is named as citing Rav, and R. Ada was actually Rav’s student, R. Aḥa is probably an error.)  
 ר' אחא בשם רב מולח ומערים מולח ומערים מלח הכא ומלח הכא עד דו מלח כוליה





obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings, [we] take collateral from 
them. Even though one is not atoned for until he agrees [to it], as it says, 
“according to his will,” [they] force him until he says, “I want.” And likewise 
regarding writs of woman (=writs of divorce): they force him until he says, “I 
want.” 
Gemara:  And even though he is not atoned: The rabbis taught, “’he shall offer 
it,’ teaches that they force him. Perhaps against his will? Hence, it says, 
‘according to his will.’ How so? They force him until he says, ‘I want.’”…And 
likewise regarding writs [of divorce]: R. Sheshet said, “One who declares a 
protest against his writ, his protestation stands.” Obviously! No, it is necessary to 
explain this in a situation in which the write was coerced and he agreed to it. 
What might we have said? He nullified it (=the protest). This teaches, if so, let it 
say, “until he gives.” What is “until he says”? Until he nullifies his protest 
[verbally]. 
 
The phenomenon of compelled consent parallels the externally constructed intention used in 
some ha‘arama cases. Not surprisingly, it originates in tannaitic material. The concept is 
vindicated by Biblical verses in the midrash.785 Leviticus in Sifra Dibura de-nedava 3:15, 
reads:786   
 יקריב אותו מלמד שכופין אותו יכול על כרחו ת"ל לרצונו הא כיצד כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני
“He shall offer it” – this teaches that they force him. Perhaps against his will? 
Therefore, it stipulates, “according to his will.” How so? They force him until he 
says, “I want.” 
 
Predictably, BT expresses a similar discomfort about the vacuous quality of compelled consent 
as it does about ha‘arama. First, in the sugya cited above, R. Sheshet teaches that the husband’s 
coerced consent to give the writ of divorce is qualified significantly. It cannot overcome a formal 
protest that he had made beforehand. There is recognition that this statement of consent cannot 
compete with a person’s own true desires expressed freely at some earlier point in time. 
Compelled intention is somehow deficient. 
                                                          
785 See supra n. 132 for the literature regarding whether Mishnah or Midrash Halakhah is chronologically primary.  
 
786 For how this notion developed after the close of BT, see Yehiel Kaplan, “Kofin oto ad sheyomar rotzeh ani – the 
quality of the principle and its application in our time,” Eds. Yaakov Habba  and Amihai Radziner, Iyun b’Mishpat 





 The stam in the sugya below grapples with compelled consent by moving in the opposite 
direction, suggesting that what stands behind the law must be an understanding that the person 
truly does want the result of his/her consent. This too emerges from a discomfort with 
constructed intention: 
 נ. )מינכן(-בבלי קידושין מט:
רבא הוי דברי' ההו' גבר' דזבין לנכסי' אדעת' למיסק לארע' דישר' בעידנ' דזבין לא א' ולא מידי א' 
יקריב אותו מלמ' שכופין אותו  מיהא דתנן 'שבלב ודברי' שבלב אינן דברים מנליה לרבא הא אילימ
יכול בעל כרחו ת"ל לרצונו הכיצד כופין אותו עד שיאמ' רוצ' אני ואמאי והא בלביה לא ניח' ליה 
דניח' ליה בכפר' אל'  שבלב אינן דברי' דילמ' שאני הת' דאנן סהדי 'לאו משו' דאמרי' דברי 787אלא
אלא לאו משו'  'מסיפ' וכן את' או' בגיטי נשי' כופין אותו עד שיאמ' רוצ' אני ואמאי הא בליבי' לא ניח
 'לשמוע דברי חכמי 'משו' דמצו 788דאמרי' דברי' שבלב אינן דברי' דילמ' שאני הת'
A certain man sold his property with the intention of immigrating to Palestine, but 
when selling he said nothing. Said Rava: That is a mental stipulation, and such is 
not recognized. How does Rava know this? Shall we say, from what we learn: [If 
his obligation be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it without blemish:] he 
shall offer it: this teaches that he is compelled. I might think, against his will. 
Hence it is taught: ‘with his free will.’ How is this possible? He is compelled until 
he declares, ‘I am willing.’ Yet why, seeing that in his heart he is unwilling? 
Hence it must surely be because we rule that a mental affirmation is not 
recognized! But perhaps it is different there, for we ourselves are witnesses that 
he is pleased to gain atonement. But [it follows] from the second clause: and you 
find it likewise in the case of women’s divorce and slaves’ manumission: he [the 
husband or master] is compelled, until he declares, ‘I am willing.’ Yet why, 
seeing that in his heart he is unwilling! Hence it must surely be because we say: A 
mental declaration is not recognized! But perhaps it is different there because it is 
a religious duty to obey the words of the sages!  
 
In this passage, there is an attempt to derive the ruling that mental stipulations do not impact 
contracts from the case of forcing a person to say he is willing. In other words, that would be a 
suppression of his personal wishes because they are merely mental stipulations. However, the 
stam instead suggests that indeed the case where a person is compelled to say that he is willing 
truly represents his internal intentions, whether because he is happy to gain atonement, or 
                                                          
787 MS Oxford adds: משום דניח' ליה. This is probably a scribal error due to the frequency of the phrase in this sugya. 
 





because he truly wishes to obey the words of the sages. The stam softens the ruling of the 
tannaim out of a concern for internal intentions and stipulated intentions matching one another. 
The redactors cannot accept such substitutes for the truth.789  
II. Vow Cancellation for the Future 
 : -בבלי נדרים כג.
ר"א בן יעקב אומר אף הרוצה להדיר את חבירו שיאכל אצלו יאמר כל נדר שאני עתיד לידור משנה:
 זכור בשעת הנדרהוא בטל ובלבד שיהא 
ר' אליע' בן יעק' או': וכיון דא' כל נדר שאני עתיד לידור יהא בטל לא שמע ולא אתי גמרא )מינכן( : 
חסו' מחסר' והכי קתני הרוצ' שיאכל חבי' אצלו ומסרב בו ומדירו נדרי זירוזין הויין והרוצ'  'בהדי
ני עתיד לידור יה' בטל ובלבד ויאמ' כל נדר שא 790שלא יתקיימו נדריו כל השנ' כול' יעמד בראש
שיהא זכור בשע' הנדר אי זכור עקרי' לתנאי' וקיים ליה נדרי' א' אביי תני ובלבד שלא יהא זכור 
והכ' במאי עסי' כגון שהתנ' ברא' השנ' ולא ידע ממה  791בשע' הנדר רבא א' לעול' כדאמרן מעיק'
נודר נדרי' לית בי' משש' לא א' על  התנה והשת' קנדר אי זכור בשע' הנדר וא' על דע' הראשון אני
דע' הראשון אני נודר עקרי' לתנאי' וקיים ליה נדרי' רב הונ' בר חיננ' סבר למידרשי' בפירק' א'ל רבא 
 'תנא מסתי' ליה סתומי כדי שלא ינהגו בו קלת ראש ואת דרש' לי' בפירק
                                                          
789 Parallel treatment appears in bMen.47b-48a: 
 מח. )המבורג(-בבלי ב"ב מז:
מנא ליה לרב הונא הא אילימא כל דזבין איניש אי לאו דאניס לא הוה מזבין ואפלו אמ' רב הונא תליוה וזבין זביניה זביני 
הכי זביניה זביני ודילמ' שאני אונסא דנפשיה מאונסא דאחריני אלא מדתניא יקריב אותו מלמד שכופין אותו יכול אפלו 
ליה דתהוי כפרה ואלא מדסופא  בעל כרחו ת'ל לרצונו הכיצד כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני ודילמא שאני התם דניחא
וכן אתה אומ' בגטי נשים שכופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני ודילמ' התם נמי מצוה לשמוע דברי חכמ' אלא סברא הוא 
אגב אונסיה גמר ומקני מתיב רב יהודה גט המעושה בישראל כשר בגוים פסול ואמאי ]פסול[ לימא אגב אונסיה גמר 
שרשיא דבר תורה אף בגוים כשר ואמאי אמרו פסול כדי שלא תהא כל אחת ואחת ומגרש הא אתמר עלה אמ' רב מ
 הולכת ותולה את עצמה בגוי ומפקעת את עצמה מיד בעלה
R. Huna said, “If a man consents to sell something through fear of physical violence, the sale is valid.” Why so? 
Because whenever a person sells s/he is under compulsion, and even so the sale is valid. But should we not 
differentiate internal from external compulsion? Therefore [give another reason], as it has been taught: [From the 
superfluous words], ‘he shall offer it,’ we learn that a person may be force to bring an [offering which s/he has 
vowed]. Does this mean, even against his/her will? [This cannot be] because it says, ‘of his own free will.’ How then 
[are we to say]? Force is applied to him until he says, ‘I consent.’ But perhaps there is a special reason in this case, 
viz. that he may be well satisfied so as to have atonement for his sins? We must therefore [look for the reason in] the 
next passage [of the baraita]: ‘Similarly in the case of divorces [where the rabbis have said that the husband can be 
forced to give a divorce] we say [that what is meant is that] force is applied to him till he says, ‘I consent.’ But there 
too perhaps there is a special reason, viz. that it is a religious duty to listen to the word of the Sages.  What we must 
say therefore is that it is reasonable to suppose that under the pressure he really made up his mind to sell.  R. Judah 
challenged: “A writ of divorce which is forced by Jews is valid, if forced by Gentiles, invalid.” Why is it invalid? 
Say that because he is forced, he truly decides to divorce [her]? It was said about this: R. Mesharshia said, 
“Biblically, it is valid even [if coerced] by Gentiles. Why did they say it is invalid? So that every woman would not 
go and depend on a Gentile in order to removed herself from her husband’s authority.” 
 
790 Venice Ed. specifies בראש השנה 
 
791 MS Moscow: רבא אמ לעולם אימלך דלא מיחסרא והכא במאי עסיקינן. According to this MS, Rava is undermining the 





Mishnah: R. Eliezer b. Ya’aqov says, “Also one who makes an oath based on his 
fellow joining him for a meal.” He should say, “Any oath that I make in the future 
is null [from now], as long as he remembers at the time of the oath. 
Gemara: R. Eliezer b. Ya’aqov says: And [just because] he said, “Any oath that I 
take in the future should be void” [it works]? But [the other person] did not hear 
[his nullification] and will not come to him [for a meal]. There is a lacuna in the 
mishnah, and this is how the mishnah should read: One who wishes for his friend 
to eat at his home, and he refuses, and he foreswears him, these are oaths for the 
purpose of rousing [only, and are thus not binding even if the fellow does not 
come for the meal]. And one who wishes that his oaths will not be upheld 
throughout the year should stand at the beginning [of the year] and say, “Anything 
that I will swear in the future is null [from now],” so long as he remembers at the 
time of the oath. If he remembers [at the time of his oath], [does that not] uproot 
the condition and uphold his oath? Abaye said, “It should read, so long as he does 
not remember at the time of the oath.” Rava said, “It is as we said from the 
beginning, and what are we dealing with here? Where he made a condition at the 
beginning of the year and did not know what his condition was. And now he is 
taking an oath. If he remembers at the time of the oath and says, ‘Based on the 
first [stipulation] I am swearing, the oaths have no standing. But if he did not say, 
‘I swear based on the first stipulation,’ it uproots his oath, and this oath stands. R. 
Huna bar Ḥinena wished to teach this at the public learning session. Rava said to 
him: the tanna made it unclear so that people would not treat vows lightly, and 
you wish to teach this at the public session?! 
 
Both here and in PT (yNed. 2:2, 37d) there is a way to keep any and all vows from being 
effective throughout the year. This is a very helpful loophole. However, only in BT is there a 
concern with what that loophole might lead people to do. Rava792 here is concerned about people 
becoming lax about oaths because they know of a helpful loophole. As we have seen, BT cites 
anxiety over how the use of loopholes may impact a person’s relationship to the law generally. In 
this case, Rava worries about the simple knowledge that a loophole even exists. 
 
                                                          
792 See Halivni, Meqorot U-mesorot, Nashim 298-9. for the suggestion that Rava may be simply reading the mishnah 
as two separate cases: the first case is להדיר את חבירו, another instance of נדר זירוזין, continuing from the example in 
the previous mishnah – an oath made merely to convince someone of your conviction, such as I swear that I won’t 
buy this for more than two dollars! The second case is  אומר כל נדר שעתיד לידור , one nullifies oaths ahead of time. 
This is in fact the wording of the mishnah in Oṣar Ha-Geonim 118. Additionally, the version which includes the 
word אף before להדיר את חבירו connects the first case to the previous mishnah. YNed. 3:1 cites two different versions 





III. Selling Out 
 : )דפוס ונציה(-בבלי מנחות סז.
אמר רבא מאן דאמר מירוח הגוי פוטר גלגול הגוי פוטר מאן דאמר מירוח הגוי אינו פוטר גלגול הגוי 
 ועוד איתיביה רבינא לרבא חלת גוי בארץ ותרומתו בחוצה לארץ מודיעין אותו שהוא ...אינו פוטר
פטור חלתו נאכלת לזרים ותרומתו אינה מדמעת הא תרומתו בארץ אסורה ומדמעת והא האי תנא 
אי הכי אפילו חלה  793דאמר מירוח הגוי אינו פוטר גלגול הגוי פוטר מדרבנן גזירה משום בעלי כיסין
נמי אפש' דאפי לה פחות מחמשת רבעי' קמח ועוד תרומה נמי אפשר דעביד לה כדר' אושעיא דאמר 
בי אושעיא מערים אדם על תבואתו ומכניסה במוץ שלו כדי שתהא בהמתו אוכלת ופטור' מן ר
אינמי דעייל לה דרך גגות ודרך קרפיפו' התם בפרהסיא זילא ביה מילתא הכא בצינעא לא  'המעש
  .זילא בי' מילתא
Rava said, “the one who holds that the smoothing of the pile of corn belonging to 
a Gentile exempts it [from tithes], also holds that the rolling out of dough 
belonging to a Gentile exempts it [from ḥallah]; and one who holds that the 
smoothing of the pile of corn belonging to a Gentile does not exempt it, also holds 
that the rolling out of dough belonging to a Gentile does not exempt it…And 
Ravina challenged Rava [from a baraita]: the ḥallah separated by a Gentile in the 
land of Israel, and the terumah separated by him in the diaspora, they tell him that 
he is exempt. His ḥallah is eaten by non-priests; his terumah does not make its 
mixtures inedible. This indicates that his terumah in the land of Israel is indeed 
forbidden [to non-priests] and does render its mixtures inedible. But this tanna 
says that the smoothing of a Gentile does not exempt, yet the rolling of the 
Gentile does? That is only rabbinic [that the smoothing does not exempt], as a 
decree out of concern for the large landowners. If so, then, ḥallah should also not 
be exempt! They can [use a different evasion to get around the law:] cooking less 
that 5/4 [a qab of] flour. [As for] Terumah [they may] also [evade the law], they 
may do like R. Oshaya; as R. Oshaya said, “A person may practice evasion with 
his produce and bring it inside in its chaff, so that his animal may eat from it, and 
it is exempt from tithing. Likewise, he can bring it via the roofs and courtyards! 
There, it is public, and it is embarrassing for them to do. Here, it is in private, so it 
is not embarrassing. 
 
The stam here show discomfort with various loopholes but with an understanding that the 
loopholes cannot be closed – e.g., baking less than the requisite amount of dough to require 
ḥallah to be taken, bringing food into the house in unconventional ways or in an unfinished state 
in order to evade tithing obligations. Moreover, the stam recognizes that people will use 
loopholes, but it assumes that the amoraim do not wish to be party to offering newly accessible 
                                                          





loopholes where none were being used before. For example, though the dodges of bringing food 
into the house in an unprocessed state or in an unconventional way exist, the בעלי כיסין, the 
wealthy land magnates will not employ those methods, as they are too public. If, however, they 
were told that Gentile ownership could exempt them, they would begin using that more private 
method to shirk their obligations. Once again, there is a concern for how loopholes and 
knowledge thereof, will impact the average person. 
 
IV. Salty 
We have already mentioned that by the fourth generation of BT amoraim, ha‘aramot involving 
intention may have been waning. R. Ada b. Ahava was the only fourth generation amora cited as 
employing it, as seen from this sugya. The entire context of this sugya is very telling: 
 :-בבלי ביצה יא.
העור לפני הדורסן ולא יגביהנו אלא אם כן יש עמו כזית  ...בית שמאי אומרים אין נותנין אתמשנה:
 בשר ובית הלל מתירין.
ת"ר אין מולחין את החלבים ואין מהפכין בהם משום ר' יהושע אמרו שוטחן  ...גמרא )אוקספורד(:
?ב?רוח על גבי יתדות אמ' רב מתנה הלכה כר' יהושע איכא דאמרי אמ' רב מתנה אין הלכה כר' 
יהוש' בשלמא דלמאן דאמ' הלכה אצטריך סד"א יחיד ורבים הלכה כרבים קמ"ל הלכה כיחיד אלא 
הושע פשיטא יחיד ורבים הלכה כרבים מהו דתימ' מסתבר טעמיה דר' למאן דאמ' אין הלכה כר' י
מימנע ולא שחיט קמ"ל ותנא קמא מאי שנא מן העור לפני הדורסן התם  794יהושע דאי לא שרית ליה
הכא אתי למימר מאי טעמא שרו ליה רבנן כי היכי דלא ליסרח מה לי למשטחינהי  795לא מוכח מילתא
אמ' שמואל מולח אדם כמה חתיכות בבת אחת אע"ג שאינו צריך  אמ' רב יהודה 796מה לי ממלחינהי
 אלא לחתיכה אחת רב אדא בר אהבה מערים ומלח גרמא גרמא
Mishnah:…The House of Shammai says: One may not place a hide for treading 
on, nor may one lift it up unless there is as much as an olive of flesh with it, but 
the House of Hillel permits it. 
Gemara:…The rabbis taught: One may neither salt pieces of suet nor turn them 
about.797 In the name of R. Joshua they said: one may spread them out in the air 
                                                          
794 MS London adds: אתי לאימנועי משמחת יום טוב 
 
795 MS Munich: דחזי למיזגא עלייהו, Venice, Vilna Eds: משום דחזי למזגא עליה 
 
796 MS Munich reverses the order: למה לי למימלחינהו למה לי למשטחינהו. This translates as, “What is the difference 
whether I salt it or spread it?” The ordering in MS Oxford, however, seems more intuitive, as it moves from the 
permissible to the forbidden. 
 





on nails. R. Matenah said: The law is like R. Joshua. And some say, ‘The law is 
not like R. Joshua.’ It is harmonious according to the one who said, ‘The law is 
[like R. Joshua].’ I might have though the when there is a debate between an 
individual and the majority, the law is like the majority. Therefore, he teaches us 
that here the law is as the individual. But according to the one who says, ‘The law 
is not like R. Joshua,’ this is obvious; when an individual and the majority debate, 
the law follows the majority. What might you have said? R. Joshua’s reasoning 
makes sense, that if you do not allow it, he will refrain from slaughtering [the 
animal on the Festival, and thus will not eat meat on the Festival]. He comes to 
teach [that the law does not follow R. Joshua]. And how is this different from 
placing a hide before a treading place [which is permitted by the House of Hillel 
on the Festival]? There, it is not obvious, for the hide may be used as a mattress. 
Here, however, one may come to say, “Why did the rabbis allow this? So that the 
food will not spoil. What is the difference whether I spread it out or I salt it?” R. 
Judah said in the name of Samuel, “One may salt a number of pieces at once even 
though he needs only one piece.” R. Ada b. Ahava was cunning and salted one 
piece at a time.  
 
Similar to the stam’s interpretation of R. Ashi’s position on bShabbat 139b, the difference 
between a loophole which is obviously evasion and that which is not obvious is significant. Only 
here the stam gives a reason why: namely because people will come to violate the law outright. 
This is consonant with what we have observed above regarding R. Ashi and the stam. 
V. Solving the Bastardization Problem 
 
 בבלי קידושין סט.
רבי טרפון אומר יכולין ממזרים ליטהר כיצד ממזר שנשא שפחה הולד עבד שחררו נמצא  משנה:
  :הבן בן חורין רבי אליעזר אומר הרי זה עבד ממזר
לכתחילה קאמר או דיעבד קאמר תא שמע אמרו לו לרבי טרפון  : איבעיא להו רבי טרפוןגמרא
טיהרת את הזכרים ולא טיהרת את הנקיבות ואי אמרת לכתחילה קאמר ממזרת נמי תינסיב לעבדא 
עבד אין לו חייס תא שמע דאושפזיכניה דרבי שמלאי ממזר הוה ואמר ליה אי אקדמתך טהרתינהו 
י אמרת דיעבד מאי ניהו דמנסיב ליה עצה ואמר ליה לבנך אי אמרת בשלמא לכתחילה שפיר אלא א
זיל גנוב ואיזדבן בעבד עברי ובשני דר' שמלאי עבד עברי מי הוה והאמר מר אין עבד עברי נוהג אלא 
בזמן שהיובל נוהג אלא לאו שמע מינה רבי טרפון לכתחילה קאמר שמע מינה אמר רב יהודה אמר 
 שמואל הלכה כר' טרפון
Mishnah: R. Tarfon says, “Bastards can purify [their line of descendants]. How? 
A bastard who marries a slave, their child is a slave. If he sets him free, the child 
becomes a free man.” R. Eliezer says, “This [child] is a bastard slave.” 
Gemara: They wondered, Did R. Tarfon mean for this to be used ante factum, or 
simply that ex post facto it eliminates the bastard status? Come and hear, “They 
said to R. Tarfon, ‘You have purified the males, but you have not purified the 





also marry a male slave. A male slave does not pass down his genealogical status. 
Come and hear: R. Simelai’s landlord was a bastard, and he said to him. If I may 
precede you, I will purify your son.’ If you say that it is ante factum, this 
statement is sensical, but if you say it is ex post facto, what does he mean? That 
he would give him advice and say to him, ‘Go steal and be sold as a Hebrew 
slave.’ And in the days of R. Simelai, were there Hebrew slaves? Did not Master 
say, ‘The law of the Hebrew slave is not enforced except where the Jubilee year 
applies?’ Rather, learn from here that R. Tarfon meant his comments ante factum. 
R. Judah said in the name of Shmuel, “The law follows R. Tarfon.” 
 
 We have seen R. Tarfon, a rabbi from the priestly caste, involve himself in the plight of 
those less elite genealogical purity than his own. In chapter 2, we observed the story of R. Tarfon 
using his priestly status in order to feed hungry women of non-priestly descent during a famine. 
And in this mishnah too he is cited as caring for the bastard, the mamzer, who is forbidden from 
marrying any Jew who is not also a bastard. The trouble is that children of bastards are 
considered bastards too. R. Tarfon, however, has a suggestion: Jewish identity follows the 
mother. Thus, if a bastard marries a female Gentile slave and has a child with her, that child will 
be a Gentile himself and will be considered a slave. And when the son is freed, he will attain the 
status of a non-bastard Jew.  R. Eliezer disagrees, suggesting that the father’s impurity is passed 
down to his son. 
  In the talmudic discussion which ensures, there is debate over whether R. Tarfon 
advocates this loophole or simply recognizes the implications of the union of a bastard and a 
bondswoman after the fact. PT has no such compunctions: 
 ירושלמי ג:יג )?(
רבי שמלאי   רב יהודה בשם שמואל הלכתא כרבי טרפון.  כיני מתניתא ממזר מותר לו לישא שפחה.
 .רבי סימאי הורי כפר ספורייא הלכה כרבי טרפון  הורי באנטוכיא.
Thus says a baraita: a bastard may marry a female slave. R. Judah in the name of 
Samuel [said], “The law follows R. Tarfon.” R. Simelai taught this way in 







While the conclusion of the stam is that R. Tarfon wished to actively provide a solution for the 
future descendants of bastards,798 it is still telling that BT even questioned this in the first place.   
 It is worth mentioning a relatively strong parallel to this concern about ex post facto 
versus ante factum in BT in the following passage: 
 )מינכן( בבלי כתובות צה:
במקום בעל  800לך ואחרייך לפלוני ועמדה ונשאת בעל לוקח הוי ואין לאחריך 799אמ' אביי נכסייך
כלום כמאן כהאי תנא דתניא נכסיי ליך ואחרייך לפלוני ירד הראשון ומכר ואכל השני מוצי' מיד 
הלקוחות דברי ר' רשב"ג או' אין לשני אלא מה ששייר הראשון ומי אמ' אביי הכי והאמ' אביי איזהו 
 'עצה למכור כרשב"ג מי קאמ' תנשא נשאת קאמ 801רשע ערום זה המשיא
Abaye said: [If he wrote in her ketubah] “My possessions are yours, and after you 
[they belong] to so-and-so,” and she got [re]married [after he died] the [new] 
husband is considered a buyer, and no one else has any right to possession in the 
face of the husband. Like whom [is this opinion]? Like this tanna, as it was 
taught: [If a testator wrote] “My possessions are yours [to inherit] and after you 
[they belong] to so-and-so,” if the first person sold [the inheritance] and 
consumed, the second person may take the [inheritance] from the hand of the 
buyers. These are the words of Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says, The second 
person has only what the first person left over (=did not sell or consume). But did 
Abaye say this? Does Abaye not say, "Who is a cunning knave? One who gives 
advice to sell according to the opinion of R. Gamaliel [so that the second inheritor 
does not get anything]? Did he say, "She should get remarried"? He said, If she 
has remarried (i.e., ex post facto). 
 
According to the stam, Abaye here is clearly against taking advantage of a loophole, yet 
he recognizes that the loophole is legitimate after the fact.802 If this is the case, why not simply 
close the loophole, as Abaye advocates in ha‘aramat ribit? We suspect that Abaye is willing to 
                                                          
798 See Novick, “‘They come against them…’” for a discussion about the significant responsibility placed on the 
rabbis for solving the intractable problem of bastardy. 
 
799 MSS St. Petersburg, Vatican 113, Soncino Ed.: נכסיי; MS Vatican 130, Vilna Ed.: נכסי; Later in the sugya, where 
Abaye’s comments are repeated, MS Munich too reads נכסיי rather than נכסייך. Thus, the first is likely a scribal error. 
 
800 It is quite strange that every MS and every Ed. reads לאחריך rather than לאחרים. We assume that this is because it 
is simply repeating the stipulation made in the ketubah, "ואחריך לפלוני". 
 
801 MS St. Petersburg: ממציא instead of משיא 
 





abide by R. Shimon b. Gamaliel’s ruling, not simply because it was ex post facto, but because it 
is a case of a woman getting remarried. There is certainly pathos here. The woman left as a 
widow should certainly get remarried, for stature, for consistent means of support, etc. And who 
knows what the reaction of potential suitors might be to knowing that they could lose what the 
woman brings into the marriage? Perhaps that would hurt her prospects. Thus, Abaye’s original 
perspective echoes the breakdown we saw in the Palestinian material, that self-same ha‘arama 
done in the name of equity is legitimate, while done an ignoble end is not. And yet, the stam’s 
proposal about Abaye’s willingness in this arena rests on an assumption of the loophole having 
already been utilized. 
VI. Lip Service 
 ח:י תמשנה שביעי
וזה דבר  )דברים טו(  'מחזיר חוב בשביעית יאמר לו משמט אני אמר לו אע"פ כן יקבל ממנו שנאה
השמטה כיוצא בו רוצח שגלה לעיר מקלט ורצו אנשי העיר לכבדו יאמר להם רוצח אני אמרו לו 
  :וזה דבר הרוצח (שם יט)אעפ"כ יקבל מהם שנאמר 
One who repays a debt to his fellow during the Sabbatical year, [the other party] 
says, “I waive [the compensation].” And if he answered him “Nonetheless [I wish 
to pay you], he should accept [the money] from him. As it says, “And this is the 
word of the Sabbatical.” Likewise regarding a murderer who has been exiled to 
the city of refuge. If the people in the city wish to honor him, he must say, “I am a 
murderer.” If they say to him, “Nonetheless [we wish to honor you],” he may 
accept [the honor] from them, as it is said, “And this is the word of the 
murderer.”803 
 
  משנה ט
 המחזיר חוב בשביעית רוח חכמים נוחה ממנו...
One who returns a loan during the Sabbatical year, the rabbis are proud of him.  
 
The mishnah suggests (as does Sifri) a radically narrow reading of the requirement of for 
waiving loans during the sabbatical year. It does not preclude the possibility that a loan may be 
repaid; it simply must be repaid by as a volitional gift rather than a loan reimbursement. Both 
                                                          





Talmuds offer quite animated versions of how this loophole should be used, with full awareness 
of its function 
 ירושלמי שביעית י:ג
המחזיר חוב בשביעית אומר לו משמט אני רב הונא אמר בשפה רפה והימין פשוטה לקבל אמר רבי 
ואינון מוקרין ליה בגין תרתיי צריך מימר יוסי הדא אמרה בר נש דתני חדא מיכלא והוא אזל לאתר 
 :לון אנא חדא מיכלא אנא חכים
One who returns a loan during the Sabbatical year, [the other party] says to him, I 
waive [the repayment]. R. Huna said, “[Do so] in a soft voice and with his right 
hand outstretched to receive [the payment].” R. Jose said, “This is similar to a 
man who studied one tract and comes to a place where they honor him for two 
tracts must tell them, “I only know one tract.” 
 
Rav Huna wants the creditor to take full advantage of the irony of his/her statement: say that s/he 
waives the loan in a barely audible whisper, while holding out his/her hand to receive payment.  
R. Jose compares it to a person who has to make an embarrassing admission and does not really 
want the results of this admission! In BT, Rabbah goes so far as to suggest coercing the debtor 
into saying, “Nonetheless”: 
 :לזבבלי גיטין 
 ,יקבל הימנו -צריך שיאמר לו משמט אני ואם אמר לו אע"פ כן  -חוב לחבירו בשביעית  המחזיר 
 אל ,כשהוא נותן לו :איתיביה אביי .עד דאמר הכי 'ותלי לי :אמר רבה .דבר השמטה וזה :שנאמר
ליה נמי עד  תלי :אמר ליה .אלא יאמר לו שלי הן ובמתנה אני נותן לך ,יאמר לו בחובי אני נותן לך
אייתינהו ניהליה  ,אבא בר מרתא דהוא אבא בר מניומי הוה מסיק ביה רבה זוזי .דאמר הכי
אמאי  :אמר ליה ,אתא אביי אשכחיה דהוה עציב .שקלינהו ואזל ,משמט אני :אמר ליה ,בשביעית
 .אין :ליהאמר  ?אמטת ליה זוזי למר :אמר ליה ,אזל לגביה .הכי הוה מעשה :אמר ליה ?עציב מר
 .לא :אמר ליה ?ואמרת ליה אף על פי כן :משמט אני אמר ליה :אמר ליה ?ומאי אמר לך :אמר ליה
השתא מיהת אמטינהו ניהליה ואימא ליה  ,ואי אמרת ליה אף על פי כן הוה שקלינהו מינך :אמר ליה
וה ביה דעתא לא ה :אמר ,שקלינהו מיניה ,אזל אמטינהו ניהליה ואמר ליה אף על פי כן .אע"פ כן
 .בהאי צורבא מרבנן מעיקרא
One who repays a debt to his fellow during the Sabbatical year, [the other party] 
says, “I waive [the compensation].” And if he answered him “Nonetheless [I wish 
to pay you], he should accept [the money] from him. As it says, “And this is the 
word of the Sabbatical.” Rabbah said, “And one may threaten him physically until 
he says it.” Abaye challenged him: When he gives him [the money during the 
Sabbatical year], he should not say, ‘I give this to you out of debt,’ bit rather, 
‘This is my [money], and I am giving it to you as a gift.’ He said to him, 
“Physically threaten him until he says this.” Abba b. Marta, otherwise known as 
Abba b. Mineyomei, owed Rabbah money. He brought them to him during the 





Mineyomei) took the money and left. Abaye came and found him (=Rabbah) 
upset. He asked, “Why is master sad?” He answered, “This was the story.” He 
(=Abaye) went to him (=Abba) and asked him, “Have you brought money to 
master?” He answered, “Yes.” He asked, “And what did he say?” He answered, “I 
waive.” He asked him, “And did you say, ‘Nonetheless [I wish to pay you]?’” He 
said, “No.” He told him, “If you had said, ‘Nonetheless,’ he would have taken 
them (=the money) from you, so go to im now and say ‘Nonetheless.” He 
(=Abba) went to him (=Rabbah) and said, “Nonetheless [I wish to pay you].” He 
(=Rabbah) took the money from him (=Abba). He (=Rabbah) said [to himself], 
“This young student was clueless at first.” 
 
Rabbah goes one step further: he wishes to apply the compulsion here and to force the debtor 
who has started the process of returning the money to make sure that s/he is not turned away by 
the creditor.  Moreover, though Abaye seems to disagree with Rabbah’s approval of using force, 
he himself goes out of his way to tell protect his teacher’s finances when a loan compensation 
during the Sabbatical year goes source.  One cannot force a declaration of one’s desire to pay.804 
VII. R. Yoḥanan’s vow 
 )פריש( =יומא פד.בבלי ע"ז כח. 
לה בשבתא מאי  'ת'ש דר' יוחנן חש בצפדינא אזל לגבה דההיא מטרוניתא עבדא ליה חמשא ומעלי אמ
אמרה ליה לא צריכת ואי מצטריכנא מאי אמרה ליה אשתבע לי דלא מגלית אשתבע לה לאלהי 
שראל לא ישראל לא מגלינא גליא לי' למחר דרשה בפירקא והא אישתבע לה הכי קאמ' לה לאלהי י
 מגלינא לי' הא לעמיה מגלינא והאיכא חילול השם דגלי לה מעיקרא
'R. Yohanan suffered from scurvy and went to a certain matron. She treated him 
on Thursday and Friday. He said to her: “What should I do tomorrow (=the 
Sabbath)?” She replied: “You will not need the treatment.” Rabbi Yohanan said: 
“But what if I do need it?” She replied: “Swear to me that you will not reveal the 
remedy to anyone.” R. Yohanan swore to her: “To the God of Israel I will not 
reveal it.” She then disclosed the remedy to him and the next day he taught it in 
his public lecture.  
But did he not swear to her not to reveal it?  He swore that he would not reveal it 
to the God of Israel, but to His people, Israel, he would reveal it. The Talmud 
asks: But is this not a profanation of the name of God? From the beginning 
(=before he shared the recipe with the study hall attendees) he revealed to her 
[what he had done by using precise language for his oath]. 
 
                                                          
804 This story, as is often the case, introduces the human element of Rabbah’s sadness and Abaye’s protection of his 





R. Yohanan constructs his vow quite carefully, planning to evade its understood meaning in 
favor of its atomistic meaning. Thus, he does not technically violate his oath. Interestingly, 
however, the stam is concerned with the moral-religious or socio-religious impact of this 
legalistic dodge. Does this chicanery not amount to a profanation of God’s name before this 
Gentile woman, as she would assume that he simply broke his vow? The stam’s solution is that 
he told her about his little trick before revealing the secret recipe of her remedy the following 
day in public.  
The parallel PT version of this story appears in yAZ 2:2 with no mention of the vow and 
with significant consequences for the woman herself. 
ר' יוחנן הוה לי כן והוה מיתסי קומי דתימטיניס בטיבריא ר' אבהו בשם ר' יוחנן אהן צפדונא סכנתא 
בערובתא נחת לגבה אמר לה מיצרך אנא למחר כלום אמרה לי לא ואין צרכת סב גרעינין דתומרים 
ואית דאמרי דנלביסין בפלגיהון יקידין ואור דשערין וצואת קטן נגובה ושחוק וטפול ולא תימר קומי 
 ש שמעת וחנקת גרמה ואית דאמרין איתגיירתבר נש למחר עאל ודרשה בבית מדר
R. Abahu [said] in the name of R. Yohanan: Scurvy is [mortally] dangerous [and 
may be treated on the Sabbath805]. R. Yoḥanan had it and was being treated by 
[the daughter] of Domitian806 in Tiberias. On Friday he asked her, “Will I need 
any [treatment] tomorrow?” She said: No. But if you do need something, put on 
seeds of date palms (and some say seed of Nicolaos dates), split in half and 
roasted, and pounded together with barley husks and a child’s dried excrement, 
and apply that mixture. But do not reveal to anyone [this potion].” The next day, 
he went and expounded upon [the potion recipe] in the study hall. She heard, and 
she strangled herself. And some say, she converted to Judaism. 
 
The Palestinian sugya records no loophole. In fact, R. Yoḥanan’s dishonesty is responsible either 
for her death or for her conversion because of his perceived or true betrayal.  It certainly is 
interesting that BT includes R. Yoḥanan’s vow, and likewise it is interesting that BT’s stam cares 
how R. Yoḥanan’s cunning would be perceived by the woman. In our review of BT ha‘arama, 
we noted that the stam is concerned with “how things look” – is the ruse obvious? Can people 
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tell? Similarly, the stam here is concerned with how things look to the Gentile healer. This is not 
a linear comparison, but reflects the stam’s interest (and indeed some amoraim as well) in issues 
beyond the realm of the technically legal. 
VIII. On the Fringe 
 בבלי מנחות מא. )מינכן(
וסרבלא  808אשכחיה לרב קטינא דהוה מיכסי סדינא א"ל קטינא סדינא בקייטא 807דמלאכ)ח(
מה תהא עליה א"ל ענשיתו אעשה א"ל בזמן דאיכ' ריתחא ענשינן אי אמרת  810ציצית 809בסיתווא
בשלמ' חובת גבר' הוא היינו דמיחייב דלא קא רמי אלא אי אמרת חובת טלית היא הא לא מיחייב' 
י דחייביה רחמ' כי מיכסי טלית דבת חיובא היא לכסוייה מי חייביה רחמ' ואלא מאי חובת גבר' היא נה
 הכי קא"ל טצדקי למיפטר נפשך מציצית
For an angel once found R. Qatina [who was accustomed to] wearing a [linen] 
wrap in the summer and a cloak811 in the winter. He exclaimed: Qatina, Qatina 
warp in the summer and a cloak in the winter, but what will happen with the 
fringes? (R. Qatina) replied: Do you punish a person for [neglecting] a positive 
precept? He said: In a time of wrath we do. Now, if you hold that the law of 
fringes is an obligation relating to the person – then that is why one would incur 
guilt for not wearing a garment with fringes; but if you hold that it is an obligation 
relating to the garment, then why [is any guilt incurred] given that these garments 
are exempt? What then might you hold? That it is an obligation incumbent upon 
the person? Although the Torah holds a person accountable when he wears a 
garment that is subject to fringes, but did the Torah also oblige him to cover 
himself [with a garment which requires fringes]? This is what [the angel] replied: 
[It is] a means to excuse yourself from the law of fringes! 
 
In the context of a discussion as to whether ṣiṣit entails a requirement that every four-cornered 
garment must be affixed with proper fringes or that every person wearing a four-cornered 
garment must have fringes properly affixed to it.  The stam, in the context of the angelic tale of 
R. Qatina suggests that there is one dimension that has been left unexplored: Even if a person has 
                                                          
807 MS Paris, Vatican 118, Vatican 120, Venice Ed.: מלאכא 
 
808 MS Vatican 120:בקטינא, probably a scribal error based on the amora’s name. 
 
809 MS Vatican 118: בסיתרא 
 
810 Venice Ed. adds the words של תכלת 
 





a requirement to put fringes on his four-cornered garment, need he go out of his way to wear 
such a garment in the first place? It seems that the stam says that he need not do so. Yet, from the 
angel’s comments to R. Qatina, he also may not go out of his way not to wear a four-cornered 
garment in order to evade the ṣiṣit requirement.812  
 While the Palestinian Talmud had used the terminology of חשש הערמה, suspicion of 
evasion, BT does not. However, this story evinces a similar concern. Moreover, the angel is 
prepared even to punish R. Qatina for such unwarranted behavior. The angel knows that R. 
Qatina means to evade the law of fringes. 
Moral Theory: A Turn to Virtue Ethics 
 Before offering a contextual explanation for BT’s discomfort with intention ha‘arama 
and attendant interest in how things look, what an agent’s true interest is, etc.,  we detour into the 
realm of modern moral philosophy to understand what underlying philosophy such discomfort 
indicates. As legal theory did for our analysis of ha‘arama in chapter 2, moral philosophy offers 
vocabulary and systematization in order to capture these concepts. 
University of Pennsylvania Law professor Leo Katz points out that use and acceptance of 
loopholes generally betrays a deontological perspective on morality, from the Greek root deon, 
meaning obligation or duty. As opposed to consequentialists (e.g., utilitarians) who will go to 
                                                          
812 The term used here to refer to evasion is טצרקי, and it appears only one other place in all of BT, in bBQ 56a: 
 
You should surely have realized that since you left it in a sunny place, it will 
use every possible means )טצרקי( for the purpose of getting out. 
 
Both A. Kohut and J.N. Epstein, among others, have related the term to the Middle Persian word čārag. According 
to P.O. Skjaervo, this Pahlavi word means “a way out, a way to do.” It would be interesting to know whether the 
term čārag was used to refer to loopholes generally, and what those contours were. I leave this question for future 
research. See Yishai Kiel, “Redesigning tzitzit in the Babylonian Talmud in light of literary depictions of the 
Zoroastrian kustig,”Shoshannat Yaakov: Jewish and Iranian Studies in Honor of Yaakov Elman, Eds. Shai Secunda 






any lengths to maximize the good, deontologists yield to constraints even when trying to achieve 
the best outcomes. In his words: “Simple consequentialism holds that good determines the right 
– the amount of goodness produced by an action is the sole determinant of its rightness – 
whereas the deontologist denies this, holding that other considerations are relevant.”813  
The classic scenario which exemplifies their debate is that of a terminally ill patient on a 
respirator. If there is only one respirator available, and a terminally ill patient is connected to it, 
should the hospital administrator demand that the respirator be disconnected and given to a more 
promising patient? According to consequentialists, the answer is yes: in save a person whose 
changes for survival are great (or simply superior to other patients), one may actively remove the 
necessary life sustaining resources from someone who shows little or no hope of recovery. For 
deontologists, however, there is a constraint: maximizing the good cannot come at the expense of 
moral behavior. Deontologists instead offer the following scheme. Ordering respirators that must 
be disconnected for servicing and repair every few weeks may solve the problem. When the 
respirator connected to the terminally ill patient is disconnected for servicing, the hospital staff 
would simply not reconnect it to that patient, but would connect it to a more promising patient. 
For deontologists, the passive process is more acceptable than the active removal of care, and so 
this may be done in order to maximize positive results. 
 The parallel to rabbinic legal loopholes is clear: while, occasionally, there are reasons to 
break the law, or even to change it, the rabbis basically feel constrained by legal process. Even in 
pursuit of the good, of values the rabbis (and, in their view, Jewish law) themselves cherish, one 
must be bound by technical statute. On this view, there is something inherently valuable and 
                                                          





moral about following the law.  Thus, it is, indeed, in their estimation, more acceptable to reach 
the same ends by legal means than by illegal means.814 This fits neatly within other rabbinic 
requirements for the significance of process and mode in defining and constraining outcomes, 
inter alia, not accomplishing a commandment by violating another one,815 the distinction 
between passive transgression and active transgression, etc. A number of other core principles of 
ancient rabbinic which are likewise compatible with deontology: e.g., preferential treatment of 
certain relationships over others (as in the case of saving one’s teacher’s lost item before saving 
that of one’s parent, the ruling of saving oneself before others, offering charity to co-religionists 
before others), the concept of supererogation (lifnim mi-shurat ha-din).816 While these examples 
have yet to be analyzed through this lens in detail (including chronological and geographical 
stratification), as GEM Anscombe points out, it is quite natural for religious systems to sway 
toward the deontological, as they posit law as divine.817  
One must be wary to conclude though that a deontological emphasis suggests that any 
technically licit path is legitimate, regardless of the end goal. After all, deontologists are 
                                                          
814 See Michael Harris, “Consequentialism, Deontologism, and the Case of Sheva ben Bikhri,” The Torah u-Madda 
Journal 15 (2008-09) 68-94, for a discussion of a deontological thread within rabbinic law. See also, Moshe Sokol, 
“Some Tensions in the Jewish Attitude Toward the Taking of Human Life,” The Jewish Law Annual 7 (1988) 97-
113, and “The Allocation of Scarce Medial Resources: A Philosophical Analysis of the Halakhic Sources,” AJS 
Review 15 (1990) 63-93. Two rabbinic concepts/texts marshaled in evidence of a deontological orientation among 
the rabbis are 1) the ruling regarding not giving over one member of a city for rape or death even in order to save the 
entire city (mTer. 8:12, tTer. 7:23), and 2) the rabbinic concept of lifnim mi-shurat ha-din (e.g., bBQ 99b, bBM 24b), 
or supererogatory behavior. Both reflect an interest in rules over maximizing the good. Harris shows convincingly, 
though, that each can be read through a Consequentialist lens as well. What is unique about rabbinic loopholes is 
their need is certainly dependent upon a Deontological perspective. 
 
815 Regardless of which commandment seems more significant 
816 Two major distinctions between Deontology and Consequentialism generally are that the former recognizes the 
primacy of some relationships over others and that it recognizes that law is not infinite. Hence, the significance of 
special relationships in Judaism with other Jews and with one’s teacher, as well as the concept of supererogation, 
which indicates that there is indeed a boundary to what law requires of a person. 
 





themselves interested in achieving positive consequences (and even maximizing the good) 
though they are distinguished from consequentialists by rule-constraint. The end goal itself must 
be considered good in order for the discussion of constraints even to begin.  This is easily 
contrasted with the Brandeisian perspective and returns us to the discussion of Dworkinian 
formalism in chapter 2, above. 
Indeed, based on what we have seen in our study of rabbinic loopholes throughout the 
tannaitic and amoraic periods, the rabbis do not focus on process alone. After all, we have seen 
more examples of rejected loopholes than of accepted loopholes. True, some reasons offered for 
loopholes being rejected relate to constraints on the effectiveness or eligibility of loopholes in 
certain situations,818 but the most obvious limitations on ha‘arama is where the end goals are not 
desirable. Had the rabbis subscribed to a Brandeisian perspective, all would have been fair game. 
But, in truth, the consequences do become quite significant in determining whether even a 
completely licit process should be outlawed or not. This perspective is still cleanly within the 
rubric of deontological thinking; deontologists do not ignore the consequences of actions, but 
instead merely constrain one to achieve those consequences licitly. 
 In what we have seen in BT, however, there is something more than simply deontology at 
play. There are indications of Virtue Ethics being applied to ha‘arama.819  Re-popularized by 
G.E.M. Anscombe820 and MacIntyre in the mid/late-twentieth century, virtue ethics was first 
                                                          
818 e.g., against an infraction that requires a qorban ḥatat 
 
819 Deontology and virtue ethics do indeed often act together against consequentialism. (David McNaughton and 
Piers Rawling, “Deontology,” The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, 453) Walter Wurzburger has argued for 
virtue ethics as a part of rabbinic thinking in Walter Wurzburger, Ethics of Responsibility: Pluralistic Approaches to 
Covenantal Ethics. Philadelphia (1994). See David Shatz’s review, “Beyond Obedience: Walter Wurzburger’s 
Ethics of Responsibility,” Tradition 30,2 (1996) 74-95. 
 
820 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 (1958) 1-17; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. 





articulated by Aristotle and is more concerned with agent morality than with act morality. 
Succinctly stated: “Moral philosophy should focus more…on what kind of person it is best to be, 
rather than on what principles we should invoke to solve artificially constructed moral 
dilemmas.”821 Martha Nussbaum explains that though there are different variations of Virtue 
Ethics theory, there are some basic convergences: 
Insofar as there is any common ground among the defenders of ‘virtue ethics,’ it 
lies, I suggest, in these three claims: 
A. Moral philosophy should be concerned with the agents, as well as with 
choice and action 
B. Moral philosophy should therefore concern itself with motive and 
intention, emotion and desire: in general, with the character of the inner moral 
life, and with settled patterns or motive, emotion, and reasoning that lead us to 
call someone a person of a certain sort (courageous, generous, moderate, just, 
etc.) 
C. Moral philosophy should focus not only on isolated acts of choice, but 
also, and more importantly, on the whole course of the agent’s moral life, its 
patterns of commitment, conduct, and also passion.822 
  
Several sources in the Palestinian material may imply a virtue ethics perspective. 
Describing a person as a רשע ערום, for instance, indicates that cunning may be more of a 
character trait than an isolated activity. Likewise, R. Judah b. 'Ilai’s lament that the דורות האחרונים 
are less virtuous than the דורות הראשונים because the former look for any and all loopholes to 
avoid tithing, indicates that what is at stake may be more of a personality flaw than merely any 
one action.  In the Babylonian material, however, there is evidence of a much more agent-
centered perspective. This is clear from R. Ashi’s insistence that use of ha‘arama be limited to 
scholars,823 the stam’s concern that a woman who uses ha‘arama to immerse her impure clothing 
                                                          
821 David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, “Deontology,” The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. 453. 
 
822 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?” The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1999) 170 
 
823 The other two sources defined the people themselves as bad because of their use of loopholes; R. Ashi defines the 





on the Festival might come to do so directly, and the citation above about not teaching people 
about the loopholes of canceling vows, lest they stop taking vows seriously. Beyond these things, 
perhaps the Babylonian Talmud’s interest in the sincere self in general reflect the very same 
issue.  One must not perform certain types of ha‘arama not because of onlookers who may 
misunderstand, and not because of intentions not being “concretize-able,” but because ultimately, 
it is the person’s own duplicitous intentions that will serve to create a slippery slope for future 
actions of the agent him or herself.  Indeed, concerns of this type may be most warranted in 
situations of projected intentions. If the rabbis are becoming more sensitive to the significance of 
the internal and the external self corresponding to one another, projecting an intention may not 
be good enough. There is still a concern that a person might change as a result – either 
mistakenly become more lax, or even purposely become more permissive. 
Interim Summary 
 There is relatively much less ha‘arama in BT than in the earlier Palestinian material. As 
early as the third generation of BT amoraim, evidence suggests that ha‘arama is about cover-up 
rather than construction; as early as the fourth generation, the term איערומי is used to mean 
perjury; also in the fourth generation, amoraim seem less interested in discussing ha‘arama 
(Abaye’s potential interlocutors) and even ignore it in favor of interpretations that are less 
dependent on agent intentions (Rami b. Ḥama). Moreover, beginning with (at least one reading 
of) Rava, there is a discomfort with even concrete but obvious ruses, a discomfort which the 
stammaim echo. R. Ashi rails against ha‘arama and tries to make actions and intentions 
correspond. The stam changes earlier baraitot for the very same reason, so that actions accord 
with stipulated intentions. All of these are indicative of a more internal approach to intention, a 





and doing another, with one’s internal intentions being obviously contradicted by one’s actions.  
Moreover, we posit that this is an increased focus on the self in allowing ha‘arama. This is 
consistent with R. Ashi’s demand that only someone who will not be adversely affected by the 
use of ha‘arama may avail him/herself of it.  
 Legal loopholes are a very ancient way of circumventing the law. They evince a 
simplistic and rigidly formalistic way of viewing a legal corpus. The Palestinian material, 
parallel to its Roman law counterpart, suggests a more internal view of the law, less rigidly 
formalistic, more in tune with the spirit of what the law is really trying to accomplish. Thus, 
Tosefta and PT mark one step towards a more internal view of the law. BT, however, makes a 
rather giant leap forward. Rather than simply looking inside of the law, BT looks inside of the 
individual, demanding that his/her actions comport with his/her intentions. This is an important 
new step. We have used the model of Virtue Ethics in order to exhibit the significant difference 
between act-centered ethics and agent-centered ethics.  
The fact that this change begins in the third and fourth generations of amoraim is not 
surprising. There is renewed interest824 in the topic of intention in rabbinic law among those 
amoraim, as reflected in arguments as varied as liability under tort law825 and transgression of 
                                                          
824 Shana Strauch-Schick, in her very comprehensive study of the evolution of intention in rabbinic law within the 
Babylonian Talmud, has suggested that while the early amoraim do not discuss intentionality, which had already 
been discussed in tannaitic literature, for the third generation of amoraim, and more explicitly in the fourth 
generation of amoraim, that intention becomes a critical part of defining action once again. As she asks, “if the early 
Amoraim were aware of the notion of intention…why, then, did they choose to disregard it?”  Her focus is 
particularly on the significance of intention for tort liability, but as she argues convincingly throughout the paper, the 
question is equally applicable for other uses of intention as well. (Shana Strauch- Schick, (dissertation) 23); See also 
Alona Lisista, ‘Intent’ and ‘Thought’ as Halakhic Concepts in Talmudic Literature, JTS, 2004 
 
825 Aharon Shemesh, “Shogeg karov l’meizid,” Hebrew University Annual 20 (1995-1996), 342-399 ((cited in 
Shana Strauch-Schick Intention in the Babylonian Talmud: An Intellectual History (Doctoral Dissertation) Yeshiva 





Sabbath law.826  Perhaps this renewal included qualitatively different conversations from 
tannaitic conceptions of intention. Early understandings of intention were more externalized, 
more concrete. It is in the third and fourth amoraic strata that a more abstract, more intimate,827 
more subjective version of intention comes to the fore. The fact that Abaye and Rava become the 
champions of the intention828 concept in BT,829 and they are broadly recognized for ushering in 
major shifts in rabbinic thinking, both in their move towards greater conceptualization and 
                                                          
826 Shaul Kolcheim Davar She’ein Mitkaven b’Safrut ha-Tannait u’ve-Talmud (Doctoral Dissertation) Bar Ilan 
University, Ramat Gan (Hebrew) (2002) 18. (cited in Shana Strauch-Shick (2011) Intention in the Babylonian 
Talmud: An Intellectual History (Doctoral Dissertation) Yeshiva University, New York, 14, n48) 
 
827 As Yohanan Muffs writes, “the later the literature – be it legal, religious, or literary – the greater the stress on 
inner states of mind, and in legal contexts in particular, the great constitutive importance of intent and volition” – 
Yohanan Muffs, Love and Joy, Law, Language and Religion in Ancient Israel (New York: Harvard University 
Press, 1992) 145. Annelise Riles, though, challenges him in Annelise Riles, Rethinking the Masters of Comparative 
Law. Oregon: Hart Publishing (2001). Regardless, we still must distinguish between intention to commit a sinful 
action and intention to perform a miṣvah. The latter may still require only the “ritual self.” As Strauch-Schick writes 
regarding the fact that Rava requires intention for sin but not for the fulfillment of a misvah: “When it comes to 
rituals it is the performance which matters, regardless of the mindset that accompanies it. As recent theories of ritual 
studies have posited, the purpose of rituals is the creation of a “subjunctive universe” and a shared illusion of a 
potential ideal among its participants of which intention is not necessarily an essential component. The performance 
of the act and the illusion it creates are what matter since the actions of the ritual are what produce meaning. The 
inner states of the participants could, therefore, be completely irrelevant.” (Strauch-Schick, 155) Though, it is 
likewise possible that Rava exhibits this inconsistency for a different reason: “Applying a model of legal theory may 
shed light on Rava’s conflicting rulings. His insistence on proper intention in the case of torts and violations on the 
one hand and the lack thereof in the fulfillment of positive obligations on the other hand, demonstrates that he was 
consistently interested in protecting the actor.” (Strauch- Schick 153) 
828 She summarizes: The fourth-generation Amoraim, Rava and Abaye evinced an increasing interest in the notion of 
intention in a variety of areas. In tort law, Rava required that one act with the intention of causing specific damage in 
order to impose liability. He also distinguished intentional tortious acts from negligent ones, imposing either no or 
lesser liability in the latter. He also discussed the need for intention in the violation of religious law. His rulings are 
often set in contrast to his contemporary Abaye’s, who imposed liability even where there is no intent to violate. 
However, rulings of Abaye, in which he questioned his teacher Rabbah’s positions which reflect a system of strict 
liability, signify that Abaye too did not impose liability without considering the actor’s intention. His rulings 
indicate that he required a minimal intent to act as opposed to Rava’s specific requirement of intent to violate. 
(Strauch-Schick, 172) 
 
829 Strauch-Schick notes that there is an important distinction between the positions of Abaye and Rava in terms of 
their respective requirements for intention in order to transgress: Rava consistently required that, to be culpable, one 
act with the intention of violating a commandment, while Abaye required that one merely perform an intentional act, 
regardless of purpose. (Strauch-Schick 109) Given that we do not know what Rava might have responded to any of 





abstract thinking.830 Moreover, we cannot ignore831  the fact that this trend echoes what Christine 
Hayes has observed regarding legal fictions, and Tzvi Novick has observed regarding 
implausible legal presumptions as well: Babylonian amoraim, especially of later generations, 
limit the use of constructions that do not reflect true reality.  For Hayes, this reluctance on the 
part of BT amoraim is related to their anxiety about radical agency, and for Novick it is because 
of a more sophisticated rhetorical esthetic. For the particular application of this trend to 
ha‘arama, however, we suggest a developing sense of the importance of interiority in defining 
one’s actions.832 
                                                          
830 See Tos. bQid 45b s.v. hava, Ya’akov Sussman, ve’shuv le’yerushalmi neziqin, 101 n188, and Leib Moscovitz, 
Talmudic Reasoning, chapter nine. 
 
831 See Introduction (above)   
 
832 After analyzing what the significance of interiority may mean for the philosophy of the rabbis, there is still the 
question of what prompted this new emphasis. Just as the Palestinain Talmud’s treatment of ha‘arama relates 
strongly to its Roman cultural context, the Babylonian Talmud’s treatment of ha‘arama has parallels in its 
Zoroastrian cultural context.   
Yaakov Elman stresses how embedded Babylonian Jewry was within Persian culture: 
Jews and Persians had coexisted in Mesopotamia, mostly peaceably, for some 700 years by the 
time that the first generation of prominent Babylonian talmudic rabbis were born in the third 
quarter of the 2nd century…The Babylonian Jews would continue to live under Iranian rule for 
more than five centuries, including the entire period of the formation of the Babylonian Talmud 
(220-500 CE). The 1.8 million words of that Talmud, twice the size of the Code of Justinian, 
provides us with a rich source for understanding the intellectual, cultural, and social life of the 
Jews of southern Mesopotamia during those three centuries, thus presenting a picture of the 
community’s close relationship with Middle Persian culture, and their social and intellectual 
contacts with their fellow citizens of the Persian Empire. (Yaakov Elman, “Talmud ii. Rabbinic 
Literature and Middle Persian Texts,” Encylopaedia Iranica, online edition, 2010, available at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/talmud-ii) 
 
Elman observes the many similarities as well between Judaism and Zoroastrianism, whether in particulars such as 
the status of the menstruant woman, or general theological principles such as reward and punishment or heaven and 
hell. Sassanian Babylonia was a ripe context for mutual influence. 
It is well-documented that BT and Zoroastrian literature share an emphasis on the significance of intention. (See 
Shaul Shaked, “Religious actions evaluated by intention: Zoroastrian concepts shared with Judaism,” Shoshannat 
Yaakov (2012) 403- 413: “The texts quoted leave little room for doubt that the Zoroastrian doctors regarded 
intention, either in the virtue of performing good deeds or in the sin which consists of desisting from such a 
performance, a meaningful factor, perhaps an essential one, in evaluating the religious merit of a person’s ritual 
conduct.” (413); See also Yishai Kiel, “Cognizance of Sin and Penalty in the Babylonian 
Talmud and Pahlavi Literature: A Comparative Analysis,” Oqimta 1 (2013) 1-49; M. Macuch, “On the Treatment of 
Animals in Zoroastrian Law,” in: Iranica Selecta: Studies in Honour of Professor Wojciech Skalmowski on the 





                                                          
129; Y. Elman, "Toward an Intellectual History of Sasanian Law: An Intergenerational Dispute in Hērbedestān 9 
and Its Rabbinic Parallels"The Talmud in its Iranian Context, Eds. C. Bakhos and R. Shayegan. Tübingen: Mohr 
(2010) 21-57) In fact Shana Strauch-Schick argues that Rava’s specific interest in intention may be a result of 
Zoroastrian influence. (Strauch-Schick, 18-20, 210ff. Yaakov Elman has made the case for Rava having been more 
impacted by Zoroastrian influences than Abaye, as the former lived in a Meḥoza, a suburb of the Sasanian winter 
capital of Ctesiphon, while the latter lived in Pumbedita, which was more rural and offered less contact with the 
Persian world. Regardless, presumably, once a discussion began in rabbinic circles, it would have ripple effects. 
(Yaakov Elman, “Ma‘aseh be-Shtei Ayarot: Mahoza u-Pumbedita Ke-Metzayygot Shtei Tarbuyot Hilkhatiyyot,” 
Torah Li-Shemah: Mehqarim be-Mada'ei ha-Yahadut li-khvod Prof. Shamma Yehudah Friedman, Ed. D. Golinkin. 
Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press (2007) 3-38.)  For the purposes of this study, however, it is significant to 
determine whether intention is a uniquely inner force or whether it is considered a mere legal fact, one which may 
potentiall be “externally constructed.” Below are several examples from Zoroastrian corpora that indicate the 
significance of interiority:  
 
AW (Ayādgār ī Wuzurgmihr) §84  
The function of innate wisdom is to preserve the body from doing things that induce fear, from 
deliberate (nigerišnīg) sin, and from fruitless effort, to hold in mind the transience of the things of 
this world and the finality of the body, not to diminish from the things related to one’s future 
existence, and not to increase those that are related to one’s passing away. 
 
There are a number of Zoroastrian texts which discuss deliberate action, (Ardā Wirāz nāmag (Awn) 37.4;  Rivāyat 
of Āturfarnbag and Farnbag-Srōš (RAF) 57A.1; Šāyast nē Šāyast (ŠnŠ) 10.37; The Pahlavi Rivāyat accompanying 
the Dādestān ī dēnīg (PRDd) 18e; ŠnŠ 10.6; Herbedestān 9.3; Dādestān ī dēnīg (Dd) 7.1; ŠnŠ Suppl. 14; ŠnŠ 8.4) 
and this passage specifically asserts an internal quality to wisdom: “innate wisdom,” as opposed to “acquired 
wisdom” is connected to deliberations about sin.  
 
WZ (Wizīdagīhā ī Zādspram) 29.7 
And the soul, the commander, which is the lord and administrator of the body, in which is its own 
chief and foundation, is similar to a fire-tender, who has among his functions (the duty) to keep 
the dome clean, proper and under supervision (pad nigerišn), and to kindle the fire. 
 
Here, the mind supervises the body’s activities. It is not the action which is primary, but the mind which 
directs the activity.  This is significant, in that the intimate “I” of the person is meant to steer his or her 
actions.  
Zoroastrianism further contends that subjective internal thoughts even without action are as 
impactful as action itself. Recently, David Brodsky has observed that Babylonian amoraim, as opposed to 
Palestinian rabbis, share this common view with their Zoroastrian contemporaries. (Brodsky also discusses 
Christian texts which likewise assert the equation of evil thought with evil deed: David Brodsky, “‘Hirhur 
ke-ma‘aseh damei’ (‘Thought Is Akin to Action’): The Importance of Thought in Zoroastrianism and the 
Development of a Babylonian Rabbinic Motif," forthcoming in Irano-Judaica Vol.7, 25ff) He writes: 
…while Rabbinic Judaism of tannaitic Palestine generally did not conceive of thought as being mitzvah or sin, some 
rabbis in amoraic Babylonia did conceive of it as such. In doing so, these Babylonian rabbis, notably Rav, R. 
Naḥman, Rava, and Ravina, were in line with the Persian cultural context of the time, and they are precisely the 
rabbis whom Yaakov Elman has shown generally to be the most culturally Persian (Yaakov Elman, “Middle Persian 
Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation and Resistance in the Shaping of Rabbinic Legal Tradition,” The 
Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature. Eds. Charlotte E. Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007)165-197) This notion was entirely new in rabbinic Judaism. (Yaakov 
Elman, “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation and Resistance in the Shaping of Rabbinic 
Legal Tradition,” The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature. Eds. Charlotte E. Fonrobert 
and Martin S. Jaffee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007)165-197) To be sure, the tannaitic Palestinian 
Rabbis did consider intention to fulfill good deeds and to commit sin as playing a role in the halakhic system, 
however, for them intention needed to be coupled with action to be sin or mitzvah. The Zoroastrians and some 





                                                          
(Bernard Jackson goes to great length to eschew the notion that early rabbinic law prosecutes for intention alone. 
(E.g. showing that the prohibition to covet was truly interpreted as the prohibition to steal (Ex. 20:17; Deut. 5:21); 
For further examples, see Bernard S. Jackson, “Liability for Mere Intention in Early Jewish Law,” HUCA 42 (1971) 
esp. 197-207. As for the Palestinian amoraim, Brodsky believes they were had imported Babylonian ideas: 
“Although amoraic Palestinian sources rarely evince any knowledge of the ideology that thoughts could themselves 
count as sin or as mitzvah, three short passages do exist in amoraic Palestinian literature that contain such a notion. 
In two of the three passages (Gen. R. 19 and Lev. R. 7:3), a trail seems to have been left exposing that the notion 
was likely imported from Babylonia. The concept, therefore, seems to have originated in Babylonia, and to have 




He (every person—DB) should be contrite and 
repentant to the gods for every sin he thinks he was 
guilty of that day in thought, speech and action. 
pad harw wināh ī menēd [ku] hān rōz pēšār (?) *būd 
pad menišn gōwišn kunišn az-eš abaxš ud andar 
yazdān pad-padīd *bawišn (all transcriptions and 
translations of Dēnkard 6 are from Aturpāt-i Ēmētān 
1979) 
 
Dādestān ī Dēnīg 13.3 
and in the future body, on the completion of all 
accounts, the Creator Ohrmazd himself does the 
account, (the Creator Ohrmazd) to whom the account 
of all the thoughts, words and deeds of the 
creatures...are known through his omniscient wisdom. 
pad harw wināh ī menēd [ku] hān rōz pēšār (?) *būd 
pad menišn gōwišn kunišn az-eš abaxš ud andar 
yazdān pad-padīd *bawišn (all transcriptions and 
translations of Dēnkard 6 are from Aturpāt-i Ēmētān 
1979) 
 
Dādestān ī Dēnīg 19.2 
It is said that the souls of the dead and departed are on 
the earth for three nights. The first night they receive 
comfort as a result of their good thoughts and sorrow 
as a result of their evil thoughts. The second night they 
receive pleasure as a result of (their) good words and 
trouble and punishment as a result of (their) evil words; 
and the third night they receive help as a result of 
(their) good deeds and punishment as a result of (their) 
evil deeds. 
widardān ud murdagān ruwān 3 šab pad zamīg hēnd. 
u-šān fradom šab az humat šnāyišn az dušmat bēš. 
dudīgar šab az hūxt rāmišn az duš-hūxt duš-xwārīh 
pādifrāh ud sidīgar šab az huwaršt frayādišn az 
dušxwaršt pādifrāh rasēd. 
 
 
 סד: )המבורג(בבלי ב"ב ק
אמ' רב עמרם אמ' רב שלש עברות אין אדם ניצל מהן בכל יום 
 הרהור עברה ועיון תפלה ולשון הרע
R. 'Amram said in the name of Rab, “A person is not 
saved from three sins every day: thought of sin [hirhur 
‘averah], [the lack of] focusing on prayer, and gossip.” 
 בבלי ב"ב טז.
בכל זאת לא חטא איוב בשפתיו אמר רבא בשפתיו לא חטא בלבו 
 חטא 
“In spite of this, Job did not sin with his lips (Job. 
2:10)” – Rava said: With his lips he did not sin, with 
his heart he sinned. 
 
 :-בבלי שבת סד.
רב נחמן אמ' רבה בר אבוה אמ' ויקצף משה על פקודי החיל אמ' 
שמא חזרתם לקלקולכם הראשון אמרו לא נפקד  להן משה לישראל
למה אמרו לו אם מידי עבירה  ממנו איש אמ' להם אם כן כפרה זו
 יי'י  יצאנו ידי הרהור לא יצאנו מיד ונקרב את קרבן
And Moses became angry with the commanders of the 
troops […and Moses said to them, ‘You let all the 
women live’]” (Num. 31:14–15). Rav Naḥman said in 
the name of Rabbah bar Abuha: Moses said to Israel, 
‘Perhaps you have returned to your original sinning 
ways.’ They said to him, ‘Not one of us had 
intercourse’ (Num. 31:49). (This is a play on the 
verse. For this nuance of paqad, see Jastrow, 
Dictionary, 1206, s.v. paqad. In its biblical context, 
it seems to mean, “and no man is missing.”) ‘If so, 
what is this sacrifice for?’ They said to him, ‘If we 
have escaped from the hands of sin, from the hands of 
[sinful] thoughts we have not escaped.’ At which 
point they said, ‘We have offered the sacrifice of the 
Lord’ (Num. 31:50).(bShabbat 64a (MS Oxford). See 
also the parallel in Masekhet Kallah 7 and the analysis 
of this passage in Brodsky 2006: 52–66 and 124–29.) 
 
The significance of this joint phenomenon is that thought is decoupled from action and is recognized on its 






In this chapter we have seen a turn to integrity in the Babylonian material which requires 
that internal and external intention correspond to one another. This may be related to the 
observation that the third and fourth century of Babylonian amoraim renewed their interest in 
intention. Perhaps they also began to redefine it. This marks a development in rabbinic thinking 
from the Palestinian material, which was one step removed from legal formalism, in its interest 
in the inner life of the law, to a new step which involved recognizing the subjective actor as 
significant. This trend begins in the third and fourth generation of BT amoraim and becomes 












                                                          
alone knows.  The permanent bond between thought and action which had convinced Rosen-Tzvi that intention is a 
type of action (See chapter 3, above) has been severed. Intention is not just about defining actions, nor is it simply 
defined by actions. The internal self is real. It is indeed possible that the Babylonian Talmud’s perspective on 







In this work, we have used our study of the changes in the use of ha‘arama terminology 
to paint a portrait of evolving legal thought: progressing from an emphasis on formalism to an 
interest in equity, and ultimately to a concern for the subjective individual actor. Simultaneously, 
the material indicates a move from the more externalized notion of the ritual self to the more 
evolved notion of the sincere self. To be sure, these are not completely linear evolutions, and 
they do admit inconsistencies. But they are indeed broadly descriptive of the development of 
rabbinic law in this area. These developments are likely the result of a combination of factors 
which are both innate to rabbinic thought- a natural progression from earlier stages – as well as 
environmental or external factors. 
Rigid formalism is typical of religious systems, as it does not take the individual into 
account. Its focus is the perfect law legislated by the perfect Lawgiver. Thus, regardless of unjust 
consequences for individuals or for society as a whole, a rule must be kept at all costs. An 
interest in equity, however, belies more nuanced expectations for the relationship between law 
and society. Sometimes considerations of equity are about consequences for people or society, 
but other times considerations of equity are about the impact of a given law on the environment 
or on the legal system itself. As Jonathan Wyn Schofer defines it, “The ‘subject’ delineates a rich 
and messy terrain, characterizing the self as it speaks, experiences, knows, chooses, and acts.”833 
This development is distinct from a liberalization of the law: 
Four stages in the development of law with respect to morality and morals may be 
recognized. First, there is a stage of undifferentiated ethical customs, customs of 
popular action, religion, and law; what analytical jurists would call the pre-legal 
stage. Law is undifferentiated from morality. Second, there is a stage of strict law, 
codified or crystallized custom, which in time is outstripped by morality and has 
                                                          
833 Jonathan Wyn Schofer, “Self, Subject, and Chosen Subjection: Rabbinic Ethics and Comparative Possibilities,” 





not sufficient power of growth to keep abreast. Third, there is a stage of infusion 
of morality into the law and of reshaping by morals, in which ideas of equity and 
natural law are effective agencies of growth. Fourth, there is a stage of conscious, 
constructive lawmaking, the maturity of law, in which it is urged that morals and 
morality are for the lawmaker, and that law alone is for the judge.834 
 
According to his vision, one can move past the rules. The rabbis, however, are more reticent 
about this. Our discussion of loopholes indicates just how bound the rabbis themselves were by 
the law. They were not simply legislators, but with regards to their inherited law, they were 
judges. They could not just invent new rules and break old rules. That is, by definition, why 
loopholes come about as legitimate legal means. The rabbis in fact, never completely give up on 
formalism. They simply tweak it. As Christine Hayes has observed, the proclivity for radical 
rabbinic agency actually wanes over time. If anything, the rabbis’ focus on the self leads to 
stricture rather than leniency. 
However, though the rabbis are unwilling or see themselves as unable to change the law, 
whether as a result of their interaction with Roman legal culture, internal forces or probably both, 
they did indeed recognized the shortcomings of the positive law. They recognized that 
sometimes the values of the law itself cannot upheld by conventional legal interpretation. 
Sometimes such interpretation might cause terrible financial loss or even sinful behavior. 
However, rather than simply accepting this reality, they are willing to use an age-old method of 
evasion not to buttress what they see as the values of the law. This is reflective of their 
commitment to law in its current technical iteration as well as their determination to square 
halakha’s rules with its perceived morality. Despite the slippery slope invited by the use of legal 
dodges, the rabbis do their best to curtail the abuse of ha‘arama. This too indicates either an 
                                                          





extreme emphasis on the values they seek to uphold, and/or an understanding that people will not 
accept anything less. 
Simultaneously, the rabbis’ explicit reference to their functionalist goals – e.g., 
preventing sin, preventing monetary loss – is at odds with other depictions of rabbinic, and 
especially amoraic and post-amoraic modi operandi: 
Rabbinic explanations of legal rulings – mainly, amoraic and post-amoraic 
explanations of tannaitic rulings – are frequently formalistic and conceptualistic in 
nature. Such explanations often focus on the formal legal status of particular 
actions of objects – for example, is a particular structure defined as a halakhically 
valid partition – rather than on the assumed goals of the law (e.g., promoting 
equity). By contrast, rulings in other legal systems are often based on functionalist 
considerations and explained in consequentialist fashion, in light of 
socioeconomic or moral considerations and the like. Contemporary historians of 
rabbinic law, too, are frequently inclined to explain rabbinic rulings in light of 
socioeconomic, historical, or political considerations rather than inner-halakhic, 
conceptualist considerations.835   
 
This places ha‘arama in a unique category of rabbinic interpretation. 
 
Another question raised by ha‘arama is that of trust in Jewish practitioners not to misuse 
these dispensations. On the one hand, the rabbis explicitly outlaw certain ha‘aramot, yet they are 
willing to allow others, thus putting great faith in the individual. This, however, may begin to 
yield to cynicism and/or realism in amoraic times. We cited in our introduction a statement by 
early Palestinian amoraim in the name of the tanna R. Judah bar Ilai lament the exploitation of 
tithing loopholes. The late amora R. Ashi reaches a fever pitch with his qualification that only a 
ṣurva me-rabanan, a rabbinic scholar, may be trusts not to mishandle (certain) ha‘arama 
leniencies. Ha‘arama places the rabbis in the corner of both the law and the practitioner, playing 
both sides of the conflict – actualizing the law while offering insider information to those 
                                                          





impacted negatively by the law. Moreover, it places the law and the practitioner on the very same 
side, allowing the law to work on the practitioner’s behalf. The rabbis are the agents of this 
matchmaking. 
           Within this study, both the continuity and the change that emerges from the Palestinian 
Talmud to the Babylonian Talmud are significant. Working off the tannaitic precedents, the two 
Talmuds inherit the tradition of ha‘arama and add their own respective flourishes.  Both 
Talmuds cite the tannaitic examples, use them as leverage against one another, and question 
whether to apply the tannaitic precedents to new circumstances. They likewise share some of the 
limiting criteria for determining which ha‘aramot should be deemed acceptable and which must 
be overruled or rejected - e.g., the significance of monetary loss or of sin.   
 There are, however, two fundamental differences between how PT and BT speak about 
ha‘arama. First, in PT, ha‘arama is a pervasive concept, touching on so many areas of Jewish 
law; in BT, ha‘arama basically becomes relegated to the Sabbath and Festival law. Thus, the 
presence of ha‘arama in BT is both quantitatively more rare and also much less diversified.  
Second, PT and BT examine ha‘arama from radically different angles. When PT seeks out 
ha‘arama to prevent it, there is a sense that it is not necessarily the methodology which bothers 
the amoraim or the editors, but the fact of circumvention itself. Thus, suspicion of ha‘arama is 
often about the equity of the situation. This stage of rabbinic thinking, indicative mostly in the 
Palestinian material, while it emphasizes the importance of the human agent, still views the 
practitioner as a mere subject which is impacted by the law. The only subject equity knows is the 
lawgiver him/herself. What would the lawgiver say if s/he were here? How would s/he want the 





fact, there is moreover an acceptance of a constructed self. Agents may “fake” their intentions, 
creating legal or ritual reality that differs from their internal subjective selves.  
In BT, however, the focus of weeding out ha‘arama is on those cases which involve the 
legal actor’s intention. It seems that the methodology of stipulating intention is under 
examination rather than the fact of circumvention generally. The distinction that Shmuel Shilo 
attributes to all of the rabbinic material - between “use of a rule of law in order to by-pass 
another rule” versus “the actor claiming that his intention was such…when in fact his intention 
was quite different” 836 only becomes truly noticeable in the later Babylonian material.  Thus, in 
BT, we observe a move towards integrity, the inclusion of human being not only as object but as 
subject, a being who interacts dynamically with the law. This is evident in several ways. First, 
externally constructed intention becomes very circumscribed and limited in application: a 
person’s actual subjective self matters: the distinction between obvious and inconspicuous 
ha‘arama becomes a litmus test. Moreover, there is a concern with the impact of using loopholes 
on the individual him or herself. Will it lead him/her to be more lax with the law in the future? 
Also lurking in the background is the question of how the use of ha‘arama may impact 
onlookers. No longer is the concern simply the black on white application of the law at issue but 
the impact of such application on the human psyche.  Moreover, BT’s discomfort with this 
method is evident in its use of the ‘.r.m. root in reference to lying, as well as distinctions made 
between different types of actors such as the young rabbis versus the less learned. 
This development of probing internal intention relates to the current debate regarding the 
pervasiveness of Realism and Nominalism within rabbinic law. Realism and Nominalism837 
                                                          






come to law from the realm of philosophy, and their distinction838 finds its origins in twelfth 
century scholasticism. Peter Abelard was the original nominalist: he argued that “only individual 
substances exist outside the mind, and that universals (i.e., abstract notions – E.S.) are merely 
names (nomina) invented in the mind to express the similarities or relationships among 
individual things belonging to a class.”839 While three tables may each be white, by the idea of 
“whiteness” does not exist in reality; the abstract concept of “whiteness” is invented by the mind 
to categorize. The same may be said of notions that are more abstract – beauty, justice, courage, 
etc. Abelard’s position ran counter to the Greek Platonic heritage, that reality as we perceive it 
with our senses is truly just derivative of universals or Forms, abstract notions which truly exist. 
Hence, Realists argue that universals do indeed exist and are not simply invented by the mind. 
The dispute between Realism and Nominalism is ontological in nature.  
The Realism/Nominalism debate, however, is equally relevant to law: twelfth-century 
scholastics debated as they combed Roman law for underlying universal legal principles whether 
such universal principles actually existed in the world, or whether they were only categories 
imposed by the human mind.840 And, in recent decades, this debate has become relevant to 
rabbinic law in Antiquity: were the rabbis Realists or Nominalists?841 To begin the conversation, 
                                                          
837 “The view that all abstract notions (in philosophy: universals) are unreal and consequently fictitious is based on 
one fundamental premise, viz. that ‘reality’ exists only in the natural, perceptory, sensory world. Only those objects 
that can be perceived by the human senses ‘really exist’. All others are chimera, fictions.” (Pierre J. J. Olivier, Legal 
Fictions in Practical and Legal Science Vol. 2, Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press (1975) 46)  
838 See Ed., DD Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, London: Philosophical Library (1964), s.v., Nominalism, for a 
thorough discussion about the debate between nominalism and realism.  
 
839 Harold Berman, “The Origins of Western Legal Science,” Eds. J.C. Smith and David Weisstub, The Western Idea 
of Law, London: Butterworths (1983) 919. 
 
840 Christine Hayes, “Legal Realism,” 121 
 
841 While Jeffrey Rubenstein questioned Silman and Schwartz’s uses of the terms Nominalism and Realism 
(Rubenstein, “Nominalism”158  n5), Hayes’ definition of the terms is consistent with how these terms are used by 





Moshe Silberg842 suggested that rabbinic law was naturalistic, namely that “halakhah affected its 
objects by a type of ‘physical causality’ analogous to the ways in which the laws of nature 
operate upon the material world.843” His definition of naturalistic may not quite have meant what 
Realism itself means, but Silberg did spark discussion that did begin to speak in conventional 
Realist/Nominalist terms. Yohanan Silman balanced Silberg’s picture by suggesting a tension 
between Realism (his equivalent of Silberg’s “naturalism”) and Nominalism within rabbinic law. 
In defining Nominalism and Realism for these purposes, Silman suggested a distinction between,  
“a view of the commandments as orders resultant from the will of the commanding God, on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, a view of the commandments as guidelines based in 
independently existing situations.844”  In other words, is an action wrong only because God 
commanded so, or has God commanded so because it is intrinsically, ontologically wrong? 
While some845 have criticized this definition too, Christine Hayes has noted that it indeed  
parallels the debates among the Scholastics: do universals have ontological existence, or are 
universals being imposed by something besides for the natural world, such as the human 
mind?846 
                                                          
 
842 Moshe Silberg, “The Order of Holy Things as a Legal Entity,” Sinai 52 (1962), 8-18  
 
843 Rubenstein, “Nominalism,” 159 
 
844 Silman, “Halakhic Determinations,” 251 (Hebrew) 
 
845 Jeffrey Rubenstein suggests that Silman and Schwartz’s realism is more akin to natural law, while their 
nominalism parallels legal positivism. (Rubenstein, “Nominalism,” n. 2, 5); Yair Lorberbaum counters Silman’s 
binary with his own: reality-based halakhot vs. values-based halakhot (Lorberbaum,  “Halakhic Realism,” 4 
(abbreviated version of “Halakhic Realism,” Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-‘Ivri 27, 2010)) 
 





Daniel Schwartz,847 using this same definition of Realism vs. Nominalism, departs from 
Silman, suggesting that the rabbis were nominalists while the sectarians at Qumran were realists. 
He cites, for example, the sectarian ban on polygamy based on Adam and Eve being 
monogamous as an example of legal realism because it comports to the state of nature,848 and the 
rabbinic permission for polyandry as an instance of legal nominalism, as it violates nature. In 
addition to challenging849 Schwartz’s specific examples, Jeffrey Rubenstein850 does for Schwartz 
what Silman did for Silberg: he brings the other side of the debate back into the picture – 
offering that the rabbis have exhibit both nominalistic and realistic tendencies.851   
It is important to note that the argument between Realism and Nominalism is not just 
about the origins and existence of universals, but it is likewise about epistemology, how the 
content of law is known or determined – whether solely by empirical knowledge of “the way 
things really are,” as Realists would argue, or perhaps not.  Realists and the Nominalists each 
gave different weight to the “role of epistemological certainty in determining the content of the 
law.” For Realists, perceiving nature, “the way things really are,” confirms or denies the 
existence of universals. For Nominalists, however, universals both exist in the specific acts or 
entities that they characterize and, as universals, are “qualities attributed to entities by the mind.” 
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851 He further suggests that nominalism is so prevalent in rabbinic law because of the distance of the rabbis from the 
society of the Bible; the more distant a generation is from the original law code, the more it must see those laws as 
constructions, as they no longer ring as realistic or as relevant as they could have been when they were first made. 





Therefore, empirical knowledge plays a more limited role, and the universals may be revised 
independent of “the way things are.”852  And rabbinic law certainly contains examples of both 
Realism and Nominalism in this regard. For example, in the famous story of R. Joshua and R. 
Gamaliel, when the latter instructed R. Joshua to appear on what he had calculated as the Day of 
Atonement with a staff and coins, R. Aqiva explains that the calendar is determined by human 
declaration, whether it conforms to empirical reality or not.853 On the other hand, the preceding 
mishnah establishes that if the new moon is not attested to by witnesses on the night of the 
twenty-ninth of the month, the month is automatically considered thirty days long, and the thirty-
first day becomes rosh ḥodesh with no declaration by the court; after all “they have already 
sanctified it in heaven.”854  
And there is yet another application of Realism versus Nominalism, which finds its 
expression in the realm of ethics. In the fourteenth century, the early nominalist William of 
Ockham, for example, argued for a will-based ethics in which actions themselves are morally 
neutral and are evaluated as good or evil based on the agent’s intentions: “the goodness is only a 
name or a connotative concept, principally signifying the act itself as neutral and connoting an 
act of the will that is perfectly virtuous”855 He offers the example of someone who begins 
walking to church with the intention to praise and honor God, but at some point continues the 
journey out of pride,856 or someone who jumps off a cliff to commit suicide and genuinely 
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repents half-way down.857 In each case, he argues, one’s intentions change the activity mid-way 
from good to bad or from bad to good, respectively.858 In legal terms, Ockham’s perspective 
translates into whether or not it is the mind (intention) that determines reality for the purpose of 
law. One need only look to rabbinic im/purity law to find the combination of Realist and 
Nominalist perspectives: one the one hand, a person’s decision that an object s/he has created is 
ready for use defines it as a vessel and thus renders it subject to ritual impurity. On the other 
hand, a person’s decision no longer to use the item in question cannot render it pure again once it 
has been contaminated. Instead, the vessel must undergo a physical change that renders it unfit 
for use, it is not considered changed for legal purposes.859 This evinces a more Realist 
conception. 
 Taken in sum, the three applications of the Realism/Nominalism debate, outside the 
realm of philosophy, ask whether legal reality or actions are to be determined based on the 
physical world as it is or based on the mind, whether human or Divine. What our study adds to 
this discussion in terms of rabbinic law is that it adds a new layer of inquiry. Our question is not 
whether the rabbis were nominalistic or realistic. Our question is whether in those situations in 
which the rabbis evidence nominalistic tendencies, what type of cognition is required? Need 
there be sincere internal feeling, or is ritualized mental construction enough? It seems that the 
Palestinian material sometimes suffices with the latter, while the Babylonian material requires 
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the former.  As we have explained at length in chapter three, this is part of a larger debate about 
the development of the requirement for genuine subjectivity within rabbinic law. 
Influence 
 The question of subjectivity relates closely to the question of outside influence. As 
detailed in chapter three above, the argument between Mira Balberg and Ishay Rosen-Tzvi about 
whether the early Palestinian rabbis required sincere internalized intention when committing an 
act has been deeply related to the early rabbis’ understanding of Greek thought. Balberg argues 
for a Stoic understanding of the self, which is an intimate “I,” while Rosen-Tzvi argues that this 
is not necessarily the case, regardless of the Hellenistic ideas known to the early rabbis.   Our 
work complicates this further by suggesting that there may be a split – evidence of the intimate 
“I” in some arenas of law such as cultic im/purity, with a more legalistic and externalized 
understanding of intention in other branches of law, such as tithing or the Sabbath. The intimate 
self, we argue, does not become a more widespread criterion until the Babylonian amoraic 
period. Thus, we do not accept wholesale impact of Greek thought. 
We do, however, assert Greco-Roman influence, specifically on the legal thoughts of the 
Palestinian amoraim.  The limited degree to which Biblical material involving subterfuges seems 
to have influenced or even interested rabbis in both Palestine and Babylonia is surprising. As we 
detailed in the first chapter, aside from the very ‘.r.m. vocabulary, taken from Genesis and 
Proverbs, there is no real connection to speak of between the Biblical and rabbinic corpora. 
Moreover, rather than recalling Biblical precedent for the use of loopholes where such 
circumventions are plainly evident in the text, the rabbis read their own loopholes into the 
Biblical text, and on scant basis.  Instead of working from within Jewish literary tradition, we 





geographical and temporal proximity, as well as ample precedent for such borrowing in general, 
this is rather predictable. Like Roman jurists at the close of the classical period and beyond, the 
Palestinian rabbis were developing an interest in the damage that following the letter of the law 
might cause. As the second century Roman jurists emphasized the problems of fraus legi, legal 
fraud, the Palestinian rabbis suspected ha‘arama and tried to put a stop to it in places where it 
undermined the law. Also, like their Roman counterparts, there were “legal frauds” that the 
Palestinian rabbis were willing to countenance.  We argue that the most significant criterion is 
the question of equity, what the lawgiver himself would have wanted to see in application of his 
statute. 
The perspective of later Babylonian rabbis also bear similarities to their own religio-
intellectual milieu, the Weltanschauung of their Zoroastrian counterparts. While BT offers many 
fewer examples of ha‘arama, as well as a limitation of its scope, its unique contribution is the 
question of the legal actor’s innermost thoughts. It is possible that the significance of subjectivity 
correlates to a similar way of thinking found in Zoroastrian literature of the time.860 
It is likewise possible that Roman material influenced the Babylonian rabbis. Even within 
the development of Roman law itself, the notion of fraus legi began to take on a more subjective 
valence as time went on. During Rome’s classical period861, the litigant’s intent to evade was 
immaterial. “It did not matter to the classical jurists whether the party intended to evade the 
law862; they considered what was done to be a violation if the result accomplished seemed to be 
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undertaking of “suspicion of ha‘arama.” For instance, in the case of declaring one’s leaven ownerless two days 





what the law wished to prevent.” 863 By the time of Justinian, however, the sixth century C.E., the 
intent to evade is what determined an action as being in fraudem legis: “the post-classical law 
considered the intention of the party to evade the law as the touchstone of fraus legi.”864  In other 
words intention came to the fore in Roman tradition as well.  However, the relationship between 
Roman law and the Babylonian Talmud is complex and is likely filtered through a Palestinian 
lens. While Boaz Cohen and others865 argued that the Babylonian Talmud was indeed heavily 
influenced in its content and method by Roman law, more recent scholars are more critical of 
such comparison. As Catherine Hezser writes:  
The older studies often lack proper distinctions between Palestinian and 
Babylonian, tannaitic and amoraic texts. They quote Babylonian next to 
Palestinian texts, for example, and try to elucidate them on the background of 
Greco-Roman law. Roman law may be considered the proper framework for 
examinations of the legal traditions transmitted in Palestinian documents only. 
For the Babylonian Talmud, Persian law has to be consulted, as Yaakov Elman 
has repeatedly emphasized.866 
 
And while Richard Kalmin has recently argued that the Jewish Babylonian gained an infusion of 
Palestinian conventions in the fourth century, his argument is limited basically to “literature, 
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literary forms, and modes of behavior” rather than law.  Kalmin attributes this 
“Palestinianization” of Babylonian rabbis to the increased exposure to Roman Palestine brought 
about by Persian King Shapur I’s transplantation of thousands of residents of the eastern Roman 
Empire to Mesopotamia, eastern Syria and western Persia in the mid-third century, upon his 
conquest.867 He writes: 
We have seen that in several respects, Babylonian Jewish society between the 
third and seventh centuries CE conformed to Persian models. At no time, 
however, was it sealed off from influences from the west, most recognizably in 
the form of traditions deriving from Palestinian rabbis, but also in the form of 
non-rabbinic and non‐Jewish traditions deriving from Palestine, and perhaps from 
elsewhere in the Roman Empire. Mid‐fourth‐century Babylonia, however, appears 
to have witnessed the literary crystallization of processes accelerated by events of 
the mid–third century in Syria and Mesopotamia, with literature, literary forms, 
and modes of behavior deriving from the west attributed in the Bavli to 
Babylonian rabbis, perhaps to a greater degree than had been the case 
previously.868 
 
His study advances parallels between Babylonian rabbinic thinking in its Persian context and 
motifs and Palestinian phenomena which emerge(d) in a Roman context, but this does not 
necessarily prove direct connection between Roman law and Babylonian rabbinic thinking. It is 
plausible that Palestinian rabbinic material, itself influenced by Roman law, was the filter 
through which the Roman material reached the Babylonian rabbis. Thus, similarities between the 
two Talmuds in their assessment of criteria for allowing ha‘arama, for instance, may be the 
result of transplantation of rabbinic ideas from Palestine rather than Roman jurisprudential ideas. 
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 Of course, we must not ignore the possibility that the Babylonian treatment of ha‘arama 
simply reflects a natural progression within rabbinic thinking itself on this subject, parallel to, 
but not influenced by, outside counterparts. 
Did the rabbis like loopholes? 
In his book on the topic, Leo Katz writes of legal evasions: 
I have read somewhere, and I do not remember where, a shrewd bit of marriage 
advice credited to F. Scott Fitzgerald: ‘Don’t marry for money,’ he is supposed to 
have said, ‘go where the money is, then marry for love. What charmed me about 
this statement when I first read it was the whiff of unabashed immorality that 
surrounds it. What has come to fascinate me about it since then is that it seems to 
epitomize much of the advice that good lawyers give their clients, advice that 
consists of shrewd stratagems surrounded by the whiff of unabashed immorality. 
The question one wants to ask about such advice is whether it only seems immoral, 
or whether it really is. And if it is immoral, why isn’t it illegal? Or is it illegal? But 
then how can good lawyers give it? What to make of such advice and such 
stratagems is one of the most enduring puzzles of the law.869 
 
Indeed, this paragraph sums up the questions that the rabbis of the amoraic period themselves 
were asking. And their response(s) did not amount to simple acceptance of loopholes, but to 
examination and judiciousness about which circumventions would be permitted and which 
would be overruled by the rabbinic establishment.  Exploitation of gaps in the law had been a 
fact of life since the Biblical age, yet the tannaim and amoraim were dissatisfied with either 
blanket acceptance or blanket rejection of the practice. 
As for their orientation towards the methodology of technicality itself, this is unclear.  In 
our introduction, we cited Haim Tchernowitz’s use of German Historical Jurisprudence to 
explain the rabbinic penchant for circumventions: the rabbis understood using the letter of the 
law to make change as the best way preserve law as a manifestation of the will of the people 
                                                          





while maintaining its relevance to new generations. EE Urbach, however, makes a substantially 
different argument. On his theory, the rabbis were catering to the changes that people were 
already cleverly making on their own.  Indeed, the tannaitic material is mixed. In some places, it 
is unclear whether the rabbis are founding a new dodge or simply ratifying one which is already 
in use. Likewise, as dodges are generally noted in the rabbinic corpus as the response to vexing 
situations, perhaps the dodge was merely the next best thing to outright transgression. Even 
where loopholes were getting out of hand, as in the citation regarding evasion of tithes included 
in our introduction, the rabbis seem powerless or unwilling to outlaw a common practice. On the 
other hand, the rabbis are very pleased that R. Tarfon makes use of a loophole to feed people 
during a drought.  Surprisingly, they seemed to prefer his action to simply feeding the women 
priestly food outright but instead employing the subterfuge of betrothing them.   
What emerges from our study, though, is that the amoraim are more interested in limiting 
use of legal subterfuge than in promoting it.  They limit it where it conflicts with equity, where it 
obviously belies false pretenses. On the other hand, they were willing to admit several such 
tricks for valued purposes. Thus, where the letter preserves the spirit of the law, the rabbis are 
supportive, but where the letter undermines the spirit, the rabbis are uncomfortabel with the use 
of loopholes.  Thus, while colloquially, the rabbis are known as purveyors of loopholes, our 
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———Mavo Le-Nusaḥ Ha-Mishnah. 3rd ed. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1964. 
Ewald, William. “Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 143 (1995): 1889-2149. 
Feldman, Louis H. “Josephus’ Portrayal of Judges 19-21.” Jewish Quarterly Review 90, no. 3, 
(2000): 255-292. 
Fishbane, Michael A. Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel. Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon 
Press, 1985. 
Flavius, Josephus. Antiquities of the Jews. In Josephus, translated by H.St.J. Thackeray. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962-1965. 
Fox, Michael V. Proverbs 1-9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. 1st ed. 
The Anchor Bible v. 18A. New York: Doubleday, 2000. 
——— “Words for Wisdom : ‘Tevunah’ and ‘Binah’; ‘Ormah’ and ‘Mezimah’; ‘Ezah’ and 
‘Tushiyah.’” Zeitschrift Für Althebräistik 6, no. 2 (1993):149-169. 
Fraade, Steven D., Shemesh, Aharon, and Clements, Ruth A., eds. Orion, Center for the Study of 
the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature. Rabbinic Perspectives: Rabbinic 
Literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium 
of the Orion Center, 7-9 January, 2003. Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah v. 62. 
Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2006. 
Friedman, Shamma. "Mavo Kelali A1 Derekh Heqer Hasugya." In Mehqarim Umeqorot, edited 
byH.Z. Dmitrovsky, 283-321. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 
1978 
———“Mishna-Tosefta Parallels.” In Proceedings of the Eleventh World Congress of Jewish 
Studies (1994): 15-22. 
———“The Baraitot in the Babylonian Talmud and their Parallels in the Tosefta.” In Atara 
L’Haim, Studies inthe Talmud and Medieval Rabbinic Literature in honor of Professor 
Haim Zalman Dimitrovsky. Jerusalem: Magnes Press (2000): 163–201. 
———“The Primacy of Tosefta to Mishnah in Synoptic Parallels.” In Introducing Tosefta: 
Textual, Intratextual and Intertextual Studies, edited by Harry Fox and Tirzah Meachem. 
Hoboken: Ktav (1999): 1-37. 
———“The Spelling of the Names רבה and רבא in the Babylonian Talmud.” Sinai 110 (Spring-
Summer 1992): 140–164. 
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Manuščihr. Dādestān Ī Dēnīg .Paris: Association pour l’avancement des études iraniennes, 1998. 
Martin, Dale B. The Corinthian Body. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1995. 
McGinn, T.A.J. “The ‘SC’ from Larinum and the Repression of Adultery at Rome.” Zeitschrift 
Fuer Papyrologie Und Epigraphik Bd. 93 (1992): 273-295. 
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